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THE JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. XI. No. 41.

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NEW SCIENCE AND OLD PHILOSOPHY

(Presidential Address to the British Institute of Philosophy,
October 15, 1935)

SIR HERBERT SAMUEL, G.C.B., G.B.E., M.A., Hon. D.C.L.

(With comments by the Chairman, the Bishop of Birmingham)

CAST a backward glance over the last hundred years and it will be seen at once where the greatest advance has been. We cannot claim, I fear, that it has been in philosophy. Nor yet has it been in the sphere of religion; nor in politics; nor in the arts. Plainly enough, it is in science that this age has excelled; and in industrial production through the help of science.

In every direction the frontiers of knowledge have been enlarged. Astronomy and geology, physics and chemistry, all the branches of biology, have marched into new fields and established themselves there. The effect upon thought in general has been profound. The discovery in the last century that evolution is the process dominant in nature, had a revolutionary effect. In this century the theory of relativity, the quantum theory, the discovery of radio-active substances, and the unveiling of the structure of the atom—perhaps the most marvellous achievement yet of the mind and hand of man—these are powerfully affecting some of our fundamental ideas. The new science has undermined all the orthodox theologies. And it seems to be ousting the old philosophies. The present generation does not give its mind to Plato or Aristotle, to Kant or Hegel. It breathes a different intellectual atmosphere.

Except in that one sphere of theoretical and applied science, this age knows itself to be a time of confusion. And in the confusion there grow up on every hand—as always in such times—a plentiful crop of weeds, rank and noxious; in government and in morals, in literature and the arts.

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But we seem to see that, gradually, philosophy is adapting herself to the new situation. She is learning to breathe the new atmosphere. She is leaving a period of barren dialectics, of elaborate, intricate reasoning; when each subtle logician in turn appeared quite convincing until he was superseded by the next logician, a shade more subtle still. Now philosophy is beginning to recognize, however slowly and reluctantly, that the discoveries of the new science must transform her own ideas from the bottom up. Separated from science, is philosophy anything more than mere speculation and assertion? Based upon science, drawing its materials from the results of observation and experiment, while building on the plans and with the tools of reason, philosophy may become a solid edifice in which the soul of man may dwell securely.

My address this evening will offer an example of the approach along these lines. Rashly venturesome, I will take one of the oldest of philosophic problems—the question What is Reality?

Consider first the aspect of the universe as we see it in ordinary life. There are objects all about us. They are solid; they have size and weight. They have colour, smell, and other qualities. The rose is red and the grass is green. A fire is hot and ice is cold. The sun rises and sets, and in the sky at night there are some thousands of little stars that twinkle. There are wind and weather, and “the wind bloweth as it listeth.” Men act as they choose, according to their own free will. They are subject to chances; one man is lucky and wins a prize in a lottery, another is unlucky and is killed in a railway accident, and it is pure hazard which is which. In this world time is one thing and space is another; the clock and the calendar tell us about time; the yard-stick and the map tell us about space; and the two are quite distinct. This is the world as perceived for hundreds of thousands of years by primitive man; as perceived now by the child, and, in its main features, by animals.

Now consider the aspect of the universe as it has been revealed, so far, by physical science.

Material objects consist of molecules which are atoms combined together. Atoms are of various kinds; there are ninety-two kinds, so far as we are aware; and these we term the chemical elements. Each atom is a complicated system of electrical units. There are four kinds of units so far discovered, which have been named protons, electrons, positrons, and neutrons. Atoms may contain any number, from one to ninety-two, of electrons; the number of electrons gives to any class of atom its specific character as a chemical element. The electrons are engaged in some kind of incessant motion, with frequencies of the order of thousands of billions in a second.

Besides matter, there is radiation. The universe is full of electro-

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magnetic waves. Those which have so far been discovered range in length from about a forty-thousandth of a millionth of a millimetre, at one end of a continuous series, to several kilometres at the other end. We detect the shortest as the "gamma rays" emitted by radioactive substances. Next to them in the series are the X-rays used in clinical investigation. Then come the rays of the ultra-violet spectrum; next the various rays of light visible to us, from violet to red; then the infra-red rays. Finally come the Hertzian waves, which are used in broadcasting; they range from about one-tenth of a millimetre, from crest to crest, to several kilometres. Some of these waves carry what we call radiant heat; but there is also material heat, which is due to the motion of molecules. Sound results from wave-movements of atoms in the air. Smell is due to particles of matter shot off through the atmosphere.

The scale of terrestrial life is about midway between the scale of the electrons and the scale of the stars. The telescope shows us about a thousand million separate stars, each more or less comparable, in size and luminosity, with our sun. These are within the galaxy of which the solar system forms part, and there are many millions of such galaxies. The light of the sun, travelling at the rate of 186,000 miles a second, takes eight minutes to reach us. The light from the furthest galaxies so far perceived has taken about a hundred and fifty million years to reach us. In the universe as so presented there is no possibility of separating space and time. Motion is an essential feature of every minutest part; the atom and radiation involve incessant movement. Motion consists in being here at this moment and there at that moment. You cannot separate the "here and there" from the "then and now." If you try to do so, if you arbitrarily take a space without its time or a time without its space, you contradict nature. In the universe presented by physical science there is only a single space-time.

In that world every event is the consequence of previous events; there is no such thing as chance; everything that happens, everything that is done, is the effect of a combination of a multitude of prior causes. (This principle has been challenged in recent years by Heisenberg, with the support of Eddington, Neils Bohr, and others. They have propounded a "Principle of Indeterminism," sometimes termed "Principle of Uncertainty," and hold that hazard reigns at the heart of nature. This theory has been expanded in a manner that is singularly unconvincing, and has not been able to withstand the criticisms of Einstein, Planck, and other eminent physicists.) All phenomena, whether the movement of the stars or the blowing of the wind, are subject to Causality and to the Law of the Uniformity of Nature. Like causes always produce like effects.

Such then is a second aspect of the universe. It is a materialist

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aspect. There was a time when many scientists were content to rest there. They anticipated that further research would bring into the same frame all the phenomena that still remained outside, especially the phenomena of Life and Mind.

I remember attending the meeting of the British Association of 1912 and hearing the Address of the President of that year, Professor Schäfer, the distinguished physiologist. In the course of it he said: "The elements composing living substance are few in number. . . . The combination of these elements into a colloidal compound represents the chemical basis of life; and when the chemist succeeds in building up this compound, it will without doubt be found to exhibit the phenomena which we are in the habit of associating with the term 'life.' The above considerations seem to point to the conclusion that the possibility of the production of life, i.e. of living material, is not so remote as has been generally assumed." There are few who would use that language to-day. The view now predominant is rather that which is held by Professor J. S. Haldane when he says, in his recent book, *The Philosophy of a Biologist*: "No degree of physical and chemical complication brings us in any way nearer to the phenomena of life or conscious experience." A dead animal, or a dead cell, has the same chemical composition, so far as we know, as it had a little while before, when it was alive; but it is essentially different. The point was clearly expressed by Professor Wildon Carr. He wrote: "A material thing, say a billiard ball, is what it is in such a place at such a moment; it is altogether present whenever and wherever it is. A living thing, a germ, or a seed, an animal or a person, is never all that it is in any place at any moment. Its reality is not its actuality, but its potentiality. At every moment it is more than it actually is at that moment. An acorn is the potentiality of an oak-tree even though it may be crushed under foot and never develop its nature. The most exhaustive description of the constituent molecules, atoms, electrons, and the completest history of their assemblage, will not express the reality of the acorn. The chemist in his laboratory might conceivably assemble and fit into their exact order all the actual constituents of the acorn, but to synthesize a real acorn he would need to create its past and endow that past with a directing power to determine its future. This is the great distinction between the living and the non-living; there is no more in the non-living than its actuality; in the living there is more than its actual reality; its reality is its potentiality."

A magnet is held over a needle and the needle jumps to the magnet; that is a purely mechanical phenomenon. But watch a chess-player cogitating for half an hour whether he shall move a pawn one square forward or the queen two squares back, and finally

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deciding for the one or for the other; can that process, by any refinement or elaboration, be held analogous to the jump of the needle? Or imagine a dramatist sitting down to write his next scene, or a mathematician thinking out the solution of a problem, or a violinist playing an air from memory—there is something essentially different there from anything which physical science can describe. The gardener is different from his spade, not only in degree, but in kind.

So there is a third aspect of the universe, besides the ordinary aspect, and the material aspect revealed by physical science. There is a vital, mental, psychic aspect—call it what you will.

Let me pause at this point. From this survey, so far as it has yet gone, certain things will be clear.

The first is that it is one and the same world with which we are dealing. When we speak of the everyday world of common sense being different from the world of science or from the world of the mind, we are obviously using merely a figure of speech. There are three aspects of the same world, and not three different worlds.

I may say "the rose is red." Or I may say "the atoms forming part of the surface molecules of the rose are of a kind which absorb the greater part of any ray of white light that falls upon them, and reflect that part of the ray which has a wave-length of about one-eighty-thousandth of a millimetre; when a group of reflected rays of that wave-length falls upon the retina of a human eye, it passes through some of an assemblage of about half a million 'rods and cones,' and then affects some among the nine thousand million neurons which make up the brain behind the eye; in doing so it gives rise to a perception which we name in language by the word 'redness.' " The first statement is simpler than the other, but both describe the same thing.

Every sensation that we have is transmitted electrically. Physiologists are able to time and to measure the electric impulses which pass along the nerve fibres. Anyone who has survived being struck by lightning, or anyone who has received a mild electric shock along his arm, will not doubt that the world of ordinary life, the world of the electron, and the mental world are one and the same. So also anyone who listens to a wireless broadcast of speech or music.

It is the same with regard to our current notions of space and time and the physicist's conception of an indivisible space-time. To give an example: I may propose starting on a motor tour in Scotland next Tuesday. Or I may change my mind and say that I shall start the tour in Scotland next Wednesday instead; or in Wales, instead of Scotland. The day and the place seem to be quite

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independent, and either can be changed without reference to the other. Nevertheless, the very existence of Scotland, or of Wales, depends upon the continuity of the mountains, the valleys, the fields, the towns of those countries through a succession of Tuesdays and Wednesdays. And there could be no Tuesdays or Wednesdays unless something existed somewhere, in Scotland or Wales for example, at those times. There cannot be a Scotland at no time, or a Tuesday nowhere. The motorist must recognize that when he starts for his tour, he does really set off into the space-time of Einstein.

So again with regard to the free-will of the ordinary world and the determinism of science. Both may be facts. If we consider only the person who is about to take some action—if we start from that point—we see that the choice of action is due to a free exercise of his will. But if we go further back, if we ask, What is this Personality, what is this Will, that choose and act?—we see at once that they are themselves determined by prior causes. I choose freely between this and that, but my choice depends upon my bodily structure and my character. The "I" that chooses, my body and my character, are the outcome of prior causes which are uncountable in their number and infinitely complex in their mutual interactions. They are the causes that have produced this earth, this nation, my family, my environment. I myself am the outcome of these. If they had been different, I should be in some degree different; my body and my character would be different, and the actions that I would choose to do would be different in consequence. My own personality, and my will that chooses, are as much the product of causes as anything else. The facts that many of the causes operate from within and not from without, and in the mental, not in the material, sphere do not make them any the less causes, or in any way affect the issue.

So also with reference to chance. From the standpoint of the individual it is pure luck whether his ticket in the lottery wins a prize or not, whether he is, or is not, in the train and in the carriage where people are killed in a collision. For him it really is mere chance and nothing else. Yet an omniscient mind, which knew all the prior circumstances in each case, would know which man was to win the prize and which be killed in the accident. The science of statistics; the general uniformity, year by year, of the figures of murders, suicides, accidents, diseases; the fact that, when exceptional circumstances are present, that uniformity is modified—show conclusively that what is sheer chance to the individual is compatible with the Law of Causation working in the community.

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The second conclusion which, I submit, is to be drawn from our survey, is that all these aspects of the universe equally present reality. But this has by no means been the conclusion generally accepted by philosophers.

It was discovered centuries ago that, underlying the world as known to primitive man and as perceived by the child or by the animal, there was another world—to use the customary figure of speech. This was gradually revealed; principally through the invention of the glass lens, and its use in the telescope and microscope, and of the prism and its use in the spectroscope; later by the invention of electrical and radiological instruments. Thereupon it was generally assumed that this must be the true world, superseding the other. A distinction was drawn between appearance and reality; the old world of common sense was mere appearance, the new world of science was reality. But those philosophers who, long before, had realized that there was a mental element in the universe, regarded reality, as so described, also as illusion. The mental element, or the world of ideas as Plato termed it, that alone, they held, was ultimate fact.

It is difficult to find a reason for this mutual exclusiveness. Is it anything more than an arbitrary assumption? Why should it be supposed that what is newly discovered is necessarily more real than what is familiar? Or that reality is to be found only in what are called "ultimates"? Why should the electron be regarded as more real than the atom, or the atom than the solid object? The world of ordinary experience is not an illusion because it is built up of atoms and electrons, any more than a house is an illusion *qua* house because it is made of bricks, or a human being because he is composed of cells of protoplasm.

I cannot walk through a wall; the wall is "solid" in relation to my body. That is fact; that is reality. It is not made less so by the other fact that a wireless ray from a broadcasting station can pass through the wall as if it was not there, and actuate a portable wireless set in my room. The solidity of the wall, for me, is not illusion merely because it is not solid to the wireless ray. Nor does the fact that in the brain of the chess-player there is some process going on which is not material in its character, render the material chess-board and chess-men mere appearances.

We may make mistakes. We may assume that the earth is fixed and the sun moves round it. Or when we see part of a stick refracted in the water we may think that the stick is bent. Or there may be actual illusions—dreams, hallucinations. But none of these affect the philosophic issue as to the nature of reality. When Shakespeare wrote, "We are such stuff as dreams are made on," he wrote good poetry but bad philosophy.

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It is often assumed that the real must be single, ultimate, and absolute. But why that assumption? Why should not reality also be relative?

A powerful school of philosophy has declared that because objects are known to us only through our senses, directly or indirectly, and can be perceived only by our minds, we can have no assurance that they possess intrinsic reality; they may be no more than constructs of our minds. I cannot, of course, enter here into the general problem of epistemology. I would only submit this one observation, which presents itself as obvious as soon as we begin to use the conclusions of physical science as premisses in philosophy. It is certain that the universe existed when there were no human minds; the ray of light from a distant star, which started on its journey a hundred million years ago, is enough by itself to prove that, to say nothing of the teachings of geology. It follows that the universe cannot be merely the construct of human minds. Whether the actual impressions made by the objective world upon our minds correspond with its intrinsic reality we cannot tell; but that is no reason for rejecting the conception of reality itself.

Philosophy is doomed to sterility if it accepts the course of reasoning which says—any conception of reality which is incomplete must be ruled out; human knowledge is of necessity incomplete; therefore human knowledge can give us no conception of reality. That is equivalent to saying, "What I know cannot be real for the very reason that I know it." Knowledge and reality are thereby placed in two different spheres with no possibility of communication between them; and philosophy, if it does that, can only itself retire, as gracefully as possible, from the scene, having ruled itself out as well as reality. From such an inglorious fate we may be saved by accepting the principle that reality also is relative. The bee buzzing on the window-pane finds it solid; to the ray of light passing through it is not. The impenetrability is real in the one case, the penetrability in the other. Thought is as real as matter, and matter as thought. The ideas in the mind of the architect, from which springs the design of the house, are not less real, nor more real, than the house itself.

Let me summarize the position as so far presented. The universe is seen under various aspects; for convenience they may be described as those of ordinary life, of physical science and of mentality. There is only one universe, so that if there seem to be contradictions between one aspect and another that must be due to mistakes in apprehension on our part. This is substantially the doctrine of Spinoza. Summed up by Sir Frederick Pollock, in his book on the Life and Philosophy of Spinoza, it is expressed as follows: "There

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is not a world of thought opposed to or interfering with a world of things; we have everywhere the same reality under different aspects. Nature is one as well as uniform."

We may go on to say that reality, as human minds can conceive it, is not something absolute but a system of relationships. And if philosophy accepts this, it will find itself here on much the same ground as modern physics, in so far as physics accepts the central principle of the Theory of Relativity.

From this position we may push on further.

Apart from the impressions of familiar experience, philosophy must accept its materials from science, and as yet the materials dealing with the physical aspect of the universe are much more abundant than the materials dealing with the psychic aspect. Our present knowledge of the world of mind, and of life also, is perhaps comparable to man's knowledge of the world of matter in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is seen that there is a vast territory to be explored. Some pioneers have crossed the boundary and have brought back exciting accounts of what they have found. But the task of methodical exploration is only at its beginning.

Take, for example, the phenomena of growth. We are so accustomed to seeing grass grow, leaves and flowers unfold, chickens being hatched out of eggs, that we seldom stay to consider how these things come about. Biology tells us that living growth is usually accomplished by the division of cells; it differs from the inorganic formation of crystals in being from the inside outwards, and in using material which is in most cases quite different from that composing the organism. Embryology tells us of the single fertilized germ-cell as it divides, proliferates, differentiates. In an animal embryo some groups of cells become muscle, some nerve tissue, some bone, skin, heart, lungs—each in right proportion and in the right place. Science so far has been able only to describe this process as observed fact. But we cannot refrain from asking, What is it that is going on in each cell to lead it so to develop? Clearly there must be something tremendous going on there.

Samuel Butler, in his stimulating book *Life and Habit*, contended that a mental process of some kind is at work, some kind of choice; that there is an element of memory, inherited from all past ancestors and crystallized into habit, which determines the action of the germinating cells. The late Sir Arthur Thomson held much the same view. He wrote in the *Journal* of this Institute, in April 1931: "There must be, one cannot help thinking, some evolutionary urge or *nisus*, *elan*, or impulse, rather subtler than has been yet analysed into either mechanical or chemical or biological terms. I mean nothing mystical, but something more than tendencies to aggregate,

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to colloidify, to incorporate, to grow, to multiply, and so on, with all the involved catalysts, hormones, and organizers—I mean a psychical urge, the subjective side of endeavour.” Again he wrote elsewhere, “It is difficult to think of a germ-cell, of a higher animal at least, as being without its psychical aspect. Unless we think of “the mind” as entering in at a later stage in development, the germ-cell must have a dim primordium of the subjective, the promise and potency of mentality.”

General Smuts, in his *Holism*, presents the same problem. Every organism is a “whole,” which is essentially different from a mere concatenation of its parts, and can only be understood as a whole; just as a precious picture by an old master is essentially different from the few shillingsworth of paint and canvas that went to its making.

Consider the problems that arise in connection with hypnotism and telepathy, perhaps water-divining also. Underneath an accumulation of credulity, superstition, hallucination, and fraud, there seems to be some element of fact not yet explained. So also with Fabre’s researches into the methods of communication between insects. He found empirically that things happened for which no explanation, based upon present knowledge, would suffice.

There is need of a clue. Psychologists are in search of it. One of the most eminent among them, Dr. Aveling, has recently written: “It is not unduly optimistic to hope that the immense amount of material being gathered together in experimental psychology will lead to an empirically established and acceptable view of the nature of the conscious principle.” (Possibly some experimenter in electro-biology, exploring, perhaps, that problem of communication between insects, may discover a form of radiation which affects mental processes directly.) By dint of trying we may hit upon some brilliant simplification; as Copernicus did when all the apparent motions of the sun and planets, which seemed so intricate and confused, were brought into harmony and order by his discovery of the movement of the earth; or Newton and Einstein when they presented the theories of gravitation and relativity; or J. J. Thomson and Rutherford, when the discovery of the electron revealed the unity underlying the diversity among the chemical elements; or Pasteur, when he established the common microbic origin of many different and mysterious diseases. So now, we await some discovery in the psychic sphere which may enable a number of confused and apparently discrepant phenomena to fall, quite simply, into their places in an ordered scheme.

Although physics has advanced so much further than “psychics,” if I may use that term, yet physics also brings us to a point which seems at present to be a dead-end. What, after all, is an electron?

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In the endeavour to answer that question physics seems sometimes, as Bradley put it, "to attempt to compromise between something and nothing." Whitehead says that "the event is the unit of things real;" just as Bosanquet had spoken of "the eternal deed that is the heart of reality." But on examination that proves not to be very satisfactory. If you get rid of everything except a happening, there can be no happening either. Eddington recognizes this. In a recent book he writes: "You cannot have space without things or things without space; and the adoption of thingless space (vacuum) as a standard in most of our current physical thought is a definite hindrance to the progress of physics." There is something here waiting to be discovered.

I have spoken of various aspects of the universe, and of three in particular; but that is obviously an arrangement merely for convenience of discussion, and not arising out of the nature of things. Nor need those three aspects be the only ones. The probability is that they are not.

Primitive man was wholly unaware of the aspect of the world which physical science has revealed. So far as he was concerned it might have been non-existent. Civilized man, realizing in some degree that second aspect, still had until recently only a dim, vague idea of the third, the mental aspect; and his present understanding of it is only rudimentary. Why should we suppose that there are not other aspects as well—a fourth, a fifth? There is indeed good reason to believe that there are. All our present knowledge, all our present lines of inquiry, pushed to their furthest point, would still leave unexplained the fact of existence. There must be something beyond. "Under every deep," said Emerson, "a lower deep opens." It is often said that the ultimate must necessarily be incomprehensible to the human mind. But this is only a guess, an arbitrary assertion. It may well be that it is incomprehensible. But on the other hand it may not.

A man goes into his library followed by his dog. The dog is aware of the books; he can see the volumes, smell them, touch them; but by no possibility could the mind of the dog apprehend the matters dealt with, for example, in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. Perhaps our relation to the universe is of the same order. Considering the origin of man from lower organisms, and the way in which his mind has been evolved, it would be surprising if it were not so. Yet it may not be so.

Herbert Spencer made a division between the known, the unknown, and the unknowable; but whether there is an unknowable is itself among the unknown. We have already advanced some way. Primitive man would have regarded such knowledge as we now have of the

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microbe, the electron, radiation, the quantum of action, or with the matters dealt with by higher mathematics, as altogether beyond the limits of comprehension. Yet they have proved to be within them. It is not impossible that a line of research may be opened some day which shall bring within the grasp of human understanding a fourth aspect of the universe, as different from the second and third as these are from the first. And afterwards, perhaps, yet other aspects. And in one of these, it may be, we shall find Deity, not only implicit but explicit.

Viewed from this standpoint many of the old controversies of philosophy seem strangely remote. Particularly the attempts, repeatedly made, to divide the subject-matter of inquiry, whatever it may be, into two categories, the method of dichotomy. How much time and thought have been spent upon the distinction between "substance and predicates"; Locke's "primary qualities and secondary qualities"; Descartes's "matter and mind, *res extensa et res cogitans*"; Hegel's "being and not being"; the nineteenth-century scientists' "matter and force"; in our own day, Bergson's "matter and the *élan vital*"? So also all the controversies as to the boundaries between man and nature, reason and instinct, physics and metaphysics, appearance and reality, the immanent and the transcendent, natural and supernatural, faith and reason.

We may perhaps be developing a new philosophy to which all such discussions will seem as far away as the scholastic controversies of the Middle Ages, or the fierce theological disputes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It may be of interest to the historians of philosophy, to the antiquarians of the intellect, to explore these mediaeval walled cities, with their mazes of narrow streets, where metaphysicians pursue each other round corners and in-and-out of twisting culs-de-sac; but the modern philosopher, anxious to arrive at a destination, will make a new by-pass that cuts them out.

Let me end with a summary of the ideas I have tried to lay before you.

The world in this generation is crying out for a philosophic basis for its thought. It will not find it except in a philosophy which builds with the materials brought to it by science. Science shows us aspects of the universe other than that of ordinary life: the aspect revealed by physical investigation and the psychic aspect. These must all be mutually consistent, since they represent the same world. Each of them presents reality within its own framework; for reality need not be something absolute and ultimate, but can be a system of relations. There may be, there probably are, other aspects of the universe besides those so far revealed; for neither

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our present physics nor our psychics give, or promise, any complete explanation. Whether it is within the capacity of the human mind to grasp these other aspects we do not know; and we cannot tell unless and until we do in fact discover them.

So long as science was materialistic, any philosophy based upon it was a closed system, and gave no room for what we term the divine. A philosophy based upon a broader science does give room for it. And here, too, such a philosophy meets the need of the age. For now, as ever, man seeks Deity.

Some day we may be able to find a plain and simple access, even from the world as we know it, to Deity. The prophet, the saint, the poet, point the goal. So it may be that Science, Religion, and Philosophy—knowledge, spirit, reason—all three together, shall redeem and raise mankind.

* * * * *

In thanking the President for his address, the Bishop of Birmingham said:

Some among you may wonder at my presence here. If a political leader takes a close interest in philosophy, the fact is regarded as an unexpected but amiable eccentricity. But such tastes in a Bishop give rise to suspicion. He had better confine himself to theology, if he can retain amid his diocesan duties any intellectual interests; and, if he desires ease, let his theology be orthodox.

But I confess to:—light to an insatiable interest in the progress of modern science; and, like Sir Herbert, I desire to use the new discoveries to fashion a philosophy which shall enable me to understand a little better the universe in which I find myself.

The address which our President has just given he kindly allowed me to see in typescript a few days ago. I was impressed, as all Sir Herbert's hearers to-night must have been, by the wide range of knowledge which he has used with easy mastery and by the skill with which his arguments are marshalled. I cannot but admire and sympathise with the President's determination to use recently-won knowledge in the search for reality. My admiration is conjoined to such a measure of agreement as a somewhat unorthodox disciple of Berkeley can give to a disciple of Spinoza. Loyally following his master, our President seeks the reality underlying all that is manifesting itself alike in matter and mind. I, on the other hand, find myself almost at the outset forced by the unity of the world to which I belong to see behind it creative Intelligence which sustains the whole. But whereas I thus quickly reach Deity as alike creative Intelligence and sustaining Power, Sir Herbert expects to find Deity at the end of his quest. I doubt whether the bases

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which our philosophies respectively offer to religion are widely different.

But may I briefly indicate how I should myself be tempted to vary Sir Herbert's scheme. I should begin with the obvious statement that, to form a picture of the world in which we find ourselves, we perceive events. Perception is something more than mere cognition: there is in it the synthetic activity of the mind. By the continued exercise of this activity we frame concepts and finally obtain a conceptual scheme which is our picture of the world.

In complete agreement with the President I say that the most obvious picture is that of naïve common sense. I agree further with him that a more rational picture is that given by the trained man of science. A still better picture will presumably be obtained when the man of science can frame a scheme which includes the phenomena of life and conscious experience.

But then I ask whether by such a process we shall ever get to Reality. The answer—I suggest—depends upon whether our successive mental constructs are a continually more adequate picture of "things in themselves." Now I feel compelled to maintain that such a happy conclusion is only likely if human reason is akin to the creative Intelligence which has fashioned the universe—if, in other words, man can in a limited degree think the thoughts of God. I am prepared to make this assumption for we are part of the scheme of things, and, if our minds play us false to the end, the universe is not, for us, rational. If the assumption be incorrect, the human mind can only hope to reach a scheme which embraces all known percepts and contains no internal contradictions. Knowledge of such a scheme would not, of necessity, be knowledge of reality.

The difference between Sir Herbert and myself is, of course, far-reaching. He says that "thought is as real as matter." I reply that matter, so far as we know it, is merely a mental construct. The progress of scientific speculation lends no warrant to the belief that matter differs from thought in that it possesses substance. I cannot quarrel with our President's statement that reality, as human minds conceive it, is not absolute but a system of relationships. Yet, though we interpret reality as a system of relationships, it may nevertheless be absolute. For instance, as he truly says, we cannot perceive space without time or time without space. Yet the unity of space and time on which the doctrine of relativity is based may seem necessary to us only because of the limitations of our perception. Our instinct that space and time are somehow different in quality is very strong. Absolute time may exist in the mind of God.

Sir Herbert rejects, as I am inclined to do, the principle of

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Indeterminism. That principle is founded on the fact that, in regard to such particles as electrons, we cannot observe the present without changing it. I would argue that this fact may well result from the limitations of our perception and have no more ultimate significance. If the behaviour of individual particles is lawless, it is difficult to understand how aggregates can show obedience to law.

But I quarrel with Sir Herbert for his constant use of the concept of cause. We do not discover causes: we only observe sequences of events. Those sequences under like conditions appear to be uniform. But in these sequences there is no logical necessity: our mental satisfaction arises from their constant repetition. Moreover, our knowledge of the sequences of nature is very limited. I cannot with any mental satisfaction impart the notion of cause into the sequence whereby irradiation of an egg leads to a monstrosity of a chicken. I am content to say that observed sequences belong to the unity of the universe. In other words, the cause of events is the will of God.

Sir Herbert, as we all know, is a convinced determinist. He is in good company, to which I am unworthy—and unwilling—to belong. I feel forced to believe that God, the sustaining Power or Intelligence of the universe, is creative: and I see no reason why man should not have some measure of creative freedom. This affirmation of the truth of a very common feeling is but an aspect of my fundamental postulate that there is some kinship between the mind of man and the mind of God. I do not, of course, pretend that our actions are not in large measure determined. What I cannot believe is that all that happens in the physical universe is the result of a definite scheme and that we are absolutely powerless to change the course of events. But I admit that it is difficult in our present state of knowledge to justify my scepticism.

In conclusion may I say how happy I am in the feeling that, as the President has suggested, arid theological and philosophical controversies are ceasing to engender hatred. We are less aggressively confident, more humble, than were our forefathers; and also we have the sympathy that comes of sharing the common background created by men of science. So I feel no bitterness as I follow and criticise our President. Rather I find pleasure in the shrewdness and urbanity of his exposition, and enjoyment in contrasting the weak places in our respective philosophic schemes. We may travel by different paths; but we begin with the same conclusions reached by our men of science, and none of us know where we or our successors will end. There need be no latent hostility between any of us if only we continue to seek truth.

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THE RT. HON. THE EARL OF LISTOWEL, PH.D.

It has long been the habit of philosophers, and is still a common failing of ordinary playgoers, to see tragedy through the coloured spectacles of an acquired philosophical or religious outlook, and to commend or condemn rather from the standpoint of partiality for a certain view about life in general than from that of one assessing the intrinsic merits of a work of art. Because we all, whether laymen or specialists, theorize about the nature and destiny of that mysterious universe which, for a brief span, our minds illumine, and because the working hypothesis so engendered is inevitably tinged by our personal idiosyncrasies of temperament and taste, there have been—and, building on such a foundation, there must be—almost as many different theoretical explanations of the tragic as theoreticians speculating on this high theme. Besides introducing that personal equation which has always been anathema to science, the distorted vision for which philosophical preconceptions are responsible brings with it minor illusions that are scarcely less injurious; the reading into a play or a novel of notions that had never entered the poet's brain, or the interpolation of history with incidents that never really occurred, the discarding of much that is genuinely tragic because it happens not to fit into the mould shaped by our own ideas, and the acceptance of much that is not merely untragic, but actually in-artistic—pacifist, or communist, or feminist, or religious propaganda—because it happens to display the native hue of our own convictions.

Schopenhauer, in common with the other German idealists, and despite his remarkable artistic sensibility, stumbled heavily into this pitfall. The great quietist, whose prophetic voice challenged so imperiously the shallow materialism of the industrial revolution, saw in tragedy, the masterpiece of poetry and second only to music among the arts, a perfect reflection of those dark, irrational powers that condemn mankind to unending misery, and in the tragic hero one of those rare beings who, conscious that selfish passions are the prime source of evil, deliberately withdraw from a world contaminated by stupidity and vice. "Thus we see in tragedy," he writes, "the noblest of men who, after a long struggle and bitter suffering, abandon freely and gladly the aims they have hitherto pursued so vehemently, and renounce for ever all the pleasures of life." And he then proceeds to speak, in the very same breath, of

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an obscure tragedy called *Mohammed* by Voltaire, and of such incontestable *chefs-d'œuvres* as *Hamlet* and *Faust*.

Bertrand Russell succumbs to this very methodological sin when he hails tragedy as the highest incarnation of freedom, being a deliberate imaginative representation of man's invincible endeavour to build, in defiance of the hostile universe without, a flawless temple to his own immaculate spirit. In that memorable essay, where reason is suddenly kindled by deep poetic feeling, he declares that "of all the arts, Tragedy is the proudest, the most triumphant; for it builds its shining citadel in the very centre of the enemy's country, on the very summit of his highest mountain; within its walls the free life continues, while the legions of Death and Pain and Despair, and all the servile captains of tyrant Fate, afford the burghers of that dauntless city new spectacles of beauty." Brave words these—but who does not see that they reflect a whole philosophy, that of a pessimist steeling himself to forces indifferent and infinitely superior to ours, something of the "grim, fire-eyed defiance" with which Carlyle so valiantly faced the inevitable?

But if we are to escape from such arbitrary and personal judgments as are offered us by the imposing array of philosophical definitions of the tragic, and to take our stand on the common ground of experience among generations of men who have dwelt in civilized communities, we must cast aside the panoply of prejudice and preconception in order to approach our quarry, in all humility, armed with nothing save an open, receptive, keenly sensitive spirit. Our march towards the truth begins, therefore, from the immediate and living experience, whether past or present, of tragic lives, tragic events, tragic spectacles, tragic scenes, that have, at one time or another, darkened the path of history or raised everlasting monuments in the cathedral of art.

This maps out a field of inquiry that cannot conceivably be circumscribed by dramatic tragedy. Nature, it is true, however grand and terrible its convulsions may be, lacks the human element which would stamp it with the hall-mark of the tragic; the avalanche, the volcanic eruption, the violent quaking of the earth, or the furious hurricane of the typhoon, must be a magnificent and exhilarating, if awesome, spectacle, tinged perhaps momentarily by fear, but never suffused—at any rate for the observer—by the darker shades of melancholy. History, on the other hand, tells many tragic tales. It records the slow decline towards ultimate extinction of well-established cultures, gradually blotted out by senile decay from within, and by the irresistible pressure from without of famished hordes of bloodthirsty barbarians; thus, according to Toynbee, of the nineteen different civilizations that have gained a foothold on this planet during the last five thousand years, only five

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—the Western and Orthodox Christian, the Islamic, the Hindu, and the Far Eastern—have succeeded in surviving, even in a degenerate and attenuated form, until the present day. The footprints of fourteen others have therefore been already obliterated from the sands of time. History chronicles besides the fate that has overtaken in every age the indomitable pioneers of social progress, and the prophets whose vision has roused the slumbering idealism in men's hearts, describing the contempt, persecution, or violent death they have always endured at the hands of their philistine contemporaries. The legendary figure of Prometheus, condemned to excruciating torture for having bestowed the gift of fire, typifies many of the greatest benefactors of mankind—a Socrates, a Jesus, a Jeanne d'Arc, a Lincoln, a Jaurès—whose very elevation of soul has been the prime source of their undoing.

But if we catch a glimpse of the tragic among the prosaic and unflattering annals of the historian, we see it, again and again, in the panorama of imaginative creations opened before us by the artist. Not, at its full stature, among the major or minor spatial arts, for a story, whether glad or pitiful, necessitates a sequence of events which happen in the lapse of time. What Lessing said so justly of painting, when he held it up for comparison with poetry, namely, that it can only imprison a single fleeting moment which it snatches out of an endless file stretching from past to present, applies with equal force to all such arts as deploy themselves only in the dimensions of space. Architecture and decorative art, not being representative of personality or of the concatenation of events, are completely devoid of tragic elements.

Not so, however, painting, sculpture, and the graphic arts, which abandon brute matter for the higher sphere of human life, enterprise, and conflict. Here, at least, the shadow of the tragic falls athwart our path, and we enter those crepuscular regions which lead insensibly to the pitchy cavern of consummate tragedy. The plastic artist seizes upon what he conceives to be the crescendo, the absolute climax of mortal agony, a moment when something lofty, towering clear above its fellows, is pulled down and smashed by the malice of men or the cruel indifference of fate; and this he rescues from oblivion by means of his brush or his pencil, his marble or his bronze. The tragedy which gave birth to the Christian religion hovers over the sacred paintings of the Primitives of all nationalities, and over the pictorial art of the Florentines, the Umbrians, and the Venetians, until the sensuous paganism of the Renaissance had broken the spell which bound the Middle Ages. The theme of the Crucifixion appears and reappears wherever Christianity has ministered to religious needs. It is sounded, with childish clumsiness but touching sincerity, by hundreds of devout Primitives; by Grünewald in the

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scarred and tortured figure that he painted for the high altar at Colmar; by Botticelli, in his tragic *Entombment* of the Alte Pinakotek in Munich; by Rubens, in his sombre *Descent from the Cross*, so rightly housed in the Cathedral at Antwerp; and by Michelangelo, in his *Pietà* at St. Peter's, where the bereaved Mother bends, as much in dumb solicitude as in despairing grief, over the young and still beautiful body of her beloved Son.

Passing from the hegemony of spatial extension and immobility among the fine arts to that of time, succession, and movement, we observe immediately that temporal sequence is a necessary rather than a sufficient condition for the emergence of the tragic. The dance, when dissociated from the element of mime which it borrows from a sister art, that of the theatre, is a hymn of praise to the latent loveliness of the body, and the misfortunes that befall the soul are therefore alien to the ordered periods of its more material enchantment. Music, though it often approaches the portals of Melpomene, lacks the capacity for portraying the adventures of any specific and determinate individual; and without these credentials the threshold of the muse cannot be traversed even by her most ardent devotees. The tapestry of melody, harmony, and rhythm can show on its panels every shade of sentiment and mood, but they are invariably disembodied, being detached from the distinct personalities to which in reality they seem indissolubly united.

The musician exhibits, with unique intensity, the gloom and horror, the frightful abyss of undiluted suffering or cosmic despair, opened before our eyes by the tragic disaster, rather than the fatal course of events which led up to and precipitated the calamity. It is pure instrumental music, the sonata, the quartet, the concerto, and, above all, the symphony, that reveals far more clearly than the external realism of programme music, that overwhelming darkness which descends at times upon the spirit of the composer and of all sensitive, impressionable beings. The dismal failure of attempts to describe in musical tones a tragic issue is evidenced by the *Heldenleben* of Strauss. Who could tell, without guessing from the title or glancing at his programme notes, that the beautiful symphonic poem to which he was listening related the story of a heroic life and death? Let us turn rather to the greatest adagios of the pure musicians, for they reach not infrequently the stupendous pitch of tragic grandeur.

Beethoven, who left no peak unscaled, sounds this note in the *Pathétique*, and again, with a greater vehemence of despair, in the haunting funeral march of the *Eroica*; and so does Brahms, brooding in his *Requiem* over the transitory splendours of human existence; or Schubert, forsaking momentarily his natural gaiety and eroticism, when he plunges, with the wonderful contrasts in the first movement of his *Unfinished*, straight into the murkiest depths of the tragic

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hell; at which, indeed, he is already hinting in the *Doppelgänger* and the *Erkönig*. The first movement of Tchaikovsky's *Sixth* and last symphony breathes a dark and terrible foreboding, a sense of irreparable loss, as though death, before snatching the composer away, had commanded him to record for mankind in a last oracular utterance the dreadful and inscrutable secret of its doom. Vocal music, not because it is wedded to the voice, but by reason of its alliance through words with poetry, and through gesture with mime, belongs unmistakably to another category. It is because they trespass beyond the boundaries of pure music as such that *Othello*, *Tristan*, or *The Ring* move us with the perfection of their tragic beauty as well as their extraordinary musical power.

This leads us, after a long detour through the provinces of art's domain, to the spot where Melpomene has delighted to exhibit her naked majesty ever since she cast off the yoke of the primitive nature-worship to which, in youth, she was so long enslaved; our wanderings have brought us, at last, to narrative and dramatic poetry. The lyric is left purposely unmentioned, for lyrical poets, like sculptors and painters, tend rather to describe in evocative language a single, isolated state of feeling, one that has neither sequel nor antecedent, and they therefore share a like inability to launch out upon the stream of events that follow one another down the course of time. But they share besides—and this is their link with the tragic—a wonderful capacity for capturing the moment of utmost desolation. Think of the pathetic songs of the old, heart-broken Harfenspieler in *Wilhelm Meister*, whose tragic essence has been translated into another medium by the consummate artistry of Hugo Wolf; think of the nostalgic hypochondria in the laments of the consumptive Leopardi, of Heine's anguished outpourings, a veritable epitome of all the bitterness in disappointed love, of the black pessimism with which so many of A. E. Housman's most exquisite lyrics are laden.

But the true home of the tragic, outside the history of outstanding persons and perishing cultures, is the drama, the epic, and the novel. What broad features, we are entitled to ask, are common to tragedy, whether written in narrative or dramatic form, to the classical and romantic and realistic varieties that stretch from the Athenian amphitheatre to the modern stage, and to the vastly different works that supreme tragedians like Ibsen, Shakespeare, and Sophocles have produced in the tragic vein? Dismissing the particular excellences exhibited by individual plays, individual authors, and individual schools, let us concentrate our whole attention upon those underlying similarities, those essential points of mutual resemblance, that alone confer genuine significance upon an otherwise empty and meaningless concept.

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Sometimes a truism hides a vital truth. To say that every tragic story within the last two thousand five hundred years, whether it was told in Greece before the birth of Christ or in England during the present century, has involved at least one central figure commonly known as the hero or heroine, sounds dangerously platitudinous. Nevertheless, it explains part at least of the riddle we are trying to solve. For there is something of the *monstrum per excessum*, of the super-man, of the giant decked out in human clothing, about the man or woman whose fate has furnished or can furnish a fit theme for tragedy. They live, these strange, volcanic beings, on a different plane to that occupied by ordinary mortals like ourselves; it may be that the passions stirring them are more elemental than those sophisticated habits have tamed in us, or that they are better attuned to those overtones of wisdom, loveliness, and high courage which our more earthy natures labour so heavily to catch. They may be gods or devils, but they are certainly not housewives or business men; they are sometimes akin to the genius and sometimes to the criminal, but never to the dull, plodding, self-satisfied, unadventurous average representative of the species. This margin of excess over the mean is the precise point at which the sublime projects into the territory of the tragic; for there is—indeed there must be—an element of sublimity in the tragic spectacle, even though it is the subsequent course of events that decides whether the sublime figure is to become tragic as well.

Now the greatness of the mighty protagonist is not necessarily, even in part, a superiority based on such external trappings as social status, birth, or rank, the "high estate" with which Bradley endows the hero in his definition of Shakespearean tragedy. True it is that in the four tragic masterpieces of Shakespeare the central figure crashes down from the apex of the social structure, being either a sovereign monarch, or a nobleman who seizes the crown, or a prince of the blood royal, or a general in the service of the wealthiest maritime republic in Europe; and, moreover, that the tradition of a comfortable place in the public eye was not broken until the nineteenth century. The rise of the middle classes to economic and political ascendancy was mainly responsible for a swift and sudden change of scene from Courts and palaces to urban or suburban homes; the drama of Ibsen, Strindberg, Sudermann, Hauptmann, Shaw, is as plainly bourgeois in character as that of Corneille or Racine was princely and aristocratic.

What is more, contemporary dramatists have swept aside the last of those artificial barriers that divide men up according to the size of their incomes or the purity of their pedigree, and quite regardless of their intrinsic value. The peasant tilling the soil, the skilled artisan in the workshop, even dwellers in the fetid slums or

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congested tenements of our drab industrial cities, have now been summoned, from the obscure corners where history would pass them by, to join the small but intrepid band of heroes that rouses anew the faith, the pity, the admiration, the exultant delight, of each successive generation of men. Hardy's Tess milks the cows as a dairymaid on a west-country farm; Hauptmann's Silesian weavers are, like the miners in Zola's *Germinal*, the miserable, starved, cheated, ruthlessly exploited workers that slave under capitalism for those who possess their sole means of livelihood, and his Rose Berndt is of the humblest peasant extraction. Nan Hardwicke, the friendless orphan of Masefield's beautiful tragedy, speaks in a soft, sibilant dialect that mingles sweetest harmony with the atrocious discords of this pastoral symphony.

Centuries have elapsed since the fate of King Oedipus first struck terror into the souls of gaping Athenians. The tragic hero has been stripped, progressively, by the very movement of social change, of his royal purple, drained of his blue blood, reft of the public office or private millions that raised him on a dais above the heads of the common crowd. Time has winnowed in this fashion the good grain from the chaff, freed the essential from its adherence to the inessential, separated effectively the transitory from the permanent and durable; and the residue remaining after this historical purge, that inherent greatness of the inner man which the collapse of civilizations cannot undermine, is what calls for our closest attention since the outer husk has been discarded.

We should first rid ourselves of those ethical blinkers that have so often distorted the approach to heroic personality. I do not merely mean that the melodramatic crudities of poetic justice are thoroughly misplaced in tragedy, but that any attempt to measure the stature of the hero in moral terms, or to brand him with responsibility by means of some stain, some ἀμαρτία, however slight, upon an otherwise flawless record, is bound to be frustrated by the resistance of plain and stubborn facts. In the everlasting battle between the powers of darkness and those of light, between Ormuzd and Ahriman, there have fought in the ranks of Lucifer men whose very ardour in the cause of cruelty and cunning, of destruction and brute force, has uplifted from the common rut. Such was the baleful genius of the conquerors who laid whole kingdoms waste, Caesar, Alexander, and Napoleon; of Shakespeare's blood-stained adventurers, Macbeth and Richard III, and of his tigerish Cleopatra; of Ibsen's demonic Hedda Gabler; of Tamburlaine, Marlowe's inhuman monster; and of Webster's devilish Duchess or his sanguinary Vittoria Corombona. Beasts of prey, dealing ruin, misery, and death wherever they prowl, victims of an insatiable egoism that swallowed up the last

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vestiges of altruism and self-restraint, they share, nevertheless, in the sublime grandeur of those natural forces that so infinitely surpass the puny strength of man.

Their downfall was the sequel to no passing frailty of the flesh, to no momentary error that the future might have redeemed, for vice was rooted in the very substance of their animal natures, and when they crashed they were pulpy, rotten, worm-eaten to the core. Nor can the Aristotelian *ἀμαρτία* be seen to mar the spotless escutcheons of those whose footsteps were guided, by the pure light of conscience or love, before their appointed time to the gates of death. Antigone is disloyal to the written laws of the State, because, like so many since, even at the cost of her own life, she must follow unswervingly the higher loyalty that appeals from the ideal legislator within. "I join with men in loving," she declares to Creon, "not in hatred." What crime has Goethe's Gretchen committed to be overtaken by the twin furies of madness and infanticide? What sin was hers, save that she loved not wisely but too well? Maeterlinck's Burgomaster of Stilemonde can be reproached for nothing save a heightened sense of common decency, that renders his own death preferable to the execution in his place of an innocent man, while Shaw's St. Joan is condemned, simply because she refused to utter a soul-destroying lie, to the slow and excruciating agony of the stake. The Abraham Lincoln of Drinkwater is a solid rock unstreaked by swollen-headedness or selfish complacency, an utter stranger to the multitudinous ambitions of the ordinary aspirant to public office. While he pilots the ship of State his humanity is broad enough to embrace the black man as well as the white, and deep enough to feel the ravages of war among his enemies of the South as acutely as the wounds it inflicted on his own comrades of the North. In the hour of victory he allows compassionate forgiveness to seal a lasting peace, where vengeful hatred would certainly have sown anew the seeds of discord; and yet, his work half done, he succumbs to the bullet of an assassin. There is, indeed, no tragedy more poignant, more heart-rending to behold, than the story of those rare beings, unstained by any trace of egoism or duplicity, who have been betrayed by their very nobility into the hands of grabbing, grasping, merciless mediocrity.

We have now reached a point where we can safely declare that the central figure in tragic drama must, in some direction or other, reach out beyond the mean. Its greatness may be evinced in the guile of the criminal or in the devotion of the saint, in breadth of knowledge, in splendour of imagination, or in sheer capacity for suffering; what matters is not the particular organ affected, but the simple fact that, in some part of the organism, distinct hypertrophy should be perceptible. This disposes immediately of the frequent

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but fallacious assertion that every death-bed is a tragic scene; for the grave is the common terminus of all our separate journeys, but it is only at the passing of a hero that the Valhalla of poetry rings its bells and throws wide its gates in welcome. The setbacks and disappointments, the sorrows and misfortunes, that strew so liberally the path of ordinary life, require to be magnified a thousandfold before they can rub shoulders with the sublime. And that is why a certain type of literature, however lavish it may be with broken hearts, with thwarted hopes, with chronic melancholia, never attains the stature of the tragic. It belongs, properly speaking, this cloud upon the surface of the soul, to a separate and independent category of aesthetics, to that of the sad.

But heroic personality is clearly not the sole or sufficient ingredient of tragedy; if a figure of tragic dimensions basks continually in the sun of good fortune, and reaps success at every step it takes, the penalty to be paid is contentment with a role in successful novels or, at best, in straightforward drama. There must be obstacles to face, enemies to circumvent, misfortunes to overcome; these obstacles, moreover, are of no ordinary size, but so colossal as to exact the utmost from a colossus, so overwhelming as to prove, after a long and honourable struggle, absolutely insuperable. The hero has therefore to cover, in the unfolding of the story, the whole distance between his initial reverse and his ultimate destruction; some terrible mishap or calamity pushes him over the vertiginous steep, down which he rolls until his misery, gathering momentum every second, is cut short by the final plunge into psychic ruin, madness, or the grave.

Always the change of fortune must be from good to bad, never from bad to good, or even from better to worse, and, like the fairy-tale, back again to blissful happiness at the close. The conventional "happy ending" to a tale of woe, stock-in-trade of melodrama and the second-rate novel, either appals by its improbability or, when constructed to seem at least fairly plausible, gives the stamp of tragic-comedy to a literary production. Shakespeare, exhausted perhaps by the tension of his four tragic masterpieces, concludes his career as a dramatist with a series of clumsily constructed tragic-comedies—*Cymbeline*, *The Tempest*, and *The Winter's Tale*. The Greeks turned tragedy into comedy by the superlatively crude mechanism of the *deus ex machina*, which shocks us more than it did them because we do not share their polytheistic superstitions. Medea, the murderess, is wafted skywards by a winged chariot when on the point of being arrested for her crime; the goddess Athena appears in the *Iphigenia* just in the nick of time to prevent Thoas from capturing the fugitive pair. Similar artifices, if somewhat less clumsy than these, have been often used by modern dramatists

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to steer their characters safely home, after many storms, to an unreal haven of lifelong happiness.

There emerges from what has been said that the hero should fall from a great height to annihilation. According to the principle of contrast, which looms so large among the fine arts, the greater the height from which he topples the more dire the ruin, the more sombre the tragic effect, of the whole catastrophe. From the very summit of worldly success, domestic felicity, outward prosperity, and inward peace of mind, he is hurled by a concatenation of misfortunes that might to-morrow befall any one of us, into a yawning gulf of failure, suffering, and unfathomable despair. Many have maintained that physical death, in whatever shape it may come, is the only fitting climax to such a story, but the example of the great tragedians suffices to show that the transformation of a rational being into a mental cripple or a lunatic, is equally, if not more terrible, than his bodily dissolution. The great majority of classical tragedies terminate, it is true, with the physical death of the hero or heroine; but that severe mental disequilibrium is alone sufficient for a tragic climax is attested by Prometheus, who lies chained in everlasting torment to his rock; by Oedipus himself, who leaves his palace blinded and broken, but still alive; and by the Mrs. Alving of *Ghosts*, who is fated to linger on after her only son has gone raving mad before her eyes.

If we glance back for a moment at the ground we have traversed, we shall see that the essence of the tragic, visible after every redundant feature has been pruned away, is really exceedingly simple; an *exceptional person endures exceptional ill fortune culminating in the destruction of his mental faculties*; a single star of the first magnitude, shining in lofty isolation from its fellows, dives suddenly to extinction in the dizzy abyss of surrounding space. Whether such a fate as this has been allotted by providence to real figures moving, majestic in tribulation, across the stage of world history, or by the artistic imagination to people whose only lives are in the pages of a novel or across the footlights of a theatre, matters not in the least; for life has its tragedies as well as art.

When we survey the dramatic tragedies of ancient and modern times, of all those periods when the arts have prospered in Western Europe, we find, besides the common traits already indicated, a striking cleavage in the manner of struggle which hurls the hero from his pedestal; it may either be predominantly an *outer conflict*, when the hand of fate or the hostility of society conspires to overthrow him, or predominantly an *inner psychological conflict*, when he harbours in the mainsprings of his own personality a secret but invincible foe. Broadly speaking, the modern tendency is to emphasize the strident disharmonies within the soul, whereas the Greeks

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preferred to stress the antagonistic relations in which an individual stands to his fellow-men or to the cosmos. That personal character, rather than mere outward happenings, is the real focus of dramatic interest, was first discovered by Euripides, and from that day to this the main current of European drama has flowed consistently in a subjective direction. The impersonal and philosophical sweep of classical tragedy has been brilliantly described in a passage from Whitehead. "The pilgrim fathers of the scientific imagination as it exists to-day, are the great tragedians of ancient Athens, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides. Their vision of fate, remorseless and indifferent, urging a tragic incident to its inevitable issue, is the vision possessed by science. Fate in Greek tragedy becomes the order of nature in modern thought."

It would be well in conclusion to examine briefly the purely subjective or psychological aspect of this particular embodiment of the beautiful; to consider, not the succession of happenings external to ourselves which are the separate links in a tragic story, but rather their direct effect upon the responsive reader or spectator, to tear, if we can, a few pages from the autobiography of the sensitive recipient. Generations of philosophers have been staggered by an amazing paradox; men shun pain as they do the plague, yet here is a torture invented by themselves, that they pursue, embrace, and adore, as though they were passionately enamoured of it. This, too, is the stumbling-block that invariably trips up the aesthetical hedonist. There is, I believe, only one possible explanation for such anomalous behaviour; that, in the case of the tragic—as in that of the sublime, the ugly, and the grotesque—we do not react with a simple homogeneous feeling of either pleasure or pain, both sentiments being in evidence to a greater or lesser degree, and that the gain accruing to us from the element of enjoyment and its attendant circumstances outbalances the loss we experience in terms of pure, undiluted suffering. Let us proceed to test our hypothesis in the light of fact.

Nowadays the delicacy of our psychological insight exceeds the wildest dreams of Aristotle. We no longer regard pity and fear as the twin emotions ruling in the realm of the tragic, because we realize that they are casual by-products of the tragic process; if a person or a fictitious character is sympathetic to us, we feel, undeniably, inclined to pity him when bowed beneath the weight of his misfortunes, and to tremble at every threat of impending calamity. As spectators we cannot long remain impartial, dispassionate, unmoved, in fact we become very soon partisans, planting ourselves firmly beside the hero and in the path of his advancing enemies; but emotions provoked in this way are directly relevant to a personal attitude towards the situation, to a subjective

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disposition to favour one side rather than another, and only indirectly to the incidents that mark the course of the narrative itself.

No one would deny that the sharp pangs of suffering that pierce the witness to a tragic history are an immediate and direct outcome of the sombre happenings which are its very marrow. We spontaneously, instinctively sympathize, "feel with," the hero or heroine whom fate has so cruelly condemned, utilizing to the full our unhappy faculty for sharing in the feelings of others and for making their sorrows our own; while, if the Titan's misfortunes are completely unmerited by his deeds, an outraged sense of justice augments our tribulation. But, more powerful perhaps than any of these sources of despondency, is the sense of loss that clouds our whole horizon when some divine spark—so rare a visitant to this humdrum world—is suddenly and for ever quenched. We may be young, carefree, exuberant with vitality and hope, fortune may have showered her blessings on us with a liberal hand, but the illusions of a fool's paradise cannot save us, sooner or later, from facing the grim reality that tragedy reveals. It epitomizes the universal omnipotence of dissolution and death. Nothing, it reminds us, however extensive its bulk, however strong and durable its texture, however fresh and youthful its complexion, however rare, elevated, or beautiful its animating spirit, neither the rose that withers in a single summer nor the stars that fade out after millions of centuries, can stem, even for a moment, the irresistible and annihilating torrent of time. It bids each of us remember that though we strive untiringly to wrest from Nature the secret of her being, though our days are haunted by a loveliness that hovers so enticingly beyond our reach, existence is fleeting as a match that flames in the dark; that the treasure-house of knowledge will be despoiled, the fragile dream of perfection instantly shattered, in the iron grasp of a remote, inevitable, and unexplored future.

Yet, for such as are able to appreciate the intrinsic merits of high tragedy, the impression it leaves on the soul is not by any means one of unrelieved gloom, or even of momentary pessimism about the value of individual lives. How well I remember Miss Nancy Price, who has done so much to raise the London theatre from its lamentably low level, coming one day before an audience to plead on behalf of a fine modern tragedy written round the life of Nurse Cavell; let no one be afraid, she so rightly assured us, that tragic drama will leave them in a state of acute depression or suicidal despair. Indeed, the reverse is true, not merely because it is often accompanied by a retinue of agreeable concomitants—a well-constructed plot, carefully drawn characters, a troupe of actors rising superbly to the occasion, a literary style rich in metaphor, abundant in vocabu-

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lary, euphonious but natural in phrasing—not merely because our vitality is so enhanced by emotion that we prefer even terror or pain to the empty tedium of pure apathy, but, first and foremost, because a tragic history contains in itself a full measure of comfort, encouragement, and exalted joy. 57113

Some of us, outraged by the baseness of human motives or convinced of the futility of human aspirations, may retreat from the dust of conflict to hibernate in a comfortable arm-chair cynicism; others, embittered by the buffeting they have received at the hands of fortune or society, may sally forth to castigate their fellows by dint of a caustic or ironical tongue; others still may be overcome, with the fading of adolescent dreams, by a blasé indifference to everything save their private interests. But tragedy confounds the cynic, silences the ironist, and arouses the most indifferent from their slumbers. What a marvellous piece of work, despite his simian heritage, is this insignificant biped who has made himself within a few million years unrivalled master of the whole globe; what unplumbed depths of feeling he hides in his puny breast, what inexhaustible wealth of thought, what magical flights of fantasy, what immeasurable devotion to forlorn hopes, losing causes, impossible ideals, he carries about with him in a few inches of cerebral cortex. Nature may have poured the blood of wild beasts into his veins, but she has also cast him in the image of a god; she may turn life into a torture chamber from which death is a merciful deliverance, but she cannot crush the rebel within him or humble a spirit that is ignorant of defeat; she may destroy individuals as rapidly, as blindly, as remorselessly as she creates them, but the causes for which they suffered, the movements in which they found their immortality, survive to triumph in the promised land they beheld shining from afar, and where their brother pilgrims, thanks to those before them who fell by the wayside, will one day enter into the fullness of joy.

Fortifying and gladdening in the oppressive atmosphere of tragic bereavement, such reflections as these flit, almost involuntarily, across our minds, and awaken an immediate echo in our sensibility. For our natural height, so dwarfish in the petty transactions of a breadwinner's task, has been increased in the twinkling of an eye to the giant stature of a hero or a heroine; we have supported calamity after calamity—misfortune on the grand scale, not such pinpricks as are caused by the little vexations, the trifling disappointments, we find so hard to bear in ordinary life—without one murmur of complaint, without a flicker of an eyelid, with a steadfast equanimity born of inexhaustible courage; and, if our cause was that of the gentle Nazarene, or of the Maid who left her fields to weld France into a nation, we have lived to see that the sacrifice was not

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in vain, that the victory for which these pioneers strove so hard was won decisively by their successors. Such is the precious balm offered by the tragic to its devotees; such is its sole justification for claiming that, though it may be sad, it is never depressing; and such the reason why, whenever drama has attained the high place it merits among the arts, whether in ancient Athens before its decline, or in England, France, and Spain during the Renaissance and its aftermath, or in Western Europe ever since the romantic revival of poetry, tragedy has constantly reappeared as the highest and the most philosophical of its varieties.

GREAT THINKERS

(VII) MALEBRANCHE

PROFESSOR JOHN LAIRD

NICOLAS MALEBRANCHE was born in Paris on August 6, 1638, and died there on October 13, 1715. According to Fontenelle he was a tenth, according to André a thirteenth child, and his "machine" (i.e. his body) was persistently refractory. He was tall—about six feet—but something misshapen from rickets or some other such cause. His spine, according to the unprofessional P. Adry, was "tortueuse dans toute sa longueur," his clavicles too large, while his arms "n'étaient point attachés à l'ordinaire." Besides he had "all the maladies known in his time," including severe acidity of the stomach from the age of twenty-five onwards (probably arising from a duodenal ulcer). Nevertheless, he used to chew tobacco and was one of the earliest Parisians to become a coffee-drinker. For the most part, however, he tried to "manage his machine" by drinking water copiously. His portraits show him to have been strange, gaunt, intense, high-browed, and small-chinned.

What might have become of Malebranche had his "machine" been less abnormal may be a matter for curious conjecture. His father had a good position in the royal treasury, and a maternal uncle was Viceroy of Canada; but Nicolas from the first was studious and unworldly. As an adolescent he wanted to be a Trappist. His "machine," however, was unsuited for austerity and so became a fortunate occasional cause for the decision to make him a priest of the Oratory, the freest and mildest place in his church for a life-long meditative.

Malebranche's views are summed up in the saying that he elaborated a Christian philosophy in which Descartes was the Doctor in things natural and Augustine the Doctor in the things of grace. The Oratory was a stronghold of Augustinianism made vigilant by the need for defining its position in relation to Jansenism and munitioned after 1656 by Ambrose Victor's edition of Augustine's works. Its attitude towards Cartesianism is rather more doubtful, but that doctrine was permitted and to some extent encouraged under P. Bourgoing; and P. Poisson, a noted Cartesian, entered the Oratory in the same year as Malebranche (1660).

By his own account, Malebranche began by being *extrêmement prévenu* against the Cartesian philosophy, although he was also

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contemptuous of his Peripatetic training at the college of La Marche and later at the Sorbonne. The year 1664, however, changed all that, for he ran upon a copy of the newly published (posthumous) *De l'Homme* of Descartes in a bookstall on the Quai des Augustins and was at least half converted as he fluttered the leaves. There was no turning back. He mastered the volume, then Descartes's other works; and he became for life a Cartesian Augustinian.

The editor of *De l'Homme* was De la Forge, a physician in Saumur, where Malebranche had spent some months of his professional training, and De la Forge, in the next year, published his *Traité de l'esprit de l'homme*, developing his theory of occasionalism and explicitly coining the term. It is likely enough, therefore, that Malebranche had rather definite anticipations that day on the Quai des Augustins, and it is clear that he was strongly influenced later by the works of De la Forge (which he possessed) and also by the writings of the other chief French occasionalist (whom he quoted), the lawyer Cordemoy, who published his *Le discernement du corps et de l'âme* in 1666.

Doubtless Malebranche would have developed the theory for himself even if he had not found the name "occasionalism" in current use. In any case he made himself into the first Frenchman of his time in philosophy and one of the first in science and in letters. The first volume of his first (and greatest) book, the *Recherche de la Vérité*, appeared in 1674 and was succeeded by the other three volumes at about the optimum interval for a healthy family. Of his later works, the most debated was his *Traité de la Nature et de la Grâce* (1680), one of the best was his *Traité de Morale* (1683), while his *Entretiens sur la Métaphysique et la Religion* (1688) gave the best general summary of his mature philosophy. But he was never long parted from his pen, and he defended his doctrines with a formidable array of polemical pieces. I have not read all his writings, and regret in particular that I have been unable to see the interesting volume of dialogues in which (for the benefit of the Jesuit missionaries in China) he shows how pure reason can prove the existence of God to the confusion of the Confucians. But I have read some six thousand smallish pages.

The longest of these polemical activities was with the ageing Jansenist, Arnauld (who died during the controversy), but Malebranche also defended himself against Régis, Foucher, and others, and against the Jesuits generally (despite his good offices to their missionaries in China). He had also to wait some time before he gained Bossuet's admiration and Fontenelle's regard. His *Treaty on Grace* was put upon the index, but its author remained pretty calm. "If I were in Italy," he said, "where this sort of censure has its abode, I would abstain from reading a book condemned by the

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Inquisition; accepted authority must be obeyed. In France, however, this tribunal has no standing. So there the Treatise will be read" (André's *Life*, p. 200).

As I have said, Malebranche was renowned in letters and in science. He became a member of the Academy in 1699. De l'Hôpital's dying request was that Malebranche should edit the treatise on the infinitely little. Leibniz dealt with him as a distinguished but erring equal about 1687 (when Malebranche candidly confessed to a Cartesian error regarding quantity of motion). Malebranche had a European reputation in the science of optics, and when he visited Rochefort in 1688 the officers of the fleet gave him a reception and consulted him about naval architecture. As regards letters, an admirable comment appears in André's remark, "le pédantisme était en désespoir."

In so far as an elaborate philosophy can be summed up in a phrase, the epitome of Malebranche's is that "we see all things in God." His endeavour was to expound this Plotinian-Augustinian doctrine to the "new" or scientific world.

The phrase, however, might easily mislead. What Malebranche saw in God he saw with his mind and not with his eyes (indeed he believed that the colours he saw were, strictly speaking, in himself). As a scientist and philosopher he sought *clear* ideas (as the other new philosophers did), and he disdained all others. Yet Malebranche's philosophy was not simply a theory of knowing; it was also a theory of being. In God's wisdom lay all our seeing, but God was also the sole reality, the great I AM; and there was no efficacy save in Him. He was Being in all its infinity; and He was omnipotent because *all* effective power (or causality) was His alone.

For Malebranche, then, a clear idea was the pellucid intellectual vision of a Platonic or Plotinian essence, constitutive of ultimate reality. The man who saw such an idea participated in God's wisdom, which was also God's nature in the plenitude of its power. Such "ideas" were like the *nombres nombrants* that ordered as well as expressed the essence of numerically determined existence; and similarly with regard to geometry. God was the place of all such ideas, although not in the heretical sense that made Him extended. Yet God was the intelligible essence of extension, and also made the difference between possibility and actuality.

According to Malebranche there was a *total* disparity between the way of clear ideas and the way of sense. Indeed error, the subject of the *Recherche*, was due in the main to the confusion between sense and knowledge. The senses did not really *tell* us anything. They only warned us, and the man who mistook their pragmatical warnings (e.g. of danger) for knowledge of fact was the dupe of a prejudice

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that dated from the Fall (when man's body became a tyrannical obsession instead of a submissive, innocuous servant). The imagination and the passions, being sensory and bodily, were tainted by this original sin; and so in sundry ways were many of our natural human inclinations.

Consequently, a great part of Malebranche's philosophy consisted of an account of the place of the senses and of their derivatives, such as memory, imagination, and passion. The grand rule of philosophy was *Nosce teipsum*, i.e. knowledge through clear ideas "in the silence of sense," and the total repudiation of sensory mis-knowing.

In his account of the senses, Malebranche was content, for the most part, to argue from the facts concerning vision. Here, as he admitted, Augustine had not always divined what the new science had triumphantly ascertained; but Malebranche himself was heartened by the new discoveries. It was now known, he said, that colours (which, after all, are all that we see) were not in the object but in the beholder's mind. Hence it was a gross error to suppose that they must reveal the nature of physical objects. If they revealed anything they revealed ourselves (and that very obscurely). In short, these new discoveries refuted the crude notion that the eyes are the messengers of truth in physics and the foolish superstition that seeing should be believing.

What held of colours, on this essential point, held also of the other sensible qualities. All of these were in us, as much as pleasure and pain, and they could not reveal the nature of extra-mental fact any more than pain could. The red-hot poker is no more red than it is in anguish, and scholastic-Aristotelian occult qualities, *species impressae* and the like, qualify for admission into Limbo.

It may be doubted whether Malebranche was quite as consistent as he supposed. He did admit a certain unclear sensory *representation* of distant objects. He accepted "natural judgments" in this matter, not infallible, but not at all contemptible, and such judgments seem, in his view, to have been largely based on sensation. He also held that the presence of a colour was a strong and reasonable although slightly risky indication of the *existence* of a physical object in one's neighbourhood. Indeed, he allowed himself to say of bodies "que nous less *conndissons* par la voie courte et sûre mais confuse de l'instinct ou du sentiment" (*A.*, I, 166).¹ In short, he did not uniformly hold that the senses revealed *nothing* concerning physical nature.

Let us pass the point, however, and approach his account of the two great divisions of natural science, viz. (a) physical bodies and

¹ *A.* = *Correspondence with Arnauld*, ed. 1709 (4 vols.).

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the communication of movement, (b) the laws of the union of body and mind.

(a) In this matter the first point to settle is whether we know that physical bodies exist; the second point is our knowledge of their nature.

On the first issue, Malebranche admitted quite candidly that it was impossible to produce an irrefutable scientific *demonstration* of the existence of such bodies. Natural reason supported a strong inclination to accept their existence, and Malebranche did accept it, admitting that he was bound to do so because the Scriptures said so. (It may not, however, be entirely clear what "the existence of physical bodies" could mean in Malebranche's philosophy. His official view of the meaning of real existence was participation in God's actualized as opposed to His merely possible ideas; and some may think that, in the physical domain, this view dims what should not be obscure).

On the other hand, Malebranche was confident that *if* physical bodies existed it was demonstrable what their nature must be. Extension must comprise their whole essence. They must be extended and the attribution of other qualities to them was either a sense-prejudice or the sense-begotten nonsense of the Peripatetics, the "*galimatias impertinent et ridicule*" of Aristotle or of some other clouded intellect.

Bodies move. They move regularly. They move, if they move freely, in a straight line. Their movements can be described, predicted, and postdicted with the most elegant precision by deductions from the fundamental laws of motion. Nevertheless, according to Malebranche, they have no efficacy. They can only *receive* motion, and can neither create nor acquire by communication any power whatsoever to move themselves or to move other bodies. All their power of any sort is divinely imparted. (See, e.g., *R.*,¹ *Ecl.* XV, vol. iv, 226.)

This does not mean only that there is no way of *demonstrating* any other efficacy. It means that there *can* be no other, that there is no possible suggestion of any other agency "that can make any impression at all upon an attentive mind." The theologians, it was true, had adopted a face-saving nonsensical device according to which God lent His concurrence to all second causes. If so the concurring force would act, but would not act alone. Therefore the second causes would have to act too. They would be genuine independent causes (although part-causes) which is precisely what Suarez, Fonseca, and other such theologians wanted to conceal. Others talked of "Nature" and of "natural causes" acting in their own right once they were created, thus splitting the universe into a pagan and non-pagan part.

¹ *R.* : *Recherche de la Vérité*, in edition of 1772 (4 vols.).

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The unity of the universe stood in the way of all these devices, but Malebranche, far from being content with such assertions, disputed the ordinary view of our natural knowledge of natural causes on lines which appealed to Hume, and so influenced the more famous Scottish arguments that made natural causality an affair of sensitive belief rather than, in any sense, of clear ideas. (Malebranche might not have relished such company; but he found it.)

(b) The contention that bodies could not act on minds, or minds on bodies, must have seemed much less revolutionary than the contention that bodies could not even act on one another. The Cartesian view that minds must be unextended, bodies extended, combined with the doctrine that causal connection presupposes continuity of kind, made some such theory inevitable; and many would have agreed that the Cartesian muddle of the *mélange confus* and the pineal gland was a thing not to be thought of. Malebranche could also quote Cordemoy in support (*R.*, I, III).

Hence parallelism, not interaction, seemed to be indicated in the two respects in which there is *prima facie* evidence of material-mental influence. The human will can produce no physical effects. What happens is that Omnipotence moves my arm when I decide to raise it. God always answers this natural prayer. Similarly a pin-prick does not cause a smart. God regularly produces the smart in me when the pin enters my "machine."

Such parallelism presented no theoretical difficulty to a philosopher who denied the efficacy while affirming the regularity of *all* (so-called) "natural" causes. Psycho-physical parallelism was but a species of Malebranche's universal "natural" occasionalism. On the other hand, the detail of his psycho-physics was subtly elaborated with special reference to the laws of the "machine" in sense, memory, passion, and a certain *liaison des idées* that anticipated much in the later associationism of such men as Hume, Helvétius, or even Hartley, but resembled Hartley rather than Hume inasmuch as the explanation was based upon presumed cerebral traces. (It must be confessed, however, that Malebranche's physiology was somewhat sketchy. He knew something about the circulation of the blood, and supposed a good deal about animal spirits, their traces, and the structure of the brain.)

This part of his doctrine had a theological side. As we have seen, Adam before the Fall was supposed by our author to have had a body that did not suffer from sense-obsessions. After the Fall, he and his offspring did so suffer, and in our present state the woman was chiefly responsible for the perpetuation of original sin. Our mothers conceived us in sin because of the blood connection between the maternal machine (even its brain) and the foetus. In short, our bondage to our senses was an ineradicable maternal impression,

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and the scientific Malebranche credulously collected a great deal of reputed evidence on this curious subject.

But what had Malebranche to say about our minds themselves?

Although he accepted and developed Cartesianism in so many ways, he differed acutely from the master in a part of his theory of the soul. He agreed that the essence of the self was thinking, and that the immaterial pensive substance was separated by the whole diameter of being from the incogitative material substance whose entire essence was spatio-temporal. He also allowed that it was a contradiction to suppose that the soul could exist without thinking, for in that case it would be a substance deprived of its essence.

Evidently, however, this *pensée* that was said to be the essence of mind was a formal defining property whose correspondence to actual empirical thoughts (such as sensation, imagination, or even reasoning) was a matter for inquiry. In dreamless sleep, for example, there is no evidence of the existence of empirical thoughts. And here Malebranche vigorously asserted a very un-Cartesian standpoint from his earliest writings to his last (e.g. *R.*, Bk. III, Pt. II, Ch. VII, and *Ecl.* xi).

His contention was that in respect of clear ideas the human mind was *not* as well known as physical bodies. Physical substances (he held) can be represented by clear ideas, but there is no comparable clarity regarding the "modifications" of our minds. We are aware of colour, odour, etc., by internal "sentiment or feeling"; we can prove these *sensa* to be non-physical and therefore (?) mental. But even the Cartesians disputed whether our minds were literally blue or stinking (*Ecl.* xi); and when we examined an act of attention, say (and our minds *were* attentive), it was obvious that we had no clear idea why the essence called *pensée* generated the derivative called attention. "*Quand je connais que 2 fois 2 sont 4, je la connais très clairement, mais je ne connais point clairement ce qui est en moi qui le connaît*" (*R.*, IV, 211). In short, we cannot clearly deduce the specific character of mental acts from their mental essence while we can deduce specific properties of triangles, say, from their spatial essence. What knowledge we have of our empirical thought-processes is entirely an affair of internal sentiment, and is therefore, from the scientific point of view, enigmatic and almost negligible.

These contentions, obviously, have great metaphysical importance and are not much the worse because they have a distinctively modern timbre. All that Malebranche had to say about the mind bore the stamp of an unusually candid effort towards self-examination, and showed the "meditative" at his best—at any rate if his descriptions be distinguished from certain of his inferences.

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Among these inferences his various reflections concerning the nature of ideas, and certain of his views regarding the human will and its "freedom," should be considered here.

On the first point, critics and commentators (such as Sainte-Beuve and Delbos) are apt to be rather unkind to Malebranche, and it seems plain that Malebranche was both puzzled and annoyed that his remarks about ideas and their nature should be taken with such portentous seriousness by Arnauld and others, and selected for a flanking attack even upon his doctrine of grace. Indeed, he admitted that he had sometimes used the word "idea" rather loosely, although, by his own account, he had always used it very strictly when engaged in discussing Platonic or clear ideas.

The detail of what Malebranche had to say concerning Arnauld's *Des vraies et des fausses idées* deserves a book to itself and has recently been admirably debated by Dr. Church in his *Study of Malebranche*. Here I shall attempt only to indicate Malebranche's point of view and his reasons for clinging to it.

According to Arnauld, in a part of his argument, it was the business of every idea to know. All ideas were "essentially representative." Hence it was absurd to interpose merely representative entities between the mind and the things it knew; for ideas "represented" directly and immediately and would be embarrassed and indeed paralysed if there were such intervening deputies.

Malebranche repudiated such opinions, but from an oblique angle. He was as ready as anyone to deny the existence of certain sorts of representative intermediaries, for he repudiated the crude Aristotelian-scholastic theory of *species impressae*, that is to say, of floating physical images that stuck in the mind. On the other hand, he strenuously denied that any "natural" psychological events could be "essentially representative." To suppose so, he affirmed, was a piece of uncreatively arrogance, and a confusion between sentiment and knowledge.

His arguments in this connection were of varying merit. For the most part he was content to aver that vulgar sensory ideas cannot give knowledge of anything, and in particular are not infallible (as they would have to be were they *essentially* representative). Yet he also included many arguments that were very much weaker to the general effect that colours, sounds, and all other such "ideas" must be locally and temporally present to the soul. Hence since the mind could not "take a walk among the stars," and since the stars could not walk into the mind without cerebral disaster, it followed (he said) that our minds could *only* represent the sun and the stars and could not know these bodies directly. While the illustration was half a pleasantry the contact-theory of perception implied in it was not a pleasantry; and the argument was weak precisely

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because the contact-theory (in an occasionalistic or in any other sense) can so easily be evaded.

Substantially, Malebranche's position was that *clear* ideas did *not* represent, and that vulgar sensory ideas would represent only if it pleased God to create some corresponding (physical) being (R., III, 390). For the object of genuine knowledge was always God, and the finite could not represent the infinite. What a finite being (with God's help) could do was to participate (i.e. to comprehend and be comprehended) in some measure in the divine wisdom. That was *non-representative* knowledge, and had no resemblance to Arnauld's impious views.

Malebranche's doctrine of the human will and its freedom had a warier eye for theological niceties than most other parts of his philosophy. This need not be said of the part of the theory that was a mere consequence of his general theory, e.g. that the alleged physical efficacy of the human will was as much of a myth as any other natural efficacy, and that the fact could be proved to demonstration. But it has to be said of other parts of his doctrine.

He maintained quite simply (and, some may think, quite uncritically) that our personal experience proved that we were "free"—and this despite his belief that we had no clear ideas of ourselves or of the nature of our mental operations. Such freedom, however, had (he said) no physical efficacy, and, strictly, could have no mental efficacy either. The solution was (e.g. *T.N.G.*,¹ 197, and frequently) that freedom consisted in suspense of decision or judgment. Such suspending of decision was in one sense inactivity and nothingness, yet, in another sense, provided the opportunity for the truth to become manifest to our attention. Sin and error were therefore due to a subtle way of doing nothing, and Malebranche, like some other eminent philosophers such as Locke and William James, seems never to have perceived that his proposed solution was a sham. To postpone decision is as much of an action, and, for that matter, as much of a decision, as to decide incontinently to act in other ways, and it has neither more nor less efficacy than any other sort of decision.

The account of mechanics and of psycho-physics were Malebranche's contribution to what might be called natural philosophy. His account of "natural reason" in general was just his account of participation in the Logos (or God's wisdom); and this, as he said (A., III, 155), was attested by thousandfold experience as well as by pure argument. Like Malebranche himself we may assume that this third part of "natural" philosophy was affirmed and made manifest in the development of the other two.

It has already appeared, however (although the point should now be underlined) that "nature," "natural laws," and "natural philo-

¹ *T.N.G.* = *Traité de la Nature et de la Grâce*, ed. 1684.

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sophy" existed on sufferance only in Malebranche's considered theory. For him "nature" was a pagan superstition, and although the term might be used in certain contexts with comparatively little risk, it became mischievous folly if "nature" were mistaken for something ultimate and truly independent. "My view is," he said (*A.*, I, 51), "that the *Nature* of the pagan philosophers is a pure chimacra that men have imagined on the strength of the testimony of their senses." It was a convenient boundary, but could not and should not stand for an autonomous province in the cosmos.

Therefore, when Malebranche added two other great general laws to the three already mentioned (admitting that probably there were others still but professing that he knew nothing about them), he believed himself not to be invoking a new spiritual realm to redress the balance of the old but simply to be asserting the sempiternal unity of a theocentric universe. What he held was that the pagans (and all Christian theologians who builded upon Aristotle's or some other pagan philosophy) had omitted two fundamental general laws of reality in their metaphysical speculations. These were, fourthly, the laws by which the angels have the power to act on bodies and through bodies on human minds, and, fifthly, the laws by which Jesus Christ has sovereign (although, like the angels, only occasionalistic) power over the minds and hearts of mankind.

The truths of the fourth and fifth general laws were said to be evinced by the Scriptures and by the operation of the Holy Spirit in the Church. They were not known by reason or by experience. "The dogmas of Faith," Malebranche said (*A.*, IV, 176), "are invariably the foundation of my metaphysical reflections."

Discussing the fourth general law, Malebranche, a persistent defender of the regularity of divine action, went a long way towards denying the reality of sporadic, *ad hoc* miracles. Although he could not deny them all, he tried to generalize the bulk of the received miracles. As he admitted, some explanation had to be given for the accepted fact that the temporal prosperity of the Hebrews (for example their frugal but presumably sufficient rations of manna) corresponded with the nicest precision to the merits of their moral and religious behaviour. So Malebranche affirmed that it was *certain* (*A.*, II, 300) that God had given St. Michael and the angels, but more particularly St. Michael, the power of recompensing or chastening the Israelites in precise proportion to their fidelity or infidelity. St. Michael, however, was only an occasional cause. God answered his prayers about the Israelites quite regularly. As Nicole (a critic) said, God did so because that was the cheapest way. He pooled the necessary miracles.

The fifth law was also occasionalistic. It was Christ *as man* who was the occasional cause of the New Covenant. Christ was the

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propitiation for our sins, the meritorious cause of all grace, and also the distributive (occasional) cause of grace when He was established as the chief priest in God's house. "C'est à lui comme homme, mais uni à la sagesse éternelle, qu'il appartient de construire le temple de Dieu vivant" (A., II, 383). This temple was the Church; and Christ, the mediator and intercessor, was not more efficacious than any other finite cause. On the other hand, God was not less attentive to the prayers of His son than to the natural prayers of men. He therefore engendered an holy concupiscence, through Christ's intercession, to counteract the sordid concupiscence that came from the Fall. It is further to be remarked that Malebranche was quite prepared to accept certain paradoxical consequences over which his opponents made merry. "Oui, monsieur," he said (A., I, 465), "Jésus Christ est maître de philosophie, de mathématique, d'arithmétique en ce sens que lui seul enseigne aux hommes toutes les vérités qu'ils découvrent en conséquence de leur attention."

Before proceeding further with this "unfortunate"¹ theory of grace it seems advisable to say something of Malebranche's system of ethics.

He had little sympathy with the pagans. "Let Greek sages," he said (M.,² 11), "or Stoics prate of *deus sive natura*." It was for him to consider the universe of the true God. In ethics God's order was all; it was the sole virtue, and it involved a meditative retirement into oneself, a hearkening to the inner voice "in the greatest possible silence of the senses" (M., 21).

Whatever libertines or soi-disant *esprits forts* might say, ethics was based upon love of a certain sort, viz., the thirst for union with deity, and the love of God's *order*. What had to be subjugated was *mere amour-propre*, Christ being the occasional cause of habituation into saintliness (M., 83).

Everyone desired happiness (cf. *T.N.G.*, 186). It was pleasure that made anyone actually happy (*T.N.G.*, 224). Indeed, good and felicity of some sort were convertible terms. But although all happiness was in some sort good, carnal happiness was a tawdry business that separated us from God. Malebranche's psycho-physics, his doctrine of efficacy, and the rest of his general philosophy were pressed into the service of these contentions.

The second part of the book dealt with our duty. Even the just might commit bad or irregular acts. There must therefore be rules and discipline—in other words, duty. So there were general duties towards God, more special duties towards God's wisdom (e.g. to condemn mere imagination, to avoid mistaking scientific excitement or reputation for genuine meditation). There was the duty of com-

¹ A., IV, 212.

² M. = *Traité de Marche*. H. Joly's edition, 1882.

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mitting all our felicity into God's hands; and there were particular duties towards the several persons of the Trinity.

In addition, there were secular and human duties regulating, e.g., the esteem, the respect, and the benevolence that a man should exercise towards his fellows. (Thus (*M.*, 193) there could be no truly social relationship between men who despised one another.) There were universal duties, of which the chief was the requirement that true or spiritual goods should not be denied to anyone (*M.*, 202). There were special duties towards political and ecclesiastical superiors, and there the bishop was greater than the magistrate "as being nearer God's wisdom" although, for the same reason, "the abuse of ecclesiastical authority is more criminal before God than the abuse of royal authority" (*M.*, 213). There were conjugal and parental duties. (Malebranche gave severe injunctions for accelerating the rationalization of young children, though he was fond of them himself.) There were duties towards all equals, "the chief aim of all our duties being to preserve charity among men and to unite ourselves to them in a tender and durable friendship in order to be of service to them and to make them serviceable to themselves" (*M.*, 245). Finally, each man had duties towards himself, and principally the duty of sanctifying himself.

Indeed, there can seldom have been a finer or more closely knit exposition of contemplative and catholic Christian ethics.

But let us return to the theory of grace.

According to Malebranche, the only possible reason for God's action in creating *any* universe rather than in not creating at all was God's glory (*T.N.G.*, 2), and the divine *amour-propre*. Hence all that He did must show forth His glory. Essentially, however, He was wisdom; and simplicity, order, and regularity were the inevitable criteria of wisdom.

Consequently, if God had to choose between, on the one hand, His great love of mankind and His desire that all should taste felicity, and, on the other hand, the simplicity of His orderly ways, it followed that He must choose the latter or (what was impossible) cease to be divine. The multiplication of special miracles was *not* simple or orderly. We had, therefore, to believe that God did not exercise His special providence in this way (unless, if ever, on very rare occasions) and so had to accept the consequence that He (very reluctantly) permitted evil, and a great deal of it, to exist in order that His glory might not be tarnished by His departure from His divinely simple principles of cosmic order. Malebranche fully admitted the reality of evil, and of a certain "disorder" (*A.*, III, 277) in the universe, but he regarded these as minor affairs, however prevalent and however terrible. Indeed, his various estimates of the proportion of persons saved varied between 1 and 5 per cent.

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with a preference for the lower figure, and he was horrified at the fact. But, as he thought, fact it was.

It was fact despite God's magnificent provision for its alleviation by making Christ (and His temple the Church) the occasional cause of human salvation. More in detail Malebranche averred concerning this matter that Christ's intercessions were His fugitive particular desires (*T.N.G.*, 131) with the consequence that certain special persons at special times had the special benefit of His intercessions and solicitude. (So far as I know Malebranche ignored the obvious consideration that if God's wisdom and regularity were saved by committing general powers of the order commonly called miraculous to St. Michael or to Christ, there was no good Malebranchian reason why God might not have increased such delegated occasional power to such an extent that no one would be damned. Why should the thing depend upon what Christ happened to think about at any given moment?)

Not unnaturally this doctrine of grace was hotly attacked. Occasionalistic or not, the general implications concerning evil and retribution seemed shocking to some, and Malebranche's doctrine of freedom (on which sin and punishment depended) could scarcely be expected to win general assent. Indeed, it is not surprising that Malebranche was accused on the one hand of embracing Luther's heresy (i.e. of believing in a "servile" will) and, on the other hand, of being far too Pelagian (or libertarian).

Such controversies, however, had little bearing upon the problem of predestination, about which so many moderns are shocked without having taken the trouble to understand the question. Malebranche took it to be obvious, and agreed by all competent theologians, that God, in making the universe actual instead of a mere possibility, foresaw all that would come to pass in the universe, and consequently foreknew precisely who would be damned. He therefore predestined everyone to his fate; for He created everyone, knowing what each would do. Accordingly, the serious question regarding predestination reduced itself to a very fine point. As Malebranche said (*A.*, I, 518), "*Toute cette dispute de la prédestination se réduit a savoir, si Dieu veut premièrement sauver tels et tels, et leur donner pour cela telles et telles grâces; ou si Dieu veut premièrement donner sa grâce a tels et tels, et sauver ceux qu'il prévoit en devoir faire un bon usage.*" On that point the Church had made no definite declaration.

Such, then, are the general lines of Malebranche's Christian philosophy. "I write for philosophers," he said, "but for Christian philosophers who revere the Scriptures and the infallible tradition of the universal church" (*M.*, 83). It would be a serious error, therefore, to regard him primarily as a mere philosopher whose important

contribution was only to the "new world" of Cartesian science. Yet if any man worked for an integrated philosophy based on rationally sifted evidence, that man was Malebranche. Therefore there is nothing really peculiar in the apparent paradox that anti-deistic writers, as well as Jansenists, Jesuits, and others, looked askance at his work.

Few expositors of a Christian philosophy have ever made a more profound and a more original synthesis than he. He was the Aquinas of the new world, and if he did not have quite Aquinas's stature, the reason why his philosophy did not and does not have the same commanding position in the circles for which he wrote is partly that the wreckage of Aristotelianism seems easier to save than the battered hulk of Cartesianism, partly that Malebranche was the last of the great Cartesians, in so far as he was a Cartesian. Indeed, as we have seen, some of his best arguments could be and were used by the empiricists of the eighteenth century. The very clarity and grace of his style contributed to this result.

But let us inquire further into his influence.

On the Continent, Malebranche's views entered largely into the lively Cartesian and anti-Cartesian controversies of the first quarter of the eighteenth century. For example, the redoubtable Bayle entered into the lists, defending Malebranche's opinions against Arnauld's regarding the relations between "plaisir" and "bonheur." (How could there be any credit in renouncing carnal pleasures unless a *good* was renounced?) It is interesting also to note that a short work published in 1770 and largely written by Holbach, entitled *Le Militaire Philosophe, ou Difficultés proposées au R. P. Malebranche*, assumes throughout that Malebranche was regarded at that time as the shadow of a perfectly candid name and argues that he should have adopted a personal not an institutional view in his discussions on matters of religion. Among other Continental authors greatly influenced by Malebranche in the eighteenth and nineteenth century a recent writer (Vidgrain) mentions "Fardella, Cardinal Gerdil, Rosmini, Gioberti in Italy; Ubaghs and the University of Louvain in Belgium; the Abbé de Lignac, Fabre, Branchereau and Mgr. Hugonin in France." Gerdil's book (Turin, 1748) is the only one of these I have seen. In intention the book was anti-Locke even more than pro-Malebranche, but Gerdil believed Malebranche's ideas to be true *dans le fond* (Preface) and adapted a saying of Fontenelle's to the general purport that it was a much easier business to be a philosopher than to be both philosopher and Christian.

Malebranche's influence in this country was very considerable indeed. I have already said something of Hume's attitude towards his views, and most recent works on Hume (such as Dr. Church's or my own) supply fuller evidence. Recent commentators on Berkeley

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again are agreed that Berkeley had Malebranche prominently in mind, and Dr. Luce, the latest of them all, in his *Berkeley and Malebranche* (Oxford, 1934), makes much more extensive claims.

As is well known Locke wrote an essay (published posthumously) with the title *An Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of seeing all things in God*. This essay extended to some 20,000 words, and Locke's editor explains that it was "not published by the author because he looked upon it to be an opinion that would not spread, but was like to die of itself or at least do no great harm" (*Works*, ed. 1801, IX, 210).

Certainly Locke himself was influenced very little; for Locke could write "I think it is more possible for me to see with other men's eyes and understand with other men's understanding than with God's; there being some proportion between mine and another man's understanding, but none between mine and God's" (IX, 251). The man who could write that might have had some sympathy with Malebranche's Cartesianism, but could have had none with his Platonic Augustinianism. Nevertheless, unintelligible as Locke may have found the fact, there were plenty of neo-Platonists in England in Locke's time with whom Locke had to reckon, and Locke, during his lifetime, did publish his *Remarks upon some of Mr. Norris's books wherein he asserts P. Malebranche's Opinion of our seeing all things in God*. Among other objections, Locke affirmed that Norris (and Malebranche) had fallen headlong into "the religion of Hobbes and Spinoza by resolving all, even the thoughts and will of men, into an irresistible necessity" (X, 255 *et seq.*). [Nevertheless, the pseudo-solution of suspense of will was accepted by Locke in the twenty-first chapter of the second book of his *Essay*.]

Norris, Rector of Bemerton and at one time Fellow of All Souls, was an enthusiastic disciple of Malebranche and of St. Austin, as may be seen in the works mentioned by Locke, and in Norris's *magnum opus*, the *Essay Towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World*. The same is true of Arthur Collier in his *Clavis Universalis*. Indeed, many of Locke's critics, such as Lowde (whom Locke respected), considered that Locke, Norris, Blount, and Malebranche were all deists of a kind, or at any rate far too rationalistic, so that their differences did not matter very much. They were common enemies of the Church of England. Lowde, however, was a better critic of Locke than of Malebranche, as may be sufficiently indicated in the following excerpts from his *Moral Essays* (1699). Regarding efficacy, "the monsieur betakes himself to his modish way of fencing with ideas" (p. 157). Regarding Malebranche's main thesis, "his Notions seem not here to lye very cleare in his Head" (p. 161).

The chief agent in the spread of Malebranche's ideas in England was T. Taylor, the Platonist, who translated Malebranche's *Recherche*

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(= "Search") together with his *Treatise on Grace* into English in 1694. In the dedication to the work Taylor wrote, "This, sir, unmasks the errors which impose on man in abusive appearances. This conducts you in the way to truth, through all the mazes of doubt and uncertainty and gives you the prospect of such an happiness as shall fill the whole extent and capacity of your soul." In a subsequent work, *The Two Covenants* (1704), Taylor said, "What I here offer is bottom'd upon Mr. Malebranche and is but a comment, as it were, upon his text." Taylor also quoted an unqualified eulogy of Malebranche from "the ingenious Mr. Norris," which ran as follows:—

"If you would have a general instrument of knowledge, an universal key, a book that will thoroughly regulate, order, and form your understandings and teach you how to use your intellectual powers for the avoiding of error, and conduct you in the search of truth (a search almost as unsuccessful as that of happiness), that will instruct you in the most fundamental theories and prepare you for all that is further intelligible: that will purify and refine your minds, and brighten, clear up, and enlarge your thoughts: that will rid you of all your prejudices and sensible prepossessions, give you clear and distinct ideas of things, and furnish you with the true and solid principles of science, and with the most necessary and important conclusions. In fine, if you would have a book that is alone a library, and an ever rising and flowing spring of knowledge, that ought never to be out of your hands but always to be read, studied, dwelt and fed upon, till it be digested, made your own, and converted, as it were, into the very substance of your souls, let me recommend to you M. Malebranche *de la Recherche de la Vérité*. . . . For indeed to speak out truly what I think . . . I take it to be upon all accounts one of the best books that is in the world; and that of all human composures there is none that does better serve the interests of truth and of true religion."

ON THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING PROFESSOR MILNE'S COSMOLOGICAL THEORY

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ON page 95 appears a review of a book by Professor E. A. Milne in which is described a new theory of the metrical character of the world and the interpretation, in the light thereof, of many important astronomical phenomena. Although the author states that his object is not to criticize the general form of the principle of relativity, there appears to be a fundamental distinction between the viewpoints of Einstein and Milne which is frequently emphasized and which it is profoundly important to examine as minutely as possible, for if Professor Milne's claim is established the foundations of physics are essentially modified. The purpose of this article is to compare the outlooks implicit in Milne's theory and the theory of relativity, respectively, in order to see how far, if at all, current ideas require alteration. It should be mentioned that, although Professor Milne speaks of his theory as "the principle of relativity in a much weaker form" (weaker, that is, in its power of restricting natural possibilities, not in its power of representing phenomena) and frequently uses the word "relativity" to describe it, we shall here, to prevent misunderstanding, restrict the meaning of the word to Einstein's theory.

We begin with what is common ground: we shall accept it without discussion. Our minds have an intuitive knowledge of the passage of time, but no such knowledge of space; our various experiences, that is to say, are arranged in a time-order, but they all happen "here." In order to make sense of them we invent a continuous extension called "space" in which we place "events" postulated to be the origins of those experiences, and we extend our notion of time over this continuum, so that each event happens at a particular place, and at a particular instant of time coincident with some instant in the time sequence of our actual experiences. Thus, the experience of a sudden sensation of light is attributed to an event called "the outburst of a new star" which occurred at some assigned place at an instant when some former experience was occurring to the observer. There is at least a large amount of arbitrariness in the metrical qualities we may assign to this space, and also to the time we may assign to each event located in it; all that is necessary is that the assignments shall be logically self-consistent and shall merge continuously into the actual time-order of the observer's

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experiences (with which they must always be compatible) when the events contemplated approximate to here and now.

This is the starting-point of both theories: let us see first how relativity proceeds therefrom. Since Milne does not consider dynamics, we may restrict ourselves here to the special theory of relativity. We shall present the arguments in a form slightly different from, though logically equivalent to, that usually adopted, in order to simplify comparison with Milne's procedure.

We begin by defining space in terms of an arbitrarily adopted "rigid scale," to which we assign the property of keeping a constant length wherever (and whenever) it is placed. There is, at this stage, no meaning in asking whether its length *does* remain constant, because constancy is defined in terms of it. Thus, if, according to the ordinary standards of physics, the chosen rod is continuously rising in temperature and therefore, according to those standards, continuously expanding, we shall express this by saying that the ordinary standards of physics are continuously falling in temperature and therefore continuously contracting, our "rigid scale" alone remaining variable. It is perfectly arbitrary whether we choose one standard or another to define constancy.

We soon discover, however, that there is a natural phenomenon (known as the "Doppler Effect") which makes it imperative to choose a particular scale. Briefly, this phenomenon is that the spectrum of light radiated or reflected from a body whose distance (judged by this scale) from the observer is changing, is displaced with respect to the spectrum of similar light radiated from a body permanently at the position of the observer. It is conceivable, of course, that this effect might be ascribable to a "field of force" instead of to motion, or to a physical difference in the sources of the two beams of light, so that our use of the word "imperative" is really not justified. Milne, however, by implication rejects all such interpretations, and insists strongly that the Doppler effect is a kinematic phenomenon, so for our present purpose we may take it as establishing an absolute definition of constancy of distance between ourselves and a distant point; i.e. as defining an absolutely "rigid scale."

We have now to choose a standard scale of time. We choose any phenomenon which is repeated unceasingly in our experience, and define the successive repetitions as occupying equal times. Again, it does not matter fundamentally how irregular those intervals are according to our customary clocks; all definitions of equality are equally valid. We find it convenient, however, to choose a definition in the following way. We set up a definite length of rigid rod, as already defined; place at one end a mirror, and at the other a lamp behind a circular wheel having equally spaced teeth at its circum-

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ference, which we can rotate about the rod, which passes normally through its centre. We adjust the mirror so that, when the wheel is not rotating, a ray of light from the lamp, passing through the space between two teeth, is reflected from it back through that space again into our eye. On rotating the wheel we find that the light disappears, that ray which passes between any pair of teeth being now stopped, after reflection, by that one of the teeth which has moved, during the journey of the light, into the position formerly occupied by the space. We adjust the speed of rotation of the wheel so that the reflected light is permanently invisible, and then we define the times of successive rotations (which may be measured by a cyclometer) as equal intervals of time. By making the teeth, spaces, and ray of light sufficiently narrow, we can reach any degree of precision we wish—subject, of course, to quantum theory restrictions which are not in question here.

It is to be noticed that although, for the purpose of description, we have spoken of light travelling from the lamp to the mirror and back again, there is no assumption that light has a constant velocity, or indeed has any existence. Everything could have been described in terms of our own operations and experiences, without considering the passage of any physical agent from the lamp to the mirror.

We next find by experiment that the time-scale given in this way is independent of the length of the rod chosen, in the sense that equal time intervals determined with one rigid rod are equal time intervals determined with any other. The cyclometer readings vary with the length of rod in such a way that the change of reading for any period of time is inversely proportional to the length of rod used. Thus, if we set up two such pieces of apparatus (which we shall call "clock-scales") side by side, with rods of lengths l and $2l$, respectively, and operate them simultaneously over a limited period of time of any duration, the change of cyclometer reading of the first, when that of the second is a , will be $2a$. This means that if (as on other grounds we find it convenient to do) we postulate an entity called "light" which travels from the lamp to the mirror and back, the average to-and-fro velocity of this entity, according to our adopted standards of length and time, is the same everywhere. If, further (as again on other grounds we find it convenient to do), we associate with this light a frequency of vibration indicated by the position of its spectrum, it follows that this frequency defines a time-scale according to which the average to-and-fro velocity of light is the same everywhere in space.

Again, however, we need not think of light at all. In that case our result means that the length of rod divided by the time of one revolution of the wheel is independent of the dimensions of our

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instrument. For the sake of brevity we shall not further refer to the freedom of our conceptions from the idea of light as a physical agent. It will be clear that the constancy of the velocity of light is simply a poetical way of stating what time-system we are using: we define our time measure in such a way that light, if we call it into existence, has a constant velocity. The advantage (apart from irrelevant physical considerations) of calling it into existence is that since this time-system is related to our rigid scale in a particularly simple manner which we could never discover except by observation, it is convenient to assign this fact to something in the nature of the objective world, and light is admirably fitted to be that something.

Our clock-scale now enables us to measure the time of any event at which it is present, and therefore the time-interval between any two events in our own experience, since it is now to be regarded as a part of ourselves. We call this interval the "proper time-interval": it measures the passage of our intuitive time. Since both events are "here," there is no space interval between them. We have yet, however, to define the (so far arbitrary) time which we are to assign to an event at which we are not present with our clock-scale. We do this by choosing a time-system such that the velocity of light ($= c$) is everywhere and always constant—not merely the average to-and-fro velocity which we have already established, but the velocity in any direction. If, then, to a particular experience which happens to us at a proper time, t , we assign a cause at a distance, r , we must place that cause at a time simultaneous with our proper time, $t - \frac{r}{c}$.

We can now define uniform motion. Imagine a straight line set out in any direction, along which we place lamps at equal intervals according to our rigid scale. Set a body moving along the line, and arrange for it to light each lamp momentarily as it comes to it. A stationary observer will then see a number of flashes at times t_1, t_2, t_3, \dots by his clock. The motion is said to be uniform when the intervals, $t_2 - t_1, t_3 - t_2, \dots$ are all equal, and the common magnitude of those intervals, for a given distance between consecutive lamps, provides the data for measuring the speed of motion.

Experiment now shows that a clock-scale constructed in the manner we have described does not change its behaviour when it is moving uniformly. Thus, if we operate two clock-scales in the same manner, and set one of them moving uniformly along our line, its light does not reappear between the teeth. It therefore gives a value for the velocity of light which is independent of its uniform motion. We can, further, by a suitable mechanical contrivance, record the readings of the moving clock when it receives light-signals from any two neighbouring events, and compare the interval between those readings with the interval between the readings of

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our stationary clock for the same events. It then appears that the time-intervals between the events deduced from the two pairs of clock readings are not the same. Hence, since the velocity of light is constant, the space-intervals given by the stationary and moving rods cannot be the same. Nevertheless, a simple combination of the space and time intervals turns out to be independent of uniform motion. Now a space and an associated time were, in the first instance, quite arbitrarily invented in order to simplify the rationalization of our experiences. Obviously, then, that end can be much better served by adopting instead a single extension whose metrical properties are defined by the indications of our clock-scale. In such an extension (called "space-time") the intervals between events are unaffected by uniform motion¹ of the instrument, and so may be called "absolute." When the instrument is present at two events there is no "space" separation, and the interval is identical with the proper time separation. When the events are "simultaneous" in the time-system defined by any state of motion of the instrument, there is no time separation, and the interval is identical with the corresponding space separation.

This account of the special theory of relativity is designed, not necessarily to be completely free from logical gaps (although, it is hoped, it is free from logical errors), nor to present the experiments involved in the precise form in which they are carried out, but to make comparison with Milne's theory as direct as possible. It will be noticed that no assumptions are made. The liberty afforded by the agreed fact that space and external time are originally arbitrary conceptions is accepted fully, and accordingly postulates are made which are restricted step by step only by the requirements of actual observations. The final result is that an extension called "space-time" is adopted and defined by metrical properties given by the readings of two kinds of instrument—scales and clocks. These two kinds are virtually reduced to one by making use of the observed fact that a time-scale is possible which combines naturally with our space-scale to give an invariant measurement of space-time.

Before considering Milne's alternative to this procedure, it will be well to look at his objections to it. They are two—first, the indefinability of the rigid scale; and secondly, the artificiality of "space-time." Let us examine them.

Milne asserts that the rigid scale of relativity theory is an illegitimate conception because a precise description cannot be given to another observer and we can therefore not be sure that two observers are using "identical" scales. Ignoring for the moment the question whether this, if it were true, would constitute a disquali-

¹ General relativity extends this independence to the case of non-uniform motion.

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fication, we notice that the charge of indefinability appears to arise from an oversight which, as we shall see, also vitiates Milne's constructive proposals: he appears to have overlooked the significance of the Doppler effect. Here is a prescription for making a rigid scale which is perfectly communicable. Take any solid rod, place at one end a lamp and at the other a mirror adjusted to reflect the lamplight back to a position adjacent to that of the lamp. The rod is rigid so long as the spectra of the direct and reflected light remain relatively undisplaced.¹

The second objection appears to arise from an inconsistency of thought. It would be intelligible coming from a critic who maintained that space and world-wide time were independent objective existences, but Milne takes as his fundamental standpoint the position that the time-sequence of our experiences is all that is intuitive, and that space (and consequently the time to be assigned to events in space) is an artificial construct. He is therefore denying to relativity the right to one artificial construct while himself adopting two. The fact that those two are (arbitrarily) formed out of the arbitrary measurements of intuitive time does not save them from being artificial. Space-time also is formed out of the measurements of intuitive time—an interval between two events in space-time can be defined as the proper time between those events—and it is far less arbitrary. Milne appears to be appealing to the prejudices of the pre-relativity thinker who regarded space and time as fundamentally independent, without realizing that he is violating those prejudices far more by employing the same measuring instrument for both space and time.

Let us, however, come to Milne's theory itself. The observer, whose *a priori* equipment is simply an intuitive appreciation of the passage of time, selects arbitrarily any recurring phenomenon and, like the relativist, defines the successive repetitions as occupying equal times. He invents a space in which events are situated, and assigns to each event in that space a corresponding time in the following way. He sends to the event a signal, chosen arbitrarily except for the requirement that it can be immediately reflected back to him (or, alternatively, a second observer coincident with the event in question may, immediately on the arrival of the signal, dispatch another similar one to him). He thus obtains two clock-readings, t_1 and t_2 , corresponding respectively to the dispatch and return of the signal. He then defines the time, T , of the event as $\frac{1}{2}(t_1 + t_2)$, and the distance, R , of the event as $\frac{c}{2}(t_2 - t_1)$, where c is any arbitrary number.

¹ See the remarks on p. 56 concerning the practicability of proposed observations.

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Comparing this with the relativity procedure up to this point, we see that it requires only one instrument (a clock) instead of two (a clock and a scale), and, moreover, the clock remains arbitrary. The source of these two additional degrees of freedom is clearly that the restrictions recognized by relativity—namely, the fact of the Doppler effect, restricting the measurement of space, and the postulate of the constancy of the velocity of light, restricting the measurement of time—are not accepted. It follows inevitably that Milne's theory must be relatively indefinite in two respects. The first is that it does not provide for the observed absoluteness of relative motion. However the distance of a body is "changing," we can always choose a clock so that $\frac{c}{2}(t_2 - t_1)$ remains constant in

time, and the body is consequently judged to be at rest, notwithstanding the fact that the Doppler effect gives us an absolute criterion of its motion with respect to the observer. Milne appears partly to realize this defect, for he writes (p. 26): "When we dispense with the concept of the rigid length-measure it is not at once apparent what is meant by being 'relatively stationary.'" He does not seem, however, to grasp the full extent of the damage it does to his scheme, for he goes on: "I have in fact analysed this 'stationary' problem, with surprising results, but they will not be treated here." Since the problem vitally affects the foundation of the theory, it is essential that it should be treated here.

Let us, however, suppose that for the "arbitrary" clock we choose a particular one which distinguishes between relative rest and motion. The Doppler effect requires that this particular one shall be synchronous with a light wave. Then, as compared with relativity, Milne apparently has the advantage that he uses only one measuring instrument instead of two, and has no need to postulate any constant velocity. But actually he has postulated a constant velocity. He cannot, even with his particular choice of clock, explain the Doppler effect without making his signal a beam of light, and he himself shows that his postulates require that the signal velocity shall be c , which he has chosen to be constant. We see, therefore, that if Milne's theory be modified so as to take account of distinctions which actually exist in nature, it becomes—up to the point we have so far reached—identical with relativity: in so far as it differs from relativity it is defective.

The next step in the relativity procedure—namely, the consideration of the behaviour of clocks and scales in relative motion—is not possible to Milne because he has no criterion of relative motion. Accordingly, we must regard his theory, as so far described, as his suggested substitute for special relativity. Consisting as it does merely of a definition of space and time extensions in terms of clock

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readings, it can scarcely be regarded as an adequate substitute, and would doubtless not have been suggested had it not been intended later to amplify it by a postulate chosen to make it capable of dealing with a particular problem—namely, the structure and history of the universe as a whole. Those who are interested in the foundations of scientific thought will perhaps challenge the right of a theory thus to take to itself additional postulates before it has shown evidence of superiority to pre-existing ideas, and when it is remembered that relativity is not merely much more neatly fitted to the facts of nature, but has also proved itself by a natural extension capable of comprehending the whole phenomenon of gravitation as we know it, which Milne's theory as yet shows no power to do, the challenge becomes more insistent. It becomes clamorous when it is considered that the postulate refers, not to the realm of nature which we know, but to the universe considered as a whole, which is a hypothesis. It may fairly be urged, however, that, from the scientific point of view, subsequent comparison with observation may justify the postulate, and if such comparison is favourable the foundations may then be put in order. Let us therefore consider the extension of the theory.

Milne proposes a "cosmological principle," according to which, if A and B are two "equivalent" observers, the totality of A's observations on the universe are described by him in the same way as B describes the totality of *his* observations on the universe. (The definition of "equivalence" will be given in a moment.) Milne recognizes, of course, that all observers in the universe may not be equivalent, and also that universes are conceivable which will be described differently even by equivalent observers. Out of all the possibilities, however, he selects only equivalent observers and calculates what kind of universe will be described by them in identical terms. The cosmological principle is justified in so far as the actual universe is of this kind. Thus the ultimate appeal is to observation, although Milne's "own private opinion is that the universe must satisfy the cosmological principle, because it would be impossible for an act of creation to be possible which would result in anything else" (p. 69).

Two observers, A and B, each making his observations in the manner already stated, are equivalent when A can describe the totality of his observations on B in the same way as B can describe the totality of his observations on A. Such observations are, as we have seen, simply clock-readings, and the descriptions are functions of clock-readings. Equivalence implies that the functions are of the same form for A and B. Two such functions are essential. First, A can determine the distance (R) of B at various times (T). In general, R will vary with T , according to some function, $R = c\phi(T)$.

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Secondly, by telescope or intelligible communication, A is assumed to be able to read B's clock at each instant, T , by his own clock, and he can express the succession of these readings (t') by a function, $t' = f(T)$. B can similarly observe the distance (R') and clock-reading (t) of A at various times, T' , determined by his own arbitrarily chosen clock, and obtain functions, $R' = c\phi'(T')$; $t = f'(T')$. Then the mathematical conditions for the equivalence of A and B are that $\phi \equiv \phi'$ and $f \equiv f'$.

We do not intend to comment generally on the possible activities of the observers in question, but it is important that they should be recognized. It is clear that since, in the applications, A and B may be on different spiral nebulae and use atoms as clocks, practical difficulties are not recognized. If a process is conceptually possible, the fact that nature has provided no means for making it actual is irrelevant, and Milne's promise (p. 23) to "state tests, which could actually be carried out, by which observers in different places and in relative motion could compare their clocks" must be interpreted accordingly. But there is one point in which Milne's observers differ fundamentally from those of relativity—namely, that they must be able to transmit across space not merely physical signals but *ideas*. Whether the transmission is to be "telepathic" or by the assignment of symbolic meanings to the signals used is not stated, and, except from the practical point of view, is immaterial. The point is that the theory is thereby converted from a physical into a psycho-physical one.

This is not a detail; it is fundamental. It is easy to show by an argument which Milne frequently uses (not always, we think, legitimately, but we have no space to discuss that question) that without its psychological element the theory has no meaning. A and B might conceivably ensure that they use the same constant, c , by making some appropriate use of the instant at which they are assumed to be momentarily coincident; they might conceivably read one another's clocks at later times by super-telescopes; but in order to determine that their functions, ϕ and f , are identical, they must transmit ideas across space. Without such transmission the condition of equivalence is unverifiable. But what is unverifiable has no physical meaning. Hence equivalence, robbed of its psychic aspect, has no physical meaning.

Milne is evidently aware that there is some point of importance here, but he has hardly, we think, realized what it is, for he seeks to locate whatever vulnerability is thus introduced, in the underlying idea of relativity rather than in his own application of that idea. "Relativity and solipsism," he says (p. 16), "are incompatibles. Relativity is the complete denial of the solipsist position. Relativity is the comparison of experiences of different observers." This is

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clearly inaccurate. Relativity is, in fact, completely solipsistic. We do not mean, of course, that every relativist must accept all the philosophical implications of solipsism, but that he must not in his physical theory assume anything inconsistent therewith. In the account of relativity which we have given we have deliberately refrained from introducing a second observer, and, so far as observation goes, have identified even the first with an unconscious measuring instrument. It is true that relativistic literature abounds in references to "another observer," but the phrase is invariably a convenient way of saying "myself in a different position in space-time." Changing to another observer and changing one's own co-ordinate system are identical processes, and if there is in the universe an observer whose point of view cannot be represented by a change of co-ordinate system, relativity takes no account of him. Incidentally, this disposes of the objection to the transport of rigid scales, for since the scale is the observer, every other observer considered automatically uses the same scale.

It is, in fact, one of the most satisfactory features of the general theory of relativity that it makes such a definite distinction between changing one's point of view in a physical system and changing the system. The former corresponds to a change of co-ordinates; the latter to a change of metric unattainable by a change of co-ordinates. This simplicity is given full recognition by Milne. Indeed, although (p. 5) he says clearly that "a transformation of co-ordinates by a single observer . . . merely gives an alternative description of the phenomena by the same observer," he appears to contradict this on the same page by saying "the general theory of relativity . . . often employs co-ordinates . . . constructed from observations made partly with the observer's own measuring apparatus and partly with the apparatus of other observers." Actually, the general theory of relativity does not construct co-ordinates out of observations: it expresses observations in terms of co-ordinates.

Milne's restriction to equivalent observers is easily seen to be tantamount in many respects (though, of course, not entirely) to the special relativity restriction (transcended in general relativity) to measuring instruments in uniform relative motion, and such observers only are considered in his derivation of the Doppler effect formula, Lorentz transformation equations, etc. But all these things have, in fact, been determined by a single observer, for there is no evidence that the universe contains another observer in Milne's sense of the word (i.e. an intelligent being who communicates with us by Milne's method). The fact that there are actually many experimental physicists does not affect this statement, because they pool their observations and act as one. Consequently, Milne's derivations—apparently proceeding from his imperfect system of measurement

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supplemented by a psycho-physical postulate—must really proceed from quite a different origin, since they give the familiar results.

Let us take the Doppler effect as an example. Milne introduces his two equivalent observers, A and B, but, as we have seen, he cannot in actual fact make use of their equivalence because the Doppler effect is a physical phenomenon discoverable by a single observer. The unconscious elimination of observer B is made at the outset. In order to become equivalent B must adapt his clock to conform with the behaviour of A's, and he is not thereafter at liberty to change it. Milne, however, assigns to him not the clock prescribed by this necessity, but an atom, and to A a similar atom. No attempt is made to show that such atoms are consistent with the condition of equivalence. Furthermore, the signal, which so far has been arbitrary, becomes identified with light actually radiated by those atoms. Virtually, therefore, B with his equivalence-ensuring clock is eliminated, and in his place is put an ordinary, physical atom, while A remains the sole observer in the universe. The conclusion drawn (p. 37) that "any suggested explanation of the red-shift observed in a distant nebula as 'due to' other than relative velocity can only be maintained by abandoning the 'equivalence' of the distant nebula to ourselves, in the sense in which we have defined 'equivalence,'" can therefore scarcely be regarded as convincing.

In the course of development of his theory, Professor Milne makes several criticisms of general relativity which seem to be based on misunderstanding. It is impossible to consider them in this article, which must be limited to a discussion of the basis of the theory; nevertheless, it is desirable to state that those criticisms should not be accepted without examination. It is only fair to add that Milne expressly disclaims any feeling of hostility to the general theory of relativity, and we do not for one moment suggest that the criticisms are unfair, but we do believe that he is not fully aware of the strength of the position he attempts to overthrow. The general theory of relativity is by no means final truth. It is unsatisfactory in form in that what it immediately indicates is a solution for which one has to discover the problem. It is dependent on the use of co-ordinates, which have no physical meaning. And it violates its own principle in that its reach exceeds its grasp—it gives us complete world-lines of which we can observe only the intersections. But defects such as these are inevitable in the present state of knowledge, and the almost inviolable logic of the theory, combined with its remarkable success in application, makes it extremely unlikely that it will be overthrown in our time except by some alternative which gets beneath its foundations.

The fact is, that while Milne's ultimate contention that all physical measurements should be expressible in terms of our intuitive expe-

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riences—which in the physical world are confined to events in a time sequence—is perfectly sound, the time is not yet ripe for such an expression. Successfully to combat relativity, one must refuse to go beyond those experiences and—somewhat in the manner which is beginning to be revealed to us by quantum phenomena—construct a logical “nexus” which has no need of a continuous extension of space or time. Milne deserts his programme at the beginning. He puts out a continuum in which events are to be located, and from that moment there is little doubt about the result: no matter how he specifies the nature of that continuum, either his theory must be equivalent to relativity or it must be defective, for relativity, as we have seen, takes the inevitable course, making no assumptions at all. There is room, of course, for further generalization of relativity—in the direction of a unified field theory, for instance—and it may be that the Finsler geometry, to which Milne’s work calls attention, will be adaptable to that end, but such generalization will not displace, it will include relativity as we now know it. There seems to be no escape from this conclusion. Relativity must either be uprooted as a whole, or extended: there is no possibility of patching it up.

The question that arises is therefore: Has Professor Milne re-expressed the ideas of relativity in a form better adapted to the solution of certain important problems, or has he provided an expression of relativity which lends itself more naturally than the current expression to further generalization, or has he simply wasted his time? This question demands an answer, but so long as the theory rests on its present unsatisfactory basis no answer can be given. It is much to be hoped that Professor Milne will rigorously reform the foundation of his work so that it may appear in its true shape. It is hard to believe that the brilliant mathematics and elegant graphical processes which his book displays are not the solution of some problem, but the question to be faced is—What problem? Until that is settled it is impossible to decide whether his work bears any relation to nebulae or cosmic rays, or indeed anything at all in nature.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MAIMONIDES AND ITS SYSTEMATIC PLACE IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY¹

DOZENT DR. PHIL. S. ATLAS

MOSES MAIMONIDES, born March 30, 1135, the eight hundredth anniversary of whose birth we now commemorate, is one of those universal spirits who mastered the whole realm of knowledge of their time. His fruitful and extensive literary activity covered many fields: astronomy, medicine, Talmud, and philosophy. His works on medicine were in former times highly esteemed. In the field of philosophy he strove for the synthesis of Aristotelianism and revealed religion, an endeavour which was of paramount importance for the later development of philosophic thought. His influence as a philosopher is not confined to the sphere of Jewish thought, but has left a lasting impression on the history of philosophy in general.

In his chief philosophical work, *Guide for the Perplexed*, Maimonides set himself the task—as the name of the book indicates—of being a guide for those who are perplexed by the problem of reconciling philosophy with biblical religion. He sought to harmonize religion and philosophy and to resolve the apparent contradictions between the two spheres. He pursued this task of reconciliation not on the basis of the admission of two distinct spheres having different aims and purposes whose limits were to be defined and adjusted, but on that of the recognition of their essential unity. Metaphysical truth and religious truth, he claims, are not two different kinds of truth but the true concepts of religion and philosophy are identical. Real religious belief is also knowledge, whereas faith if it is not at the same time a form of knowledge is valueless. This intellectualism leads Maimonides to declare the knowledge of God and the World to be the most sublime ethical task of man. For only through knowledge does man come nearer to God.

True religion and philosophy have the same task and pursue the same aim, namely, to enable man to participate in the eternal through the knowledge of God. For immortality, the participation in the Divine, man achieves only through knowledge of God and of the universe. Thus, the acquiring of knowledge becomes the ultimate ethical task to which all other tasks of man are subordinated, and the supreme value to which all other values are merely subsidiary.

¹ A lecture delivered on May 8, 1935, at Cambridge, by invitation of the Faculty of Mental and Moral Science of the University.

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But, since the true concept of religion can be obtained only by a philosophic process of thinking of which not everyone is capable, it is the task of the theologian who possesses the true concept of religion to discover in the Scriptures the esoteric contents which coincide with the philosophic contents. On the other hand, in studying the Scriptures, what we shall find in them is to be determined by our own reason. Reason is the ultimate judge in matters of truth, and what reason declares to be untrue cannot be made the content of faith. Since reason compels us to apprehend the concept of the unity of God in such a way as to exclude every multiplicity of positive qualities and attributes, for His unity is an absolutely simple one, therefore the anthropomorphic passages in Scriptures have to be so explained that they can be harmonized with the concept of unity as taught by philosophy.

Now at the point where Maimonides departed from the basis of Aristotelian philosophy, namely in the problem of Creation, he said that it was not Scripture which compelled him to maintain the thesis of creation out of nothing; for, if reason should compel him to accept the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world, he would interpret the passages in the Bible in such a way as to harmonize them with reason. On the question of Creation, however, reason, which is the only determining factor, does not give a definite answer; therefore we can accept the literal sense of the Scriptures.

The relation between philosophy and theology, according to Maimonides, can best be expressed by a picture which Kant used. In view of the well-known saying that "philosophy is the handmaid of theology," Kant said: "It can be admitted, but we have to put the question for consideration, whether she is a handmaid who follows bearing the train of her mistress or whether she goes before bearing a torch to illumine her path." By raising knowledge to the position of the sublime ethical task of man and by subordinating faith to knowledge, Maimonides has thus declared philosophy to be the handmaid which is bearing the torchlight of reason to illumine the way of religion.

By philosophy, the contents of which Maimonides holds to be identical with the true concept of religion, he means the philosophy of Aristotle. Since Aristotelian philosophy contains principles which are at variance with the teachings of revealed religion, Maimonides was compelled to examine the Aristotelian system and to reconstitute it to bring it into harmony with the teachings of religion. He accepted those Aristotelian principles which seemed to him to be necessary logically. Maimonides' concept of God as *prima causa* as well as the proofs for the existence of God are all Aristotelian. On the basis of the movement of the world which cannot be infinite he proceeds to the idea of God as first unmoved mover. It was the method of the

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Mutakallimun, the school of Arabic theology, to prove the existence of the world in time, that is to say that the world was created, from which follows the existence of God as creator. Unlike the Mutakallimun, Maimonides proceeds to prove the existence of God quite independently of the question as to whether the world is eternal or exists in time.

Following the proofs of the existence of God on the presupposition of the eternity of the world Maimonides examined closely the Aristotelian proofs of the eternity of the world and found them inconclusive.

The problem of creation was the centre of philosophical interest and was the principal matter of controversy between the followers of Aristotle and Mutakallimun, the Arabic theologians. Whilst the philosophers taught the eternity of the world, that there is only a relative and not an absolute becoming, the theologians on the other hand regarded creation out of nothing as an irrefutable principle of belief.

As Maimonides set himself the task of harmonizing the philosophy of Aristotle with revealed religion, he solved the problem by lifting the whole question on to a different plane. By reason alone, it is impossible to prove apodictically the creation of the world, as claimed by the Mutakallimun, and it is no less impossible to prove the opposite Aristotelian doctrine that the world is eternal. So, as reason is inadequate to solve the problem, it can be left to revelation to provide the solution.

If the proofs for the eternity of the world were conclusive, it would be necessary to interpret the biblical passages relating to creation accordingly, for revelation cannot be contrary to reason. Consequently, the creation of the world must be made probable in the light of reason, in which case revelation can then be shown not to be contrary to reason.

The arguments for the eternity of the world advanced by Aristotle and his followers, Maimonides classified into those based upon a scientific knowledge of nature and those which have the concept of God as their starting-point. To the first class belongs, for instance, the argument from movement. It is impossible to maintain that the phenomenon of movement had a beginning in time, for the supposition of a temporal beginning of movement involves a transition from potentiality to actuality, which is itself movement. Such an hypothesis gives rise to a process of infinite regression, without actually reaching an absolutely first movement. Likewise, matter as a result of an act of creation, presupposes the existence of other matter from which it could be formed, since matter is an indispensable condition of all physical becoming.

The proofs for the eternity of the world which are based on the

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knowledge of nature, Maimonides rejected by maintaining that it is impossible to argue from the process of becoming exemplified in a part of nature to the origin of the world as a whole. The creation of the world cannot be refuted on the basis of knowledge of nature, in which there can be no becoming without previous being, since the origin of the world as a whole is beyond the limits of given nature and therefore beyond the sphere of knowledge. He admits that there is no *creatio ex nihilo* in the realm of natural phenomena, but it does not necessarily follow from this that the origin of the universe may not be due to a creative act of God. The mistake which underlies all these proofs consists in the confusion of the process of becoming as experienced in the world with the origin of the world *in toto* which is beyond the realm of experience. It is the same mistake into which one would fall by deducing the conditions of embryonic life from the circumstances of adult existence.

The proofs for the eternity of the world, which have the idea of God as their starting-point, and which Maimonides rejected, can be summarized briefly as follows: creation out of nothing by God cannot be maintained, for the reason that it would imply that God had passed by the act of creation from a state of potentiality to that of actuality, and such change of state could only be brought about by another agent. Likewise, it cannot be maintained that God is active at one time and inactive at another, since He is not subject to accidents which could affect His will.

Maimonides rejected these propositions by pointing out the underlying mistake involved in confusing human will and action with the will of God and a divine creative act. Human will is subject to determining conditions, and human creative action involves a transition from potentiality into actuality, whereas God's will and creative power are entirely distinct from man's and have only the name in common. It is thus impossible to infer from the nature of a human creative act the nature of a divine creative act, since the two are totally different.

Maimonides' repudiation of these proofs for the eternity of the world is bound up with his theory of the negative attributes of God, since the distinctiveness of divine and human will, precluding the possibility of inferring the nature of the former from the latter, has its roots in his thesis that the divine attributes cannot be defined positively.

The objective of the arguments of Maimonides in regard to the creation of the world is only to show its acceptability, for theoretically the creation of the world can no more be proved than its eternity. Decisive for the supposition of the creation of the world is the religious purpose, which demands a supernatural creative God. For the contrary idea, that of eternity, involves the concept of God,

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not as a free creative spirit, but only as a necessary producing cause. If the creation of the world is accepted as a logical impossibility, this would imply that the whole of nature is a necessity; and man, being a part of nature, can possess no free creative personality. The acceptance of the eternity of the world would destroy the moral factor in the concept of God. A God which is a necessary producing cause, cannot be an ideal for morality. The principle of *Assimilatio Dei*, that God is an ethical ideal, is so central in the Maimonidean conception of God, that from this follows the demand for the creation of the world.

In this problem of *creatio ex nihilo*, Maimonides followed a course similar to the critical method of Kant. He does not try to prove the creation of the world in opposition to Aristotle in order to give a basis for faith, as was the case with the Arabic Kalam. He tries only to disprove the eternity of the world. He has thus transferred the problem of *creatio ex nihilo* from the sphere of theoretical knowledge to the sphere of faith, of practical ethics. On the question of *creatio ex nihilo* Maimonides' method comes very near to that of Kant in regard to the proofs of the existence of God.

The divergence of Maimonides from the Aristotelian basis at this point involved not only the question of creation and eternity, but also the concept of God and the concept of Man. According to Aristotle, God is not a free creator, but is Himself subject to the force of necessity. Likewise, the validity of the principle of causality in the world, which has its origin in God as *prima causa*, is absolute and unlimited. Thus the world does not possess a creative character; and man, as part of the world, is subject to the same principle and cannot be free in his actions.

Maimonides, on the contrary, in maintaining the thesis of the creation of the world out of nothing, apprehended the concept of God in a fundamentally different manner from Aristotle, in that he conceived God as an absolutely free creator, thus giving to the world a creative character and regarding man as a free creative personality. There is thus a correspondence between the concept of God and the idea of man, and both find expression in the same attitude towards the problem of creation.

The points upon which Maimonides differs from Aristotle are of such far-reaching significance that one is led to challenge the generally accepted view that Maimonides' system is Aristotelian. Certainly, Maimonides stands on the Aristotelian basis; but the points wherein he deviates from the Aristotelian path are not merely in details, but are so fundamental as to affect his attitude towards the whole system of thought, and the hall-mark of a thinker consists not in what he has in common with others but what is unique to himself.

Maimonides' ethical concept of God is clearly expressed in his

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theory of negative attributes. The idea of the absolute unity of God excludes the possibility of ascribing to Him positive attributes, since positive attributes involve a duality of subject and predicate. The only positive attributes which can be ascribed to Him are the ethical ones. The bearing of the theory of negative attributes is much wider than appears at first sight; it pervades the whole system and many problems are solved by Maimonides on the basis of this theory.

Every positive description of an object is necessarily either a statement of the conditions and causes of which it is a result, or an analysis of the essential elements of which it is composed. The first kind of description can only apply to conditioned objects, i.e. objects whose causes are beyond themselves; while the second type of description refers only to objects composed of a number of different elements. From the idea of the absolute unity of God, and from the concept of God as the unconditional and uncaused, follows as a corollary the impossibility of applying to Him these two forms of description. Since the essence and existence of God are identical, and His being is a necessary existence, whereas all other beings are conditioned, and their existence can only be regarded as possible existence, it is impossible to apply to God any definition which involves a relation between Him and other beings, for relationship can only obtain between things which have something in common.

All attributes which can be applied to God must, therefore, have only a negative character. That is, they express a negation of imperfection, e.g. the attribute of omniscience means a negation of ignorance; omnipotence is a negation of impotence; eternity is a negation of cause and of conditions. Every attribute which ascribes to God a perfect quality can only be expressed in a negative form, in which any comparison in respect of such qualities between Him and other beings is excluded. For, ascribing omniscience in a positive sense would imply that His knowledge is of the same kind as the knowledge of man; and this would involve limitation. Only when the attribute is understood in a negative sense, e.g. that omniscience is negation of ignorance, is the knowledge of God expressed in the highest degree, without limitation.

The real reason for ascribing negative attributes to God is to express His infinite perfection, without endangering the concept of absolute unity, and the idea of the Divine perfection is attained by means of the denial of imperfection. The only positive attributes which can be ascribed to God are ethical attributes, which refer not to His essence but to His actions; and the idea of absolute unity is thus not endangered. These ethical attributes imply the idea of God as a symbol to man of ethical perfection. Accordingly, the expressions in the Bible must be explained either as negative or as ethical attributes.

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By the negative definition of the knowledge of God, Maimonides overcomes the difficulty in regard to the problem of the freedom of the human will. In contradistinction to modern philosophy, where the problem of free-will consists in its involving infringement of causality; in the Middle Ages the question of free-will was considered in connection with the idea of the absolute knowledge of God, which includes fore-knowledge. In modern times, the problem is postulated: how is freedom of action possible if the validity of the principle of causality is absolute? In the Middle Ages, the problem took the form: how can freedom of will be harmonized with the absolute knowledge of God, since this includes fore-knowledge of the future? Maimonides countered the problem by stating that the knowledge of God is absolutely distinct from human knowledge in that it can only be defined negatively. Fore-knowledge would exclude freedom of will only if knowledge is defined positively; as divine knowledge in contradistinction to human knowledge is defined negatively, then the question, "How can freedom of will and the fore-knowledge of God be harmonized," is unjustified?

The idea of the absolute unity of God, with the consequent exclusion of every positive definition, is a neo-platonic one. Maimonides utilized it to elaborate his ethical concept of God which is the ultimate aim of his philosophy. The neo-platonic conception of God can be regarded as leading to the ethical concept of God, which is manifest in Maimonides' doctrine that the only positive attributes to be ascribed to God are ethical ones, and which shows itself in many other points of his system.¹

As a necessary consequence of his theory of negative attributes, it follows that our knowledge of God is confined to His ethical attributes only, to His actions, not His essence. Any metaphysical knowledge of His being is impossible. And in the scale of values which he established in accordance with Aristotle, he subordinated ethical perfection to contemplative, since the highest value for man is knowledge of God and the universe. The faculty of pure thinking and contemplation constitutes the essence of man which places him above all other beings. All the same, knowledge of God means knowledge of His ethical attributes, and this involves the idea of God as an ethical symbol for man and the moral command to man to follow God in His creative work. Thus the highest value of knowledge of God turns out to imply a moral imperative commanding *assimilatio dei*—a striving to approximate to the moral idea symbolized in the idea of God, an imperative to become a co-creator and co-operator with God.

In denying the possibility of metaphysical knowledge of God Maimonides set limits to the validity of human reason. Maimonides,

¹ cf. Julius Guttmann: *Die Philosophie des Judentums*. München, 1933, p. 185.

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with all his belief in human reason, is conscious of its limitations, and always maintains a critical attitude towards it. The validity of human reason refers only to knowledge of the sublunar world. Whatever transcends the sublunar world is beyond the realm of knowledge. There are problems for which human reason is inadequate. Just as the metaphysical essence of God cannot become an object of knowledge, and the problem of the eternity or the creation of the world passes human comprehension; so, too, the ultimate purpose of the universe as a whole is a metaphysical problem which cannot be scientifically approached.

In this delineation of the realm of knowledge and the realm of transcendence which is beyond knowledge, is manifest that critical attitude which relates Maimonides to the critical philosophy of modern times.

In accordance with Aristotle, Maimonides teaches that the principle of purpose governs all phenomena. All phenomena have to be teleologically explained. This is the object of natural science, to find out the final cause of everything, which is the most important of the four causes. But it is impossible to explain teleologically the universe as a whole. For Aristotle, who considered the world not as the product of a creative act of God, but as a necessary effect of the existence of God, the question of its purpose cannot arise. On the other hand, those who taught the creation of the world found it necessary to explain its purpose. They therefore considered man the purpose of creation. Maimonides rejected this theory and maintained that the teleological principle has its application immanently to all worldly phenomena but not transcendently to the cosmos as a whole. The question of the purpose of the world is, by its very essence, unanswerable, for if we take man as the final purpose of creation, then the question remains, "What is the purpose of man?" and so, necessarily, we continue *ad infinitum*. Thus the question of the final purpose of creation belongs to those metaphysical problems which cannot be solved on a scientific basis.

By denying the possibility of determining the purpose of the universe, Maimonides is far in advance of his time. In general, the geocentric conception of the world leads to the anthropocentric conception of man as the purpose of the universe. Maimonides, by opposing this view and by maintaining that the question of the ultimate purpose of creation cannot be scientifically approached, anticipated the conception of Descartes, who centuries later denied the possibility of apprehending the purpose of creation and considered it presumptuous to seek to understand God's design. (*Meditationes de primâ philosophia*, med. IV.)

The main problems with which the age of Maimonides was concerned were: God and the world, God and man, and God and revela-

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tion. The first of these problems was: How is *creatio ex nihilo* possible, since creation out of nothing seems to be contrary to the idea of God's all-perfection? The next problem was: How is human free-will possible, in view of the fore-knowledge of God? And the third problem concerned itself with the possibility of revelation.

Maimonides attempted to find a solution to all these problems which would at the same time be acceptable both from a religious and from a philosophical point of view. Concerning the first problem, his position is opposed to that of Aristotle who applied the principle of necessity to the world as a whole and considered the world as eternal. Similarly, Maimonides rejected the theory of the Mutakallimūm who held that the divine act of creation is an eternal process and accordingly denied the existence of natural law. Maimonides, while maintaining the existence of natural law, regarded the universe as a whole as having its origin in a free creative act of God. The principle of necessity which prevails in nature is not applicable to the universe *in toto*. By his conception of God as a free creator and not as an absolutely quiescent being, together with his doctrine of the negative attributes, Maimonides brought to fullest expression his ethical concept of God. He thus invests the universe with a creative aspect and conceives of God as a symbol of man's ethical perfection. And here too is found the basis of the freedom of the human will. Without freedom of will there can be no morality, for true morality implies independent creation. The attribute of God's omniscience, which involves fore-knowledge, does not exclude human freedom of choice, since omniscience is not to be defined positively but negatively as a denial of ignorance. Further, revelation is not to be considered as an infringement by God of natural law. Prophecy, like all phenomena in nature, is subject to the laws prevailing in nature, since it is dependent on ethical and intellectual perfection, without which prophecy would be impossible. On the other hand, prophecy is not merely a natural phenomenon which must necessarily appear when certain pre-conditions are satisfied, but is ultimately dependent upon the divine will without which there can be no prophecy.

The work of Maimonides exerted a profound influence on general philosophic thought. To men like Spinoza, Moses Mendelssohn, Solomon Maimon, and Hermann Cohen, Maimonides' works were the source of inspiration for their independent philosophic thought, although subsequently they went their different ways.

The Kantian Solomon Maimon—his surname implies his reverence for Maimonides—never wholly lost touch with the philosophy of Maimonides. Many points can be traced in Solomon Maimon's thought which show his close connection with Maimonides. Hermann Cohen, the founder of the "Marburg School" of Neo-Kantianism,

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loved to emphasize the relation between his own thought and that of Maimonides. In the theory of negative attributes of Maimonides, Cohen saw Kant's ethico-theology which taught the idea of God as bound up not with nature but with ethics. He recognized a spiritual affinity with Maimonides, whose teaching concerning negative attributes and the method of negation leading to the idea of the divine perfection Cohen saw to be closely related to his own "Logik des Ursprungs," i.e. "The Logic of Generation." In both systems it was through the method of negation that all existence was built up. In the case of Maimonides this led to the idea of the all-perfection of God; and in the case of Cohen the method of negation, that is, "the infinitesimal method," aimed at the ordered Cosmos.

In his *Characteristics of Maimonides' Ethics* Cohen tried to interpret the ethics of Maimonides in his own spirit—as the ethics of critical idealism. It is true that some aspects of Cohen's interpretation are not in accordance with Maimonides' actual teaching. Cohen misinterpreted Maimonides' conception of the moral ideal as an infinite process, whereas Maimonides stands upon the Aristotelian basis, the basis of The Mean. All the same, Cohen reached his standpoint through the philosophy of Maimonides, with which critical idealism has much in common. The moral concept of God is fundamental to both.

The significance of Maimonides consists not in the fact that he connected the Aristotelian philosophy as interpreted by the Arabs with revealed religion. His importance consists rather in the way in which he modified the Aristotelian philosophy, and in the original method by which he gave a new validity, in spite of his Aristotelianism, to the moral concept of God. The old prophetic idea of God was always breaking through in his thought. In spite of the radical changes in philosophical thought which have occurred since his time, Maimonides, through his original and profound treatment of religious problems, through the infectious enthusiasm of his philosophic attitude and through his boundless belief in human reason, has retained his significance even for our time. And even if his work does not have the same paramount significance which it had in former times, it is still important for our own day. The realm of philosophy is unlike the realm of natural science, wherein the new physics has completely superseded the older physics. There are problems in philosophy which are eternal, old yet always new; the forms of the problems may change, the content remains the same. Thus philosophy is different from natural science wherein the history of science does not play so essential a role as does the history of philosophy in the sphere of philosophy. Physics, for example, as such, is not connected with the history of physics. But with regard to philosophy, even if it is not to be identified with the history of

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philosophy, still its study is inseparable from that of its history. In philosophy ancient thinkers are constantly awakening to new life, and are freshly interpreted in connection with newly arisen forms of thought. While Aristotelian physics has only an antiquarian value, some aspects of Aristotelian philosophy are represented in current philosophic thought. It is sufficient to indicate that so recent a work as Hans Driesch's *Die Philosophie des Organischen* is nothing else than a modern version of Aristotelianism. Similarly, Plato has been freshly interpreted and accommodated to new forms of thought. So too, Maimonides' philosophy can be considered and interpreted in connection with the religious and philosophic problems of our own day.

As for Maimonides' influence on the history of general philosophy, his theory of creation out of nothing, in particular, has had a profound influence on Christian thought. One of the main issues between philosophy and theology concerned the creation of the world. The Aristotelian proofs of eternity were considered irrefutable. For this reason the Church strongly opposed the Aristotelian system and prohibited the study of Aristotelian philosophy. A different attitude was assumed by Maimonides who, while in general agreement with Aristotle, yet disproved the Aristotelian thesis regarding the eternity of the world. Naturally, therefore, the Maimonidean exposition was of particular interest to the Christian world, for it revealed to the scholastics a new method of maintaining the creation of the world on a philosophic basis. Thus, Maimonides in the thirteenth century facilitated the ascendancy of Aristotle by removing the obstacle—the thesis of the eternity of the world. Thereby he contributed towards the displacement of Platonism and Neo-Platonism by Aristotelianism in the Christian philosophy of the thirteenth century. The *Guide* appeared in 1190, and early in the thirteenth century it was already known to the Christian world. William of Auvergne, the bishop of Paris, and Alexander of Hales, the English theologian who first introduced Aristotelian philosophy into Christian theology, made diligent use of Maimonides' work.

Albertus Magnus, who flourished soon after Maimonides, one of the most significant figures in the Catholic Church, incorporated in his own work complete chapters of the *Guide* of Rabbi Moses Aegyptus, as he called Maimonides, and in general made extensive use of Maimonides' work. He thus prepared the way for his pupil Thomas Aquinas, who used Maimonides' work in the construction of one of the most important systems of Catholic thought. While Albertus Magnus was more the compiler, Thomas Aquinas was the creator of a unified complete system of Christian Theology. Accordingly Thomas Aquinas not only quotes Maimonides but has assimilated his thought into his own system.

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With regard to the far-reaching influence of Maimonides on Thomas Aquinas, some scholars go so far as to claim that the *Guide* of Maimonides is the precursor of the *Summa* of Thomas Aquinas, and in questions concerning the reconciliation of revealed religion and Aristotelian philosophy Thomas Aquinas follows Maimonides as closely as the differences between Judaism and Christianity permitted.¹

It must, however, be admitted that there are fundamental differences between Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas. For example, with regard to the problem of creation, Maimonides retains his critical attitude to the bitter end by maintaining that the creation out of nothing can no more be demonstratively proved than can the eternity of the world. His only aim was to show the acceptability to reason of the doctrine of creation out of nothing and thus to show that there is no contradiction between reason and revelation. On the other hand, Thomas Aquinas is dogmatic in his assertion that creation out of nothing can be made evident by means of demonstration.

All the same, Thomas Aquinas received from Maimonides the stimulus for the construction of his own views on creation through the latter's disproof of the Aristotelian arguments in favour of eternity.

As in the scholastic period Maimonides served chiefly as the pattern for the harmonizing of religion and Aristotelian thought, so in the Renaissance with the decline of Aristotelianism the interest in Maimonides, although naturally diminished, was not effaced. For this period his attraction lay not, as in the preceding period, in his theory of creation, but in his theory of negative attributes, in his thesis that the essence of God cannot be the object of knowledge and in his interpretation of the biblical figurative expressions.

In modern times Leibniz is the principal philosopher who thought Maimonides worthy of study. Leibniz became acquainted with Maimonides' work through the new Latin translation of the *Guide* by Johannes Buxtorf (printed at Basle in 1629). Leibniz used it, quoted from it, and professed great regard for the author. Leibniz introduces his notes² on the *Guide* with the following words: "The work of Rabbi Moses Maimonides called *The Guide for the Perplexed* is pre-eminent and is more philosophical than I

¹ Cf. Emile Saisset, in *Revue de Deux Mondes*, 1862.—Jacob Guttman, *Das Verhältniss des Thomas von Aquino zum Judentum und zur jüdischen Litteratur*, Göttingen, 1891.—Jacob Guttman, *Der Einfluss der Maimonideschen Philosophie auf das christliche Abendland*, in *Moses ben Maimon, Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaft des Judentums*, Leipzig, 1908.

² Published by a French scholar, Foucher de Careil; Leibniz, *La Philosophie juive et la caballe*, Paris, 1861.

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expected; it merits close attention. He was a man of unusual intellectual power, in philosophy, mathematics, medicine, and finally in biblical exegesis."¹ Moreover the system of Leibniz bears affinity in several important respects to that of Maimonides.

Attempts have been made to trace spiritual relationship between the philosophy of Spinoza and that of Maimonides. While some aspects of Spinoza's system can be best understood on the background of the *Guide*, yet the contrast between these two thinkers is so fundamental that any effort to bring them close together must necessarily entail a violation of the principles of one or the other.

In their conception of God as well as that of the world they differ fundamentally. While Maimonides presents an ethical Monotheism, Spinoza develops a natural Pantheism. Maimonides' theory of negative attributes leads to the ethical concept of God; Spinoza's theory that the world consists of two positive attributes of God—*res extensa* and *res cogitans*—and that the world as a whole is a manifestation of the Divine substance leads consistently to the annihilation of ethics. According to Spinoza the world exists necessarily as a constituent part of God, while according to Maimonides the existence of the world only follows as a product of a free creative act of God. According to Spinoza the validity of the principle of causality is absolute and all-embracing; everything that exists, does so of necessity. There is no freedom of human will which is the essential presupposition of ethics. In a world-order like this man as a part of nature is subject to the same laws which govern the rest of nature. He has no specific place in the cosmos. On the other hand, Maimonides, by his conception of God as a free creator and as a moral symbol to man, has assigned to man a pre-eminent place in the cosmos, and by recognizing him as a free creative personality has invested him with a significance which distinguishes him from all other forms of existence.

It seems that of all modern philosophers Leibniz is most akin to Maimonides. Leibniz as well as Maimonides represent the doctrine that the world being the creation of God must be in its essence absolutely good. This idea is based upon the conception, common to both, of God as a perfectly free creative spirit. Leibniz, like Maimonides, conceived of God as an active, dynamic, absolutely free creator in contradistinction to Spinoza, whose conception of God is that of an absolutely static substance. The spiritual affinity of Maimonides and Leibniz can best be traced by comparing Maimon-

¹ *Egregium video esse librum rabbi Mosis Maimonidis qui inscribitur Doctor perplexorum, et magis philosophicum quam putaram, dignum adeo lectione attenta; fuit im philosophia, mathematicis, medica arte, denique sacrae scripturae intelligentia insignis.*

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ides' arguments against the Mutakallimun on the question of the existence of natural law and the arguments advanced by Leibniz against "Occasionalism" represented by Malebranche and others.

According to the Mutakallimun the world consists of atoms, for the maintenance of which as well as for their coherence continuous re-creation by God is required. There are no natural laws. They conceive of the creative act of God as a continuous one which extends to the minutest details, coming directly from God. They thus present an "Occasionalism" which excludes the existence of natural law. The same "Occasionalism" is manifest in their conception of substance and accident. Substance and atom are identical. The accidents require a continuous re-creation without which no accident could exist for two consecutive moments. As they deny the existence of natural law they conceive of causality not as a law in itself but merely as an habitual sequence. This doctrine of causality as a psychological phenomenon was adopted later by the Arabic philosopher Al-Ghazzali, who made it the central point in his system and thus anticipated David Hume's scepticism.

It seems that the basis of the "Occasionalism" of the Mutakallimun is to be found in their concept of God as an all-perfect being, in which preference is given to the attribute of omnipotence over that of omniscience. The idea of God as omnipotent involves the supposition that all being and existence are immediately derived from the divine will. Since natural law would limit divine omnipotence the Mutakallimun deny its existence. All existence must therefore be due to a continuous divine creation.

Maimonides rejected the doctrine of the Mutakallimun and maintained the existence of natural law. In the world all phenomena are governed by law established by creation. Maimonides' view of nature being subject to natural law and logic originates in his conception of God as the infinitely perfect being because of His omniscience rather than because of His omnipotence. An ordered cosmos in which law prevails as a manifestation of divine wisdom is more compatible with the idea of divine perfection than a lawless universe in which all phenomena are due to an immediate act of creation as a manifestation of divine omnipotence. Thus the existence of natural law follows from the superior emphasis given to omniscience among the divine attributes.

Parallel with Maimonides' arguments against the Mutakallimun are the arguments advanced by Leibniz against "Occasionalism" of his time as represented by Malebranche and others.

At the centre of philosophic interest since Descartes stands the problem of mutual interaction and influence on each other of the two absolutely different substances, body and soul. How can two entirely different substances like body, the essence of which is

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extension, and soul, the essence of which is thinking, influence and stimulate each other? The attempt to find a solution to this problem was the determining factor in the development of philosophic thought subsequent to Descartes. In the different answers to this question consists the essence of the philosophic systems of Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibniz.

According to the doctrine of "Occasionalism" the stimulation of the body is only the occasion on which there comes about some modification of the soul, and vice versa. It is only God who finally produces the modification in one substance on the occasion of the stimulation given by another. Thus, the unity of the world is guaranteed by the idea of God, so to say, as a permanent controller connecting the two totally distinct substances, and their influence on each other is due to an immediate act of God.

Leibniz expresses the occasionalists' idea of God by means of a simile, comparing God with a supervisor having constantly to adjust two watches to keep them in time with one another. He has constantly to produce the harmony which they are unable to bring about unaided. In like manner, it is the function of God to cause the two totally different substances to correspond with one another. The occasionalists thus give preference to God's attribute of omnipotence. By His constant intrusion into the process of nature, in order to produce the harmony of the two distinct substances, the unity of the world is brought about. Thus the unity of the world is guaranteed by the omnipotence of God.

In contradistinction to this is Leibniz's theory of pre-established harmony, which has as its basis the idea of God as all-wise. His doctrine is that at the Creation a harmony was established which ensured the correspondence of the two substances with one another. They can be compared, to follow up Leibniz's simile, with two perfectly synchronized watches. At the creation of the world, by the wisdom of God, unity was established; and thus, at the creation of the two substances, their harmonious correspondence with one another was provided for. Leibniz considered that this natural harmony of the two substances was more compatible with the idea of God's perfection, than the occasionalists' theory of a supervisor making constant adjustments. Thus in Leibniz's theory of a pre-established harmony, the emphasis is laid on the attribute of omniscience, and this corresponds with Maimonides' view, while the conception of the occasionalists corresponds to that of the Mutakal-limun.

It is obvious that within the limits of one lecture it is possible only to call attention to a few points which indicate the systematic place of Maimonides in the history of philosophy and his influence thereon. They may nevertheless suffice to show that the philosophical

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work of Maimonides, even considered as a product of the culture of his time in the light of which it is to be read and understood, has exerted an influence far beyond his own day; and that his trend of thought shows surprising affinity to modern philosophic ideas. The conviction grows increasingly clear that the realm of spirit stands above nations and races. Great spirits, even though they are closely connected with the general culture of their time and are bound up with the nation of their origin, yet belong to the whole of mankind. Such a one was Maimonides.

SOVEREIGNTY AND THE STATE¹

R. E. STEDMAN, M.A., PH.D.

THE question of political sovereignty must at all times be of acute academic interest, since it is practically impossible to say anything about the state without implying something about sovereignty, or vice versa. Political *theory* has very generally found this conception central to its inquiry; but in recent years the notion has been thrown into sharp relief by political *events*. In Fascism and Nazism the doctrine of state sovereignty is "made flesh" in startlingly substantial forms. These modern incarnations of *Leviathan*, and their threat to much which has come to be deeply valued, give unprecedented importance to an age-long discussion. Political theory is not to-day, if it has ever seemed, a simply academic issue, or an "arm-chair" branch of philosophy. Not all of those who carry through revolutions, who build barricades and defend them with their lives, have a clear philosophical theory of the state; but powerful beliefs and motives they certainly have; and it daily becomes more manifest that unless the world is content to allow its political future to be determined more and more by obscure visceral impulses or crude economic motives a more intense effort to achieve and to apply true beliefs in the political field is imperative.

My purpose in this paper is a modest one. I do not propose either to refute again or to rehabilitate the old sovereignty theories of a Hobbian or an Austinian sort. The former is too easy, and the latter I deem impossible. But the vitality, in one shape or another, of these views argues that they must at least adumbrate some political truths if not those which they explicitly affirm. I wish, therefore, to consider as sympathetically as possible a notion which it is now fashionable either to adopt or reject without criticism. There is a manifest need to ask: On the supposition that the state is not sovereign, what—apart from interested motives—suggests to serious thinkers that it is? And on the same supposition, what is the general ground of obligation to obey the law, and the particular ground of the obligation to disobey it? As a preliminary I shall tentatively define sovereignty, and suggest some evidence for the conclusion that the state is not sovereign. Such evidence (which

¹ Delivered as a public lecture in February 1935. I should like to refer to Professor Ernest Barker's admirable article in the October *Hibbert Journal*, in which he most persuasively argues for the position I desire chiefly to enforce.

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I do not give as exhaustive) is required to substantiate the standing supposition of this argument.

The state I take to be society formally organized for the purpose of order by means of law. Societies in which order is otherwise secured—for example by custom, taboo, or similar means—are not, according to this definition, states. Such a definition is to some extent arbitrary, but it accords with wide usage and seems to me to escape most of the possible objections. The doctrine of state sovereignty affirms that it is an unconditional obligation upon every member of the state to obey the law. Sovereignty, therefore, is not mere power. An individual or group may enjoy power, more or less, but on this view the only power which can be exercised as a *right* is that which the state wields directly through the instruments of law enforcement or indirectly by delegation or specific commission. This view is immortalized by Hobbes in the *Leviathan*. But something very close to it was movingly expressed by the condemned Socrates of the *Crito*.

"If we mean to kill you," the Laws of Athens are made by Socrates to say to Crito who is beseeching him to escape with him from prison and death, "because we think it just, must you do your best to kill us in your turn? Can you claim that you have a right to this, you, the lover of virtue? Is this your wisdom, not to know that above father and mother and forefathers stands our country, dearer and holier than they, more sacred, and held in honour by God and men of understanding? That you ought to reverence her, and submit to her and work for her when she is in need . . . and either win her consent or obey her will, suffer what she bids you suffer, and hold your peace . . .?"

The principal difference between this view and that of Hobbes is that for Socrates the ethical obligation is prior to (or is more fundamental than) the claim of the state to obedience, while for Hobbes moral notions have no significance whatever except within the state. Thus when Hobbes speaks of "natural rights" as existing before the foundation of the Commonwealth, what he really means is that such and such things a man will do or demand in so far as he has the power. The "right to life," e.g., can mean for him simply the fact that, so far as he is able, a man will defend himself. This is a psychological fact, not a moral right. I cannot here argue that the position of Socrates is the sounder, but I have no doubt that this is so, and for the sake of the present discussion I must be content to assume it. The position for Socrates is that a man must always do his duty, and that it is always his duty to obey the law. In all political situations, therefore, the state is sovereign.

Professor Bosanquet sees sovereignty in a similar light. "The state," he argues, "as the operative criticism of all institutions is

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necessarily force, and in the last resort it is the only recognized and *justifiable force*" (my italics). It is not power, but the *sole right* to power, which characterizes the state.¹

The question whether or not the state is sovereign in the sense of wielding supreme power by right clearly concerns us very closely. In fact it has been generally answered in the negative of late by English political philosophers. But on the Continent scholars have adhered, in general, to the sovereignty theory; and political activity has widely been based upon it. For these reasons alone it seems to me mistaken both as tactics and as theory to treat the issue as certainly decided against the state. Mr. G. D. H. Cole brushes the whole discussion aside. Not only does the claim of the state to sovereignty obviously fail, but, he affirms, no body can anywhere be discerned which really pretends to sovereignty in the sense suggested. But events have revealed the error of this judgment. Indeed, it may be said with some assurance that the *claim to sovereignty* is a mark of all states, howsoever they differ in other respects. We may sympathize with Mr. Cole's dislike of these pretensions (if they are pretensions), but their presence is surely not in doubt. One of Mr. Cole's chief premises for the conclusion that the state does not exist is the diversity of so-called states. But star-fish vary without ceasing to be star-fish. And whether or no we agree with Otto Gierke that "The attribute of sovereignty is the state's peculiar and specific criterion," it appears to me merely a matter of observation that the *claim* to sovereignty is a mark common to all diversities of state forms.

Perhaps one of the most damaging arguments against the right of the state to supreme power is the simple denial that the state ever has wielded supreme power. In this event it would be hardy to assert the existence of a right which never has had and—so far as can be anticipated—never will have, a factual basis. The claim to the right of power presupposes the existence of power. But this presupposition, it may be argued, is void. One defence against this argument would be to insist that a right can be a right where its factual expression is utterly impracticable, but few would venture on this dubious ground. The alternative and more plausible objection would be to deny that no state has ever enjoyed supreme power. When we look at states "close up" the contrary appearance may meet us, but if we look farther perhaps we shall fare better. Rome, for example, appears to present a face of unbroken power. In fact, however, the situation was not so simple. The exercise of supreme

¹ In fairness to Bosanquet it should be added that the state, for him, exercises, or is the organ of, a sovereignty which attaches not to the state as such but to "the whole fabric of institutions." This distinction need not concern us here but in a full discussion it would deserve attention.

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power must be taken in time as well as in extent, and the formal instruments of Roman rule cannot be found by the historian to wield unchallenged power for any length of time. The real picture, surely, is not one of law and power permanently, or even steadily, coincident, but rather of an unceasing warfare of groups and persons for the exercise and spoils of government. In modern times it becomes more and more evident that state power is limited in many informal ways, and to a very large degree, by an indefinite number of forces strictly irrelevant to the legal political sovereign. Suffragettes, passive resisters, Trade Unions, Chambers of Commerce, powerful individuals and groups, all lend their ounces or pounds to the force by which actual rule is effected and modified.

Considerations such as these have led Mr. Cole and others to turn right away from the notion of sovereignty, and even of the state, as a clue to political life, and to seek for light in voluntary association and in community in general. This shift of emphasis has undoubtedly been of value, but its danger appears to me to lie in its tendency to underestimate the peculiarity of the state, even where it does not run to the extreme of denying its existence. The state does, to my mind, enjoy a peculiar position and authority which cannot be explained away. Attempts to do so generally express the voluntarist and syndicalist preferences of their authors rather than the realities of the political situation. In fact the state is not all powerful, but its exercise of force is unparalleled, and impressive to an extent which suggests a difference not of degree, but of kind between the state and the voluntary associations. It is, by the way, a misnomer to describe the state as a voluntary association, since I cannot choose to belong or not to belong to *some* state, though I may in some cases renounce a particular citizenship. It is of greater moment, however, to note that the exercise of power by all agents other than the state seems to differ in important regards from that of the state itself. Thus after a successful revolution the voluntary association which carried it through hastens to equip itself with the armour of *law*, or to put its action on the footing of state action.

It remains, then, to adumbrate a view according to which the state is not sovereign but which sufficiently accounts for its claim to sovereignty, justifies its unparalleled (but not supreme) power, and, while showing the ground of the general obligation to obey the law, leaves a loophole for the particular obligation to disobey it. This is the theme of a book, not of an article, but a few suggestions may here be made.

The significance of the claim to sovereignty, it seems to me, lies in its emphatic assertion of the ethical basis of the state. It is here that the state claims *right*, and right is either *moral right* or it is

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nothing at all. The state does not simply say to a man: "You must obey the law!" It affirms that he *ought* to obey it. The exercise of mere power by the Eastern type of despot did not (so far as it was mere power without any vestige of even qualified consent) imply any claim to sovereignty over the subject peoples above which it spread its devouring power. The nexus maintained was without benefit of any moral sanction whatsoever. But within the limits of the parent communities of these empires such a claim was generally made and upheld by virtue of the priestly status of the king or the kingly status of the priest. The cohesion of such communities, which becomes the germ of empires themselves void of ethical import, is not the product of power alone, but of power sanctioned by divine authority. Here the moral sanction is not discriminated from the religious, but in principle the distinction is discernible between might and sovereignty, power and the right of power.

But if the state claims right, its claim must be subject to the general conditions of right. Unfortunately, no subject in the whole of philosophy is more controversial than this. For my part I am unable to accept merely formal theories of rightness—which, with Kant, trace the right to a wholly inward state of mind—and I must here simply assert what really calls for argument, namely that the right can only be understood in conjunction with the good, and that the right of the state to power belongs to it as it is an instrument of good. The extremely "high" view of the state held by Socrates and Plato is thus to be accounted for by their conviction that the state was the primary condition of the good life for man. All the extremes of Plato's *Republic* and *Laws* flow from his high estimate of the ethical functions to be carried out by the state. It is no doubt very largely to this ideal city, and only in part to the actual beloved Athens, that Socrates acknowledges absolute allegiance in the *Crito*. If the state were sovereign it would be in its moral function that we should see the foundation of its sovereignty. And in so far as a state enjoys the right of unparalleled power it does so for the same reason.

Under modern circumstances, at any rate, it is more than doubtful whether any actual state could claim to be the primary positive condition of the good life of its members. But it might more modestly and more justly be claimed for the state that it is a primary negative condition of the good life in that such a life could not be worked out except within a field of public order established by law. Thus it has this claim to general obedience, namely that its purpose of law and order is the *sine qua non* of the specifically human life. The claim to sovereignty, where it is not a mere device of despotism, enjoys whatever force it possesses because of the extremity of the need of man for public order, without which his


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life would indeed be "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short." We can readily understand, therefore, why it is in times of unusual political disorder that the most extreme sovereignty theories are promulgated. Thus the *Leviathan* was being prepared at the very moment that the actual sovereign was being overthrown.

Some writers, notably Professor Laski, are closer to Plato in expecting that actual state activity should directly or positively foster the full realization and development of its members. I take the somewhat lower line of insisting upon its instrumental function as the preserver of that order without which such realization could not be hoped for. But in essence these positions are similar, since they alike see the justification of the state in its moral character.

The matter may be put thus: The state is society organized for the maintenance of peace and order, and hence it has an indisputable right to such power as is necessary in the changing situation to guarantee its purpose. How much power this is cannot be decided in general terms. But I think it is a safe generalization that the better the state—i.e. the better it effects its purpose at large—the less this feature of power will obtrude. As Professor MacIver excellently puts it, "Force holds nothing together." It is the antithesis, not the essence (as Bosanquet holds) of law. Indeed, the ability of the state to use force to secure its proper purpose constantly puts this purpose in peril. The course of history is strewn with the wrecks of communities which have collapsed from excess of internal force.

Since, then, as soon as the state's claim to the possession and right of supreme power is sharply tested it is seen to be without substance, is it not odd that all states do in fact continue to make this insupportable claim? Not, I judge, altogether. It is not accidental that in time of crisis, when the claim is in fact most precarious, it is most vigorously maintained. As the crisis continues a revolution may overthrow the state at the very moment that it is solemnly declaring its sovereignty. What, it may be asked, is the sense of this? Perhaps we may see in this claim an oblique mode of insisting that it is of the essence of government (which, of course is the state in action) to be continuous. If public order is to be secured government must go on.¹ In the narrow sense "governments" come and go with the regularity of the seasons, but the function of government is actually continuous in spite of the succession of ministries. And since government must be continuous if its purpose is to be effected, it stands to reason that the state must challenge the *right* of any individual or group to interrupt the activity of government. So long as a government exists it must act *as if it were supreme, as if there were no rightful power but its own*. In Great Britain this gesture is kept up by the fiction of the



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sovereignty of the King in Parliament. In China we find a weak government strenuously claiming the sovereignty it does not possess in order to extend the field of public peace and order. In the U.S.A. we have the highly instructive observation of the President (as quoted in the English press and wireless news) that—in effect—if the Constitution can carry his monetary policy well and good, but if it cannot it is not the policy which will be changed. This is inevitable, for crisis brings out the essentials of political life. Thus what may be described as the *provisional or pragmatic sovereignty* of the state arises. This pragmatic sovereignty has its moral basis in the extreme need of man for peace and public order. This need is so extreme that only something very good indeed can be the basis of a right to disobey the law.

But the ethical basis and character of the state has implications which are destructive of the claim to absolute and unqualified sovereignty. Peace and order are essential to human life, but they are *instrumental goods* only. Hence the right of the state to pre-eminence among associations and to unparalleled power is a conditional right. And the ends to which security and order are means are of such a nature that they cannot be *gleichgeschaltet*. Hence the state can claim a right to maintain peace and order only in such a manner as to permit the free pursuit of culture—of science, art, religion. These efflorescences of the human spirit are not derived from the state, but the state can destroy them. Any exercise of power which endangers them is not sovereignty but tyranny.

Finally, in appealing to *duty* (which is the obverse of right, the right of the state being a claim upon the duty of its members), the state is invoking an authority which, in the last resort, must be fatal to sovereignty theories. A man's duty is what his conscience imposes. Hence, when a dutiful citizen obeys the King's law, the sovereign he is acknowledging resides in his own breast. In claiming sovereignty the state has appealed to conscience and not (as Hobbes claims) merely to fear and the desire for order. But conscience is sovereign in its own sphere. Therefore the provisional or pragmatic sovereignty of the state is cut across by any issue which awakens clear conscientious objection to obedience. Thus we cannot go as far as Socrates, who admits the propriety of persuasion of the state, but where this fails will not allow disobedience on any grounds whatsoever. But that conscience does in fact lead to disobedience is, of course, too obvious to need emphasis. All sovereign states know it to their discomfort. The conclusion I wish to emphasize is this, that the particular obligation to disobey the state is implicit in the claim of the state to right as well as power, and in the general obligation to obey the law. To claim for governments the right to

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override conscience in the name of sovereignty comes to a contradiction in terms, and these the terms most vital of all to man. Hence it is not surprising that governments which claim the sovereign right to set at nought the consciences of their people come inevitably to rely upon the only remaining instruments of obedience, namely, force, torture, and terror.

DISCUSSION

SCIENCE AND THE EXPLANATION OF PHENOMENA

HELEN WODEHOUSE, M.A., PH.D.

DESCRIBING and explaining; tracing the outlines and smoothing out the folds; making clear and making plain; in either case hoping that our hearer may be able to say, "Yes, I see it better now." Is there really a fundamental difference between these two? Common parlance uses both words for the same kind of process. We may be asked either to "explain" or to "describe" the working of a machine, answering the English boy's question "Why does it do this?" or the Scotch "What's the go of it?" To account for a sum of money is to explain its absence by describing its expenditure. We say, "Why is that man offended?" or, equally, "What's the matter?" and a brief description of the man's character and history, showing on what structure a casual remark has impinged, may lead us to say, "That explains it." Even where purpose enters we may vary the words we use. "Why on earth did you do that?" "What was your idea in doing that?" "Describe what you had in your mind." "Please explain."

"The function of science," writes Professor W. T. Stace,¹ "is to answer the question 'what?' but never the question 'why?' In other words, its function is simply to *describe* phenomena, never to *explain* them." I desire to urge that common speech does not make, and that philosophy should not make, any such gulf between the two processes as would justify this ruling. To explain a phenomenon D is sometimes to describe ABCD; sometimes, where purpose enters, it is to describe ABCDE; sometimes to spread out D into its details $D_1D_2D_3$; often to do all these together. It is to show D in its full character, and in its background and setting, and with its background showing through the details and interworking with them (our symbols are inadequate for this). We are to see D's structure and function and possibilities, and the world's bearing upon them and their bearing on the world. The contour of a face is partly explained when we have learnt to see the bones beneath the skin and to notice how a habitual expression has moulded what lies over the bones; and we should understand the face better still if we knew all the man's history and heredity on the one hand, and all that physiology and psychology and the sciences of nutrition and education can tell us on the other. A perfect description of England and India, in their present and their past, might do much to explain each to the other. A complete or perfect explanation or description has presumably never been given of anything in the world.

One word, no doubt, is used more widely than the other. We sometimes complain, "This is a description but not an explanation"; meaning either that it does not go beyond what was given, or that the new information is not relevant. To the statement "You are very late," the answer "I hurried all the way" is descriptive but not explanatory; whereas "I met the Man with the Green Hat," if the title is that of a notorious button-holer, is explanatory as well as descriptive. An ultra-Humian might maintain that in

¹ *Philosophy*, October 1935, p. 410.

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the realm of science nothing is more relevant than anything else; that we can only hope for observed sequences; not for sequences that are more or less intelligible. We shall not claim that perfect intelligibility, which means complete and perfect knowledge, is achieved anywhere. But it does seem reasonable, we usually think, in psychology that a bad shock should tend to be followed by haunting fears, and in meteorology that floods should follow not after drought but after excessive rain. "The people living in those red-painted houses are always suffering from malaria." "The man looked at me and dropped dead." If we are told that it is no business of medical science to explain, we may surely ask, at any rate, for a fuller and more relevant description.

I do not think that Professor Stace does take the ultra-Humian position.¹ Nor do I think that he really means to take another conceivable position; that no account would be worthy of the name of explanation unless it connected the given phenomena with some thing-in-itself that can never appear and therefore can never be described. I have not been able fully to understand what criterion of explanation the article does arrive at; for pp. 413g-414a (on the desire to feel at home) seems to suggest a motive rather than to supply a criterion. To say that Professor Stace does not make his own criterion clear would be to put the matter unfairly, for he pictures the explanation-asking public as putting pressure on the scientist to give them something other than description, and speculates as to what it can be that they are really wanting. I suggest that all they want, in most cases, is to be helped to see the "go" of things more fully and clearly, and to understand better how one bit of the world fits in with the rest. Sometimes the questioner would naively like to find some particular answer; he would like to find, for instance, as part of the account, that the puzzling phenomenon served a purpose, or that something which looked inimical to what he cared for was really not so. But most requests for explanation are surely not thus tied down; and they have many motives.

The final "Note on the Concept of Explanation" seems to bear only upon one particular problem—the attempt to give an explanation of the universe taken as a whole. The earlier section, pp. 416-23, directed against certain mathematical physicists whom the author believes to be misled by feeling bound to seek an explanation, would seem to be equally well stated if he merely urged (as he does) that the account they give (whether called explanation or description) is incorrect. I venture to suggest, however, that the contents of these two sections do show the motive of the article; that Professor Stace is giving battle to certain particular answers to particular problems; and that to this extent these pages "explain" what precedes them. For I cannot think he means seriously and universally the suggestion made on p. 423d, that, whether in science or philosophy, "the whole idea of explanation is illusory, wherever it is found." Indeed he does not say so.

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¹ He seems, for instance, not to rule out the intensified intelligible connection which we call necessity, and its complement which is impossibility. Near the bottom of p. 420 he speaks of a formula describing "every possible path of every possible gravitating body."

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PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE

SOME RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS ON THE FORMATION OF GREEK THOUGHT

HISTORY and Legend are, Professor Robin believes,¹ traditionally misconceived in being conceived as in conflict. To write history is either to destroy utterly the claim of some legend to be veridical, or else to rediscover, behind what is imaginary or fabulous in it, indications of what the facts really were. Such is the accredited view. But, asks M. Robin, is not legend, on the contrary, a positive element in history? And he answers in effect that nowhere is legend more regular, indeed more necessary, than in its contribution to the history of philosophy, ancient and modern. This history has a wholly original character. It does not resemble the history of the sciences; for this relates either the checkmates in research—instructive to be sure, but dead for future science—or else its victories—equally instructive, though only their results survive. Nor does it resemble literary history; for even if this be accompanied by evaluatory criticism, seldom is interpretation of doctrine admitted. Interpreting a philosophy is seizing not only its literal sense, but above all its import and efficacy. It is a continuously creative and reflective activity which unceasingly quickens the materials on which it reflects. But since what is called objectivity cannot be attained by the historian of philosophy except by shutting his eyes to the limits of his powers, he must candidly confess—and without admitting that the confession impairs the value of his effort—that objectivity cannot be his chief end. No great philosophy can really be considered dead, its sincere and sympathetic evocation is always possible. The history of philosophy is philosophy; it is philosophy philosophizing on its past efforts, and contemplating itself in the perennality of its changing existence.

What philosophy and its history can become when pursued from such an outlook and by one of M. Robin's consummate skill, his work at the Sorbonne, his European reputation as a 'maître' in Platonic studies, and his last two volumes,² testify magnificently. In the recent second edition of *La Théorie Platonicienne de l'Amour*, and perhaps even more in the most brilliant introduction to his edition of Plato's *Phaedrus*—which far surpasses all discussions of this dialogue known to me—we have an impressive example of that "creative and reflective activity which unceasingly quickens the material upon which it reflects," of which M. Robin spoke in his article. The 185 pages of this "notice," as it is modestly called, form a remarkable essay in interpretation, in which the details of the argument are reviewed, their significance and contexts clarified and made to contribute to the theme of the unity and

¹ L. ROBIN, "L'histoire et la légende de la philosophie," *Revue philosophique*, 60^e année, Nos. 9 and 10, 1935. Pp. 161-175.

² LEON ROBIN, *La Théorie Platonicienne de l'Amour*, nouvelle édition. Paris: Alcan, 1933-30 Fr. Pp. 229.

Platon; *Œuvres complètes*. Tome IV. 3^e partie—*Phédre*. Texte établi et traduit par L. ROBIN, Collection des Universités de France. Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1933. Pp. clxxxv + 96. 30 Fr.

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structure of the dialogue. What that structure is, and what is the "immediate object" of the *Phaedrus* ("thorny" questions in this case) are lucidly and fully discussed. To summarize without mutilating the exquisite pages on Plato's view of the soul and its destiny, and those on love and its relation to philosophy, is impossible. Suffice it to place on record that these, and the pages on Dialectic (particularly "descent by division"), and on the myth and its *raison d'être* (pp. 108-160) are of a quality that the experienced Platonist may well envy, but rarely match. All who would know Plato *intime* must read, re-read, and ponder M. Robin's introduction.

M. Schuhl, who worked under M. Robin's direction, has prepared a work on the formation of Greek Thought: that is worthy of that privilege. The special merit of the book is hardly to be gathered from its title, which may too readily suggest a series of monographs on Thales and his successors down to Plato. M. Schuhl's book is not of this kind: it is not monographic, and it contains no exposition of Plato. A history of thought rather than of thinkers, it attempts to run down to their origins two protracted tendencies, mystical and scientific, which, unreconciled in Plato, have interacted now in opposition, now co-operatively, in producing the philosophical, scientific, and technological accomplishments of his predecessors. Starting from the contrast in spirit between the Apolline and the Dionysiac cults first made fundamental by Nietzsche, M. Schuhl records the steps by which the Greek mind detached itself from "the sombre and opaque sadness" surrounding magical and religious rites and beliefs in pre-Hellenic times down to the days of the sophists. To find the spiritual problems of earlier thinkers reinstated in their religious and ritualistic settings is suggestive, but to see how vivid and intelligible those settings become when interpreted in the light of the last thirty years' discoveries in Grecian and Oriental archaeology and ethnology (e.g. Evans, Woolley) is something very novel in a book of philosophical history. The conventional picture of the experience of the Greeks (e.g. as drawn by Schiller, Ruskin)—one of unbroken harmony and serenity—rests on a misrepresentation of fact, and M. Schuhl presents evidence in Book I to show that even among festivals of a joyful character the Dionysiac element is the superficial one, and that a current of consternation and dread runs beneath. How "*sous le ciel le plus pur on sentait parfois planer d'obscures puissances*" is well indicated in four chapters on Belief and Ritual, in which the author examines the significance of pollutions, contagious and otherwise, purifications, imprecations, divination, meteorological and agrarian magic. In Book II we witness the chief stages in the evolution of religion down to Homer, and an attempt is made to determine what part was contributed by the oldest Grecian inhabitants, what part by the Cretans, and what by Achaean invaders. Thus some 150 copiously documented pages (two-fifths of the book) are devoted to the formative influences at work before the Milesian cosmologists (with whom traditional histories begin) make their appearance. This transition is marked in Book III, where philosophical and scientific beginnings in Ionia are contrasted with a mystical reaction centred in the Eleusinian mysteries, the cult of Dionysus, Orphism, and Pythagoreanism. Here the primitive dualism breaks through again. We witness on the one hand a predominantly positivistic effort elaborating an inductive science, and a powerful current of mysticism on the other. Ancient cults which the Olympic religion had ejected revive, permeate strongly the popular classes, and survive in some measure among the Ionians. But the positive spirit is as far from any

¹ P. M. SCHUHL, *Essai sur la Formation de la Pensée grecque: Introduction historique à une étude de la philosophie platonicienne*. Paris: Alcan, 1934. 1p. 460. 50 Fr.

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empiricism in their cosmologies as it is near to empiricism in their technological inventions. For in the recurrent tendency of their cosmology to exhibit "the one" behind multiplicity they are but transposing earlier theogonies. But M. Schuhl denies that their Physis is "mere matter opposed to spirit": he will not go so far as some historians (e.g. Joël), who see "an intrusion of the divine in nature." Physis is "that which shoots forth and grows"—"living generation"; Thales's water is not merely the marine element, but "la semence liquide."

The two currents, positive and mystical, which we saw associated in Pythagoreanism, now reappear in complete opposition. There is a 'shift' in the earlier dualism; the antithesis which the work of Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles displays is no longer one between a positive, inductive science and a monistic metaphysics. It is metaphysics, not science, that now becomes the accredited representative of the positive spirit, and an undercurrent of Orphic mysticism becomes its antithetical term. Thus the main problem now arising is so to harmonize and unify both that neither is sacrificed. Here M. Schuhl seems to encounter some difficulty to 'fit' that which is genuinely metaphysical in effort and attainment into the antithesis 'positive-mystical' in terms of which he has so far made his way. For this metaphysical element is not itself something mystical, though at times its inspiration may have been so. Nor is it an obvious efflorescence of that positive tendency whose fruits are undoubtedly seen in various fragments of inductive science—physical, meteorological, and medical—or in the technological inventions.

In his last book, M. Schuhl emphasizes the rise of a new spirit in the Athens of Pericles. A general problem of reconciling logic with reality is that which the work of Parmenides set for the 'advanced' minds of the time. Leucippus seeks to solve it by partitioning Parmenidean Being into atoms; Empedocles by instituting a repugnance between the four elements. But Anaxagoras was the first "to envisage undismayed that infinity of regression (the impossibility of reaching indivisible elements) which became a logical scandal and an absurdity for the ancients." Here philosophy reaches a temporary deadlock. If on the one hand neither generation *ex nihilo* nor total transformation can be allowed, and if on the other contraries are observed to engender each other, then our choice is limited to two alternatives. Either, like Melissus, we must follow Parmenides in renouncing all hope of reconciliation, or else maintain that the contraries pre-exist one in another—everything possessing besides its dominant and apparent characters, an infinite number of invisible qualities "en germe," on the analogy of those ritualistic mixtures of all kinds of seed used in certain festivals. Everything being thus given *ab origine*, Anaxagoras could echo Parmenides, saying that "the All" can neither augment nor decrease. So, although the Panspermia of Anaxagoras is, in being sensibly characterized, further removed from Eleaticism than the atomism of Leucippus, that atomism, in retaining the Void, is further from Eleaticism than Anaxagoras's Panspermia, which rejects it. The richness of these last chapters can be indicated only summarily. In the middle of the fifth century we behold a fermentation of ideas on most matters of human interest. It is an era of 'beginnings' and 'developments' that leave a lasting impress on later culture: developments in astronomy, plane geometry, the fine arts, and political theory; we witness, too, the superseding of the old by a new medicine, the creation of solid geometry, an advance in mechanical invention, and the first inquiries made into the origin of religions. At the end of the century a violent reaction breaks out against the new ideas and new pursuits. "The misfortunes and ordeals of the war were favourable to that brutal realism

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which was gathering in the meantime, but they also restored to the people a sense of mystic disquietude." Despite their rigorous proscription, the divinities of Thrace, Phrygia, and Syria penetrate to Athens, and many episodes testify that the fear of occult powers (investigated in Book I) is not yet dead.

M. Schuhl's work is a veritable introduction to Plato's thought, in a new and literal sense. He selects and connects most judiciously; he disengages many of the ideas Plato was to synthesize, and the character of the influences, rational and mystical, operative on him. The moment of Plato's magnificent synthesis is, however, short-lived. The time approaches when the disciplines he succeeded in associating are to be put asunder by Aristotle and others. "Science no doubt continues its brilliant development through the oncoming centuries, but Greece knew no other mind capable of uniting, as Plato had, the most rigorous science with a mystical enthusiasm tempered by imagination, and we may well ask whether the exhaustion that followed on the Alexandrian golden age of mathematics is not essentially due to the absence of a truly 'synoptic' mind."

In his slighter volume¹ on Plato and the Art of his time the same empirical method is followed. He tries to determine as closely as may be what Plato's 'reactionary attitude' in matters of art and taste really amount to, and to interpret the recurrent quarrel between 'ancients and moderns' as it was then manifested. The scene of artistic theory and practice early in the fourth century was one of crisis and transition. Plato's position in the issue is commonly known—mistrustful of change, he was a protagonist of the hieratic art, setting his face against the innovations of his contemporaries. But what is less commonly understood is the reasons for this reactionary attitude, and in elucidating them M. Schuhl renders a real service. He builds up from textual supports a concrete and fairly definite view of the character of the innovations Plato beheld, and shows effectively from this why Plato should have been mistrustful of change in artistic outlook and aim, and why he condemns the newer attainments with some severity. More than a threatened disturbance of preferences and habituations is at issue. The proposal that Plato allowed his ethical and political fervour to prejudice his aesthetic opinion, too often permitting intellect to usurp the place of disinterested appreciation, can be settled only after confrontation with information such as M. Schuhl furnishes. When Plato refers to sculptors and painters, it is not those abstract entities "the" painters that he has in mind, but to certain definite men of his time, of whose names and works M. Schuhl often informs us. Nor does Plato condemn 'modern art' wholesale, though only a few, and quite special forms of it, escape censure. Probably the issue is at bottom a moral one; transposed into the domain of art, we meet again that conservatism in politics "*qui craint toujours la décadence*." His general aversion is, however, grounded in the character of the works as well, for they virtually illustrate and confirm the Heraclitean relativity of a Protagoras. They are "*tours de force*" in the creation of "spells"; the reference is wholly to appearance, and the technique is an art of creating illusions. "There is an exact parallel between the technique of the painter who succeeds in giving from afar the illusion of reality, and that of the sophist who "can impose on the young, who are still far removed from the reality of things, by words that cheat the ear." In the former case the spectator, in the latter the auditor, is dominated by a skill and action equally irrational. From this newer influ-

¹ P. M. SCHUHL, *Platon et l'Art de son temps (Arts plastiques)*. Paris: Alcan, 1933. Pp. 123. 20 Fr.

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ence Plato turns to a moral and mathematical idealism; against the artifices of the illusionists he sets "measure, number, and weight." This naturally leads M. Schuhl to Plato's more positive views on art and their connection with the theory of Forms (Chapters 3 and 4 on "Pure Beauty and Imitation," and "The Value of Art"). Aesthetic charm or pleasingness is a valid principle for estimating products of the imitative arts only provided they exemplify no further principle, e.g. utility or resemblance. In so far as such another principle intervenes—under no matter what form—truth alone must be the supreme criterion, and "the rest scarcely counts." In exacting faithfulness of resemblance Plato had more particularly in view those newer schools whose technique involved falsifying the proper proportions of their models. Yet 'faithfulness of resemblance' must not result in a merely slavish imitation, however skilful; this Plato recognizes in the *Cratylus*. Here his hostility to too rigorous imitation marks, for M. Schuhl, Plato's reaction against a new school of extreme realists. Art is not a servile copying of reality; "it is permissible for the artist to invoke, in default of the Idea, the ideal" (that ambiguous notion which "oscillates between Eidos and Eidolon"). As we proceed, however, the initial opposition becomes increasingly 'diluted,' for Plato holds that art, imitative or purely decorative, is but one diversion among others, though a most subtle and pleasing one, M. Schuhl sets this judgment in its proper place when he reminds us that if art is for Plato "un jeu," so, too, is almost every other activity. "The composition of dialogues" is a "jeu"—a "very beautiful one; the dialectic of the *Parmenides* is a toilsome 'jeu,' the great myth of the *Politicus* is a 'jeu,' the physics of the *Timaeus* is a very reasonable 'jeu'!" So, too, the learned conversations of the old men in the *Lysis*—these are "jeux"—and is not man himself a plaything of the gods?—"la vie n'est qu'un jeu; les choses humaines ne méritent pas qu'on les prenne au sérieux; et pourtant on ne peut s'en dispenser; partout chez Platon, le sérieux et le jeu sont inextricablement mêlés: comment pourrait-il en être autrement si, dès qu'intervient la représentation sensible—qu'il s'agisse de figuration plastique ou d'énonciation verbale—nous retombons au niveau du mythe, lui-même forme, plus ou moins sérieuse du jeu?" The value of art, then, is properly to be construed through the theory of Forms and by reference to the Demiurge which, as both artist and artisan, fashions with consummate skill a physical world on the ideal model.

Professor Rey, whose recent works on the rise of science in Greece¹ have been so highly appreciated, has now inaugurated a series of monographs, the first of which² he devotes to Greek mathematics in the fifth century. It opens with a translation *in extenso* made by the late Paul Tannery of "the only great historical text which antiquity has bequeathed on the history of pure mathematics," viz. The Prologue to Proclus's *Commentary*. Pythagorean "arithmo-geometry" is closely examined, and the character of the advances made posterior by Hippocrates of Chios are made clear. An informing section on the history of mathematical speculation down to the middle of the century illustrates the tendency of science to become "un *a priori* de la technique." These mathematicians are chiefly occupied with three problems: the quadrature of the circle, the duplication of the cube, and trisection of the angle. Hippocrates' contribution to the first "places him in the front rank." Tradition accredits him with the composition of the first book of *Elements*, in which

¹ A. REY, *La Science dans l'Antiquité*. I. *La Science orientale avant les Grecs*, 1930. Pp. xvii + 495. 30 fr. II. *La Jeunesse de la science grecque*. Paris: La Renaissance du Livre, 1933. Pp. xvii + 537. 30 fr.

² A. REY, *Les Mathématiques en Grèce au milieu du ve siècle*, "Exposés d'Histoire et Philosophie des Sciences," No. 1. Paris: Hermann et Cie, 1935. Pp. 92. 18 fr.

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fragmentary and unconnected empirical generalizations are for the first time in history replaced by a well-ordered series of deductive demonstrations. Hippocrates thus marks the fruition of Pythagorean effort, and establishes geometry essentially in the form in which we now know it.

Among shorter contributions that have recently appeared, several are of outstanding importance. Two brief "Notes" on the *Philebus* and on Zeno's arguments against the existence of movement are made accessible in the collected works of the late Jules Lachelier,¹ who wrote little, but with a fine discernment. M. Festugière's paper² shows Antisthenes' difficulty about predication to be a metaphysical and not merely a logical one. The origins of Antisthenes' views should be traced in Parmenides, not in Protagoras, and a most suggestive *rapprochement* of his moral and logical theories is indicated. Professor A. Rivaud³ has re-examined evidence for the tradition that Plato borrowed the political themes of the *Republic* from the Pythagoreans. The view is not confirmed by Aristotle, but it occurs in Aristoxenus. But this writer, whose fragments are sometimes in contradiction, shows the Pythagoreans mainly hostile to politics. Yet, as M. Delatte emphasizes, there is a striking degree of similarity between their political ideas and those of Plato; e.g. on marriage and education. Reviewal of the evidence leads M. Rivaud to doubt a Pythagorean inspiration of the *Republic*. The Pythagoreans among whom Aristoxenus (who gave currency to the legend) lived, held that Plato had plagiarized Pythagoras. But political views among this school were a late, post-Platonic development; the sources of Plato's political ideas are more likely to be found among the Cynics and Sophists than among the Pythagoreans.

S. V. KEELING.

PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY

KARL POPPER's aim in *Logik der Forschung*⁴ is to consider the method of investigation used by the empirical sciences. Many people would say that their procedure is marked by the use of induction, and accordingly that the logic of scientific investigation is the logical analysis of induction. But Popper disagrees. Scientific procedure consists of two steps, an hypothesis is formed, and then it is tested. Logic is only concerned with questions of validity, and thus is only concerned with the second of these steps. But every method of testing validity is deductive, and thus the logic of scientific investigation is the study of deduction as used by the empirical sciences.

How, then, are these sciences distinguished from logic, mathematics, and metaphysics? Not, as the positivists suppose, by the logical dependence of their general laws on particular propositions. For no particular proposition can verify a general one. The positivists are wrong in their view that the laws of science can be verified; and if, as they suppose, verifiability is the criterion of significance, then not only metaphysical, but also scientific propositions are meaningless. In giving his own view Popper maintains that

¹ *Œuvres de Jules Lachelier*. Paris: Alcan, 1933. 2 vols. Pp. xlv + 210; pp. 224. 80 Fr. ensemble.

² A. J. FESTUGIÈRE, "Antisthenica," *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, XXI, 1932. Pp. 345-75.

³ A. RIVAUD "Platon et la politique pythagoricienne" in *Mélanges Gustave Glotz*: Tome II. Pp. 779-92. Paris: Les Presses Universitaires, 1932.

⁴ *Logik der Forschung*. Vienna: Julius Springer, 1935. 1p. 248. RM. 13.50.

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the methods by which we distinguish natural science are like the rules of a game, and we accept them because they serve our purpose. We shall find it fruitful, he claims, to define an empirical system or law as one which can be *falsified* by experience. The laws of nature can be expressed in the form—there are *no* so-and-soes, e.g. There is no *perpetuum mobile*. Then they do not assert that something exists, but that something does not exist. They rule out certain possibilities. If we find that a so-and-so does in fact exist we disprove the law. Suppose our general law asserts: "There are no white ravens." Suppose we find there is a white raven at the space-time position *k*. This entails that there are white ravens, and this is incompatible with our general law, which is thus shown to be false. But on the other hand we cannot disprove propositions of the form, there *are* so-and-soes, and these are "metaphysical."

Propositions such as "there is a raven at *k*" Popper calls basic propositions. These always assert, "there is a so-and-so at *k*." They are particular propositions about observable facts. On what does the validity of basic propositions depend? According to most positivist views it depends, says Popper, on an immediate conviction of their correspondence with experience. Or, as some positivists have said, they do not require proof because they describe what is immediately given. But, according to Popper, science is only concerned with intersubjective propositions, i.e. such as can be tested by more than one observer. And these, as, for example, "here is a glass of water," always refer beyond immediate experience. He maintains that every basic proposition is an hypothesis, and cannot be verified. It can only be tested by testing other propositions which we deduce from it. In science there are no "absolutely ultimate" propositions. This entails an endless regress, which, however, is not vicious because it is used to falsify and not to prove. And it comes to a "natural end," because we decide to accept certain propositions without further testing. Thus, ultimately, science is based on decisions. Popper then goes on to develop and apply his views.

Max Dessoir's *Vom Jenseits der Seele*¹ is a very detailed discussion of occult phenomena and of the theories to which they give rise. On the one hand we have to discover what really occurs, and on the other hand to consider what explanation this requires. In considering the latter we have to ask what light these phenomena throw on the mental processes of the persons in whom they occur. But there are also other questions, since people have supposed that these phenomena give evidence of further facts, in particular of human survival and the existence of a spirit world with which certain people on earth can communicate. And the occult phenomena play an important part in speculative theories about the universe, such as Christian Science and Anthroposophy.

Thus the question of evidence becomes of central importance. Dessoir points out that we can only accept the spiritualistic hypothesis if we discover events which can be explained in no other way. And the evidence for such events must be of a strictly scientific character. But whenever conditions have been strictly controlled and only reliable observers been present, no such event has ever occurred. Most of the evidence for occult phenomena lies at the other extreme. It is derived from unreliable, even weak-minded observers, and recorded after the lapse of time has allowed full scope for fancy and forgetfulness. Dessoir points out how unreliable our observations are. If an event does not in fact tally with what we expect, our imagination fills in the gap. Suppose we are told by a conjuror that he is going to perform

¹ *Vom Jenseits der Seele*. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke. 6th edition. Pp. 562, RM. 16.

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the same movement several times, it is sufficient for him to perform it twice for us not to notice the difference in the third movement which contains the trick. If I am told that someone is writing on a slate, and at the same time hear a scratching, I take it for granted that someone is writing. In observation of parapsychical phenomena the conditions are particularly adverse. It is dark, music is being played, one is not allowed to touch the medium, events happen suddenly, one becomes less alert through waiting a long time, and the emotional atmosphere is so tense that even cool observers are affected. In these conditions imagination grows rampant—one feels a touch or sees a light, and these become all manner of things, giants' fists, children's hands, dogs' heads, and so on. Every obstacle to reliable observation is present, so that even reliable observers are severely handicapped.

Dessoir gives a detailed account of both parapsychical and parapsychical phenomena. He considers a great many cases, and speaks a great deal from personal experience of them. The parapsychical phenomena include prophetic dreams, telepathy, clairvoyance, and automatic communication. He believes there is no conclusive evidence for any peculiar psychical power, but that there is a strong case for one, namely, telepathy, i.e. knowledge of other people's mental states which is not acquired through the usual channels. He thinks that telepathy may occur without either participant knowing that a communication is taking place, and that, in this way, forgotten and unnoticed experiences may be communicated. He points out that telepathy then becomes an exceedingly useful hypothesis, for it explains most of the facts alleged to be evidence of clairvoyance and communication with spirits. He believes, however, that there may be something more, that some people may possess a peculiar capacity for discovering facts and communicating them automatically. We cannot be sure at present whether this is so or not. But he completely rejects the theory of communication with spirits. And in criticizing this theory he stresses its ridiculous aspect. Listening to reports from the other world is like overhearing a conversation in a railway carriage between two members of a family, one of whom is mentally defective and the other deaf. Or, to take another point, spirits speak of light and colour, but have no eyes, they walk and have no limbs, they smoke cigars, drink whisky and soda, and in general duplicate life on earth in a world which is none the less immaterial.

Parapsychical phenomena may be ordinary occurrences, such as knocks and changes of place, which occur in peculiar circumstances. Or they may be extraordinary occurrences, such as materialization. Dessoir believes that deception plays a great part in this sphere, and points out many cases where it has been established. He allows, however, that some require further examination. We can be sure that in all cases the medium, and not spirits, is responsible for what occurs. But we cannot as yet be certain whether there is always deception, or whether the medium sometimes possesses an unusual power over material objects.

In conclusion, Dessoir criticizes speculative theories of the universe, such as Christian Science and Anthroposophy. It is obvious that such theories accept uncritical accounts of occult phenomena. But it is also important to note that their wild flights of fancy are guided by lines of thought we find in primitive theories. Dessoir believes that the same impulses lie at the bottom of all idealistic theories, reverence for the world and desire for understanding. But primitive, or magical, idealism accepted types of explanation which later forms have rejected. It tried to explain things in terms of similarity, and in particular to see the smaller as a copy of the larger. Thus, for example, the heart is in the middle of the breast because the sun is in the middle of the

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planets, dogs go mad when influenced by the dog star, and grass of Parnassus heals liver troubles because its leaves resemble the liver. And magical idealism combines this use of similarity with a strong tendency to symbolize—everything obvious points to something mysterious which it resembles. Anthroposophy uses this type of explanation when, for example, it maintains that the physical heart points to an aether heart. Anthroposophy and theories of this kind have simply reverted to primitive ways of thought.

HELEN KNIGHT.

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Relativity, Gravitation, and World-Structure. By E. A. MILNE, M.A., D.Sc., F.R.S., Rouse Ball Professor of Mathematics, Oxford. (London: Oxford Clarendon Press, Humphrey Milford, 1935. Pp. viii + 365. Price 25s. net.)

This book represents the position at present reached in the evolution of an idea. A few years ago Professor Milne drew attention to an extremely simple interpretation of a remarkable astronomical fact—namely, that the extra-galactic nebulae appeared to be receding from the earth at speeds proportional to their distances. His interpretation was the natural result of approaching the problem from the opposite direction to that which was commonly chosen. Instead of asking why a nebula should move faster when it was farther away from us, he asked why a nebula should be farther away from us when it was moving faster. The answer, of course, was obvious: it was farther away *because* it was moving faster. Professor Milne pointed out, further, that this state of affairs was the *inevitable* result of allowing the bodies in an unenclosed system to move in random directions with uniform velocities. No matter what those directions or velocities were, the system would in time expand in precisely the way in which the universe of nebulae appears to be expanding.

All previous attempts to interpret this phenomenon had been made in terms of general relativity. Milne's idea was not necessarily inconsistent therewith, but it suggested to him that to invoke the extremely generalized concepts of relativity in this connection was to disguise the inherent simplicity of the problem—like using the familiar steam-hammer to crack a nut. Further reflection, however, showed that the matter did not end there. If Milne's idea was valid, the questions naturally arose: Why should the nebulae have been allowed to continue in uniform motion without interference from their neighbours? and why should we belong to the one nebula whose velocity was zero? It became clear that to answer these questions either the general theory of relativity had to be called in again or a new theory had to be constructed which would not merely account for the law of nebular recession but express that law as the inevitable result of some more fundamental principle.

Milne chose the latter alternative. He postulated a "cosmological principle," according to which the universe was such that a number of observers in relative motion were possible whose views of it were, on the whole, identical. Such observers were said to be "equivalent," and he showed that if there were an infinite number of uniformly distributed extra-galactic nebulae, each containing an observer, then the postulate that all these observers were equivalent was consistent with the observed facts of nebular motion. We ceased to be at the centre of the universe in any special sense because in an infinite universe every nebula was equally at the centre; and gravitation needed no additional consideration because the law of gravitation, whatever it was, was subordinate to the cosmological principle: "gravitation" was simply the name given to the characteristics of motions which satisfied that principle.

This opened up an enormous field for investigation, and the book before

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us gives the results of the preliminary exploration of that field. But it gives more than that. As the basis of a theory of material motions the cosmological principle inevitably challenges comparison with the general theory of relativity: it must be either equivalent thereto or inconsistent therewith, because both claim to be capable of giving a complete description of purely "mechanical" motion. Milne holds strongly that his theory is not identical with general relativity, and he gives several criticisms of the latter which will need to be answered by those who remain unconvinced by his alternative. Furthermore, he attempts to place his theory on a firm epistemological basis by considering the possibilities of observation, and he claims that the whole of his superstructure is built on a foundation of observations which can be rigidly defined and accurately carried out by experimenters. For the majority of the readers of this journal this will be the most important part of the work, and an article discussing it will be found on page 48. It suffices here to say that Milne employs only one measuring instrument—a clock—with which he measures both space and time, his contention being that our knowledge of the passage of time is intuitive and therefore inalienable (though the system of *measuring* it remains optional), while the idea of space is arbitrary.

Professor Milne points out that if his epistemological premises are accepted, the investigations which he describes have a theoretical value quite apart from their application to the universe. They represent a *possible* universe, and comparison with what we observe will decide how far they represent the *actual* universe. Such comparison gives him ground for satisfaction. In the first place there is, of course, the fact in which the theory originated, that the extra-galactic nebulae show characteristics which qualify them to be regarded as the habitations of "equivalent" observers. Considering, then, any freely moving particle, we may deduce the general quality of its motion from the requirement that if the universe contained an indefinitely large number of such particles moving in all possible ways, those ways would necessarily be such that the descriptions of the whole system given by observers on all nebulae would be identical. But such a requirement effectively prescribes the law of gravitation. Milne is not yet able to state this in the detailed form given by general relativity, but he obtains a partially undetermined function of space and time measurements which expresses conditions to be satisfied by any specific law of gravitation which may later be derived.

We cannot discuss all the identifications which Milne makes between the characteristics of his ideal system and the observed phenomena of the universe. From an impressive list of correspondences we may select for mention a suggestion with regard to the much-discussed cosmic rays. If a multitude of arbitrarily moving particles are introduced into Milne's system, the cosmological principle requires that their velocities shall increase up to the velocity of light, and in this fact he finds an interpretation of the behaviour of cosmic rays. It is not an explanation of the existence of those rays, because no mode of origin of the particles is considered, nor is any reason suggested why they should be of the size of protons and electrons rather than galaxies. Correspondence between theory and observation, however, is found in the fact that if the postulated particles are supposed to have existed in the free state for a long time, they should, like those observed, have high speeds and be moving in all directions equally.

Milne's discussion includes some beautiful mathematical work, conducted with all the skill and rigidity which one would expect from him. The writing is usually clear, and conveys the enthusiasm with which the author has evidently performed his task. The continual advent of new ideas during the

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progress of the work is shown by the additional notes and occasional passages in the general text which have not succeeded in adapting themselves to their surroundings sufficiently to disguise their late arrival. At times the style tends towards the rhetorical, but not infrequently on such occasions a particularly illuminating sentence occurs which is worth the cost. One has the feeling that the presentation would have been more satisfying if the emotion had been recollected in tranquillity rather than displayed in its original heat, but judgment on such a point is difficult. The field opened up is evidently limitless, and after all, a little incoherence is better than eternal silence. Professor Milne has rendered a great service to cosmology, not least by directing attention to the importance of establishing theories on a sound philosophical foundation, and the further development of his line of thought will be followed with the greatest interest.

HERBERT DINGLE.

Return to Philosophy. By C. F. M. JOAD. (London: Faber & Faber Ltd. 1935. 1p. 279. Price 7s. 6d.)

This book is well described as "A Defence of Reason, An Affirmation of Values and a Plea for Philosophy." Its main destructive aim is to discredit the logical and ethical relativism which has of late been cultivated in some literary circles. Thus Mr. Joad dons the cloak of Socrates. Constructively it seeks to state, in a confessedly dogmatic fashion, the outlines of a temperate philosophical rationalism which culminates in a kind of mystico-aesthetic intuitionism. Here Mr. Joad becomes more or less a Platonist. He finds a good deal to denounce and not much to praise in the modern world, and incidentally he has his witty and utterly devastating fling at Mrs. Eddy. Unfortunately Mrs. Eddy cannot, and her followers will not, feel it.

The opening chapter on "Bunkumism, or Reason's Underworld," is a delightful piece of fun with the serious intention of underlining the peculiar difficulties inherent in philosophizing. It is all too true that the line dividing profundity from abysmal nonsense can only be traced by the highly trained mind—and not always then. Indeed, our own "left wing" philosophers will have their doubts about Mr. Joad. His treatment of Aldous Huxley's supposed renunciation of truth and worth is as hard as it is deserved: but it arouses the reflection that, perhaps, to blaze away at "literary" men is akin to the sport of shooting sitting pheasants. They make poor game for the professed philosopher. D. H. Lawrence's "belly worship" is similarly dealt with, the advocacy of "impulse" being justly countered by Bishop Butler's doctrine of cool self-love.

Mr. Joad makes no bones about the elevating character of philosophy. By its means a man may "break through" into a "world of values" transcending both the world of thought-objects and (*a fortiori*) of material existence. In this it is taken to be akin to art, and both, finally, to "mysticism." The reviewer wonders whether this sort of mystico-aestheticism is of much value either as aesthetics or as theology, but this is for the reader to judge. His emphasis of the penetration, by philosophic vision, of "another" world conjures up the image of Hume's ghost, hugely amused to find his *Treatise of Human Nature* recommended for its "numinous" quality. This would appeal to what Mr. Joad calls his "catlike malice."

Without a doubt this is a book well worth reading by the philosopher in his off hours, and by all and sundry as a first book in philosophy.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

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The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. By HENRI BERGSON. Translated by R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton, with the assistance of W. Horsfall Carter. (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1935. Pp. viii + 278. Price 10s.)

If M. Bergson had written no other work, *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion*—translated in the volume before us with an art that makes it easy to forget that English is not the direct medium of expression—would of itself suffice to mark out its author as a philosopher of rare and original genius. All the brilliant qualities we associate with M. Bergson's earlier masterpieces shine here with a lustre apparently undimmed by time. And there is the same incomparable felicity of presentation in language at once colourful and precise. Just how far the bold speculation of the present essay is successful in illumining the two provinces of experience with which it is concerned is, naturally, a matter upon which there will be many opinions. But that M. Bergson at least throws shafts of revealing light upon more than one dark corner of these provinces is not likely to be disputed even by those who are least in sympathy with the general trend of his thought.

What we are given in this work is, essentially, the ethical and religious philosophy of the protagonist of creative evolution. A conspectus of the fields of ethics and religion is found by M. Bergson to yield certain broad conclusions which cry aloud for interpretation in terms of his own metaphysical theory. The reviewer may as well confess at once his suspicion that the facts would not suggest these particular conclusions to a mind not already predisposed to their discovery by definite metaphysical prepossessions. It is not improbable, however, that readers who accept the metaphysics of creative evolution will feel that here for the first time has the moral and religious life of man been presented in its true cosmic significance.

Following M. Bergson's own order, let us consider first his theory of morality.

M. Bergson professes to discover two distinct forms of morality. It is not a matter merely of logically distinguishable aspects, but, quite definitely, of existentially separable kinds—albeit in our actual experience they tend to interpenetrate in many ways, and pure cases of either may be hard to detect. These two moralities M. Bergson calls respectively "closed" morality and "open" morality. They differ from one another both in their content and in the nature of the urge which underlies them. Closed morality manifests itself in a multitude of duties whose unity lies in their common subservience to the preservation and cohesion of the social group. It consists essentially in the fulfilment of one's function as an organ in the social organism. The obligation which we feel to its observance is at bottom due to the pressure of *habit*—the socially oriented habit of feeling, thought and action which society, acting upon our inborn social tendencies, is inculcating ceaselessly into every one of us from the cradle to the grave. But we also recognize in ourselves, M. Bergson holds, a moral urge of a different order altogether. There is a moral urge which seeks expression in the service not of a limited social group, but of all humanity. This is the urge of "open" morality, which is universal where closed morality is particular, and which is dynamic, creative of new values, where closed morality is static, merely conservative of the old. The source of the urge of open morality is ultimately, for M. Bergson, that participation in the cosmic Life-force which is the especial privilege of the mystic. But for the generality of mankind the urge is less direct in its operation. It is mediated by the great creative spirits in whom the mystical strain is strong, "moral heroes" like Socrates and Christ whose

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personalities have the power to awaken aspiration in the ordinary man. The force that operates here is one of attraction, rather than, as with closed morality, of a *tergo* propulsion. Open morality, as M. Bergson sometimes expresses it, is a morality of "appeal," closed morality a morality of "pressure."

This dichotomizing of the moral life has not, M. Bergson is aware, suggested itself, or at all events commended itself, to previous ethical thinkers. To M. Bergson, however, referring human life to its metaphysical context, the situation as he has portrayed it seems natural if not inevitable. Let us see how this is so.

The human species, like other species, is a product and temporary halting-place of the Life-force, the creative energy which is "precipitated into matter, to wrest from it what it can" (p. 178). There have been two main lines of the evolution of animal life; the one, in which instinct predominates, finding its most perfect expression in the ant-hill and the beehive, the other, the line of developing intelligence, in man. Now a high degree of co-ordination of individuals within the group is clearly as indispensable to the well-being of the human species as to the ant species. Nature, then, in "positing" the species, may be expected to have provided some mechanism which will ensure this co-ordination. In the ant-hill this is achieved with complete success by instinct. But where conduct is inspired by intelligence rather than by instinct, some other device is necessary. Intelligence left to itself will too often suggest as best for the agent what is hurtful to society. "Habit" is the device which nature adopts, and through it (we are told) nature achieves "results comparable, as regards their regularity, with those of instinct" (p. 16). Socially oriented habits exert a pressure upon the intelligent member of society analogous to the compulsive force of instinct upon the ant. In each case the result is the securing of that co-ordinated group activity without which the species could not prosper nor hardly even endure. This is the secret and ultimate source of the "obligation" which man feels towards the duties of the closed morality.

The ultimate source of the urge of open morality, as has already been indicated, M. Bergson finds in mystical experience. Man, though a member of a species posited with a determinate structure and determinate capacities, is not thereby cut adrift from the surging Life-force that gave him birth. He can still, in greater or less degree, be caught up into the current of its creative energy and participate in its forward drive. In the case of the few gifted beings whom we style "mystics" this immersion or absorption is profound: and for them the ethics of closed morality, the morality which opposes creativity and which, by implication, denies the deep-lying identity of the human species as a whole, reveals itself as hopelessly inadequate. Under their moral leadership the ordinary man becomes aware of new values, transcending bounds of race and nation, which make appeal through that mystical strain which is in him too weak to initiate, but strong enough to emulate.

Such, in very bald outline, is M. Bergson's theory. It seems to present some rather serious difficulties—though it is very easy, as one reads, to be seduced into at least a suspension of unbelief by the sparkling eloquence of M. Bergson's exposition.

There is surely a difficulty, in the first place, about the very conception of two ultimately distinct "moralities." We can all understand what is meant by speaking of two ultimately distinct moral ends or moral laws—though there are well-known embarrassments about a dualism even of this kind. But it is one thing to feel a moral urge towards two ultimately distinct ends,

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another thing altogether to feel two ultimately distinct moral urges. If the urges are really different in their internal structure, why call them both by the same title?

M. Bergson would perhaps retort that the fault, if fault there be, should be laid not to his charge, but to that of the orthodox moralist. What *he* is doing is merely to describe and interpret the phenomena dealt with by the orthodox moralist under the rubric of "morality." If he finds confounded under that rubric two quite different types of conduct, it is natural enough to express this result by saying that there are really two moralities which "differ in kind" (p. 23). Whether or not one continues to use the same word "morality" for both is a terminological matter of comparatively little moment. What *is* of moment is to recognize that so-called "moral" conduct splits up into two quite different kinds, conduct directed to social and conventional values, with *its* specific urge, and conduct directed to trans-social and creative values, with *its* specific urge.

Now the trouble about this is that it is extremely hard to discover in M. Bergson's pages any plausible justification for insisting upon a difference of internal urge in the two spheres in question. Why should we suppose that the urge felt to fulfil the duties of one's station in the community necessarily differs in kind from the urge felt, say, to emancipate the slaves of some remote country? In point of fact it seems perfectly clear that such courses of conduct may very well, and constantly do, present themselves in the form of an imperative that is identical in nature. To say this is not, of course, tantamount to accepting ethical monism: though in the present connection it is not irrelevant to remember that ethical monists of repute, such as Green and Bradley, have made careful and elaborate attempts to show how a morality at first narrowly social and conventional may develop into a morality catholic and creative, without break of continuity even in the principle towards which the urge is directed—much less in the internal structure of the urge itself.

It goes without saying that one is not attempting to deny the *existence* of the urge of "social habit." Nor need one wish to minimize its potency as a determining force in human affairs. What one must maintain, however, is that the orthodox moralist is perfectly right in recognizing a will to social good which is independent of that urge, and which is, in fact, inspired by precisely the same kind of urge as is the will to trans-social moral values. Social habit does operate, without a doubt. But the point is that social conduct inspired by social habit and social conduct inspired by recognition of moral value are two distinct things, and it is the second of them that is of primary ethical interest.

The whole question, however, is a good deal complicated by M. Bergson's apparent wish to represent the compulsion felt from socially oriented habit as being of the very essence of what we mean by moral "obligation." If that were true, then conduct inspired by social habit *would* be a genuine form of "morality." But even M. Bergson's ingenuity does not seem to the reviewer to make this identification in the least degree plausible. The compulsion felt from a habit shows itself on introspection to be so fundamentally different from the compulsion felt from an end recognized as morally obligatory that it is even difficult to appreciate the temptation to identify them. The urge of social habit is not merely, as M. Bergson calls it, *infra-intellectual*. It is also, surely, *infra-moral*.

A further general objection to M. Bergson's ethical scheme seems worth mentioning. There is a notorious difficulty confronting dualistic and pluralistic ethical systems concerning the means of deciding between ultimate obligations

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which in a given situation prescribe mutually exclusive courses. The difficulty on M. Bergson's type of dualism is of a more radical kind still. If closed morality commands us to follow a course A, and open morality appeals to us to follow a contrary course B, which ought we to follow? If indeed it be the case that the command of closed morality expresses the very essence of moral obligation (as M. Bergson, we have seen, on occasion urges), then the question is easily answered, for A will be what we recognize we "ought" to do, and B will really cease to be a "moral" alternative. But it is pretty certain that M. Bergson would not care to endorse this conclusion. If, on the other hand, we forget for the moment about the "obligatoriness" of the urge of closed morality, and regard A merely as the course towards which we feel the pressure imposed by social habit, no answer at all seems possible to the question of which course we ought to follow. For *neither* course now will have any cognizable connection with the moral ought.

The very individual character of M. Bergson's ethical views has made it difficult to discuss them with brevity, and not much space remains in which to deal with the "two sources" of religion. We can attempt little more here than to indicate the salient features of a philosophy of religion that abounds in interesting detail.

One of the "two sources," however, is easily enough explained. For it is identical with the source of open morality, viz. the mystic's union with the cosmic Life that animates all things. In language that at times rises to heights of great beauty and power M. Bergson describes the mystical experience and depicts the characteristic features of the "open" and "dynamic" religion that emanates from it—a religion whose God is the Spirit of Creative Love, and which works for a radical transformation of all humanity so that it may "by a living contradiction change into creative effort that created thing which is a species, and turn into movement what was, by definition, a stop" (p. 201).

But mystical experience cannot explain all that has a reasonable claim to be called "religion." Most actual religions have failed to be universal (as mystical religion must be). And most religions are enveloped in a complicated web of determinate dogma which mystical experience could not justify. Nor can the explanation of this latter feature be found, M. Bergson insists, in man's interpretative intelligence. For nothing is more striking than the intellectually grotesque character of much that the so-called "rational being" is ready and even eager to embrace as religious truth. To account for this "absurdity in the reasoning being" is, indeed, one of the most fundamental problems that confront a philosophy of religion. How do men come to invent and believe the frequently fantastic fables of divinities that are incorporated in their religions? Shall we be forced to postulate some special "myth-making faculty" in the human mind?

Yes, M. Bergson answers, that is precisely what we *are* forced to do. But for the philosophy of creative evolution it is no mere *ad hoc* postulate. If that philosophy be true, the myth-making faculty of man falls into place as a wholly natural product of the Life-force.

To understand this, we must remind ourselves of the peculiarity of that particular "deposit" of the Life-force which we know as the human species, viz. that it is dominated by intelligence rather than by instinct. Now intelligence, if not counteracted by other factors, is liable to defeat in more ways than one Nature's purpose in positing the species. We have already seen that it brings into jeopardy social cohesion. There are two other dangers to be taken account of. It engenders in man the conviction of the inevitability of death—a conviction which "must slow down in man the movement of life"

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(p. 108); and it reveals to man the overwhelming complexity of the causal conditions of events in his world, thus tending to dishearten him in the initiation of his purposes and to breed in him an attitude of despondency and apathy. Now the "myth-making faculty" is a device designed by Nature precisely to counteract these influences. Through its quasi-instinctive activity are constructed "religious representations" which, by peopling the world with effective presences capable of aiding human purposes, and by envisaging a prolongation of human life beyond the grave, combat successfully the depressing representations of the intelligence; and which, again, gathering about them the common ritual and common belief of a group religion, act as an invaluable consolidating agency upon the social organization which the intelligence threatens to disrupt. "Static religion," the religion founded upon the myth-making faculty, is, in M. Bergson's words, "a defensive reaction of nature against what might be depressing for the individual, and dissolvent for society, in the exercise of intelligence" (p. 175).

Into the framework of this challenging thesis M. Bergson fits a number of fascinating incidental discussions. What he has to say concerning totemism, magic, the connection of the myth-making faculty with imaginative literature, the relationship between different types of mysticism, the future of civilization (in a concluding chapter), and upon many other topics, is always absorbing and often strikingly suggestive. The reader may perhaps remain doubtful whether, after all, the "myth-making faculty" is not itself a myth. M. Bergson may seem to dismiss somewhat too perfunctorily the possibility of accounting for the fantastic element in religion by the combined action of certain accredited psychical factors. What is perfectly certain, however, is that few readers will rise from a perusal of this book without consciousness of being intellectually and emotionally enriched by contact with one of the finest minds of our generation.

C. A. CAMPBELL.

A System of Logistic. By WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, Ph.D., Society of Fellows, Harvard University. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1934. Pp. xi + 204. Price, \$4.50; 20s.)

This is a highly technical work, whose object is to carry the generalization of logical processes a stage further than that accomplished in Whitehead and Russell's *Principia Mathematica*. In the first fifty pages Dr. Quine expounds his fundamental conceptions in a preliminary way, without the technical rigour of the later part, and these pages will be found of great interest to students of general logic who do not wish to follow the author into the details of his technical developments. Dr. Quine has succeeded in using fundamental notions of such generality as to make it possible to bring together under single symbolic treatment a number of topics that in *Principia Mathematica* required separate treatment (e.g. classes, dyadic relations, and, in general, n -adic relations). He is enabled to dispense with a number of symbols which were found necessary in *Principia Mathematica* (e.g. the notation for propositional functions). He has succeeded in bringing within the scope of his purely formal treatment a number of matters that in *Principia Mathematica* had to be dealt with in an informal way. All this constitutes an important advance towards the ideal of a self-sufficient symbolic apparatus of deduction, through which instructions for the deduction of theorems within the system can be given in a form capable, as he himself says, of being carried out by a robot.

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This great increase in generality is, however, attained only by basing the system on postulates which have an entirely different character from those of *Principia Mathematica*. These are simple, and can be grasped at once. Those of Dr. Quine are exceedingly complicated, and take some pains to unravel. The only justification for taking them as postulates is that they do serve as the basis for the highly generalized system which Dr. Quine presents.

There is a foreword by Professor Whitehead, in which he stresses the importance of Dr. Quine's book; his opinion that it "constitutes a landmark in the history of the subject" is authoritative.

The exposition is admirable.

L. J. RUSSELL.

Philosophy: An Introductory Study of Fundamental Problems and Attitudes.

By CLIFFORD BARRETT. (New York and London: The Macmillan Co. 1935. Pp. xiii + 395. Price 12s. 6d.)

It is not at all easy to write an introduction to philosophy suitable for the instruction of beginners and of the instructors of these beginners. Indeed, the writer of such a book is the man that beginners, instructors, and publishers have long been wanting to find; and I do not say that Mr. Barrett is he. Nevertheless, Mr. Barrett is rather like him. He does not intrude his own point of view (which seems to be a form of quasi-theistic "idealism" designed to include, but also to supplement and to subdue "naturalism"); and although the smoothness of his exegesis disguises and to some extent actually mollifies the toughness of the matters with which he deals, he gives his readers quite a lot to bite upon.

The book follows the sound general plan of discussing what's what in philosophy, of subordinating history to general analysis and inquiry, and yet of supplying a useful account both of his recent and of contemporary discussions. Since its account of contemporary philosophy (principally American-English) is at least equal in bulk to its account of all previous European philosophy, the unwary reader might be left with an exaggerated idea of the importance of contemporary discussion; but at any rate he will not be tempted to regard philosophy as a dead thing. And it would be difficult to censure the author's itinerary through the categories of substance, relation, and causality to the themes of truth and of "value."

Although I have been surprised by several things the author says, and shocked by a few, I think I should convey a false impression were I to discuss any points of detail. The proper business of a reviewer in *Philosophy*, I am sure, is to inform the professional readers of that journal that if they are looking for a suitable introduction to philosophy for teaching purposes, they should examine this book with care. It is likely to suit some of them very well indeed, and to suit all of them better than most other introductions. A second business of such a reviewer is to commend the book to the attention of non-professional readers.

JOHN LAIRD.

Self, Thought, and Reality. By A. C. MUKERJI, M.A., Reader in Philosophy, Allahabad. (Allahabad: The Juvenile Press. 1933. Pp. xiv + 410.)

This book, influenced to some extent by the author's connections with the late A. S. Pringle-Pattison and with Professor Harold H. Joachim, of

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New College, Oxford, has for its object "to lay the epistemological foundation of a theory of self by removing some of the obstacles which have persistently clung to the problem and obscured the real issues" (p. 2). The bulk of it consists, consequently, of "something like a survey of the currents of modern thought" (p. 7); and "the imperfect sort of originality" claimed for it lies in bringing those contemporary philosophical tendencies "within the fighting-range with each other by reformulating some of the basic principles of knowledge in terms of the present age, and developing them in a partially new direction" (p. 11). The result is "a theory of the universe which is neither purely idealistic nor entirely realistic," but which still its author, for his having been mainly "inspired by the thoughts of the eminent idealists," finds it not improper to call "an idealistic interpretation of reality" (pp. 9, 10). The realistic side of the theory is expressed in the contention that "the world, though correlative to thought, is not created by it, and so exists even when it is not revealed to an individual mind" (pp. 145-46), while its idealism consists in (1) protesting (with Green and *contra* Alexander) against the realist's turning the subject-object relation into an inter-objective relation, viz. through his confusion of mind with the subject, i.e. his ignorance of the "epistemological distinction between the ego as the ultimate presupposition of knowledge and the ego as mind which is only one thing among other things of the world" (p. 303); and (2) the deduction herefrom "that the self is the inexpugnable basis of Reality" (p. 329).

We thus get a purely epistemological part (Chapters I-IX), one (X-XI) leading over to, and one (XII-XIII) mainly engaged in the problem of self. Not before this third part Indian philosophy comes in, viz. through the system of Śāṅkara as the one where the epistemological attitude is more prominent than anywhere else in the Vedānta. This part is introduced by some very sensible remarks on the "substantial help in modern controversy" that Indian philosophy can yield. We are then made acquainted with Śāṅkara's strikingly modern arguments against materialism, his refutation of the Buddhist theory of becoming (dissolving the self into a series of momentary ideas) and of the Mīmāṃsā and other schools looking (like Locke, etc.) at consciousness as accidental to the soul (psychological attitude), and finally with his answer to the vexed problem how the pure subject can be known at all, since for becoming known it must become an object. The answer (reminding of Plotinus) is that a correct knowledge of it in the absolute sense is only possible through a mystical intuition as the result of a sort of psychical metamorphosis which, however, is conditioned by systematic thought as a stage of discipline leading ultimately to the development of that higher faculty (p. 380). There is, lastly, a most interesting review—the first ever attempted, so far as I know—of the several lines, idealistic and realistic, of "neo-vedantism" that have sprung up (very much like the rivalling interpretations of Kant's system) as re-interpretations of Śāṅkara's monism.

There is, so far as I can see, little to be blamed in this admirably clear work written in correct and fluent English and printed in bold type pleasant to the eye. But there are rather too many misprints there. And it is, I believe, to be regretted that the notion of the "*Bewusstsein überhaupt*" has been declared to be outside the scope of the book. For the Western reader at least would have certainly welcomed some information on the protracted controversy, in the school of Śāṅkara, on the problem "whether the witnessing self is the individua^l or the universal self" (p. 363, n. 2).

F. OTTO SCHRADER.

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Studies in the History of Ideas, Vol. III. Edited by the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University. (New York: Columbia University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. 511. 21s. net.)

This book is a miscellaneous collection of essays without any apparent connection except the fact that they are all historical in character. They are mostly of very high quality, and I think it is true of any one of them to say that any person interested in the branch of philosophy with which it deals will be well advised to read it. Some will be all the more ready to do so when I point out that despite the traditions of the place of its origin the book shows very little trace of the influence of "pragmatism."

A book dealing with so many different subjects is quite impossible to summarize or criticize in detail in an ordinary review, so I shall confine myself to a brief indication of the contents. It fitsly starts with a very brief historical survey by Professor Dewey of the chief empiricisms of the past. There follows the only non-philosophical article, by M. T. McClure, ingeniously arguing the theory that the Ancient Greeks owed their genius to race-mixture. Then come "Renaissance and Method in Philosophy," by Richard McKeon; "Cartesian Doctrine and the Animal Soul," by A. G. A. Balz; and "The Rôle of Descartes in Seventeenth-century England," by S. F. Lamprecht. "Locke's Essay," by F. J. E. Woodbridge, the briefest but not the least valuable of the articles, is an attempt to show in what the *empiricism* of Locke consisted; "Spinoza's Art and the Geometric Order," by Howard Selsam, throws some light on both the aesthetical and practical spirit moving Spinoza; "The Emergence of Space and Time in English Philosophy," by J. T. Baker, discusses the philosophy underlying physics in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; "Coleridge," by Rudolf Kagey, shows the merits as a philosopher of one who was the first to transplant something of Kant's philosophy into this country; "Hegel and Marx," by S. Hook, maintains effectively the theory that Marxism is not Hegelian but the reverse; "Mills's Methods and Formal Logic," by H. W. Schneider, tries to assimilate induction and deduction; "Impossible Numbers," by E. Nagel, outlines the history of the development of the conception of imaginary numbers up to Boole and concludes with a summary of certain fundamental facts and criticisms relative to the modern theory of the identity of mathematics and logic, a doctrine which the author will only admit in a rather modified sense; and, finally, in "Chauncey Wright's Pragmatic Naturalism," some account is given of the views of a man who is claimed to be a progenitor of Pragmatism. It will be seen then that this book includes some meat for most philosophic tastes in tolerable abundance.

A. C. EWING.

The Neural Basis of Thought. By GEORGE G. CAMPION and SIR GRAFTON ELLIOT SMITH. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1934. Pp. v + 167. Price 9s. net.)

Five of the six chapters of this book have been written by Mr. Campion. The remaining chapter is a Discourse delivered by Sir Grafton Elliot Smith at the Royal Institution on "The Evolution of Mind."

Mr. Campion starts out from James's views on the relation of consciousness to the brain. He accepts Semon's hypotheses of "engrams" and "engrammatic systems," and (too rashly) he identifies them with Head's "neural schemata," these furnishing "the neural correlates of the multitudinous psychological

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elements which, when integrated into a more or less coherent aggregation of mental symbols or concepts, constitute what we ordinarily call 'knowledge' and which in their interactions and ever-changing functional relations constitute what we ordinarily call 'thought processes.'"

He accepts the view that "the cortex functions as the storehouse of past impressions and experience" and consequently is the seat of our engrams and schemata. (We may well pause to wonder whether conscious memory is not biologically older than the cortex.) "In the stratified arrangement of the multitudinous neurones in the cortex and the diverse complexities of the engrams embracing the neurones in these different strata we see the neural mechanism involved in 'Generalization,' in 'Classification,' and in 'Abstraction': in the 'Universals' and 'Particulars' of the Philosophers, in the 'Genera' and 'Species' of the Logicians and Biologists, and in logical constructions like the 'Tree of Porphyry.'"

Mr. Campion believes that the optic thalami, which according to Head and Holmes are the "centres of consciousness" for the affective aspects of sensation, maintain a continuous stream of ever-changing patterns of neural impulse flowing through the "multitudinous systems of 'engrams' or 'schemata,'" and that, by the reverse neural pattern from cortex to thalami, a constant circulation of neural impulse is provided, "thus keeping in an active state those 'engrams' or 'schemata' which form the neural correlates of the mental symbols or concepts which may be employed in any particular phase of consciousness through which we may at any time be passing."

This conception of a ceaseless circulation of neural impulses between cortex and thalami led him in 1929 to predict the discovery in the thalami of a counterpart to the "cortical association areas." In his Discourse Sir Grafton Elliot Smith informs us that such "elements" have since been discovered in the higher mammals; and he points out that the hypothalamus must also enter into and thus complicate this circulation.

Both authors allude to the danger of treating conative, cognitive, and affective processes as separate isolated entities; and Mr. Campion stresses the view that the concept is "a living plastic mental symbol subject to a process of organic growth" similar to that "which takes place in the material being of all of us." He contrasts this view with James's insistence on the invariability of the concept, regardless of the different sense in which the latter is there using this term. According to Mr. Campion, mental symbols embrace and "have variously been called ideas, concepts, presentations, representations, images, etc." But why these are necessarily mental *symbols* any more than percepts or sensations are, or why they should not all have meaning apart from and prior to language, Mr. Campion does not pause to consider. For him mental symbols "are the 'meanings' which the slowly interacting and cumulative influence of etymology, logic, usage, and tradition have attached to the terms which severally denote them."

Sir Grafton Elliot Smith's Discourse is an attempt to trace the neural basis, and thus the evolution, of mind mainly from the researches of Head and his collaborators and from what is known of the structure and evolution of the central nervous system. He describes as "the most significant factor in the evolution of mind" the transfer of the direction of movement from the mid-brain to the neopallium (or cerebral cortex), "an unconscious automatism" thus becoming "a consciously directed process"; to many the occurrence of such a transfer will appear most improbable. He believes the hypothalamus to be "the essential instrument of emotional expression": to it is given "the decisive influence in translating into behaviour the initiative to action which lies in the cerebral cortex." "The cerebral cortex, so to speak, is the mere

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trigger which releases the activity of the brain and provokes and directs the movements." To many this, again, will appear a very inadequate statement. He alludes (unfortunately without adequate reference) to a recent neurological memoir which proves that "an impulse from one cortical area can only reach and influence distant areas [of the cortex] by travelling through the cortex itself. . . . Even in the simplest act of thought or skill, the whole neopallium participates." He thinks one must assume that in the primitive vertebrate "the thalamus acts as an affective organ of all senses other than smell," and that the hippocampal region of the cortex performs this function in regard to smell.

Enough has been said perhaps to convey a fair idea of the general tenor and scope of this book. Being a collection of papers written at different times by two close friends, it is apt to irritate the reader by the repetition of quotations and other phrases which it contains. For example, the same passage, cited from James's *Textbook of Psychology*, appears on pages 6, 51, 65, and 99; one from Bergson's *Introduction to Metaphysics* is quoted on page 52 and twice later (once at greater length) on page 66; and a sentence taken from Alexander's *Space, Time, and Deity* is to be found on pages 14, 50, and 122. Twelve lines in Sir Grafton Elliot Smith's Discourse, which occur on page 25, are repeated in the same Discourse on page 28.

C. S. MYERS.

The Śaiva School of Hinduism. By S. SHIVAPADASUNDARAM, B.A. With a preface by J. S. MACKENZIE, Litt.D., LL.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1934. Pp. 189. Price 6s.)

This purports to be an untechnical exposition of a small portion of the 28 Śhivāgamas, the authoritative texts for Śaivaites. The dates of these texts cover a long uncertain interval, but the portion was translated from Sanskrit into Tamil in the twelfth century, with addition of the usual exegesis, a further commentary being added in the eighteenth century. The author has a lucid correct English, and has well paragraphed his exposition. Dr. Mackenzie's few words recommend the book solely as an Oriental charting of ethics. For me, whereas the charting fails in this respect to get as far as what I should like to see included in this subject generally as interworld-ethics, it is the distinctively *religious basis* opened up in Oriental ethics that is made important. Namely, that it is the common Divine nature in every man, woman, child which demands reverential recognition and warding from me. Where the author chiefly fails—and here, whether it be he as a Śaivaite, or his sources that default, for we never know if he or they be speaking—is in his seeing the soul as static and unchanging, the mere passive receptacle of impouring knowing and desiring, not the co-operator with the Divine nature. And yet the soul he rightly sees as capable of becoming God. Here is surely assumed a dynamic nature, a nature which has its own *shakti*. This word he wrongly represents as "power." It does mean literally "ability to," but actually it was India's post-Buddhistic effort to find a worthy term for man's *will*, which Buddhism exploited without a single strong, fit word by which to express it. Others took up her decadent torch.

In calling the Mahābhārata a work *written* in the sixth century B.C., about five hundred years before India had any written book, the writer has let drop a heavy brick! And the paragraph on the conventional nature of religions is a piece of mere fancy.

C. A. F. RHYDS DAVIDS.

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The Philosophy of Spinoza and Brunner. By WALTER BERNARD, Ph.D.
(New York: The Spinoza Institute of America, Inc. 1934. Pp. 239.
Price, Cloth \$2.50, Paper \$1.50.)

Spinoza has always seemed to stand a little outside of the main current of European thought—as Oldenburg neatly put it, he was “an odd philosopher, that lives in Holland, but no Hollander”. This was probably the source of the snobbish verdict that I recently overheard, that Spinoza had “an untutored mind”. Professor Wolfson has demonstrated this at least—perhaps overdemonstrated it—that he was well-instructed in medieval and Aristotelian lore; and that his mind was “untutored” in any other sense will hardly be contended by those who have made close study of the *Ethics*. Unfortunately, however, his “oddity” has made a philosopher who above all others desired to be treated objectively, and to found no school, occasionally subject to the hero-worshipping attentions of small groups of untutored disciples. I do not think that this is likely to do any great harm: it corrects itself by cheapening its own stock. What philosophy needs, however, is careful, precise, and comprehensive thought; not ecstatic glimpses of vague analogies and cloudy agreements, but principles that will at once bear analysis and yield fruitful intellectual results; in a word, not discipleship but discipline.

H. F. HALLETT.

The Hindu Conception of the Deity, as culminating in Rāmānuja. By BHARATAN KUMARAPPA, M.A., Ph.D. With a Foreword by Dr. L. D. BARNETT.
(London: Luzac & Co. 1934. Pp. xv + 356. Price 12s. 6d.)

This was the writer's Ph.D. thesis for a London degree four years ago, and he has taken the advice I have given students and let its contents stand the test for four years of *bhūya-bhūya*, more-becoming in his growth, before lending it more permanent form in a book. Putting aside the Vedas, he analyses conceptions of Deity in Upaniṣads, Gītā, Pañcarātra, Purāṇas, Ālvārs in successive chapters, then in fuller detail in Rāmānuja. The literary style is lively and lucid; the reader will not here be nodding. I am glad to tell him of the work. The interpretation of Māyā is especially interesting.

I note that everywhere the author applies the masculine pronoun to the neuter concept Brahman, lending to That Which is *nirguṇa* the attribute of sex, but that is everywhere a linguistic difficulty. Greater perhaps is one's dissatisfaction, not with the writer, but with the way in which this or that cult or school has permitted itself to chatter about and “explain” Deity. Wiser was Job: “I will lay my hand upon my mouth.” All must ultimately be for us as yet a matter of faith, a matter in which man has worded his ignorance, has aired his logic with limited premisses. In fundamentals we seek deepest certainties. We are certain, we know, that we seek a More than we have been, than we are. That More implies a Most, even if It be but an ideal point. Its reality alone makes the More have a meaning. That is all we can as yet frame “conceptions” about. Now this dynamic view of Being—the Becoming in a More—is just what I find was being felt after in the early Upaniṣads. The striking novelty in the increased use of the verb *bhū*, “to become,” in the older sayings, testifies to it. But there is no trace of this as recognized in the book. It belongs to the concept of man as “willer,” and of Deity as Willer, but India had no word for will, as the writer's fine Index betrays only too well.

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The analogy of play as alone adequate to explain Divine activity opens a way to guess at "will" and "becoming" in Deity, but the one word India failed to frame, from the other she had turned away.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

The Historical Element in Religion. By CLEMENT C. J. WEBB, F.B.A. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1935. Pp. 118. Price 4s. 6d.)

If in regard for the request of the Editor this review is brief, its brevity must not be taken as a measure of its interest and value and of my genuine appreciation and cordial recommendation of this volume. It consists of four lectures on the nature, the place, the depreciation, and the significance of the *Historical Element in Religion*, and an additional chapter in which the principle expounded is applied to four historical problems of Christianity. "What I understand by the historical element in religion is the tradition of the past of a religious community which is associated in the minds of its members with their sense of sharing in its life" (p. 25). In other words, individual religious experience depends on social religious inheritance. Even the contrasted types—the mystical and the speculative—can be shown from their own self-witness to be more dependent on such an inheritance than they profess to be. In no other religion is the historical element so important, because so essential to its distinctive character, as in the Christian, and for three reasons. "The first feature is the possession of a sacred book which is believed to be inspired to reveal the nature and the will of the God who is proposed as the object of worship. The second feature is the conception of that God as a transcendent Being communicating His will through the medium of prophets to whom He spoke directly and of a community to which is entrusted the message thus received. The third is the divine dignity attributed to its founder" (pp. 36-37). The basis for faith which this historical element afforded has been shaken by "a sense of insecurity in all traditional beliefs about the past, due to the destructive results of a new criticism" (p. 50). Some have sought refuge from this insecurity in depreciating the value of the historical in comparison with other elements in religion. What Spinoza, Lessing, Kant, and Hegel advance in this connection is critically examined by the author. What is said of Spinoza deserves quotation. "I cannot find in Spinoza's declared view of the relation of God to morality or in his conception of the universal system which he calls God, anything which, apart from the influence, surviving in his soul, of the faith which he had inherited but abandoned, can justify either a religious view of morality or a religious attitude toward God" (p. 56). The significance attached to historical religion in the "immanentism" of Croce is recognized; but a thorough denial of any legitimate place for a historical element in religion by a recent writer, Mr. Oakeshott (*Experience and its Modes*), is more fully refuted. Recognizing that the interest of religion is a practical one and yet so vital that it cannot be indifferent to the challenge of criticism, the author sums up his conclusion in the words: "While such a tradition is certainly not a sufficient guarantee of the actual past occurrence of even conspicuous details, it is yet a witness to the historicity of the general situation presupposed in the present consciousness of the community; and it is perhaps unnecessary to add that if there be a real difficulty in explaining otherwise the existence and character of the community, where these are attested by unquestionable evidence, this fact affords an important corroboration of the tradition in question" (p. 89). This guiding principle is applied to the tradition of the

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Virgin-Birth, and results in the Scottish verdict of "non-proven." In regard to the Resurrection of Christ, apart from minor details, the author holds that Christian believers are "justified in professing their confident persuasion that only a genuine experience of intercourse with a living person victorious over death can be behind the original creation of the Christian Church, its continuance and frequent revivals during the succeeding centuries, and the renewed sense to-day in many quarters—and those in nowise out of touch with what is most vital and free from prejudice in contemporary life and thought—that in the Christ whom the Church proclaims as the supreme revelation to men of a God who is spirit, lies now, as so often in the past, the only hope of a world seeking salvation from fear and despondency in face of a universe whose physical immensity threatens to reduce to insignificance the human spirit, which yet can never abandon its consciousness of superiority to all that is not spirit" (pp. 104-5). On similar grounds, the institution of the Lord's Supper by Christ is regarded as probable; but more uncertain is the conclusion regarding the special commission to Peter. I find myself in nearly all points in so profound accord, that there is no ground for any dissent. But I may refer to one consideration which is not mentioned in the argument, namely, that which Herrmann has urged in his pamphlet *Why does our Faith need historical facts?*

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

Logische Syntax der Sprache. By R. CARNAP. (Vienna: J. Springer, 1934. Pp. xi + 274.)

Logical Positivism has still to produce a stable formulation of doctrine. And the knowledgeable reader of Professor Carnap's latest and important contribution to Logical Positivism is likely to be impressed by the velocity with which his opinions (and the opinions of other members of the "Viennese Circle" of which he is a distinguished representative) are changing. No doubt a hostile critic would find it easy to establish inconsistencies, withdrawals, and changes of front in the complex of theories, as expounded, for instance, in the journal *Erkenntnis*, which have come to be known under the name of Logical Positivism. But too much can be made of the formal defects of a theory, whose process of growth may be as interesting as its final formulation.

Indeed, much of the interest of Professor Carnap's latest position is lost if his book is not approached genetically and seen as the latest stage of a tradition (if a heterodoxy can be called a tradition) which has included Hume, Comte, Karl Pearson, Ernst Mach, and Bertrand Russell among its chief representatives.

With however much variation in detail, these writers have shared a common empirical, "scientific" outlook, forming a basis for strong antipathy to metaphysics and distrust, amounting to rejection, of classical philosophy. And this common *Weltanschauung* produces unmistakable similarity in the broad outlines of their systems. Thus in each case an affirmation in the value of science finds its working expression in emphasis on empirical criteria in the theory of knowledge and its theoretical formulation in some "principle of verifiability," seeking to restrict all knowledge to the model of scientific procedure. In its negative, prohibitory aspect such a principle stigmatizes as "meaningless" or "metaphysical" all entities, from God downwards, whose presence cannot in principle be detected in the laboratory, and thus, while claiming to be neutral with respect to orthodox philosophical positions, yet has fairly obvious ontological implications.

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This is, however, often denied by supporters who will readily interpret the principle of verifiability, in terms of "economy," as an ascetic refusal to formulate redundant causal hypotheses. But the principle's application is in fact determined by epistemological rather than logical or aesthetic considerations of "economy"; entities are primarily rejected because their existence can be established insufficiently or not at all by empirical criteria. Thus the method has affinities to Descartes as well as to Occam.

The reference to Descartes makes it not unpalatable that a principle of verifiability, combining a sceptical outlook in epistemology with a striving for the logical elegance associated with economy of postulates, may have an iconoclastic impetus which is not easily arrested at the level of uncritical scientific realism. Indeed, the principle invoked to expel metaphysics is soon seen to imply, in turn, a similar examination of notions like "other persons," the "external world," and "myself," which the scientist uses uncritically. And when knowledge of the external world is ultimately reduced to acquaintance with sense-impressions, the positivist who began by enthusiastic acceptance ends by destructive criticism of scientific procedure itself. Not merely superfluous causes, but causality itself is involved in the ruin; economy is a monster who destroys his friends with his enemies.

It would be bad enough if this were all, and the positivist were left with the embarrassing task of resynthesizing, in an analytic world of simple disconnected sense-data the continuity and the types of order which analysis has ostensibly decomposed. The paradox of an emphasis on empirical verifiability which ends by destroying the presuppositions of the scientific procedure on which its own arguments are based, and deduces an idealistic system from realistic premisses, might be passed off as a dialectical difficulty by those for whom dialectics are a convenient alias for bad logic.

In fact, however, the positivist finds it difficult to remain in a state of mild idealism. For immoderate doubt may refuse to be satisfied even by a solipsistic form of idealism, may "doubt" the reality of all sense-impressions except as presented at the moment of assertion (identifying the observable with the observed), and, resisting Descartes's illegitimate importation of the thinking *self* (a notion rejected at earlier stages of analysis) come to rest in a kind of instantaneous solipsism of the specious present, the *reductio ad absurdum* of economy and doubt. If it is at all possible to arrest this headlong progress from realist or materialist presuppositions, via sensationalism, to idealism and momentary solipsism, it still remains for positivists to produce the appropriate modifications of the principle of verifiability.

While Logical Positivism has not been able to solve these typical difficulties of earlier Positivism (as Carnap's struggles with "protocol-statements," private and public languages, etc., in his *Unity of Science* have shown) a shift of emphasis to problems of language, based on developments in logistic technique and inspired primarily (if unwillingly) by Wittgenstein, has given a new aspect and a new interest to its problems. Thus, to take one instance, the fundamental problem of relating "logical constructions" to the sense-data of which they are the "constructs" comes now to be regarded as a subordinate part of the more general task of the "logical analysis" of scientific languages and theories. And philosophy becomes identified with logical analysis.

In the restriction of analysis to languages, or linguistic systems, there is undoubted gain in clarity (though the underlying problems of epistemology are now concealed in the relatively uncritical notion of a "language"), and full use can be made of a wealth of detailed logistic material from the relational calculus of Russell and Whitehead to the axiomatic and metamathematical

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researches of Hibbert and the latest symbolic inventions of the Polish logicians. On the model of these investigations, logical analysis has tended to be concerned with such problems as the exhibition of sets of necessary and sufficient axioms, and the study of internal consistency, categoricity (*Vollständigkeit*), isomorphism, etc. Such analysis is "logical" in that generalized sense in which logic is no longer distinguished, except for practical convenience, from mathematics, but agrees with it in being the science of general types of order.

It is Professor Carnap's merit in this book to have provided an explicit theoretical basis for these hitherto somewhat disconnected researches, and by providing definitions of the notions needed in such analysis, to have contributed materially to its successful prosecution. His account may be interpreted, from another aspect, as an attempt at defining the function of scientific or positivist philosophy. Unlike Wittgenstein, whose well-known views on the ineffability of philosophic insight are criticized and rejected (pp. 208-10), Professor Carnap is able to find a place for the new philosopher in the rear-guard of the scientific movement. The philosophical contribution is the investigation of the mathematico-logical properties of scientific theories. In so far as such theories are insufficiently coherent or explicit, the history of scientific discovery has shown that exhibition of structure as by formulating unnoticed assumptions or inventing more adequate symbolisms may be an important contribution to clarity of knowledge.

Professor Carnap's attempt to define the analytic method in adequate detail and to pursue its consequences by applying it to concrete, specially constructed, examples, leads him to formulate two very interesting theses. First, the desire to replace philosophy by the mathematico-logical analysis of languages (or portions of languages as organized in systems) naturally leads to regarding the languages analysed in *abstraction from meaning*, i.e. as calculi or systems of objects of determinate kinds organized in series according to determinate rules. For the purpose or application of a system of objects (whether symbols or not) is irrelevant to its mathematical structure; the existence of rules regulating the number and variety of the elements and their modes of combination is the necessary and sufficient condition for analysis to be possible. It is the properties which can be deduced from such rules of formation and combination, without reference to the application (or meaning) of specific combinations which are the "formal" properties of a language. And logical analysis, or syntax, as Professor Carnap would prefer to call it, by analogy with ordinary grammar, is the study of such formal properties. Thus syntax becomes identical with the "algebra" or "geometry" of a certain class of calculi, those which bear sufficient formal resemblance to languages in current use.

It is important to notice that what would ordinarily be called rules of logic (e.g. the rules of syllogistic inference) are, in this view, taken to belong to the rules of definition which constitute the language. Indeed, it is essential to the possibility of "syntactic" analysis that a language should contain "rules of transformation" by virtue of which one sentence "follows from" others. (In a later chapter, Carnap is able to show how a definition of "follows from" (*Folge*) is in effect equivalent to a full specification of the rules of transformation, and is *sufficient* for the syntactical analysis of the language considered.) In terms of the rules of transformation, Carnap is able, in what is often the most ingenious manner, to define the usual logical notions. (An *analytic* sentence, for example, is one from which every sentence in the language follows.)

Since the complicated, arbitrary structure of current European languages

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renders them unsuitable as illustrations of the method, Carnap invents two artificial languages for that purpose. The first is so constructed as to conform approximately to the finitist demands of Brouwer (restricted use of existential operators), while the second, having no such restrictions, is sufficiently complex for the representation, e.g. of contemporary physical theories. In each case various syntactical notions, such as "analytic," "synthetic," "synonymous," "inconsistent" are defined and investigations of completeness (*Vollständigkeit*) on the lines of Gödel's researches are pursued in detail. It is maintained that the results of syntactical analysis can be expressed in the symbols of the language analysed; the abrogation of the theory of types thus entailed is accepted, and leads to some interesting discussion of the familiar mathematical paradoxes. The reader will find much to admire in Professor Carnap's sure grasp of the elaborate technical apparatus needed in these investigations, and will be grateful for the generous amount of incidental reference to specific problems of logic, the questions of modality, and many valued logics, to mention only two.

The assimilation of "laws of logic" to rules for the definition of a language leads up to a theory of logical relativity, a "principle of toleration," which is the second main novelty of Professor Carnap's position. This principle is a starting consequence of the final transition from positivism in the earlier form of a theory with ontological implication however concealed by protestations of scientific "neutrality" to the "pure" form of a logical technique. Where the earlier positivist "attacked" metaphysics, and to that extent betrayed scientific impartiality, the neo-positivist, who is content to analyse, finds it impossible to distinguish between science and metaphysics on the basis of strictly formal criteria. For one language, *qua* calculus, is as "good" as any other. It may be more complex, or bear a one-one correlation to some part of the English language, or have any other formal property which may ultimately affect its applicability or usefulness. But questions of application are strictly irrelevant to formal analysis or syntax. Thus the way is clear for a principle of toleration. Anybody can choose a language constructed on arbitrary principles—"everybody may construct his Logic, i.e. his form of speech, how he pleases" (p. 44), provided he is explicit as to the formal rules of combination of his symbols. There are no "oughts" in Logic—"In der Logik gibt es keine Moral." And the complete relativity of all logical notions follows.

Evaluation of this important theory must be based on appreciation of the motives which determine the analysis not merely of languages, but of languages *qua* calculi, in abstraction from meaning. Recent papers by Logical Positivists have made it clear that the trend in question is determined by much the same motives as inspired Berkeley's denial of the existence of matter, the desire to dispense with a duplication of two worlds: (a) the realm of propositions (intra-mental events), (b) the parallel world of facts (extra-mental events) known only by reflection, as true propositions, in (a). Now while the elimination of the realm of facts, by legislative edict, has about it an attractive air of economy and no metaphysical nonsense, it has the fatal disadvantage of breaking the link with experience, of reducing to vanishing point the significance of the insistence on verifiability from which positivism began. It becomes very difficult, for example, to find a purely formal characterization of those "atomic statements" which in modern positivist theory replace the ultimate elements of early sensationalism. Logical criteria alone, it seems, do not suffice to allow for differences in the epistemological status of propositions. The reflection in Professor Carnap's system of the historical fact that idealism has in practice usually been allied to a coherence

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theory of truth is the difficulty of discovering a purely formal characterization of atomic statements. In effect this entails the unobtrusive jettisoning of the principle of verifiability. For atomic statements are the directly verifiable statements, and all other statements were, in the original positivist programme, tested for validity by their relation to atomic statements. But now we are not able to recognize even atomic statements; we can "choose" any statements to play the part of atomic statements. The total theoretical separation of a language from its meaning seems in fact to draw the sting out of positivism by permitting all systems (even if internally inconsistent?) indifferently, irrespective of their relations to experience and human purposes.

I do not believe that Professor Carnap would find it impossible to meet these objections; if sustained, they would in no way detract from the importance of his contributions to logistic theory. Enough has perhaps been said to indicate that Professor Carnap has written a most stimulating and thought-provoking book, which, by its uniformly high standard of presentation, the importance of the doctrines expounded, and the patience with which they are elaborated belongs to the best of recent philosophical literature. The promised English translation will be awaited with much interest.

M. BLACK.

Collected Essays. By F. H. BRADLEY, O.M., LL.D., F.R.S. (Oxford: Clarendon Press; Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. Vol. I, ix + 347, Vol. II, 348-708. Price 36s. the two volumes.)

The appearance of these two volumes, which complete the publication in book form of Bradley's writings, is a welcome occasion; for, although they contain little that has not before been printed, they make accessible for the first time some of his most characteristic essays. Here are reprinted, first, Bradley's two early pamphlets (now long out of print), *The Presuppositions of Critical History* (1874), and *Mr. Sidgwick's Hedonism* (1877); secondly, twenty-seven essays from *Mind*, the *International Journal of Ethics*, and the *Fortnightly Review*; and thirdly, six short "Replies to Criticisms and Notes" which (with one exception) appeared originally in the pages of *Mind*. To these are added two hitherto unpublished essays, *On the Treatment of Sexual Detail in Literature*, and on *Relations*; and a complete bibliography of his work.

The editors, who appear under the initials M. de G. and H. H. J., have performed their work admirably. The decision to arrange the essays mainly in chronological order was a wise choice; and the reader will be grateful for the care they have taken to provide all the necessary references and bibliographical details. The editing of the essay on *Relations*, which, left unfinished by Bradley, had to be pieced together from various MSS. and notebooks, called particularly for care and patience, and has been performed with the greatest skill. Everything, in short, that the reader could look for from the editors has been supplied.

Considered from the standpoint of subject, these essays fall into four main classes. There are, first, two essays, appealing to a more general and less technical interest than the rest—*The Evidences of Spiritualism* (1885), reprinted from the *Fortnightly Review*; and *On the Treatment of Sexual Detail in Literature* (1912), hitherto unpublished—which are admirable examples of the handling of important and interesting questions by an acute and liberal intelligence. Secondly, there are the writings which deal with (in a general sense) logical questions—the pamphlet on *The Presuppositions of Critical History*, and the unfinished essay on *Relations*, on which Bradley was working

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at the time of his death in 1924. The pamphlet is interesting as the earliest of Bradley's published work and because it is one of the earliest discussions in English of the logical and epistemological questions connected with history. He was right, I think, when in later years he became dissatisfied with its conclusions, but it remains for us one of the most original and acute discussions of these questions. The essay on *Relations* was intended to be a rehandling of a subject on which Bradley had already written much; and as it appears here it is more like elaborate notes for a treatise than an essay. No fresh doctrine, so far as I can see, is propounded, but the discussion is fuller than any to be found in the *Principles of Logic* or elsewhere in Bradley's writings. He was right in believing that "the question of relations, their ultimate nature and place in the world of reality and knowledge" is "central"; and this treatment of it shows undimmed Bradley's intellectual vitality, his characteristic appreciation of difficulties, and his candid consideration of views which, in the end, he felt obliged to reject. What he has to say here and elsewhere on the problem of relations has yet, I think, to receive the critical consideration it deserves. Thirdly, there are the seven essays which deal with ethical subjects, ranging from the elaborate criticism of the *Methods of Ethics* contained in *Mr. Sidgwick's Hedonism*, to the brilliant four pages which consider the question, *Is Self-sacrifice an Enigma?* And there are, fourthly, the twenty essays which comprise the main bulk of Bradley's writing on psychology.

It will be seen, then, that these volumes are valuable chiefly (though not exclusively) for collecting together Bradley's contribution to psychology. Bradley had a clear notion of what he thought ought to be the subject-matter of psychology and of the general character of psychological, as distinct from logical or metaphysical, questions. A sterile purism in thought is, of course, the last thing of which he may justly be accused; but he knew that there is a difference between theory and practice, between psychology and metaphysics, between ethics and moral sensibility, between religion and philosophy, and he knew that distinctions of this kind are essential to clear thinking. In one section of *Mr. Sidgwick's Hedonism* he gives us again (he had already given them in *Ethical Studies*) his views about the general character of ethical thought, and in more than one of those psychological essays he indicates his notion of the general character of psychology. *A Defence of Phenomenalism in Psychology*, originally published in 1900 in *Mind*, states his view most comprehensively; and, while it is a view which, I think, must come to be accepted more and more as psychology assumes a genuinely scientific character, it is one of which we require still to be reminded. Bradley began the publication of these essays on psychological subjects after the appearance of the *Principles of Logic* in 1883, and they continued to appear at intervals in *Mind* until 1904; but they came mostly from the period subsequent to the publication of *Appearance and Reality* in 1893. His writing on psychology is characteristic of Bradley in two respects. It is concerned entirely with the analysis of the main constitutive concepts—e.g. sensation, thought, association, attention, memory, will—which form the framework within which "experimental psychology" (with which he confesses himself "scarcely at all acquainted") works. His task, he conceived, was to make some contribution towards the further determination of this framework of concepts, and so towards the creation of a more settled terminology in psychology (II, 377). And he was certainly right in believing that "in analysis there is still much to be done" (I, 180). In this respect he takes his place within the general purpose of the traditional "English analytical school." But further, besides the superior subtlety and acuteness of Bradley's analysis when compared

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with such earlier representatives of this school as Bentham or James Mill, his writings on psychology are characteristic in respect of the attention they pay to, and the inspiration they draw from, the great mass of Continental work on the subject which belongs to the second half of the nineteenth century. Bradley's independence of judgment, in metaphysics no less than in psychology, is, perhaps, apt to obscure the remarkably wide acquaintance he had with the work of others, both in England and on the Continent. To the end of his life he remained, not only an independent thinker, but also a reader (cf. II, 653), and a reader always more interested in the work of his contemporaries than in that of earlier writers. Nevertheless, in spite of this foreign strain in his reading, Bradley takes his stand, as a psychologist, among his contemporary English writers—Bain, Sully, James, Ward, and Stout—and differs from them, not so much in outlook as in opinion, and because he never produced a systematic treatise on the subject. It may be remarked also that Bradley was a man admirably equipped for making a notable contribution in the analysis of psychological concepts. Added to a clear perception of the general character of psychology and the nature of its problems and presuppositions, he had a remarkable power of self-analysis, an acute and imaginative appreciation of difficulties, and great common sense. His contribution is, of course, fragmentary in that his writings do not contain a discussion of all even of the most important problems of psychology; but whenever he takes up a topic his treatment of it is thorough and masterly. The essays on *Association and Thought*, on *What do we mean by the Intensity of Psychological States?*, on *Active Attention*, perhaps stand out from the others by reason of their comprehensiveness. And the three elaborate essays on *The Definition of Will* remain his most notable single treatment of a psychological problem. The contents of these volumes are, I think, unlikely ever to turn out to be Bradley's most important work; but it does not require any perspective of time to make these writings on psychology appear, within their limits, some of the best in the English language.

MICHAEL OAKESHOTT.

Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Vol. IV: *The Simplest Mathematics*; Vol. V: *Pragmatism and Pragmaticism*. Edited by CHARLES HARTSHORN and PAUL WEISS. (Cambridge, U.S.A.; Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1933. Vol. IV. Pp. x + 601; 1934: Vol. V. Pp. xii + 455. Price: Vol. IV, \$0.25s.; Vol. V, \$5.21s.)

Reviewers of the earlier volumes of Peirce's *Collected Works* have already commented upon the arduous task of editing his numerous and scrappy manuscripts, and upon the plan adopted by the Editors for arranging this heap of miscellaneous writings. It must suffice here to point out that no one of these volumes is complete in itself. Peirce had much to say on many different but often closely connected topics; he was, moreover, apt to see important connections where other people failed to discover any point of contact. Accordingly he often says the same things—though, unfortunately, sometimes in very different terminology—in many different contexts. This being so, it was inevitable that there should be numerous cross-references, backwards and forwards, some of the latter being to volumes not yet published. Volume V will certainly need to be considered again with reference to the as yet unpublished Volume VI, which is to contain Peirce's writings on metaphysics.

There is no specially close connection between the two volumes now being reviewed. Volume IV, entitled *The Simplest Mathematics*, contains his unpublished papers on logic, and on the foundations of mathematics, so

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that it should be read in close connection with Volume III, containing his published papers on formal logic. A considerable part of Volume IV is taken up with Peirce's system of "existential graphs," which Peirce himself described as his *chef d'œuvre*. Agreeing with his father's account of mathematics as "the science which draws necessary conclusions" (see IV. 229*), he set himself "to study the workings of necessary inferences." He thought that for this purpose what was required was "a method of representing diagrammatically any possible set of premisses, this diagram to be such that we can observe the transformation of these premisses into the conclusion by a series of steps each of the utmost simplicity" (IV. 429). The system is worth examination even by those who, like the present reviewer, have no great liking for pictorial diagrams. Of more general interest is his discussion of signs, which overlaps considerably with papers already published in Volume II, Bk. ii. This discussion occurs in his articles on "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmatism," to which it is extremely relevant. This article is the third of three articles dealing with "What Pragmatism Is," the first two of which are published in Volume V. They originally appeared in *The Monist* for 1905. It is somewhat disconcerting to have Peirce's published papers disjoined in this manner, but there is something to be said for the attempt of the Editors to bring together Peirce's various utterances on the theory of signs. The Editorial Note prefixed to each volume and the footnotes will enable the attentive reader to discover the order in which Peirce himself thought fit to publish his views.

The title of Volume V, *Pragmatism and Pragmaticism*, calls for some comment. William James ascribed the origin of "Pragmatism" as a philosophical doctrine to Peirce. This doctrine was taken up and developed by James and Dr. Schiller. "So far," says Peirce, "all went happily" (V. 414). But, he complains, "the word begins to be met with occasionally in the literary journals, where it gets abused in the merciless way that words have to expect when they fall into literary clutches." Moreover, he felt that his own original conception of the doctrine was "a more compact and unitary conception" than that of other pragmatists. To mark this divergence he renamed his own doctrine "pragmaticism." This doctrine Peirce regarded as essentially a method for making our ideas clear. The six articles in which Peirce first put forward this doctrine appeared in 1877 (*Popular Science Monthly*). The first, entitled "The Fixation of Belief," and the second, entitled "How to Make our Ideas Clear," are put by the Editors in Bk. ii of Volume V; the third, fourth, and sixth articles are given in Volume II, whilst the fifth will appear in Volume VI. The two articles contained in the volume being reviewed are familiar to all students of pragmatism. It is not necessary to summarize them here. All that can be attempted in this short review is to indicate wherein lay the originality of Peirce's "compact and unitary doctrine." It lay in Peirce's unusually penetrating apprehension of the fact that muddled thinking and the unclear use of language go together; that to clarify thought we must pay attention to language, and that in so doing we shall be led to a theory of signs. On one occasion Peirce formulated his fundamental doctrine as follows: "The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all general modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol" (V. 438). The acceptance of this doctrine would, Peirce maintained, enable us so to state our problems as to be able to see wherein a solution can be found. It is interesting to read Peirce's various attempts to apply his

* References are throughout to the numbered paragraphs; I follow the practice of the Editors in prefixing the number of the volume.

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doctrine to selected questions, and to observe the way in which, from time to time, he modified his views. In spite of hesitations and obscurities due to entanglement with his own metaphysical theories, Peirce has anticipated to some extent the experimental theory of meaning. Both these volumes can be read with profit by anyone who has some inkling of the importance for philosophy of a clear theory of language.

L. SUSAN STEBBING.

Books received also:

- A. O. LOVEJOY and G. BOAS. *Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity*. (A Documentary History of Primitivism and Related Ideas. Vol. I.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press; London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. xv + 482. 5 dollars; 22s. 6d.
- J. MACMURRAY. *Creative Society. A Study of the Relation of Christianity to Communism*. London: Student Christian Movement Press. 1935. Pp. 196. 5s.
- M. GINSBERG, D.Lit. *The Unity of Mankind*. (L. T. Hobhouse Memorial Trust Lecture, 1935.) London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. Pp. 29. 2s.
- SIR R. W. LIVINGSTONE. *Greek Ideals and Modern Life*. Oxford at the Clarendon Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. x + 175. 6s.
- L. COOPER. *Evolution and Repentance*. New York: Cornell University Press. 1935. Pp. viii + 253. 10s. 6d.
- H. CHERNISS. *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1935. Pp. xvi + 418. 4 dollars.
- J. LAIRD, F.B.A., LL.D. *An Enquiry into Moral Notions*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1935. Pp. 318. 10s. 6d.
- N. ISRAELI, Ph.D. *Outlook upon the Future of British Unemployed, Mental Patients, and Others*. New York: Science Press Printing Co. 1935. Pp. 30. 50 cents.
- G. SANTAYANA. *The Last Puritan. A Memoir in the form of a Novel*. London: Constable & Co. 1935. Pp. 721. 8s. 6d.
- H. KABIR. *Immanuel Kant on Philosophy in General*. Translated with four introductory essays. Calcutta at the University Press. 1935. Pp. cl + 60. Rs. 5; 9s.
- G. LAPAGE. *Pursuit, In Sixty Sonnets*. Cambridge: Heffer & Sons. 1935. Pp. 62. 2s.
- VARIOUS: *The Next Five Years. An Essay in Political Agreement*. London: Macmillan & Co. 1935. Pp. xvi + 320. 5s.
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IN MEMORIAM

WILLIAM RITCHIE SORLEY

IN Professor W. R. Sorley, who died on July 28th, philosophy lost one of the ablest representatives of the idealistic movement which dominated thought in this country during the latter part of last century and the beginning of this one. Born in 1855, and going from his home in Selkirk Manse to the University of Edinburgh, he came first under the influence of Professor Campbell Fraser, the leading exponent of Berkeley's Idealism, to which in the end, "though a wide compass round be fetched," he was to return from the more Platonic and Hegelian form of that doctrine that had inspired much of the intermediate period. From Edinburgh, after winning the Shaw Fellowship, the philosophical blue ribbon of the four Scottish Universities, he went to Trinity College, Cambridge, and, after taking the Moral Sciences Tripos, alone in the first class, was awarded a Fellowship in 1883. In 1888 he went as the first Professor of Logic and Philosophy to University College, Cardiff, and in 1894 was elected to the Chair of Moral Philosophy in Aberdeen, whence in 1900 he was called to succeed Henry Sidgwick in the Knightsbridge Chair of Moral Philosophy in Cambridge. This he held till his resignation in 1933.

He was one of the group of rising young Hegelians who wrote in the volume of *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*, which appeared in 1883 under the editorship of Andrew Seth (afterwards A. S. Pringle-Pattison) and R. B. (afterwards Lord) Haldane. His essay was a trenchant criticism of "The Historical Method" as applied to morals and politics, where action is moulded, not by any actual past but by the ideal of a form of life prescribed by self-conscious intelligence: "The materials of the ideal may themselves be traceable to experience, but they are formed anew by the reflective reason." It was this idea that he developed more fully in his first book on *The Ethics of Naturalism* (1885) - perhaps still the most thorough-going criticism of the attempt, represented in these days by such writers as Herbert Spencer and Leslie Stephen, to explain the rise of moral consciousness by appeal to the facts of biological and social evolution. At one point in its course human development passes from the control of custom to determination of conscious reflection on supra-biological and even supra-social ends appearing in the form of an "ought." Yet he still so far agreed with the naturalistic view in holding, with the then current form of Idealism, that the life of the individual could only be explained in terms of the whole of which it was a part and which was the dominating factor in the determination of its value and destiny. But in the course of the next twenty years the Idealism he had known in the 'eighties had been developed by Bradley and Bosanquet on lines which seemed to him, by following too closely the lines of a deterministic logic, to have endangered personality as an attribute both of God and man, and, by their doctrine of the unreality of time, to have destroyed the nerve of moral endeavour. This divergence was signalized in his chief book, which contained the substance of his Gifford Lectures, delivered in Aberdeen in 1914-15 and published under the title *Moral Values and the Idea of God*. I can remember the sense of freshness and power that this book gave us all at the time. It was a new departure to strike into metaphysics from the side of a philosophy of

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value rather than of knowledge. We felt that if Theism was capable of defence, it must be in the line of the argument of this eloquent book. Whether the argument was itself unassailable, and whether he was right in returning from what might be called the Platonic to the Berkelcian tradition, may be a question. What is not in question is that his book, which has gone through three or four editions, is likely for long to remain the best statement of the philosophical basis of the doctrine which has come to be known as Personalism.

To Sorley's credit as a luminous writer stand several other books and numerous articles contributed to the *Cambridge History of English Literature*, the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, *Mind*, and the *Proceedings of the British Academy*, of which he was a Fellow. He married in 1889 the sister of George Adam Smith, Principal of Aberdeen University. The elder of his sons, Charles Hamilton Sorley, like Rupert Brooke a poet, fell, like him, in the War. The Gifford Lectures are dedicated to his memory with the motto: "For they seek a country." No words could more suitably express the spirit of his philosopher father's own life and work.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

THE PHYSICAL WORLD AND REALITY

SIR,

As a layman I must, in common with the majority of people, formulate a theory of the physical world and reality from whatever unspecialized knowledge I possess; being guided to some extent only by those better qualified to express an opinion than myself. Nevertheless, on reading Mr. Gomborow's article in the October issue of *Philosophy*, I feel constrained to enter a caveat against his complaisant suggestion that, because such tautological explanations as that the sun attracts the earth *because it does*, or that zinc displaces copper in solutions *because it does*, fail to satisfy an intelligent person, the real explanation must necessarily be the simple fact that God has willed they should.

With respect I would suggest that the latter theory not only is less acceptable to many intelligent persons than the former, but also does unpardonable violence to the idea of Immanent Deity. If we accept Mr. Gomborow's theory, as a logical consequence, we perforce accept the following *a priori* hypotheses, namely, (a) All "laws" of nature are "laws" extrinsic to reality; "laws," that is to say, imposed by Transcendent Will on an otherwise chaotic universe; and (b) the universe is essentially static, and its present-day dynamic quality is, or was, occasioned by some agency "outside" of and independent of reality. In other words, we are back at the mental stage of our nurseries when the image of God, first making the clock and then winding it up, was used to stultify our first questionings. Surely the physical world (or any other world for that matter) is the world made manifest to us through, and only through, one or more of the very limited number of senses with which we have been endowed. This world we *know* as a world essentially dynamic, and, if you like the expression, as a world essentially "orderly"—that is, a world exhibiting certain well-perceived and well-defined "laws"; but surely, again, that fact offers no reason at all for envisaging the world as *amenable* to those "laws," or for imputing those "laws" to anything other than intrinsic aspects of reality.

We appreciate those "laws" in much the same way as we appreciate the "greenness" of the visual world. They are "good" for us simply because they *are*, and *not* because it is good for us that they should be. The great drawback with most scientists and philosophers is that they are unable to recognize in this dynamic quality, in this orderliness, *essential* characteristics of the physical world; but only imposed and, as it were, incidental, characteristics. I feel that if Mr. Gomborow could see his way to attempt another hypothesis of the universe based this time on the assumption that things are simply because they are, the result would be instructive; provided only (and the proviso is important!) he embraced in that hypothesis a conception of Immanent Deity willing the best in man and infinite in potentiality for man's becoming.

I am, Sir, yours faithfully,
FRANK W. ROBINSON.

LONG SUTTON, LINCOLNSHIRE,
October 30, 1935.

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICAL ETHICS

MY DEAR EDITOR,

Two passages in your October issue have so impressed my mind that I feel moved to write you about them. One of them occurs on page 481, in Mr. J. L. Stock's

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review of Sir Herbert Samuel's book on *Practical Ethics*, and is as follows: "Such a book will, of course, necessarily be for non-philosophers" (the implication of this being apparently that philosophers already possess plenty of light on the subjects dealt with), "though that does not mean that it will not be of interest to philosophers also. It should discuss on a philosophical background, vexed questions of conduct, in regard to which contemporary society is puzzled, doubting what is right and what is wrong, and should presumably at the same time suggest that *the answer to the philosophical problem has some relevance to these practical problems.*" So far, so good. But my trouble begins when I turn the pages back, and, rubbing my eyes, carefully read once more these words from the account of Professor Hallett's address at the annual meeting of the Institute of Philosophy: "Who would go to a philosopher for advice on—the relations of the sexes?" The hope raised by the language of Mr. Stocks is here dashed ruthlessly, and one wonders where the truth lies. Certainly it cannot be denied that the relations of the sexes constitute one of the most baffling and, I must add, dangerous problems of contemporary practical morality, and in its rough waters many thoughtful men and women are more or less helplessly struggling, having lost all faith in the dictates of traditional ethics and in the teaching of the Church, of which last I speak with the highest honour, for I am one of her loyal servants. But my eyes are not shut, and I know how deep the trouble is. I am, moreover, unwilling to accept the implication of Professor Hallett's question as the last word of the philosophers on this vital subject. I, therefore, make bold to ask you, Sir, whether you cannot invite some of them to give their views on this specific matter in your valuable pages, and thus provide, for many eager and anxious readers, some of that light that is, as Mr. Stocks hopefully and I believe rightly suggests, in the possession and at the disposal of philosophy.

HUGH GORDON ROSS.

4, CLIVE STREET,
DUNDEE, ANGUS,
October 10, 1935.

Remarks by the Chairman.

On receipt of the above letter the Editor, while considering it inadvisable to open a correspondence on the important problem it raises, has asked me, as Chairman of the Editorial Committee, if I have any comments to make upon it that might be of interest to readers. With regard to the contradiction which the writer finds between Professor Hallett and Professor Stocks as to the relevance of philosophy to practical problems, it need not be taken so seriously if, as I took it myself, Professor Hallett's statement be supposed to refer to particular problems in the life of an individual, while Professor Stocks refers to the general principle on which the solution of such problems should be sought. I do not think any of us would be prepared to exclude from the proper sphere of philosophy a subject which from the time of Socrates has exercised the minds and the pens of philosophers. If it finds itself helpless after all these centuries to say anything useful on one so fundamental as the relations of the sexes it would indeed be sentencing itself to futility. But it would be equally passing sentence on itself if it tried to treat of it in isolation from the principle which, from the beginning, the greatest philosophers, Plato and Aristotle perhaps more definitely than any before or since, laid down as the regulating one of any conduct which is truly human. Life, they taught, for a *man* differs from the life of an animal in being a fine art—the finest of all arts containing possibilities of "love and beauty and delight" denied to all lower creatures, yet only to be realized under one condition: that the animal instincts and passions should be treated as merely the materials of the art, the means through which man's essential humanity should find expression. Each of these instincts has its function and its place, but it can only perform its function and take its proper place, as a line or a colour can in a sculpture or picture, according as it is made to minister to the form and beauty of the whole. The sex instinct only differs from others in the dominating power it exercises owing to the load it has to bear in securing the continuance of the race and constituting the physical foundation of one of the highest forms civilization has hitherto achieved in the life of the Family. What has recently brought the problem of its regulation

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into such prominence is a fact, at once menacing to social equilibrium and containing the hope of its re-establishment on a firmer basis than ever before. This is the new position that women are claiming for themselves to be individuals with personalities of their own, which they have the same claim as men to be free to develop to the limit of their capacities. It is a *menace* because, among other liberties, it means freedom to choose their own sex relations unhampered by older social (mainly masculine) "expectations" as to the form which these should assume. It is full of *hope* because it gives the clue to the regulation of this freedom in the spread of the sense among men and women alike of what is due to such personality. The principle was laid down by Kant, the greatest of modern moralists, in his celebrated maxim: "So act as to treat humanity whether in thine own person or in that of any other always as an end, and never as a means only." What Kant, as a typical son of the "age of reason," and with his Stoic distrust of feeling, failed to see was that the guarantee of obedience to this maxim was not the abstract reason, but that essentially rational emotion which we know as Love. Given love, in no merely sentimental or romantic sense, but in the sense of devotion to another for his or her own sake as an embodiment of humanity with all that this means, it may be seen to contain at once the only and the all-sufficient principle for the regulation of the sexual life whether inside or outside the bonds of matrimony. I have no space for the further development of this text. It is all the more unnecessary as it has recently been developed in a masterly way by a member of the Committee of the British Institute of Philosophy, Professor John Macmurray, in the seventh chapter of his book on *Reason and Emotion*. I venture, in conclusion, to quote a sentence or two from it which seems to me to sum up far better than in anything I could say the truth on the whole matter. After giving what is in effect a modern version of Kant's maxim, he goes on: "In all enjoyment there is a choice between enjoying the other and enjoying yourself through the instrumentality of the other. The first is the enjoyment of love, the second the enjoyment of lust. When people enjoy themselves through each other . . . they do not meet as persons at all; their reality is lost. They meet as ghosts of themselves, and their pleasure is a ghostly pleasure that cannot begin to satisfy a human soul, and which only vitiates its capacity for reality."

J. H. MUIRHEAD

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INSTITUTE NOTES

LECTURE COURSES for the Lent Term, Session 1935-36:—

"PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICAL LIFE," a course of six weekly lectures by T. M. KNOX M.A. (of Jesus College, Oxford), on Fridays, at 5.45 p.m., at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C. 1, in the Lent Term, beginning January 24th, 1936. Fee for the course, 12s. 6d. Members free.

"OUTLINES OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY," a class by the Director of Studies, on Wednesdays, at 5.45 p.m., at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C. 1. The Class will be resumed in the Lent Term on Wednesday, January 22nd.

The EVENING MEETINGS for the Lent Term of the Session will be held at University College, Gower Street, W.C. 1, at 8.15 p.m., on the following dates:—

Tuesday, January 14th: "God and the Ultimate Values." The Very Rev. W. R. Matthews, K.C.V.O., D.D., D.Lit. (Dean of St. Paul's).

Tuesday, February 11th: Subject to be announced later. The Rt. Hon. H. A. L. Fisher, D.C.L., D.Litt., LL.D., F.R.S., F.B.A.

Tuesday, March 10th: "Vice and Illusion." Professor Gilbert Murray.

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APRIL 1936

THE PLACE OF MYTH IN PHILOSOPHY

THE VERY REV. W. R. INGE, K.C.V.O., F.B.A., D.D., D.Litt.



My subject is the place of myth in philosophy, not in religion. If I were dealing with the philosophy of religion, I should, of course, have much to say on the place of myth in theology; and what I have to say may have some bearing on this subject; but I am not dealing with particular dogmas of Christianity or of any other religion. My thesis is that when the mind communes with the world of values its natural and inevitable language is the language of poetry, symbol, and myth. And, further, that philosophy has to deal with a number of irreducible surds which cannot be rationalized. They must be accepted as given material for reason to work upon. For example, we do not know why there is a world; we cannot unify the world of what we call facts and the world of values; there are antinomies in space and time which do not seem to disappear when we put a hyphen between them. Our reason—some would say reason itself—has reached its limits. We are driven to mythologize, confessing that we have left the realm of scientific fact. We give rein to the imagination, not exactly claiming with Wordsworth that it is reason in her most exalted mood, but hoping that the creative imagination may reveal to us some of the real meaning of questions which we cannot answer.

This might serve as a statement of the kind of way in which Plato uses the myth. But under the influence of modern irrationalism, and of the biological approach to philosophy, Goethe's words, "all that is transitory is only a symbol," have received an extension which he never intended. Just as Freud regards dreaming as the fiction which helps us to sleep, so thinking, we are now told, is the fiction which helps us to live. *Vaihinger's* strange book *Als Ob* seems to have influenced many modern writers. He has many points

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of affinity with pragmatism, but while the pragmatists make usefulness the only test of truth, Vaihinger holds that we use hypotheses and symbols which we know to be false, and yet arrive by means of them at the truth. How we know them to be false is not clear, unless, as Hegel's epigram against Kant declares, we know that our thoughts are false because it is we who think them. If the ultimate appeal is to biology, is not biology itself a fiction of the will to live? To those who, interpreting everything biologically, say that reason is merely an instrument of adaptation, the difference between truth and falsehood, fact and fancy, is obscured. So psycho-analysts of the school of Jung will tell a patient that he is suffering from a decay of faith in God and the future life, in which many of them do not believe themselves. I do not think that myth, in the proper sense, has any place in this type of thought. The use of concepts which we know to be false, if, as Vaihinger thinks, we really use them, is quite different from the myth, which is as near the truth as we can get, and which, we believe, may bring us nearer to the truth by means of symbols which are a projection of the reality, dimly seen by the soul, upon the world of sense.

The myth has points of contact with symbol, allegory, and legend, but is to be distinguished from all these. Like the symbol, myth represents a thought. But the symbol and the truth which it figures are contemplated apart. In the myth the truth is seen in the story, which is a sensible representation of a universal truth, the poetry of faith. Plato, in point of fact, is not very fond of the word *mythos*; he more than once claims that his stories are narratives (*λόγοι*) not merely *μῦθοι*; that is to say, he claims for them a factual basis with a sacramental meaning. This is, in fact, the attitude, often unconscious, of the religious mind to myths which have become dogmas.

An allegory, like a myth, half conceals and half reveals the truth which it clothes. But in an allegory the thought is first grasped by itself, and then consciously dressed up in a sensible image. Plato often uses allegories: for instance, the choice of Heracles. But the myth is not illustrative; it does not, like the allegory, represent pictorially results already obtained in argument. The allegory has been popular in theology, because from a very early date it was used to reinterpret and save the credit of stories which had become offensive or incredible. The Greeks applied the allegorical method to the interpretation of Homer; the Christians to parts of the Old Testament.

In the legend the factual element so far predominates that the sacramental meaning is often forgotten, and has to be reintroduced with the help of allegory. A good example in Plato is the story told by Diotima in the *Symposium*. When Socrates speaks of love as a glorious god, Diotima answers: "He is no god, Socrates, but a great spirit, one of those beings who hold a middle place between

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gods and men; for God himself can hold no intercourse with man, and all the fellowship between them is realized through this intermediate order, which bridges the gulf which separates them. Love is one of a large company of spirits. You ask about his lineage? It is a rather long story. When Aphrodite was born, the gods made a great feast, and among the company was Resource, the son of Cunning. To them came Poverty, begging at the door. Resource, grown tipsy with nectar, went into the garden and slept. Then Poverty made the scheme of having a child by Resource, and she conceived Love. As the son of Resource and Poverty, Love is a peculiar case. . . ." Then she proceeds to show how love is a blend of resource and poverty, conceived on the birthday of Aphrodite. This long speech shows how impossible it is to separate myth from allegory and legend. The legend, if it is not Plato's invention, soon passes into allegory, and the allegory into myth; for the latter part of Diotima's speech is more like prophetic inspiration. This allegory, however, proved so attractive that Plotinus elaborates it still further. In his *Third Ennead* Zeus is *Noûs*, Aphrodite is *ψυχή*, Resource is *λόγος*, Poverty is *ἔλη*, and more to the same effect.

The genuine myth, as used by Plato, is what von Hügel, speaking of Christian dogma, calls a "fact-like story" with a spiritual meaning. Is the connection with historical fact essential? This is an awkward question, which neither Plato nor his disciples are very ready to answer. Plato, in fact, was rather unscrupulous. He is willing to resort to pious fraud, "a noble lie," to make the citizens of his *Republic* believe that all is ordered for the best. "All ye who are in the State, we will say, following out our fiction, are brethren; but God at the time of your birth mixed gold in the substance of those who are fit to rule, silver in the military caste, iron and bronze in the husbandmen and craftsmen." If any are found to be wrongly classified, the error can be corrected. "We shall not persuade the first generation that this is so, but in time their descendants may believe the tale, and this belief would have very beneficial results." This is, in fact, the way in which myths degenerate. They congeal and petrify; they are accepted as flat historical recitals, and so become either meaningless or fraudulent; and then, since they no longer bridge the gulf between the natural and the spiritual, they are discarded as useless. Our Reformers objected to the Catholic materialization of the eucharistic myth as "destroying the nature of a sacrament." Their opponents answer that to convert a symbolical sacrifice into a mere commemorative service also destroys the nature of a sacrament. We seem to be on a knife-edge.

I propose to consider and criticize two books by living writers which have dealt with this subject. They illustrate two different modes of approach. Nicolas Berdyaeff is a Russian, who has had the

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unusual experience of being banished by the Tsar as a communist and by Lenin as a Christian. He found peace at Paris. His book, *The Freedom of the Spirit*, is a very able and original contribution to the philosophy of religion. He might perhaps be classed, with certain reservations, among Platonic mystics, and he criticizes from the outside, from the standpoint of Eastern Christianity, both Latin Catholicism and Protestantism. Here I am concerned only with his view of the function of myth in the philosophy of the spirit.

He begins by calling attention to the almost universal tendency to hypostatize abstractions. Being has been conceived as an objective substance, whether spiritual or material. God is conceived of as a substance, a thing; and ideas are also substances. Reality has been understood on the analogy of the material world. We have had a metaphysics of naturalism, and of phenomenism which denied the possibility of knowing life and its source. Theological systems also make God an object like other objects, and His reality is made to resemble that of material substances. Thus in Latin Christian philosophy the supernatural is simply the natural on a higher plane, a kind of second physical world. But philosophy is a function of life, and of the deeper currents of life. Spirit is life, and the knowledge which spirit has of itself is the knowledge which life has of itself. This does not justify relativism. In spirit and life are revealed qualities which are not relative. We must insist on the old distinction between soul and spirit. All psychologism in philosophy is only a form of naturalism, psychology without a psyche.

Naïve realism consists in transferring to the spiritual world that quality of reality which belongs to the natural world. The two worlds are quite unlike. Spiritual realities are revealed only in spiritual life. Spirit is real existence, an "extra-objective reality." Space and time are created by spirit and merely denote a particular condition of the spiritual world. The reality of the spiritual world is guaranteed by the mystical experience, which requires and proves a real affinity between the knowing subject and the known object.

(In denying "substantiality" to God Berdyaeff, I think, mistakes the meaning of "substance" in Western thought. He assumes wrongly that a substance must be static, not dynamic, and he prefers Heraclitus to Parmenides. But this, I think, is only an error in terminology.)

We must not set the two worlds against each other. Flesh is the symbol of spirit; history is the image of spiritual life under the conditions of time and divisibility. I affirm, he says, a spirituality which is concrete.

There are real occurrences and even conflicts in the spiritual world; these are symbolically reflected in nature and history. Naturalist theology both confuses and separates the two spheres

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of being, regarding the events of the spiritual world as actually taking place on earth. The dogmas of religion are really mystical facts and discoveries of the spiritual world, which have been translated by theologians into the language of reason and of the natural world. The language of spiritual experience is inevitably symbolic and mythological. The ideas of the soul and the spirit have themselves a mythological origin. The relation between God and man is an inward one, not an exterior relation between the natural and the supernatural in this world. So the mystics have always understood.

But is this the Christianity of the Churches? Berdyacff answers this question in a remarkable passage: "Christianity, which is a religion not of this world, suffers humiliation in the world for the sake of the general mass of humanity, and so spiritual life becomes merely symbolic, and is no longer realized in practice. Christianity, by entering the world in order to save it, is always running the risk of becoming weakened and losing its true spirit. Herein lies its dramatic quality, the origin of its success and also of its failure. It must descend into the natural world, while remaining the truth which is not of this world, that is, the truth of the spirit and of spiritual life. The whole tragedy of spiritual humanity lies in this fact." Nevertheless, the truly spiritual man never rejects the symbols, in which he sees more, not less, than the average man. The tragedy is when God is forgotten in the approach designed to lead men to Him; when "men set themselves to hate in the cause of love, to use compulsion in the name of freedom, and to become practising materialists for the vindication of spiritual principles."

This preliminary survey prepares the way for the chapter on Symbol, Myth, and Dogma. A symbol, which bridges the gulf between two worlds, presupposes the existence of both. Idealism is a metaphysical theory; symbolism is religious by the fact of its existence. Subjective idealist symbolism, such as that of Schleiermacher and the French "symbolo-fideism," contradicts the nature of a symbol; there is no necessity in these symbols; they are no bond of union with the outside world; they leave a man shut up in himself. For realist symbolism, on the other hand, the outward form is a symbolic incarnation of spiritual realities. It is fundamentally opposed both to naïve realism and to subjective idealism. The conception of which we are speaking demands the sanctification of natural and historical life, but it must be symbolic in character.

"The whole life of the Church is a myth created within history, a realist symbolism expressing and incarnating the dynamic energy of the spirit." Only the facts of mysticism are absolute, and our thought about them is always relative.

"Mystical and symbolic knowledge finds expression not in formal philosophical statement but in mythological representation. Religious

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philosophy is itself a creation of myth, an imagination. The philosophy of Plato is steeped in Orphic mythology. At the heart of Christian philosophy we find the most important of all the myths of mankind, that of redemption and the Redeemer. The most arid rational theology and metaphysics derive their sustenance from the myths of religion. Living knowledge is mythological in character."

Myth, says Berdyaeff, is a reality far greater than concept. It presents to us the supernatural in the natural, the suprasensible in the sensible, the spiritual life in the life of the flesh; it brings two worlds together symbolically. "Christianity is entirely mythological, as indeed all religion is, and Christian myths represent the deepest and most central realities of the spiritual world. It is high time to cease being ashamed of Christian mythology." But we must grasp the inner meaning in a spiritual manner, in order to free ourselves from that naively realist influence which has developed as the result of superstition.

We have here an outline of a philosophy of mysticism, of the Platonic or Neoplatonic type, in which a firm knowledge of ultimate truth is obtained by spiritual vision or insight, which is its own evidence. It is not based on rationalist argument, nor on scientific knowledge of the laws of nature. Spiritual things are spiritually discerned, and no appeal lies from the affirmations of the spirit to any facts of nature. Naturalism and positivism are denied a hearing. The witnesses to the truths of the spiritual life are the specialists in divine knowledge, the mystics.

What then are the relations between the world of spiritual values and the world of phenomena? We are forbidden to speak of the latter as mere appearance. The world of sense is real, but its reality is symbolic. Its meaning and value are not in itself, but in the world of spirit. In a word, all nature is sacramental; in being what it is, it half conceals and half reveals truths which belong to another order. This is a conception which has a high philosophical and religious value. It avoids the dualism of natural and supernatural; it asserts the holiness of the natural world, in which the footprints of the Deity are everywhere discernible. It is a form of realism, which nevertheless maintains that reality is throughout spiritual. Further, its symbolism is objective and deeply serious. It will have none of the "loose types of things through all degrees" which are woven by the poetic fancy. It relies not on fancy but on imagination, as Wordsworth, in his nature-poetry, always strives to do. So far, it seems to have much in common with what Tennyson called the higher pantheism, and with what Krause, wishing to avoid the word pantheism, called panentheism.

But is this sacramental view of nature quite consistent with the disparagement of naturalism, a philosophy based on the observation

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of nature's methods, in abstraction no doubt from the higher values which the spirit finds in them? Is it consistent with what the author calls an irrationalist attitude towards experience generally? Platonism, it seems to me, builds its mysticism on a foundation of reason, and advances with the help of dialectic from the particular to the universal, from plurality and diversity to harmony and unity. Myth is only called in to give substance to the aspirations or intuitions of faith.

The question must also be asked: Does the mystic create myths? Would it not be true to say that he commonly accepts the myths of his religion and turns them into allegories, dramatizations of the normal experience of the soul in its ascent to God? In this process they almost cease to be myths; their factual historicity has no longer much importance. And his tendency is to discard all images, one after another. Like the Indian sages he says: "Neti, neti"; things are not so. Finally, he enters the Presence, as Plotinus says, naked, alone with the Alone. The poet of nature—Wordsworth is the supreme type—continues to immerse himself in the beauties of the visible world, and to admire with pantheistic enthusiasm all manifestations of the universal life. But the religious mystic withdraws himself from the external; he draws the world into himself; *introrsum ascendere* is his motto.

Berdyaeff has a chapter on mysticism—a very good one. Mysticism is not a refined psychologism, nor an irrational passion of the soul, nor simply the music of the soul. It is not a romantic subjectivism, nor a dreamy condition. It is essentially realistic and sober. It presupposes a symbolical conception of the world, but it seeks to transcend symbolism. There are differences between the Eastern and the Western forms of Christian mysticism. In Orthodox mysticism human nature is transfigured and deified from within by the Holy Spirit. The idea of the divinization of man is its fundamental concept, the object of which is the transfiguration of everything created. Catholic mysticism is more Christocentric and more anthropological. It surrounds suffering with a kind of ecstasy, and insists that the saint must pass through "the dark night of the soul," of which Orthodox mysticism knows nothing as a normal experience. The gulf between natural and supernatural is exclusively Western. Thomism shows a fear of the intuition which bridges this gulf, and consequently condemns Plato's ontology. The danger in all mysticism is that it tends to foster an impersonal and impassible love, which is very unlike the spirit of Christianity. But "there is a mysticism of love, the apostles of which are St. John and St. Paul."

All this is excellent, but it does not help us much in solving the question of the relation of mysticism to mythology. Is the mythological apprehension of reality an inevitable result of human

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weakness, which we hope to transcend as we rise *per tenebras in lucem*, or is it the final recognition by the reason of its own limitations, when it approaches the deepest mysteries of life? The two views seem to be different. And while pantheistic nature-mysticism revels in symbols, and sometimes resembles a poetical and imaginative naturalism, exclusive mysticism aims at being able to do without them, and hopes to see God "face to face."

The symbols which the higher religion creates for itself are not generally miracle-stories. This is notoriously one of the difficulties of liberalized theology. The Christian philosopher finds in the Incarnation a revelation of the divine character and purposes towards men. The myths, if we may use the word honorifically, as Berdyaeff does, are significant not as irruptions of the supernatural into the order of nature, but as symbols of eternal truths. But this is not the way in which simple faith regards them. The plain man does not really believe that miraculous events are on the same level as ordinary events, but he thinks he does. The dove-tailing of the supernatural into the natural is, to his consciousness, the foundation of his faith. And it seems to be in these intellectual strata, and not in the mind of the contemplative saint, that myths arise. The mystic allegorizes them; he does not invent them; perhaps he does not really need them.

The best example is St. Paul, whose faith was based on a very clear conviction that the glorified Spirit-Christ "lived in him." His religion was a pure Christ-mysticism. But he identified this indwelling spirit with the historical Jesus mainly because he saw the profound spiritual significance of the voluntary humiliation, the sufferings and death, the resurrection and ascension of Christ, as a revelation of the path which we all have to tread. And although he was content not to have known Jesus personally, he insists that these cardinal events in His career were historical facts. This attitude became the framework of Christianity as a great religion. St. Paul made the Gospel intelligible and acceptable to the European mind.

Now we have seen that Plato distinguishes between *μῦθος* and *λόγος* and claims that his more serious myths, as we call them, are substantially true in fact. "Either this happened, or something like it." I cannot be quite certain whether Berdyaeff takes the same view about the Christian creeds. I think he does, but at the same time he disparages "dogmatic and systematic theology of the academic type, which is naively realist and non-symbolist." This want of definiteness is, I think, very characteristic. The religious mind shrinks from cutting itself loose from particular events, and I think rightly. I know few things more impressive than the confession of F. H. Bradley in his *Essays on Truth and Reality* (p. 431): "I find myself now taking more and more as literal fact what I used in my

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youth to admire and love as poetry." Such is the candour of a very great thinker. I gladly leave, with this concluding caution, a very thorny problem.

The philosopher does create myths, but he does not call them so. The whole psychology of Platonism, with its tripartite division of human nature into body, soul, and spirit, is mythical in form. Plotinus knows this, and cautions us against taking his classifications as anything more than contour-lines. The same applies to the Ideas, as soon as we begin to hypostatize them, as we cannot help doing if we make them more than subjective, and to the great division of "Here" and "Yonder." "All things that are Yonder are also Here," says Plotinus, well aware how necessary such warnings are. But I must consider this more fully at the end of this paper.

The other writer whose views on myth I propose to consider—much more shortly—is George Santayana, an American of Spanish extraction, who thinks and writes with the lucidity, ruthless logic, and long civilized experience of the Latin races. He is not, I take it, a religious man, and it is possible to find in his writings a fundamental want of seriousness in his treatment of the deepest problems. As a pendant to Berdyaeff this may make his approach to the subject more instructive.

Primitive thought, he says, has the form of poetry and the function of prose. Myth, which arose in this stratum, is an observation of things encumbered with all that they may suggest to a dramatic fancy. It is the common root and raw material of both poetry and science, and also of art. The Hebrews, who denied themselves a rich mythology, had no science or plastic art; the Greeks, who indulged in irresponsible myths, were the founders of science and philosophy. Myth is the natural prologue to philosophy.

Myths are not exactly believed; they are accepted as expressing reality in metaphor. When they descend to the plane of particular fact they tell us nothing more about the meaning of life, and what they tell us about fact is false. Their function is to interpret events in terms relative to spirit. In practice, they are often defecated into theosophy or corrupted into a justification of magic.

The mark of a myth is that it does not interpret a phenomenon in terms capable of being subsumed under the same category with that phenomenon itself, but fills it out with images which could never appear side by side with it. It is a fruit of experience, but no vehicle of experience; it cannot serve the purposes of action.

Of Plato he says that it was a poignant sense for the excellence of real things that made him wish to transcend them; his metaphysics was nothing but a visionary intuition of values, an idealism in the proper sense of the word. But when the momentum of such enthusiasm remained without its motive power, idealism ceased to be

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an idealization, an interpretation of reality reaching prophetically to its goals. It became a supernumerary second physics, a world to which an existence was attributed which was supported by no evidence. An idealism which had consisted in understanding and discriminating values became a superstition incapable of discerning existences. In the Stoa, on the other hand, the surviving mythological element turned nature into an idol, so that the worship of her blasted all humane and plastic ideals and set men upon a vain and fanatical self-denial. Both philosophies, he says, were post-rational, as befitted a decadent age, and as their rival and heir, Christianity, was also. The eclectic Christian philosophy which entered into the inheritance was, he says, an impressive product of the human mind; the ruins of more than one civilization and of more than one philosophy were ransacked to furnish materials for this heavenly Byzantium. It was a myth circumstantial enough to pass for an account of facts, and yet loaded with enough moral philosophy to present an adequate ideal to the heart.

This is an unsympathetic and really superficial account of European civilization on the spiritual side. It will be observed that he uses myth in a very different sense from Berdyaeff, a sense which is common enough now, but is not the sense in which I am using it to-day. For him the Life of Reason consists in the service of an ideal which does not exist but which is set before us. Whether he believes in the perfectibility of the human race he does not tell us; probably not; he is too sensible. But he never realizes that for the religious mind, as opposed to mere moralism, the ideal is not only that which ought to be, but that which is. It is this mystery or paradox of the spiritual life which makes the construction of a bridge necessary. These mysteries make myth necessary and respectable. Santayana is so unconscious of them that his criticisms of religious philosophy seem almost flippant. I have mentioned him because he is a very typical product of our time.

A discussion of the place of myth in philosophy must necessarily give great attention to Plato, both because he is the acknowledged master of the myth, and because of the immense influence which he has had and still has on European thought.

The essential charm of Plato's myths, says Professor J. A. Stewart, is that of poetry generally. Poetry exists by its power of inducing, satisfying, and regulating transcendental feeling, especially a solemn sense of timeless being. It transports us into a dream-world from which we return with a sense that we have seen the mysteries—that we have been initiated into a higher and deeper state of being than is accessible to us at ordinary times. This initiation is, strictly speaking, imparted in silence, but it is interpreted to the understanding in symbolical language. Something of the universal plan

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of creation is opened before us, nourishing, in Plato's words, "a sweet hope"—what Christianity calls faith, hope, and love. For the revelation is of the Good as the highest reality. "The religious man," says Wordsworth, "values what he sees mainly as an imperfect shadowing faith of what he is incapable of seeing. The concerns of religion refer to indefinite objects, and are too weighty for the mind to support them without resting a great part of the burden on words and symbols, by a process where much is represented in little, and the infinite Being accommodates Himself to a finite capacity. In all this may be perceived the affinity between poetry and religion."

The three realities which we desire to know are God, the human soul, and the world. The religious consciousness thinks of God as a Person. But logical thinking, whether in natural science or metaphysics, makes God impersonal. Aristotle's God is not personal, nor is Spinoza's "Deus sive Natura," nor is the Absolute of modern philosophy, nor the Nature of modern science. Plato attempts more than once a logical demonstration of God's existence and of its correlate, the immortality of the human soul. By common consent, his arguments are not such as to carry conviction to so keen a thinker as Plato himself. And yet he is unquestionably a theist, and a believer in human immortality. His arguments have not had much effect; his personal conviction has carried immense weight. It is in myth that he presents both ideas—a personal God and personal immortality.

He wishes this mythical teaching to be given to children, though they will of course take it literally. They are to be taught spiritual truth through literal falsehood. We do not like this notion, but in elementary education it can scarcely be avoided. And even the great Christian theologian, Origen, says quite frankly that in the Gospels, especially in St. John, spiritual truth is conveyed through "what we may call literal falsehood" (*ψευδεις*). Most people, in fact, remain children all their lives. In a sense, the dream-world of childhood may be dramatized for them under the form of myth.

A modern philosopher might call this dishonest. But "philosophy" is not wisdom, but love of wisdom; and wisdom, Plato is convinced, is a matter for the whole man, who is much more than a logic-chopping animal. He despises doctrinaire scholasticism, and knowledge for a man's self. In the allegory of the Cave the wise man who has escaped into the daylight must not stay there, but must go back to teach the others, who must be taught what they can understand. "We shall compel him to go back, though we do him an injustice."

But in truth the ideas of God and of immortality *can* be held only in mythical or symbolical form. We must behave as if they were literally true. Here, we may think, is a concession to *Als Ob*,

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and Vaihinger of course seizes upon it. But Plato's is no philosophy of pan-illusionism. It is precisely the things which are most real which can only be seen, as St. Paul says, as in a mirror, by means of symbols (*αἰνίγματα*). God is not an object among other objects; there is and can be no demonstration of His existence; but we *know* that He is; *τὸ παντελῶς ὄν παντελῶς γνωστόν*.

The belief in human immortality depends on belief in God. The latter is central, the former is peripheral. If this were remembered, we should be spared a vast amount of dismal "proofs" of human survival, all entirely worthless. The myth is that there is a soul-substance, which never began to exist and will never pass out of existence; which will be rewarded or punished in a future state, reincarnated perhaps many times, and ultimately continuing for ever in a disembodied state. There has been endless discussion as to how much of this Plato really believed. Hegel thought it impossible that a thinker of such eminence as Plato could have believed in individual survival. He not only dismisses the speculations as purely mythical, but advances the quite untenable view that all Plato's myths are negligible for a student of his philosophy. Zeller, Adam, and most other Platonic scholars are convinced that Plato did believe in personal immortality, though the word personal should be used with caution, since the Greeks had no word for personality and did not need one. The soul, according to Plato, is that which makes us what we are, and the soul, he says quite definitely in the *Phaedrus*, is immortal. I do not see how anyone who reads the *Dialogues* can doubt that Plato really believed this. We have only to think of our beliefs about immortality to understand what was probably his position. We all know that Christian eschatology is a mass of contradictions; no one really believes that heaven and hell are at all like the popular descriptions of them. And yet we accept these pictures, or some of them, as symbols of a state of being which eye hath not seen nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive. Coleridge, in commenting on Wordsworth's famous Ode, says that it was "intended for such readers as had been accustomed to venture at times into the twilight realms of consciousness, and to feel a deep interest in modes of inmost being to which they knew that the attributes of time and space are inapplicable. For such readers the sense is sufficiently plain, and they will be as little disposed to charge Mr. Wordsworth with believing the Platonic pre-existence in the ordinary interpretation of the words, as I am to believe that Plato himself ever meant or taught it." This is instructive, but it goes too far. Plato, and possibly Wordsworth, too, when he wrote this poem, believed in pre-existence in exactly the same way as he believed in post-existence. The two doctrines, in his opinion, stand or fall together. The symbolic form

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is necessitated by the impossibility of transcending the form of time, which in spite of this we know to be inapplicable to eternal life.

It is necessary to insist on this, because the illusionism of Plato's eschatology is really based on a metaphysical theory of reality. In his doctrine of the Ideas or Forms Plato is the protagonist, if we may not say the discoverer, of a conception of eternity as something more than endless survival. Eternity is timeless being. It must not be confounded with endless immobility any more than with endless motion; this error he combats in the *Parmenides*. Reason discloses to us a world lifted out of space and time altogether. But we can only think of eternity, mythically, as the future life. This, and the conception of God as an object among other objects, are the best examples of the necessity of mythical representation. But many philosophers cannot rid themselves of the temptation to take the myths quite literally, and they often find themselves in difficulties in consequence.

Plato did not invent his eschatology. He went for it to the Orphic religion, by which he was plainly much attracted. We seldom reflect how much of this mythology has passed into Christianity by way of Plato, though pre-existence and reincarnation have dropped out of orthodox theology. The Orphics taught that a blessed life hereafter is a fuller communion with the god which the votary has already enjoyed in this life. The soul is essentially divine, but has fallen into sin, which explains its present state. In consequence of sin we are banished from the society of the gods. The object of the mysteries or sacraments, and of the rule of life there prescribed, was to show the soul how to expiate her guilt. The beautiful myths inscribed on the Orphic tablets make us wish we had more of the same kind. The soul, released from the body, says, "I have faced the penalty for deeds unjust, and now I am come as a suppliant to noble Persephone, beseeching her to be gracious and to send me to the abodes of the good." And is there not something touching in these instructions: "On your left you will find a stream, and near it a white poplar. Go not near this stream (the river of Forgetfulness), but you will find another, cool waters flowing from the lake of Memory, and by it are guards. Say to them, I am a child of earth and of starry heaven, but my race is of heaven alone. This you know well yourselves. And they will give you to drink of the holy spring." Or the soul thus addresses Persephone: "Out of the pure I come, pure Queen of them below. For I declare that I am of your blessed race. I have flown out of the sorrowful weary wheel." The answer is: "Happy and blessed one, thou shalt be god instead of mortal." (A god, as is well known, was for the Greek essentially an immortal being.)

The myths in the *Phaedo* and in the *Republic* (the myth of Er) expand the Orphic eschatology. Socrates will not affirm that the

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Phaedo is literally true; that "would become no reasonable man. But I think it becomes him to believe that what I have said about the souls and their habitation is either literally true or like the truth, if at least the soul is shown to be immortal; and that it is worthy of him to face peril bravely in such a belief, for the peril is glorious; and such thoughts he ought to use as a charm to allay his own misgivings; in which spirit I have thus dwelt long upon this story." These words are perhaps the best indication of the way in which Plato meant his myths to be used.

It would be interesting to compare the Orphic eschatology with the beautifully simple myth of the sheep and the goats in the Gospels, and with the surely very horrible myth which Dante has enshrined in imperishable language. Myths undoubtedly promote very crude beliefs in the uneducated, and the "noble lie" in them may at last come home to roost. The cruelty which they introduced into Christianity has been a serious offset to its otherwise beneficent teaching.

But I wish to emphasize the importance of Plato's decision to admit Orphism, which was a religion, into his philosophy. Of the place which this religious teaching holds in history, Dr. Farnell says: "It familiarized the world with the conception of the divine element in the human soul, with the kinship between man and God. It quickened this sense by means of a mystic sacrament whereby man's life was transcendently fused with God's. It strongly marked the antagonism between flesh and spirit and preached with insistence the doctrine of purity, a doctrine mainly ritualistic but containing also the spiritual idea of the purity of the soul from the taint of sin. It divorced religion from the State, making it the pre-eminent concern of the individual soul and the brotherhood. Finally, its chief aim and scope was other-worldliness, its mission was the preaching of salvation, of an eschatology based on dogmas of posthumous retribution, purgatory, and a succession of lives through which the soul is tried; and it promised immortal bliss through purity and the mysterious magic of a sacrament." It almost looks as if Orpheus was the real father of Catholicism! And how much of what has been permanent and still living in Plato's philosophy is contained in his Orphic myths!

The question which we really have to consider is whether philosophy ought to include within its scope the higher religion and mysticism, although these can only express their aspirations and intuitions in imaginative and symbolical language. I maintain that if philosophy treats this part of human nature as beyond its scope, it will necessarily be enslaved to natural science, or to psychology, which is a natural science if it is a science at all. Now that natural science, abating its former pretensions, claims only to be a hypothetical study, a matter of pointer readings and mathematical

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symbols, we have to choose between returning to Plato and admitting that philosophy itself is out of contact with reality. We are left in a quagmire of relativism and subjectivism. But this is the suicide of philosophy, the aim of which is perfect knowledge of the perfect.

I was pleased to find an eloquent appeal for a "return to philosophy" in the old sense in a little book by Mr. Joad. The writing of philosophy, he says, is eloquent, inspiring, or lucid, as its themes are noble, profound, or ingenious. At any moment, one feels, the writer may break through into a different world. "Hence the mystical passages in the works of the great philosophers; the myths in which they seek to embody meanings incapable of rational statement; the inspired dogmatisms which, striking us with a feeling of utter rightness and conveying an air of complete certitude, seem to be less the products of the intellect than of a faculty akin to the vision of the mystic and the seer." Such philosophy may be accounted not only an escape from the uncertainties and transciences of the world of becoming, but a window through which the consciousness of man attains a vision of the world of being.

The concepts of philosophy are hypostatized ideals recognized as supreme realities. The philosopher cannot help mythologizing, if he tries to live by his philosophy. The Ideas are clothed with forms; the determinations of the Absolute become quickening spirits. If he avoids this, he must keep his philosophy and his conduct in watertight compartments; the former becomes arid, and the latter irrational. Of course we can do without a bridge, if we do not want to cross. But half of ourselves is on the other side. It is the task of philosophy to deliver us from the facile monisms of materialism and Nirvana. Crude realism and crude mentalism can dispense with myth, but only by shirking the great problems. In practice, their adherents usually set up queer fetishes of their own.

A bridge is of no use unless it takes us across, and some myths, honoured by time, no longer fulfil their function. Americans are fond of saying that the picture of God as a king no longer appeals to them. Since George III they have no use for kings. One of them wrote on the democratic conception of God. The Deity seems, according to him, to be rather like the President of the United States. But it would be rather rash just now to make a myth out of democracy. Parts of the Christian mythology, if we may use the word without offence, have been antiquated by natural science, not so much by Darwin or Jeans as by Copernicus and Galileo. But I maintain that the philosopher ought to be a prophet. It is a hard thing to be; and the training is not merely intellectual. A new Plato, when he arrives, may create his own myths; but he will probably prefer to work on those of Christianity, which may be as satisfying to the modern man as they were to St. Paul and St. Augustine.

THE STUDY OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

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THIS paper is concerned with the study of economic activity from two points of view; the first is that of the man of business, and his problem is "Of what use or value is the study of the activity to those who are actually engaged in the activity?" He has continually to grapple with individual and concrete situations and thus feels the clash between them and the abstract general pronouncements of certain economic studies: consequently he is bound to ask whether the latter have in fact any relevance for him at all.

The second point of view is that of the philosopher, and his problem is not the utility of the study, but its truth; and this problem presses, for the growth in the popularity of "Economics" has been accompanied by wide divergences of opinion about its methods, aims, and status. Behind the glaring searchlight of "Economics" the philosophical study of economic activity is becoming lost in the shadow. "Political economy" no longer forms part of the title of Scottish philosophical Chairs, and, where it still lingers on in, for instance, the syllabus for *Literae Humaniores* at Oxford it has the air of a mere survival of a past now distant, obsolescent if not obsolete. But if we accustom ourselves to the glare and refuse to be dazzled, we find that the light is after all not single, and that we are confronted with the problem of assessing the relative brilliance of Economic History, Economic Science, and what is sometimes noncommittally called the "Social Study" of Economics, all of which profess to illumine the darkness of the economic world.

That world rests upon and is the creation of human actions and motives and a theory about it must therefore at least do justice to the actual buying and selling transactions in which men engage. It is to lay emphasis on this fact that this paper is called "the study of Economic *Activity*," and that it focuses attention on industry and commerce, on buying and selling, rather than on, e.g. international debts which have a political as well as an economic reference.—This is not to say that economic study should be limited to mere commercial problems; it cannot be, for men are citizens as well as wage earners, and commercial life necessarily has a political environment which is more and more clearly discerned as industries grow in size and become first of national, and then of international significance. But just as we are more likely to understand the nature of political activity if we begin by studying a national constitution

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rather than a disarmament conference or a League of Nations, so the essence of economic activity as such will be most clearly evident in transactions from which political considerations are as far as possible excluded. Human activity cannot be separated into watertight compartments. Its different kinds shade off into each other, but that does not mean that there are no kinds. We must therefore remember that, since the economic sphere shades off into the political we shall not advance very far to the understanding of either economics or politics without a study of places where they overlap. But to admit that they overlap is not to assert their coincidence, and consequently, although the understanding of buying and selling is not the understanding of the whole economic sphere, it is at least the key to its essence, and to realize this is to be enabled at the outset to descend from the clouds of abstract speculation, where so many economists apparently feel at home, to the firm ground of concrete actuality.

In dealing with economic activity, therefore, we are concerned with "buying and selling," though that is not advanced as a *definition* of economic activity; it is a mere preliminary description, and it calls in fact for immediate revision, for all buying and selling is not of the same character.

Human activity, if it is to be understood, must be considered both subjectively and objectively, as both intention and behaviour. For the spectators, the activity of all the members of the team may be adequately described as "football playing," but some of the members of the team may thereby be "earning a livelihood," and their activity is wage earning for which play is only a disguise. The child turned loose in a toy shop to spend sixpence may take time to spend the money, in sheer joy at indulging in the activity of buying something: but its buying is not the same thing as the buying of the man on the Baltic Exchange who is negotiating for a cargo of palm kernels and eager to buy at 2s. 6d. per ton less than the price quoted to him. The child after all is amusing himself, buying for the sake of buying, and his activity is play. The man is engaged in the serious business of buying raw materials at lower prices than his competitor with a view to subsequently undercutting him in the price of his manufactures: he is buying, that is, with a view to profit, and his activity is economic. Thus, although the study or, at any rate, the *philosophic* study, of economic activity must deal with the development of the activity out of play on the one side, and into politics on the other, and although there is something of play in the zest of an enthusiastic salesman, and something political in a company merger that tends to be monopolist, an account of economic activity must at least be an account of buying and selling for profit, interpreted of course in the widest sense as including,

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e.g. not only advertising but problems arising from the fact that one man's profit may be the community's loss.

Now study advances as our curiosity about its object is satisfied and the advance is dependent on the method of inquiry that we adopt, the type of question that we ask, and the type of answer which we find satisfactory. These in turn will vary with our conception of the object that we are studying. Thus, in studying the human body we may ask what are the laws of its working, or the laws which its working exemplifies? and the answers to these questions will give us the science of physiology. Alternatively we may ask how the human body has come to be what it is, not what are the *laws* of its growth but what are the past stages through which it has grown, and our method is then historical and history is its result. Or we can ask what in fact the human body is and how it is related to its environment and so treat it not as an external phenomenon, existing as a clear-cut, self-existent object of study, but as part and parcel of a living experience. In other words, we may study it philosophically.

There is no *prima facie* reason for rejecting any one of these three methods of studying economic activity (in fact they lead on to each other and are all required), for (a) however misleading consideration of the activity may be in abstraction from the rest of life, the abstraction may none the less be made and so be an object to which scientific methods of study are applicable; (b) since it is the study of men's actions, it has a past and is amenable to historical treatment; and (c) it is a study with which philosophy may concern itself, for just as artistic experience is not confined to the comparatively small community of artists, so economic experience is not the private preserve of company directors and bank officials, but is a necessary part of the life of everyone. And moral philosophers unduly limit the scope of their study when they confine it to such things as promises to post letters and ignore, e.g., a business man's decisions. Consideration must thus be given to each of these three different ways of studying economic activity, and it will be convenient to take Economic History first.

That the historical study of economic life has its legitimate and important place in the context of historical study as a whole has been ably illustrated in Oxford by the Chichele Professor of Economic History in his brilliant book on the seventeenth century, and is appropriately recognized in Cambridge by the project for the addition of an Economic History to the series of historical compendia already issued in that University: but to tear economic history out of its context and to study it by itself as if the economic activities of an epoch were something separate or separable from its other activities, or as if economic institutions had a history of their own,

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is to make it unintelligible or else to reduce it to propaganda in favour of the dubious dogma of the materialist interpretation of history. The emphasis laid in modern historical work on economic and industrial activities and motives is welcome as indicative of their extraction from the political sphere in which they have hitherto been embedded and obscured, and the process of extraction has no doubt been helped by the devotion of monographs instead of mere excursus or footnotes or appendices to economic and industrial topics. There is a danger, however, that what begins as a change in emphasis may end as a destruction of historical perspective. For it is one thing to point out that *pari passu* with other developments in national life there has been a development in, e.g., the credit system, and that all these developments have interacted with each other, but quite a different thing to treat the credit system as if it had developed of itself and so had an isolated history of its own, or, worse still, as if its development were somehow the *fons et origo* of every other contemporary development or change. For, to suppose that the credit system has a history of its own is to commit the error of reducing history to catalogue making. One phase in the development of the credit system does not lead on to the next: the impulse to movement comes from those who use the system, not from the system itself. And in the lives of those who use it that system plays only one among the many parts in the cast.

Failure to recognize this results in the treatment of the history of an industry, or of buying and selling methods, as a self-enclosed and self-explanatory study. And when that happens, it is but a step from economic history to materialism, because abstractly treated, the steps in a process of economic development become not aspects of the development of civilization as a whole, but the actual phases of that development. It is one thing to point out the importance in Greek History of the Pontic corn supply, another so to exaggerate that importance that everything else in Greek History is treated in subordination and by reference to it. In other words, it is one thing to study what deserves the name of Economic History and another to produce a conglomeration of facts and to interpret them, not historically, but materialistically, for that is to produce not history but a mere abstract discipline scarcely worth calling history at all.

From the point of view of the business man the position is not quite so clear. Economic and industrial history, by which is usually meant the abstract study just referred to as undeserving of the name of history, frequently appears on the curricula of business training institutes and continuation schools, and the rationale of its inclusion seems to be that, while history as a whole is a merely academic study, this abstract type of history is useful, useful, that is, as part of the technical equipment of artisans or clerks. This, however, is

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not the view of the business man *qua* business man, for his attitude to history was comprehensively summed up by Mr. Henry Ford in his well-known phrase "History is bunk," and nothing is more striking about the world of economic activity than its indifference to history and its inability to learn its lessons. Business men tell us, and tell us rightly, that cheerfulness, optimism, and far-seeing creative activity are the life-blood of business, and that sentimentalizing over the snows of yesteryear would soon play havoc with the Balance Sheet. Yesterday's newspaper, last year's statistics, are useless, and to call them "ancient history" is to pronounce their condemnation. For they tell a tale of a day that is past, and the new idea that made a fortune then has now become a commonplace and therefore valueless. The business man cannot but be constantly reminded of the fact that he can never make the same sale twice; to-day's set of circumstances is new, and it is out of that that profits must be made. He sees that history never repeats itself, and then makes the hasty assumption that therefore there is nothing in it for him *qua* business man. He identifies false or abstract history with that real concrete history whose true significance he fails *qua* business man to understand, and consequently he sees nothing in history but a catalogue of facts about what no longer exists. Hence his sweeping condemnation of all history, even that of his own business. The selling methods employed by his firm ten years ago in India have just as little significance for him now as Hannibal's Campaigns.

This attitude is intelligible enough; but it is easy to detect in it a certain blindness. Success in moulding the present afresh in order to produce greater profits is partly dependent on an understanding of what the present is, and how it has come to be what it is, is part of the truth about it. Some knowledge of the history of trade treated concretely as an aspect of the history of civilization, might be useful as well as merely interesting to a man whose duty it is to trade with savages amongst whom barter is common, cash payments usual, notes comparatively rare, and cheques unknown. To trade successfully with West African natives to-day, a man must reckon with and understand their mistrust of Europeans, but that means, amongst other things, studying the history of the slave trade. And attempts to corner the supply of various products still continue despite the sad experience of those who have made such attempts in the past.

To understand history, however, the economic world would have to understand itself, and it actually goes on its way without seeking for such an understanding, however much individual business men may seek it. It sees that its transactions are unique, like historical events, but it reckons them atomistically: the profit or loss on each

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
transaction is summed up and entered into the profit and loss account. And this atomistic quality is just what is not discoverable in the stages of an historical development. To see business transactions not atomistically but historically is to look at them with the eyes of those who are outside the economic sphere altogether, and who refuse to accept buying and selling for profit as a self-explanatory activity, but who ask what in fact and at bottom it really is, with the eyes, that is, of philosophers. It is when business men think of the atomistic character of their own transactions, that they suppose that the past is just made up of collections of the same, and that they misunderstand history, whether economic or industrial or any other, by confusing it with masses of dead statistics from the office cellar. On the other hand, their dissatisfaction with history is not less when they fail to find in it certain abstractions in terms of which they frequently give an account of what they are doing. "I bought at 12s. 6d., after which the market fell," is a typical phrase indicative of the uniqueness of my transaction, its severance from others, the "atomizing" of it, and then the denial of a similar unique or atomic status to other transactions which are all simply conflated into a *caput mortuum* called a "market" about which general statements may be made and in the working of which rules or laws may be found.

In other words, business men are accustomed in giving an account of economic activity to cleave it into two abstractions, atomic transactions on the one hand, and on the other a *caput mortuum* governed by mechanical laws. And since about such a field the language of history can say nothing relevant, its study is dismissed as futile.

Thus, to sum up, though to the business man economic history properly understood has something useful to say, he would have to be more than a business man to understand and use it: the student, on the other hand, while welcoming it as having an important place in the context of historical study, will criticize adversely any attempt to reduce it to unintelligibility by wresting it out of that context.

We now turn to the scientific study of economic activity, and here we are fortunate in having to guide us the important and brilliant book in which Professor Lionel Robbins expounds the *Nature and Significance of Economic Science*.

Like Kant, Professor Robbins is impressed by the achievements of science and attributes that success, at any rate in part, to clear methodology. And just as Kant tried to save philosophy from chaos by putting it on the "sure path of science," so Professor Robbins tries to make economics scientific instead of philosophical as it was in the hands of Adam Smith.



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Now it is the characteristic of any scientific inquiry to demarcate a definite subject-matter to be considered in abstraction from everything else. The aim of science may be the discovery of truth about reality as a whole, but advance towards that goal seems to be *via* a continual pluralization of sciences, i.e. by an endless subdivision of subject-matter between sciences, and by gradually increasing abstraction in the search for accuracy. (Abstractness is the price of precision both in Professor Robbins's economics and in modern mathematical physics.) Hence, if economics is to be a science it must have a definite subject-matter of its own, and Professor Robbins lays down what that is. As geometry is the analysis of space, so economics is an analysis of the fact of scarcity: "Economics is concerned with the disposal of scarce goods with alternative uses. . . . That goods are scarce and have alternative uses is a fact. Economics consists in elucidating the manifold implications thereof."¹ (In reading this programme philosophers will be reminded of the method of Cambridge logic.)

Geometry can abstract from men and their actions, but economics cannot. Scarcity is meaningless in abstraction from the people for whom the goods are scarce. If scientific methods are to be used, however, *some* abstraction from men's conduct must be made; and hence just as the economics of another day postulated "*homo economicus*," an abstract type of man, Professor Robbins, rejecting such an abstraction as absurd, abstracts from human conduct as a whole and deals with one aspect of behaviour: "Economics does not pick out *kinds* of behaviour. It focuses attention on a particular *aspect* of behaviour, the form imposed by the influence of scarcity,"² and analyses that. Professor Robbins does not attempt to justify the abstraction involved in focusing attention on one aspect of behaviour and ignoring the rest. Moreover, "economic theory deduces from the assumption of scales of relative valuation their formal implication in different situations,"³ the analytic and abstract character of the inquiry being again reminiscent of Cambridge logic and *a priori* science. The geometer for instance, without trying to justify his hypothesis of triangles, merely asks us to make the assumption and then points out analytically its consequences or implications. There is a difference, however, in Professor Robbins's view between economics and *a priori* science, because while the latter can advance in indifference to the facts of experience, the former must take account of those facts, though the facts cannot

¹ *Op. cit.*, Edn. 1, pp. 75-6. Not altered in substance on p. 83, Edn. 2, though the actual wording is changed.

² *Op. cit.*, Edn. 2, p. 16.

³ P. 94, Edn. 1 (cf. pp. 75-83 and 95, Edn. 2, where the doctrine is not altered).

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of themselves solve the theoretical problem of economics; they can only suggest "auxiliary postulates" or present problems to theory¹; but the economist is not a statistician, and the collection of facts is in itself meaningless; it must be supplemented by their interpretation, and consequently the *applicability* of economic laws, alleged to be true *a priori*, to the world of fact, involves the correct interpretation of that world. For instance, it is an economic truth that "if the quantity of money in circulation is increased and other things remain the same, its value must fall," but the application of this universally true principle to the world of fact is dependent upon "a correct understanding of what things are to be regarded as money."²

Economics, in short, remains an *a priori* science; it is in fact the study of compossibilities.³ Choice in a world of scarcity has implications x , y , and z . These are linked together by mutual logical implication, so that we can say with complete certainty that if x is, then y and z are also. Hence we can lay down universal laws such as: "Under competitive conditions in equilibrium the price of commodities is equal to their cost of production per unit"; we know that this law must be true because it is a logical deduction from a given fact or facts, and if the facts appear to conflict with it and invalidate it, that is only an appearance, due to the misinterpretation of the facts.

With such a view of the aims and methods of economic study, we know where we are, and students of economic activity will be grateful to Professor Robbins⁴ for the clarity with which he expounds what economic science is, and for his grasp of the fact that like any other science it proceeds by abstraction, hypothesis, and analysis.

But the use of scientific methods in the field of economics involves the assumption that those methods are applicable in that field, or in other words that that field approximates to that of geometry. The question then arises as to whether and to what extent that assumption is justifiable.

In geometry the compossibilities which are discovered as the inquiry proceeds are simply those which were implied in the hypothesis from which the inquiry started and which are discoverable therein by logical analysis. It is because our original hypothesis required us to define it in that way that the concept of triangularity excludes that of foursidedness, and the geometer's assertion that "if a figure has four sides it cannot be a triangle",

¹ P. 118, Edn. 2.

² P. 117, Edn. 2.

³ Pp. 121-5, Edn. 2.

⁴ This view of the nature of economic science is of course not peculiar to him. Professor Pigou's *Economics of Stationary States* is confessedly the analysis of the implications of an hypothesis—an hypothesis of a state admitted never to exist (p. 264).

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depends for its truth on constancy in the relationship between triangle and square—a constancy secured by the original definition laid down; and it remains true whether in fact any such figures *exist* or not, i.e. the assertion of the compossibility of x and y is quite compatible with the actual non-existence of both of them. If, on the other hand, an experimental scientist asserts, "If I drop this stone from my hand it will fall to the ground," he bases his assertion on a belief in the constant operation of universal laws which individual occurrences exemplify and which men may understand and use, but cannot alter

Now the assertions of economic scientists are reducible to the same hypothetical form: "If wages are kept above the marginal productivity of labour, unemployment will continue," and their validity must depend on constancies similar to those upon which science relies, namely those resulting either from a logical analysis of accepted definition or else from the assumption that the field under investigation is one where universal laws operate. But if Professor Robbins relies on the former, as his treatment of his subject suggests, then the economist's assertions are about compossibilities, not in the world of fact but in the world of hypothesis, and they will be true of the world of fact only if the hypothesis from which they issue can be justified. Or in other words, his conclusions will be logically valid whether the economic world exists or not, and can be maintained in indifference to any actual concrete economic situation. Economic science, that is, is true, but true only about the hypothetical abstractions from which it starts. And this fact inevitably limits its practical utility; but it only limits and does not destroy it, for abstractions after all are not imaginations, they are true as far as they go. What truth exactly is to be found in the conclusions of economic science will be clear from what follows.

If this result is unpalatable, it is perhaps no improvement for economic science to base a claim to truth on the assumption that economic activity is a field wherein universal laws operate. This assumption is common at the present time when there is widespread a belief in all-powerful economic forces and consequent despair of the efficacy of human endeavour. But the belief and the despair are alike based on failure to understand the real nature of what are called economic laws. For these on inspection turn out to be no more than hypothetical. Professor Robbins points out that if an economist asserts that the imposition of a protective tariff will result in a rise in the price of motor cars, his assertion is not invalidated if in fact owing to such new factors in the situation as mass production and wage reduction, the price actually goes down; the decline in price, he says, exemplifies economic law, and does not

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invalidate it. For the law is "if x , then y ." But in the case in question x was not actually present by itself, it was accompanied by a and b , and consequently its concomitant was rightly z and not y . Thus the economic law is hypothetical in character, and its truth or falsehood is quite independent of the actual exemplification, at any time or place, of the conditions whose interconnection it asserts; for if we consider the formula "under competitive conditions in equilibrium the price of articles is equal to the cost of production per unit," we see at once that we can no more find in experience "competitive conditions in equilibrium" than we can find an equilateral triangle.

These consequences of marking out for economic science a territory amenable to scientific study like that of geometry or physics, need not be misleading so long as they are understood; but there is a further consequence, whose tendency to mislead is much more difficult to control. To make economics a science is to suppose that its conclusions, even if hypothetical, have the same certainty as, for instance, those of physics; to assume in other words that the same constancy which is discoverable in the dropping of the stone and its fall to the ground, is also discoverable in the relations between the imposition of tariffs and the movement of prices. But this latter relationship is one not between abstract concepts, but between men's *acts*, and human ingenuity is continually altering relations between *them*. In short, when the economist professes to give us universality, he forgets that an economic law is not merely like a physical law, one which man can understand and use, it is also one that he can alter. For the law is intended to cover man's acts and of those he, unlike the stone that is dropped, is conscious, and this very consciousness involves freedom to act differently. A law of human action can therefore be at best no more than a statistical generalization about the past, and if that is all that it is, there is no *a priori* probability that it will have any applicability in the future; for men may change their minds about what they want, or they may be led, by the discovery of a new invention or the examination of statistics of the past, to act in ways that hitherto had not occurred to them or that had been regarded as impossible.

It follows that the application of the concept of law to the field of economic activity involves abstracting from human conduct as a whole, treating it as behaviour only and not as intention as well. This abstraction in fact reduces action from something that men do, to something that happens to them. This reduction economic scientists attempt to avoid by the use of a concept of "rational choice." But if this concept is taken seriously it bursts the barriers of economic science. "Rational choice" carries with it the whole of a man's personality, and this at once makes futile an abstraction of an "aspect of behaviour"; for to suppose that a man's personality

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is made up of isolable aspects is to make a presupposition about its character that many of us would be reluctant to defend.

If economic science, however, is not wholly satisfactory to students, it is still less so to business men, for they feel a very natural perplexity about the importance to them of the abstract results in which that study issues. Professor Robbins deals with this question of the *use* of Economic Science, and his answer is that it helps men of affairs to choose with knowledge of what they are choosing.¹ It gives them no help in solving the problem of what they *ought* to choose, but it does say to them: Remember that if you choose x , you choose y also, for the presence of the one involves also the presence of the other. "If you choose to keep wages above the marginal productivity of labour, recognize that that means choosing unemployment too."

Now Professor Robbins is no doubt right in pointing out that what a business man expects from an economist, or any practical man from any theorist, is not the answer to his problem but the understanding of it, but it is questionable whether the general statements of economic science provide the enlightenment which business men require, however useful they may be to politicians in the framing of an economic *policy*.

For either they are tautologies asserting that if a is, b is, in a case where a and b have been defined as implying each other, and so not informative, or else their validity depends on the belief, which we have rejected, of the applicability of a concept of law in human affairs, or else they are too vague. They are vague, first, because they are addressed to no one business man in particular, like the example about wages and unemployment, or like "the need of the time is to raise prices," or like the statement of an ecclesiastic that the world needs a change of heart, which may be true but is not helpful, and secondly, because their actual content is too little specific; e.g. "It is the most elementary implication of the idea of scarcity that if a price is lowered the demand tends to increase." This is true enough in this vague form, but it tells the business man nothing helpful about his particular difficulty in fixing the price of one of his wares. It does not follow from this generality that to reduce the price of *this* article will involve an increase in the demand for it, for (i) the article may be sea water at the seaside; and (ii) after an accident on a mountain railway no reduction in fares will increase the number of passengers while the accident is remembered; and (iii) there are luxury articles, the demand for which falls on any reduction of price. Attempts may be made, in the light of a criticism like this, to reword the general rule so as to make these cases instances of it instead of exceptions to it, but by the time it is hedged round by provisos enough for this, it becomes a recital of instances

¹ P. 152, Edn. 2.

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instead of a general rule, or, in other words, it is reduced to a tautology once more. The most that can be granted to Professor Robbins in this direction is that when the economist says to the business man, "if you choose *a* you must also choose *b*," he means that "if you choose *a* you also choose *b* unless you change your methods or invent some new set of circumstances." In other words, the economist helps the business man by putting him on his mettle, by stimulating his genius for originality, by stating a problem to him.¹

But even if the practical applicability of economic science is not quite what Professor Robbins thinks it to be, that does not mean that it has none, and in fact the notion of economic law has some truth, as is to be expected since acceptance of it is so widespread.

When Adam Smith says that "rent as the price paid for land is *naturally* the highest the tenant can afford to pay," what is really meant by "*naturally*" is "reasonably," for in so far as a man engages in economic transactions, he reasonably aims at securing as much profit as possible. The decision to do something, is a decision to do it well, and to engage in any given activity is to aim at the good which such an activity provides. Consequently to engage in business is to aim at profit, and the choice of profit is an instance, not of the working of an economic law or a natural propensity, but of reasoned action, as of course Adam Smith was well aware. Thus the regularity which economic transactions present is the regularity of reasoned action, as opposed to caprice, and law is the disguise which that regularity takes on, when by abstraction the field in which it occurs is reduced from life to rigidity. Economic law is an abstraction, not an imagination, and its truth is precisely the uniformity which rational choices present when they are abstractly or atomically considered. And as we have already seen, in dealing with economic history, this is an abstraction of which business men themselves make use.

For philosophers may point out and point out truly that while we must just accept laws of gravity, we may, if we will, change the laws of economics, but many business men will remain unconvinced; they are too certain that it is economic law and not their own lack of insight which stultifies their efforts and makes profit-making impossible; there are numerous employees who feel themselves mere cogs in a wheel, caught into a system which they can neither change nor escape. Moreover, a business is shackled by tradition, many of its employees have gathered moss and become

¹ The case is not altered if it is maintained that economic "laws" are really expressions of *tendencies*: "bad money tends to drive out good." For the assertion of the tendency can be justified only by appeal to *either* a statistical generalization of past experiences, *or* a necessary law which produces it because it underlies it.

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immovable with the consequence that to carry into effect those new ideas upon which the advancement of any business depends, is a task which well nigh demands the patience of Job, the strength of Hercules, and the courage of Hector. Consequently, where the dead weight of stereotyped tradition presents such an intractable obstacle to endeavour, when so many men, blind to their own creative potentiality, fail to see reason and action behind law and happening, it is no wonder that a science which seeks to expound universal principles, as rigid as those of the static field of plane geometry, should possess both plausibility and attraction. The danger, however, remains that plausibility and attraction may be mistaken for validity without more ado, for principles applicable only to abstractions need interpretation before they can be legitimately applied to reality as a whole. This of course would not be denied by economists; they readily admit the difficulty, owing to the complexity of the field, of actually applying the conclusions of economic analysis.¹

But it is not the *complexity* of the field of human conduct which makes difficult the actual application to a given situation of an economic generalization; it is, as we have seen, the essential *unpredictability* of human conduct, the unforeseeable novelty which human ingenuity ceaselessly imports into the world of its creation. Economic analysis may prove that national prosperity is at a maximum when there is international free-trade, but how can knowledge of that generalization help even a politician to decide whether or no to place a tariff on indigo?

Professor Robbins has been criticized for taking too austere a view of his subject and a plea is advanced for supplementing the rigorous scientific analysis of economic facts like "scarcity" or conditions like "welfare" with consideration of problems like the effect on the welfare of the community as a whole of economically profitable advertising. To do this, it is suggested, will give us a "social study" of economics, of which economic science will form a part, indispensable indeed, but still only a part. It may be doubted, however, whether the nature of economic science is such as to permit of an appendage of that kind. For if we want to know about the nature of space we go to a geometer; if we want to know about the nature of money we go to an economic scientist. But in each case we are being told the truth about an abstraction, which has the reality only of an abstraction. Concepts like "money" are human actions or experiences frozen into immobility for the purposes of scientific analysis. How then can any *supplementation* of the analysis of *capita mortua* of that kind give us truth about the concrete world of reality? Reality is not an aggregate

¹ See, e.g., Robbins, *op. cit.*, Edn. 2, p. 125.

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or sum of abstractions. Hence when Professor Robbins points out that he is not pleading for "over-austerity in speculative range" but for "more accuracy in mode of statement" (*op. cit.*, Edn. 2, p. viii), it is difficult to see how he can achieve a wider "speculative range" without stepping outside the confining abstractions of his scientific study into what can only be the philosophic consideration of man's economic life in the context of man's conduct as a whole.

We are left, therefore, with the result that the historical and scientific methods of the study of economic activity leave incompletely satisfied the curiosity of *students*, and reach results which need special interpretation before they can be useful to politicians, let alone to *business men*.

From the point of view of the latter, economic science sacrifices individual occasions on the altar of universal principles: it treats "inflation" or the "gold standard" as something external, like the tides, and ignores the fact that these abstract nouns cover human actions and human motives, and so are less calculable than tidal invariability. But if economic science ignores the uniqueness of each business transaction, and reduces all of them to mere instances of a universal or general principle, economic history in the true sense is concerned with a stream of events, overlapping or running into each other, not reducible to the status of mere instances of a general principle, but carrying their whole importance within themselves and their development. And the business world cannot afford in this way to dispense altogether with law. Its individual transactions are indeed all of unique importance, but they are all also just means to an end and are subordinate to that end. We have seen that, in spite of this, economic science and economic history *have* relevance for the economic life, if they are rightly interpreted, and thus, to understand and profit from that relevance, those engaged in the economic activity itself must have done with abstractions and study it philosophically.

Students of economic activity, on the other hand, are no less driven on to philosophical study if they press their curiosity to its limits. For, from this point of view, economic history stops short of saying what economic activity is: it tells us only about its development. Economic science, moreover, is abstract and tells us not about men's reasoned actions, but about laws or tendencies, the disguise under which that action appears when it is considered in abstraction as mere behaviour. History and Science accept their object and take it for granted. They inquire neither into its categories nor into those which they themselves employ; but if the value and meaning of their results are to be rightly assessed, a criticism of

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those categories is required, and this is the task or part of the task of the philosophic study of the economic sphere.

That study will be a part of ethics, the study of human conduct as a whole. It will consider the various forms in which economic activity appears, and will define it by giving an account of each of them, and of its development through each of them.¹ Moreover, it will consider not only its relations to other types of human activity (e.g. political or moral), but also its own internal structure. It will criticize, for instance, the category of exchange, and study its growth from barter to the modern credit system, or the category of organization and trace it from the work of artisans and shopkeepers, through limited liability companies and public utility companies, to national enterprises like the Post Office. It will employ a wealth of empirical detail, but its task will be precisely the interpretation of that detail: it will avoid being mere phenomenology, and while it will use the results of history and science it will stand outside them both instead of helplessly oscillating between them, as perhaps the less able of Oxford undergraduate students of economics tend to do as a result of working for an examination in which there is a tripartite division of economics into theory, phenomenology, and history. To describe further the philosophical study of economic activity, however, would be to go beyond the scope of this paper. For it is concerned with the character and methods of economic study, and it is no part of its programme to outline results in which the varying methods issue. And indeed philosophic consideration of a philosophical method of study can only be philosophy itself, but it may be worth while to show by way of a tentative illustration the kind of problem with which the philosophic study of the economic sphere may be confronted, and the kind of answer it can suggest.

Biographies of successful business men sometimes suggest the problem: "Is there anything in the nature of economic activity to make illogical action compatible with, if not actually responsible for, business success?" Business men seem frequently to choose course B when it seems possible to prove that course A is the more advantageous, that there is no reason against it and every reason in its favour. A may be reasonable, they will say, but B is business-like. Method, reason, logic are all in favour of A, but it is extraordinary how often, when the business man has chosen it, B turns out in the long run to be really the better course to have pursued, at least from the business, i.e. the profit-making, point of view. It is because of this that leaders in business so often give the impression of being opportunists, devoid of any consistent policy.

This characteristic of business success, at first sight so perplexing, yields up its secret to philosophic consideration, or, in other words,

¹ For an instance of this, see p. 147 above.

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when the categorial structure of the business life is examined. For in practical affairs logic lags behind life: action is not completely self-conscious. Action, properly understood, is the conscious self-assertion of the agent in face of the real; it is a process of self-creativity in which means, doing good, and end, being good, coincide. But in the economic sphere, that process is disguised under the category of means and end, held apart from each other, and regarded as abstract particular and abstract universal, the former subordinate to the latter. The end is profit, advantage, interest; everything else is reduced to the status of means. Employees, for instance, become hands: mass production of articles indistinguishable from each other takes the place of the individual products of artistry and handicraft. Now this divorce of ends from means involves the divorce of reason or order from contingency, and this may be illustrated by another quotation from Professor Robbins: "Individual valuation and technical facts are outside the sphere of economic uniformity. To use Strigl's expressive phrase, 'these things constitute the *irrational* element in the universe of economic discourse'."¹ Knowledge—and study—are confined to the sphere of uniformity, to rational ends, and apply themselves in vain to the irrational contingencies of means. Of the universal end we may have knowledge: of the particular means only *εὐτοχία τις*, a happy hitting of the mark, the business man's flair for what action to take, as opposed to the scientist's or the logician's knowledge, as opposed even to the Record Office official's flair for the date of an old writ. This is why there is so much controversy about and so little advance in the training of business men, for no training machine can be devised for the production of the necessary "flair," and it is this also which explains why sometimes lack of business experience is not necessarily a disqualification for posts of responsibility in business. Such is the kind of light which philosophic contemplation may throw on obscurities in the economic sphere.

The argument, therefore, concludes with a plea for the revival of a genuine philosophic study of economic activity. Such a study is needed, *first*, by those who are interested in studying that field in *any* way. For as we have seen already, economic science and economic history are incomplete by themselves, and the remedy for that incompleteness is not any additional or supplementary study, but simply a philosophical study of what is— a study, namely, whose method involves both the understanding and the interpretation of general principles, a study which synthesizes the universality of science with the individuality of history, a study which grasps what ought to be in what is.

But *secondly*, the philosophic study of economic life is needed by

¹ P. 106, Edn. 2.

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those who are actually living that life themselves. For there seems to be widespread amongst them the impression that prosperity is a matter not of human effort but of economic laws, the outcome of a system of organization or of parliamentary regulation, not something that men create, but something that happens to them, like falling to a stone. To such a view scientific abstraction may lend support, but it will not withstand philosophic criticism, for the category of action bursts through the framework of mechanism.

And *thirdly*, the philosophic study of economics is no less needed by philosophy itself. For, as was said at the outset, economic activity is an universal experience: artists seek to sell their pictures; religion never gets very far from tithes. If we do not all work in factories, we all buy their products, and without a study, therefore, of men's economic as well as of their other social activities, the strands of ethics and politics lie loose and confused, and a philosophy of life has not yet developed into system.

THE INTEREST THEORY OF VALUE

A. CAMPBELL GARNETT, M.A., Litt.D.

THE connection of value-experience with activity has led to the widespread modern tendency to interpret value in terms of interest. To value a thing is certainly to take an interest in it, and there can be no doubt that the value any object has for us tends to vary with the interest we take in it. The suggestion readily arises, therefore, that the value of any object simply is the interest we take in it. The difficulty with views of this type is that interest is a distinctly subjective category while value is persistently spoken of as if it were somehow objective. Indeed, the term "value" would lose the most essential element of its meaning if it could not be applied to objects of common knowledge in such a way that two people could significantly discuss the question as to whether the object A is not more valuable than the object B and each, on the basis of his own interest and experience, defend a different view. I do not think the subjectivity of value can be as easily disposed of as does Laird¹ in discussing the argument, "Beauty is not in the aurora. Therefore it is in the beholder's mind." This, he says, leads to the absurdity, "Therefore the beholder's mind is beautiful." The apparent absurdity is due to the ambiguity of the term "beautiful." It is applied either to an experience or to the object of that experience. It might not be true, but it certainly would not be absurd, to say, "The beauty is not in the aurora, but in the beholder's experience." For we all agree that to behold an aurora is a beautiful experience. But when one says "The beholder's mind is beautiful," the form of the statement suggests that the beholder's mind is being characterized as the object of a beautiful experience; and that, of course, is absurd. It is not by such verbal tricks as this, then, that the objectivity of value can be maintained. But there is an element of *content* in the notion of value which is stubbornly objective in character. We all feel, when we value a thing, that we value it because it has value and not merely that it has value because we value it. And when we appreciate the value of a thing we always feel that others ought to appreciate the value of it too. On matters of taste it is the mark of the wise man to say "non disputandum"; but to say the same on matters of value is the mark of the fool. The interest theory of value, therefore, if it is to make good its claims, must be able to account for a genuine element of objectivity in value experience.

¹ John Laird: *The Idea of Value*.

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This is attempted, for example, in Professor Perry's *General Theory of Value*. There we are given four notions which may legitimately be employed for the critical comparison of values. These are correctness, intensity, preference, and inclusiveness. Of these, the first named, correctness, is an objective standard. But, as Perry points out, it does not yield a measure of better or worse, of greater or lesser, value. "To judge an interest to be correct or incorrect does not in any sense predicate more or less of the interest, and thus does not in any sense predicate better or worse of its object."¹ The other three notions, however, intensity, preference, and inclusiveness, do yield measures of greater or lesser value, for they define quantities of interest, and the object of the greater interest *ipso facto* possesses the greater value. But of these standards the first and second are merely subjective. They do enable an individual to set his values over against each other and weigh them. But they provide no ground for an assertion that all men ought to value A above B because the nature of B is such that it is more valuable. If X *prefers* B to A or is more *intensely* interested in B than A, then these standards, in themselves, offer no ground for decision of the question whether this manifests an axiological obtuseness or a superior axiological perspicacity in X. X's interests confer more value on B than on A and, so far as the principles of intensity and preference are concerned, that is the end of it.

In the notion of inclusiveness, however, Perry finds a standard which can be used to decide questions left undecided by intensity and preference and which he even thinks gives us an objective criterion whereby we can often say that A, independently of my preference or intensity of interest, or yours (though not independently of everybody's) is better or worse than B. So far as inclusiveness is used as a purely subjective standard, there is no doubt of its applicability to problems of comparative value. There is more value in an object that satisfies both my interests A and B than in one that satisfies one only. So, too, if two or more interests which, taken severally, are mutually conflicting can be synthesized or integrated in one composite resultant interest, then there is more value in the more inclusive satisfaction which may be thus obtained than in the satisfaction of either interest, as existing separately, at the expense of the other. Perry points out that such a fine integration of interests is obtained in the "all-benevolent will" and shows, on this basis, that the greatest value is possible only to the harmoniously developed personality. But he also applies the standard objectively to argue that a harmonious society is superior to a state of conflict between persons and to support the humanitarian plea for "the greatest good of the greatest number." The

¹ R. B. Perry: *General Theory of Value*, p. 612.

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principle of inclusiveness, he says, does not require that the two interests should be interests of the same subject, but that which James and John both like, *ipso facto*, is better than that which James likes and John dislikes.¹

But this transition from the subjective standard is only achieved through the ambiguity of words. If X is positively interested in A, i.e. if X values A, then we may say that A has value in the eyes of X. And if A is similarly valued by a million people, then it has value for the million. Further, since, on this form of the interest theory of value, the value of an object is its character of being the object of interest, A then has much of this character, much value. In this sense a broadcast concert should be said to have much value because it can be so widely enjoyed. But here "has much value" merely means "is much valued." Yet the phrase may easily be interpreted to mean "is greatly to be valued," or "is very valuable"; and the same reason for this further meaning might be given, i.e. "because it can be so widely enjoyed." But in this second meaning we have passed from the mere factual notion that the concert is widely valued (is the object of favourable interest by many) to the axiological or ethical notion that that which is widely enjoyed ought to be valued, i.e. sustained and promoted. The term "valuable" (and its comparative "more valuable" and the synonym "better") never mean merely that, as a matter of fact, a thing is valued. They mean rather that it is worthy to be valued whether it is valued or not. This significance is revealed if, for example, I say "Millions of people like to smoke opium in China, so in China opium-smoking is very valuable." No! In China opium-smoking is *widely valued*; but that does not make it very valuable. Because Foo and Lee both like opium-smoking, that does not make it any "better" than if Foo alone liked it, while Lee and all the rest of the Chinese people disliked it. And it is just as misleading to say that "The object which James and John both like is better than the object which either or both dislike."² Again, it is similarly misusing terms to argue "If to James's interest in pushpin there is added John's interest in poetry, there is more value in the world than there was before; pushpin *and* poetry are more valuable than pushpin *or* poetry."³ Only if the two interests are interests of the same subject can we say that it is more *valuable* to have both. If not, then we can only say that there is more *valuing* in the world than there was before, and that pushpin *and* poetry together are more *valued* than either pushpin *or* poetry severally. Most of us would agree that probably a world in which there is more valuing, and thus more value experience, is a world more to be valued, a better or more valuable world, a world rather to be maintained and developed, than a world

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 646.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 648.

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in which there is less. But it would be a mistake to assert that it necessarily must be so. On the other hand, most people would affirm that the little world of classical Attica was more valuable than the vast barbarian world of Scythia and Ethiopia. In doing so, we are allowing the subjective standard of "preference" to override the objective aspect of the standard of "inclusiveness." And we feel justified in doing so because we refuse to believe that the mere fact that a thing is "valued" necessarily renders it "valuable." In short, the character of "being valued" or "being an object of interest" does *not, ipso facto*, constitute the "value" of an object or make it "valuable" for any individual other than the one who actually feels the interest in that object. The attempt to treat value as an objective character of things which is *simply* given to them by the interest attitude adopted toward them by individuals thus breaks down as soon as we analyse the ambiguities on which its plausibility depends. Professor Perry's elaborate and brilliant thesis does not, after all, yield an objective standard of value.

But it does not follow that the interpretation of value in terms of interest must be given up. The failure of Professor Perry and other supporters of the interest theory of value to give a satisfactory account of the element of objectivity in our value experience is due, I would suggest, (a) to a too simple correlation of value and interest, and (b) to a certain limitation inherent in the concept of interest, and of the affective-volitional life, as taken over from current psychology. Let us take (b) first. Psychology, being a young science, has not ventured as yet to assert its right to, and need of, certain categories of its own, such as those which many biologists have recently insisted must be recognized in their own field,¹ and such as all biologists have used, whether explicitly recognizing the fact or not. Psychology has simply taken over its categories from biology and has endeavoured to interpret behaviour in physico-chemical terms *plus* such non-chemical concepts as those of the "organism" and the "struggle for existence" which were already in use in the biological sciences. In particular the affective-volitional life has always been interpreted as tending merely toward the maintenance of the individual and the species. The organism is conceived as initially uninterested so long as nothing occurs to disturb its organic equilibrium, and its interests are all conceived as originally directed solely towards those adjustments which tend to ensure the survival of individual and species.

In another work² I have urged that this account of motivation (of interest, or the affective volitional life) is inadequate, and that, in addition to its responses to stimuli—ultimately directed as these

¹ E.g. J. S. Haldane: *The Sciences and Philosophy*.

² A. Campbell Garnett: *The Mind in Action: A Study of Motives and Values*.

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are toward biological ends—"every living organism, so long as it is conscious, constantly seeks to express itself in ever-changing activity," that, indeed, "the essential nature of the process of living (from the standpoint of finite consciousness) is to be a finite centre of experience ever enlarging its grasp or penetration of the infinite reality in the midst of which it dwells." This concept of the essentially active nature of mental life presents us with a category or principle of explanation as distinct from the biological concepts of the struggle for existence and of the tendency of the organism to maintain its internal equilibrium as are these latter from the physico-chemical categories which they supplement, or which underlie them. Like these biological categories it is incapable of complete proof or demonstration, but is to be justified by its utility as an explanatory principle and by the stubborn resistance of the facts to any explanation which ignores it. In the light of this principle the objects of interest are seen not to be limited to the conditions which satisfy particular wants rooted in biological needs and feeling tone and in acquired tendencies based on these. Instead, we recognize that activity itself is an object of interest. Indeed, the progressive activity of the self in expanding its cognitive grasp of its world and extending its conative impact upon it is seen to be the most fundamental of all human interests. It is the indirect source of the lower human values which are concerned with our problems of self-maintenance and biological satisfactions; and it is the direct source of those higher human values—Intellectual, Aesthetic, Moral, and Religious—for which, on other forms of the interest theory of values, it is so difficult to account. It will be our aim, in the remainder of what we have here to say, to show how this wider and universal feature of human interest accounts both for the nature of our higher values and for the element of absoluteness or objectivity in all our value judgments.

But we must first seek to give a more definite answer to the question as to what is the precise feature of an experience which we call its value. We shall see that, while value does depend upon interest, the relation is not one of identity (De Witt Parker: "any interest in any object") nor of simple correlation (Perry: "any object of any interest"). This brings us back to point (a) in our suggested modification of the interest theory, i.e. that the relation between interest and value has been taken as too simple. Let us ask ourselves, then, what is the element of value which may be cognized in some such common experience as eating? The upholders of the interest theory usually say either that it is a feature of the self-activity of which we are aware (i.e. interest), or that it is a character belonging to the food or the act of eating by reason of that interest. But a man may eat, may enjoy eating, and may be

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aware of his interest in the food and in the eating of it, and yet, if he knows he is eating something that is not good for him, may see the process as a whole as characterized by disvalue rather than value. The reason for the disvalue is that the act of eating, though successfully pursuing the ends of the interests of taste and appetite, is seen to be out of harmony with the further end of health. This further end may be only vaguely present to mind, may be largely repressed at the moment, but not unless it is entirely forgotten or unless the act of eating is seen as in harmony with it, can the experience as a whole be characterized by a sense of value.

In such cases, if the value were merely a matter of interest, then, since there is a strong interest in eating the food (strong enough to make the man eat what he knows is not good for him), there should be a vivid sense of value. The fact that there is also an interest in health and that this interest is being injured should also, it must be recognized, introduce a sense of disvalue, which would tend to diminish the total sense of value. But the stronger interest must, if interest as such is the source of value, produce the stronger sense of value. In the type of case we are considering, therefore, the predominant value quality should be positive. But we find instead that it is negative. The hedonic tone is predominantly positive, but not the sense of value. Pleasure is always present so long as the act appears to be harmoniously progressing toward the *immediate* ends of appetite and taste. Were that active interest hindered, the experience would be unpleasant. But the sense of value is only present when the act bears the appearance of harmony not only with its immediate end but also with some more ultimate end with which it is, perhaps more vaguely, felt to be concerned. *The value experience is in this case a sense of harmony of the nearer and remoter ends with which the act is concerned.* And as we proceed with our discussion we shall find that this same formula covers all cases.

Value, if this interpretation be correct, is thus something intellectually grasped. It is due to the relation between our ends—between the nearer and remoter ends with which present activity is concerned. But activity is always directed upon an object, whether it be a physical thing, an abstract thought, a sensory image, or some other mental process. The sense of value, therefore, is always a feature of our experience of objects. In our unanalysed experience it attaches itself naturally to the object which is the centre of attention, the object upon which the act is directed, and it is not easily distinguished, even by deliberate introspection, from the other features which enter in to our experience of the object. It is not a quality possessed by objects independently of our experience of them, but, as a feature of our experience of objects, is a quality which objects have for us. Values are, thus, perfectly real characters

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of events, as real as any others; and, like all such characters, they have their own peculiar effect upon subsequent events. They are known and remembered and overlooked and forgotten like other objects that human beings experience; and, like many other objects, if not known at the time of their occurrence, they may often, nevertheless, be discovered subsequently by reconstruction of the circumstances in memory and attention to the nature of the activity involved.

When such reconsideration of a value experience occurs, the question at issue is always that of whether the nearer and remoter ends concerned were really in harmony or only apparently so, and whether the remoter end with which the nearer end was in apparent harmony was itself in harmony with other, more important, ends so that there should be no disharmony even to the most ultimate end concerned. Under such re-examination the appearance of value which an experience had at first worn may be entirely changed, or value may be seen to reside in an experience where it was not at first recognized. We then regard the later and more reflective estimate, in which account is taken of the more ultimate ends, as the true one. At each stage of such a consideration of value it is the *apparent* harmony of nearer and remoter ends that gives to the experience its apparent character of value. But at each stage it is because this apparent harmony is believed to be real and ultimate that the existence of the value is asserted as a fact. That which we assert when we assert the value of an *act*, therefore, is the existence of a harmony between the nearer and remoter ends with which the act is concerned; and when we assert the value of a *thing* we assert a harmony between the nearer and remoter ends affected by the activity to which that thing stimulates us.

It must not be thought, however, that the explicit cognition of the ends concerned and of the harmony between them, is necessary to the value experience. *The value experience is the experience of the harmonious operation of the ends concerned in present activity.* In so far as this is the case the experience bears the character of value. At the moment of the experience the individual may or may not be aware of the value when he explicitly attends to the act or object and finds it characterized by that peculiar quality which, upon analysis, we find to depend upon the apparent harmony of ends. It is not necessary to recognize the ends concerned and explicate or educe the relation of harmony between them in order to be aware of the character of value in the experience. The remoter end especially may remain merely implicit in the total experience, but, as do other implicit elements, it nevertheless contributes to the meaning attached to every part of the experience that is explicitly attended to, and to the meaning of the experience as

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a whole. Thus in many of our value experiences, and especially in those elusive experiences of the higher values—aesthetic, ethical, intellectual, and religious—the remoter end with which the act harmonizes remains very obscure. But the character of the act as being in harmony with this end may be very clearly present to consciousness. So, too, may the disharmony of ends be clearly recognized even though it is found impossible clearly to explicate the nature of any of the ends concerned, still less to formulate them in propositions. This is, indeed, the most difficult task to which the philosophy of values applies itself.

I wish, in the brief space remaining, to indicate the insight into these problems which may be gained from the standpoint of the conceptions of interest and of value outlined above.

The value of an object, then, is the harmony of the nearer and remoter ends with which the activity directed upon it is concerned; and the remotest or ultimate end or interest is the progressive penetration or grasp of the world in which we live. This penetration or grasp is both cognitive and conative. Cognitively it involves the effort to observe, know, or think all the actualities and possibilities of our world. Conatively it involves the effort continuously to create, i.e. to take effective part in the changing, growing process of the malleable world. It is in the harmony and conative aspects of this ultimate end that our higher, or ultimate values are experienced. Once we recognize this fact of the essentially active nature of mental life, we see that it is quite unnecessary to look to the specific instincts for the explanation of the interests involved in these higher values.¹ We see them instead to arise from the essential nature of mental life. We discover that they are final because they are the experiences in which that life finds its fulfilment; and they are objective, or public, because the nature of mental life is essentially the same in all of us.

Truth value is experienced in the cognitive effort to grasp the *actualities* of the world. Those judgments and propositions which seem to us to do this appear to us to have the quality or value we call truth. Not *any* judgment appears true, but only those which can be assimilated with that body of accepted judgments we call our knowledge. Each judgment is formulated in pursuit of some immediate end, the guidance of present activity, or the solution of some present problem. But each judgment, if true, is also a contribution to the ultimate cognitive end or interest, the extension of the cognitive grasp of the world. And because of the harmony of the nearer and remoter ends involved, explicitly and implicitly, in the judgment it wears for us the quality of value. The criterion of truth which determines the appearance of value is thus purely

¹ As does Prof. Alexander: *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*.

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subjective. We have already a body of judgments which are accepted as a genuine grasp of the world. The new judgment, if it appears consistent with these, is also accepted as such. If it is noticed to be inconsistent with one or more of them, then one of the inconsistent judgments has to be rejected. But, though the criterion is purely subjective, the truthvalue is a quality of the judgment, which can be made objective or public in the form of a proposition. And the meaning of the judgment and proposition refers to the objective world. Each judgment formulates experience of that world and is tested by further experience of it. The world that exists independently of our thinking, and that is grasped in our thought, therefore determines the objective standard of truth. And that objective standard is one that we approach more and more as we enlarge our experience and formulate and compare the judgments describing it, accepting those that, by their consistency, appear true and rejecting those that, by their inconsistency, appear false. The criterion of value is subjective. But the use of the subjective criterion is a valid means, and our only means, of discovering, in increasing number and certainty, propositions which are objectively true.

Aesthetic value, or beauty, is also experienced in cognitive activity, but, as R. G. Collingwood has pointed out,¹ in the special cognitive activity of imagination. To recognize the truth of this we need to distinguish carefully between the aesthetic value of an object and the pleasure derived from its sense qualities (colours, sounds, etc.) and from instinctive interests which it may arouse. These latter may be quite essential to the aesthetic value and enhance the enjoyment of the total experience. But beauty is more than any combination of these. The supreme merit of the Mona Lisa and Michael Angelo's Moses, for example, lies not in colours and shapes, nor in any instinctive tendencies that they stimulate and satisfy, but rather in the effect they have upon the imagination. The same may be said of a sunset or the song of a lark. The beautiful object has power to stimulate the imagination and to stimulate it in such a way that it proceeds harmoniously as pure imagination, introducing no elements that are inconsistent with the whole.

Now, just as logical thinking in pursuit of truth seeks to grasp the actualities of the world, so imagination seeks to penetrate its unrealized possibilities and so contributes its quota to the satisfaction of the ever-present, fundamental interest of life. The beautiful object stimulates an interest in elucidating a meaning or following a suggestion contained in itself. These meanings or suggestions are not concerned with facts to be assimilated to the body

¹ R. G. Collingwood: *Outlines of a Philosophy of Art*.

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of knowledge and so accounted as true. But they are developments of possibilities latent in the object and its circumstances, and so, so far as they are self-consistent (for we cannot think two contradictories as even possible), they are an elucidation of genuine possibilities of the world. And so the pursuit of the nearer end, concerned with the immediate object, is (providing the imaginative process is self-harmonious) in harmony with the ultimate end of life—the progressive penetration or grasp, in all its actualities and possibilities, of the world in which we live. And this harmony of nearer and remoter ends gives to the experience its sense of value—and an ultimate value because in harmony with our ultimate end.

As with truth the value experienced is the value of the object contemplated. But the criterion of the value judgment is subjective. It is the subject's own experience and upon analysis is shown to consist in the degree and harmony of his imaginative activity. Because individuals differ so their aesthetic experience also differs. But in that they have experience of the same object, and in that, in its essentials, the nature of mental life is the same in all, particularly as to its ultimate ends, it becomes obvious that they perceive, from so many different points of view, the same beauty. And it is also obvious that, in spite of the differences in point of view and experience, there are in all cases certain objective standards of beauty which can be discovered and applied. Thus, even in the difficult case of aesthetic experience, our interpretation of the nature of value, and our principle of the ultimate goal of all interest, enable us to understand both the subjectivity and objectivity of our value experience.

As Truth and Beauty arise from the cognitive aspect of our ultimate interest, so Moral and Religious Value arise from its conative aspect—the effort continuously to take effective part in the changing, growing process of the malleable world. Moral value is a quality of acts. We experience it and its negative (moral disvalue) in relation to our own acts. We call it the good and bad conscience. We also observe it as a quality of the acts of others which we then consider they should perform with a good or bad conscience accordingly. This moral experience or conscience varies greatly from individual to individual, yet the subjective criterion determining it is always the same. Those acts appear to us to be ethical which are in harmony with certain accepted standards or tendencies of our personality. For the most part these standards are traditionally defined. But occasionally we criticize our previously accepted moral principles and when we do so it is always in the interests of a more complete inner harmony. The aim of all ethical thought and discussion is so to formulate the principles of behaviour that, being followed out, there may be harmony in the soul, all

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the motives and practices of life so co-ordinated that conflict of impulse is gathered in a higher harmony and the major motives mutually support each other in the fullest possible expression of the personality, i.e. in taking the most effective part possible in the changing, growing process of our world. In brief, an action is felt to be right when its immediate end appears to us to be in harmony with the ultimate end of the individual life, the continuous active participation in the growing process of our world. And because those acts which are disruptive of the established order of the personality (and not contributory to a new and higher order) are most plainly out of harmony with the ultimate end they are most clearly felt to be evil, while those acts which contribute in a difficult situation to the strength of the personality are most clearly felt to be virtuous. This is very plainly to be seen in Greek ethics, e.g. in Plato's four cardinal virtues (Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, and Justice), in the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean, in the Stoic wise man, and even in Epicurus.

The moral conscience, then (or subjective moral criterion), is limited to this experience of internal harmony of ends under the supreme or ultimate end of the progressive, active penetration of the world. But the acts take place in an objective world, common to all of us. And human nature and its ultimate end are essentially the same in all of us. Therefore there are certain objective principles or standards to be discovered and applied in the lives of all of us. But these objectively stated principles can only be guides in the pursuit of the inwardly experienced value. And different circumstances determine that the line of activity in the maintenance of that inner consistency of personality in which our sense of moral value depends can not always be the same for each person and each occasion. No refinements of casuistry can replace the principle that each must be true to his own conscience. Moral disintegration begins when a man sells his soul to any, even a moral or ecclesiastical, authority. But in thus being true to his own subjective criterion the moral person rightly feels that he is discovering a genuinely objective value, determined by objective conditions. His act is concerned with objective things and objective results which are not entirely subject to his present determination; and not the least objective and independently presented to him, among these, are that moral tradition and those habits and sentiments which play so large a part in determining what he must do to preserve his own personal integrity, i.e. in giving to certain contemplated acts the appearance of moral value and disvalue. In the light, therefore, of this analysis the objective criterion of moral value can only very tentatively be formulated in terms of specific types of act. Its essential character is rather that of the duty of each individual to

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be true to the consistent and enlightened development of his own personality. Once again the subjective criterion of value must be the light by which we pursue the objective.

Now nothing have we said, so far, of the place of altruism in the moral life. For our moral satisfaction, it is only necessary that our altruistic aims should find a sufficient place in a well-knit and consistently lived personality. It is noteworthy that the Greeks gave no such prominent place to the virtue of benevolence as do modern thinkers, some of whom are inclined to define moral good as social good. It is, indeed, to the founder of Christianity that the world owes the conception of the supreme value of universal brotherly love; and it seems to me that the recognition of a peculiar worth in altruism depends upon a value experience which is religious rather than merely ethical. An action is characterized by the experience of moral value when its more immediate end appears to the subject to be in harmony with the ultimate end of the personality, implicitly or explicitly present to consciousness. It is characterized by the experience of religious value when it appears to the subject to be in harmony with a wider end to which his personality itself is to be regarded as a means. I would agree with Durkheim¹ that when the savage in his totemic ceremonies sinks his individuality in that of the tribe he has an experience of genuine religious value even if the totem is no more than a symbol of the tribe. And I think we must agree with Auguste Comte that Humanity may be a real object of religious devotion. For the immediate criterion of religious value, as of all value, is purely subjective. So, if the totem or an idealized Humanity are conceived as constituting the supra-individual end, then the devotion of the personality, in what seems to the person to be harmony with that end, will constitute an apparent harmony of the nearer with this remoter end, and so wear the appearance of value.

In the case of the other types of value we saw that, though the criterion of each individual is subjective, yet there certainly are objective conditions determining objective standards of value. But in the case of religious value the existence of these objective conditions is not quite so obvious unless we confine ourselves to the standpoint of Positivism, or, as it is now called, Humanism. Some people have convinced themselves that they may be discovered by metaphysics; and the historic religions teach that they are revealed by miracle. But the real touchstone by which man has felt his way to the formulation of objective standards in religion (i.e. to the definition of the nature of the supra-individual end and the conditions of its existence and of individual harmony with it) is the subjective criterion itself, i.e. the actual experience of value in the

¹ E. Durkheim: *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*.

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submission of his personality to a supra-individual end, variously conceived. The conception of that supra-individual end—totem, Humanity, Zeus, Brahma, the Christian God—which contains in his religious experience the greatest possibilities of value is the one which he regards as objectively sound. The religious man treats his value experience as a clue to the nature of reality of an importance equal to that of his sense experience.

Thus in religion, as in all other realms of value experience, while the immediate criterion is subjective, the value is experienced as a quality of the object concerned and is seen to be affected by objective conditions, more or less clearly perceived, which determine objective standards, which are themselves tentatively approached in critical experimentation with the subjective standard. The understanding of value as the harmony of nearer and remoter ends, and the recognition of interest as having its own continuous and ultimate end, enable us to explain the knotty problem presented by the elements of subjectivity and objectivity in our axiological experience, without entirely surrendering the standpoint of the interest theory of value.

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PROFESSOR C. LLOYD MORGAN

IN a scientific discussion of the processes which we (or some of us) designate "vital," attention is concentrated on an interpretation of that which happens within a relational system of physical influence. In a scientific discussion of the processes which we reflectively distinguish as "mental," attention is directed to what occurs in a relational system of psychological reference. We should seek to distinguish each from the other in any given context where both are in evidence.

In such a psycho-physical or psycho-biological context, that which observably happens often calls for a blended interpretation in terms of physical influence and in terms of psychological reference. One may, for example, act in response to some current mode of physical influence but also with mental reference to some future state of affairs. None the less, each relational field should be carefully distinguished from the other. And in dealing with those living organisms which differ in status from ourselves we should distinguish their biological status, as recipients of physical influence, from their psychological status, as centres from which mental reference is "projicient." In plants, for instance, there may be little or no prospective reference on their part to a future state of affairs. To inorganic things such as molecules, crystals, or photographic plates, we do not impute either retrospective reference to the past or prospective reference to the future.

Let us, then, briefly consider influence and reference as differing but co-related kinds of relatedness within that which we speak of as the constitution of nature. And let us take physical influence first. One commonly thinks of it (or of what I here mean by it) as *passing* from some "this," it may be a distant source of radiation, to some "that" which is recipient thereof, for example, a photographic plate. Not until the radiant influence impinges on the plate does something new and noteworthy happen. And what then happens and is then specially noteworthy is a reaction of the recipient plate. This reaction discloses to an adequately trained observer the chemical nature of the plate and that specific kind of physical influence to which it responds in accordance with this nature.

So too if in place of such a sensitized plate the recipient is a human eye backed up by a highly organized nervous system, what

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then happens is a yet more complex reaction which discloses the biochemical nature of the living recipient and the kind of physical influence to which it is so organized as selectively to respond.

In this case, however, there may be (let us now assume that there is) not only the physiological outcome of that specific kind of radiant influence which adequately stimulates the retina, but contemporaneous therewith, psychological reference to that which we speak of as an object of vision. One here turns from body-story to mind-story. In this case perceptive or unreflective reference betokens the relation which (as we commonly say) connects someone seeing, for example, and somewhat seen. In other cases reflective reference connects someone knowing or thinking with somewhat known or thought of. But in either case reference (or what I here mean by reference) as such has its genetic origin within the confines of the living organism on receipt of some physical influence and in alliance with physiological changes, neural or other, consequent thereon. And in any case if there is no one in some way minding, perceptively or otherwise, there is nothing minded—nothing to which there is the psychological relation of reference. Hence in the absence of a mind in concomitant alliance with a living body no psychological system of reference is in being.

This does not imply that in the absence of what we speak of as reference thereto there is no system of influence—no physical world. It implies only that in the absence of such reference thereto there would be no knowledge of that world based on acquaintance therewith.

Our reflective aim, then, should be carefully to distinguish that closed system of influence which we call the physical world from that complementary system of reference on which our knowledge thereof is founded.

As a matter of perceptual experience one commonly claims to be a receptive of physical influence and thereon distributive of such influence. But though perceptive reference is directed to that which one speaks of as some source of influence—to what we call "Sirius," for example—there is no *passage* of reference from one's mind to the star Sirius analogous to the physical passage of influence from the star to one's retina. None the less, in this typical transaction the psychological relation of reference is opposite in "sense" to the physical relation of influence. The former is *to* Sirius; the latter is *from* Sirius. Here, too, the terms in relation under influence—Sirius and the retina—are both physical. Under reference, however, at least one term in the cognitive relation is not physical but mental. And it is an open hypothesis (which I for one accept) that both terms as *thus* related are mental.

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Let us assume that in interpreting influence one starts with the common-sense belief in the continuant existence of a physical world in which there are diverse "organisms" (under Mr. Whitehead's extended usage of this word) each of which is receptive of influence from others and distributive of influence to others. One may subsequently try to keep in touch with that new thought-picture of the deeper relational tissue of physical events which has thus far been disclosed by modern science.

But in concurrently interpreting reference one starts with the no less common-sense belief that some "organisms" other than ourselves are referent centres (i.e. centres from which reference is "projicient"). On further inquiry, however, one may perchance have been led by Leibniz and others in the past and by Mr. Whitehead and others to-day to go beyond this common-sense belief; or, at any rate, to consider the grounds on which they have been led to believe that *all* "organisms," not-living and living without exception, are (in what after Leibniz one may call their "monadic" capacity) in some wise referent centres or centres which exemplify that which Lotze probably meant by "taking note of" and that which Mr. Whitehead now speaks of as "prehension."

This may be regarded as a speculative theory. The basal assumption is that, throughout nature, correlative with the physical influence of "this" pattern of events on "that" recipient "organism" (living or not-living) there is reference (of an incipiently mental kind) projicient from the recipient organism to the objective situation. Presumably such monadic reference (if such there be) is neither prospective nor retrospective but is restricted to a momentary "now" in the fluent phase of the reception of influence in passage. If so, it is hard to see what empirical evidence can be adduced in support of this imputation of reference as occurrent on the part of a not-living thing—on the part of the moon, for example, as receptive of a pattern of gravitative influence.

Let us, then, relegate to a philosophical suspense account any further consideration of this speculative vision of one all-embracing system of reference co-ordinate with, and complementary to, the all-embracing system of physical influence. That leaves us with that which I mean by mental reference on the part of living organisms, or at any rate some of them.

But what are we to include under mental reference in the sense here intended? I should distinguish, in ascending order, three modes of reference—sentient, perceptive, and reflective. But others—Mr. Broad, for example, in his able book on *Mind and Its Place in Nature*—restrict their use of the word "reference" to the reflective stage of mental development. Justifiably, no doubt, from this point of view Mr. Broad regards the sensing of a sensum (the pure sensa-

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tion of a noise or a patch) as objective but non-referential (pp. 305-6, cf. p. 151). From my point of view such sentient relatedness is typically referential as genetically contributory to the evolution of an emergent system of reference which, in us, becomes in due course reflective and is then characterized by judgment and belief.

On this understanding the question arises: To what is there reference at any stage of its expanding development? The traditional answer to this question is: That to which there is such reference, in any mode thereof, is what by common consent we speak of as "objective." And it is thus objective to him whom we agree to call "the subject." Such, in brief, is the classical manner of reflectively interpreting "the cognitive relation" which, on these terms, holds between "subject" and "object," whenever someone minding is in face of somewhat that is then and there minded.

On these terms the traditional differentiation of the subject as minding from objects as minded—a distinction now so familiar as to be commonly taken as typically primitive—is known by us only as a late outcome of our reflective thought. And for this reflective thought the subject as minding (or, at any rate, somewhat adequately representative thereof) must itself be objectively minded. It must itself be an object of thought. That object of thought which thus represents the subject as minding, say, on some past or some future occasion, is what we have learnt to call the conscious "self" to which there is now objective reference—retrospective or prospective—in a reflective field of thought. Hence only at the self-conscious stage of mental development can subjective minding be not only "enjoyed" but also contemplated in representative form.

But genetically preceding, and thereafter underlying, such reflective procedure is the unreflective cognition which we attribute to the infant and the animal at an earlier stage of naïve perception. A further question thus arises. When the cognitive relation (of someone minding to somewhat minded) is in being at the non-reflective stage of mental development, what is it that we speak of as a mind. To this question one of two answers may be given. Let me thus state them. Some may elect to define a mind as that system of processes which constitutes the subject's experience in minding. These processes (in perceiving, for example) are typically mental; but that which is minded or unreflectively perceived, is, they say, no less typically non-mental. Others elect to define a mind as the whole system of relational reference which includes not only the subject in process of referring to this or that object but also those objects to which there is cognitive reference on his part.

There seem, then, to be two definitions of mind and of that which is designated "mental." Each of us should say frankly which of them

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he accepts as a stance for further discussion, without presuming to demand of others like acceptance.

I am one of those who accept the latter. For me, therefore, any given object of reference is no less mental than is the subjective procedure of him who refers to it. As objective it is "in mind." But, for me, it is thus "in mind" (as Berkeley said), "by way of idea," in contrast with "in mind by way of attribute"—i.e. as characterizing the subject in process of minding.

But that which is thus in mind by way of idea (in Berkeley's sense) may indicate the presence of something that is physically non-mental within the system of influence. This or that somewhat, say "Sirius," may be a radiant centre of influence on the body and a focal centre of reference from someone as subject. Hence it is legitimate to claim that any given somewhat may be *both*, so long as due stress is laid on the radical distinction of physical things in the field of influence from psychological objects in the field of reference.

In thus including within the mind not only all processes of subjectively minding but all that is objectively minded as together constituting a psychological system of reference to be abstractively distinguished from the physical system of influence, one no longer asks whether the so-called primary, secondary, or tertiary qualities assigned to this or that object (say its shape, colour, and beauty) are mental or non-mental, for one has already defined them as objectively mental within the system of reference, whatever may be the non-mental status which may be assigned to their physical counterparts within the system of influence. For us, then, the cardinal point for emphasis is that, apart from the cognitive relation, no one of them comes into being in such wise as to be designated "objectively mental" in the psychological sense of this expression; none can afford an instance of the emergence of novelty (if such there be) within the system of reference—that is, within that system which we on our part define as a mind.

Two rather technical questions here arise. First, is that which is subjectively in mind—when one is perceiving Sirius, let us say—"identical" with some vital process (predominantly neural) which concurrently occurs within one's body? Secondly, is the sensible quality of that which is objectively in mind, as perceived, "identical" with a physical property of the material thing which stimulates some sensory organ of the body? Before one says Yes in either case one must inquire what such an "identity hypothesis" is held to imply. If its acceptance entails the rejection of so radical a distinction as is, for us, that between physical influence on and within the body and mental reference from subject to object, then in neither case can we, on our part, say Yes.

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But we, on our part, may substitute for this identity hypothesis a different hypothesis. On this hypothesis we submit that "concomitant with" seeing, for example, there are physiological processes in the living body; and that "co-related with" colour, as seen, there was a foregoing event in the more or less distant source of radiant influence which has entailed a specific biochemical reaction consequent on the reception of stimulation by the selective retina. The point for emphasis on our part is that, alike in minding and in the genesis of that which is objectively minded, *the accompanying vital processes are within the body.*

Within the body, then, are those biochemical events in the system of influence which are concomitant with the appearance of colour in the accompanying system of psychological reference. Until such biochemical events are in being there is, on *this* hypothesis, no reference of colour to anything external to the body. In other words there is, on *this* hypothesis, no transmission of colour, as a property of a material or non-mental thing—a ruby or sapphire, for example—by means of that radiant influence which is received by the retina.

On a different hypothesis, however (nowadays widely accepted), colour as non-mental *is* thus transmitted; it *does* in some way pass from the material thing which influences the retina to the biochemical constituents of the living organism; it does *not* have being (as colour) only within the psychological system of reference.

The latter hypothesis leads us back to that definition of mind in accordance with which the adjective "mental" is applicable only to the subjective processes that occur when someone is minding with consequent emphasis on the non-mental status of the secondary qualities of material things as given to perception. Here then the question arises: Should we (on *this* hypothesis) speak of the non-mental material thus perceived as thereby "possessed by mind"? And, if so, what does such "possession" imply? For an answer one naturally turns to *Space, Time and Deity*. One there learns that the phrase "possession by mind" is so used by Mr. Alexander as to carry a specialized meaning. It is so used by him as always to imply that the mind which enters into possession is distinctively *reflective* in its exercise of *judgment* (Vol. II, pp. 217, 242-3, 294-5, 304).

In so far as, or so long as, any instance of minding is assignable to the lower and predominantly sensory status in instinctive or unreflective experience, what is concurrently perceived is still, for Mr. Alexander, typically non-mental. On these terms, therefore, the secondary qualities of things—their colour and scent, for example—are wholly of "material" origin and nowise depend for the character of their being on the compresence of someone who has sensory acquaintance with them. Here no "intrusion of mind"

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(p. 216) plays any part in their natural genesis. They afford "real appearances" (p. 184) of the non-mental system of events and thus partially or selectively reveal the physical nature of the "material" given to one's mental perception.

But whenever an appearance is in some measure tainted by "illusion," in that measure there *is* such intrusion of mind, though it is not always so designated. Still "our illusions," so we are told, "are always in a manner artefacts of our own and their reality in the form which they possess is owing to the mind which entertains them" (p. 227). Hence in the genesis of all *illusory* appearance a new factor—a distinctively mental factor—plays a noteworthy part. This mental factor entails some distorted misacquaintance with the non-mental thing, or the material situation, as it "really" (i.e. physically) *is* independently of such intrusion of mind. The salient point for due emphasis here is that in illusory perception, as such, there is always some modification or distortion of the non-mental world as it actually or physically *is*, independently of our reference thereto. Nay, more. In so far as revival in memory is *always* in some degree distorted (p. 218), such distortion in all perceptive expectation is attributable to the "intrusion of mind" (or its equivalent), as generating a mental "artefact."

When we pass, however, from unreflective to reflective procedure, and feel justified in recognizing the effective presence of judgment and what this entails, then, and not till then, does there come on to the scene that later "possession by mind" which implies far more than the precedent "intrusion of mind." Not only is there some distortion of "the real appearance," there is also a "blend" of reflective minding with the non-mental material thus minded. This "blend" of the mental and the non-mental in a reflective field of reference gives genetic origin to that which we name "value" which has no being in evolutionary existence save as possessed by some mind in which there has been developed the requisite capacity of thoughtful judgment.

On these terms and from this point of view that which we commonly speak of as "value" comes into evolutionary existence (or, as I say, emerges) in a specialized field of reference. In this field it takes form as a new empirical character which, under judgment, we assign to such psychological objects as are possessed by mind in the manner described. And the natural genesis of this distinctive character is interpreted as a blending of mind (as possessing) with some pattern of material, not only afforded to perception through appropriate channels of physical influence, but so possessed by mind as thereby to acquire value.

It may, however, be said that no such interpretation of the natural genesis of value as an empirical character can throw any light on

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the ontological status of value in an abiding hierarchy of generating forms which are (in Mr. Whitehead's phrase) so ingressive into actual situations in concrescent advance as to render them expressive of the relevant Potentiality of Ultimate Being. That is so. Value as an empirical character which is new in temporal advance cannot be identical with (though it may be due to) that which has eternal subsistence in an abiding Realm of Forms. If empirical value is, as I say, "emergent" (cf. *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. II, p. 304), it should be distinguished from ontological value as "ingressive." All that one can (and may still) claim is that, since ontological value does come within the wide domain of philosophical thought, it (or some concept representative thereof) comes also within the field of psychological reference and thus becomes known by us as reflectively possessed by mind with the reality which such possession by mind entails.

For it must not be supposed that the dependence of the commonly recognized instances of empirical value on the evolutionary advent of full possession by mind as capable of judging, excludes them from the expanding realm of comprehensive reality. On the contrary, through their genesis, this realm of evolving reality (not only *physically* "real") gains a new empirical character which had no being prior to that blending of the mental and the non-mental which possession by mind implies. Hence, consequent thereon, the object itself acquires value as possessed by the subject; the subject acquires value as possessing the object; and on both counts the blended reality is newly enriched (cf. p. 302).

If, as I venture to hope, my brief summary of the salient points in this thesis is substantially correct, it does, I think, lay due emphasis on certain characterizing features which distinguish the more highly reflective from the unreflective levels of referential experience; and it does show how reflective possession by a mind which is capable of judgment makes a real difference in that which is thus minded in bestowing on it a so-called tertiary quality, such as beauty or truth or goodness, for example. There may be difficulties which preclude my acceptance of the underlying definition of mind as subjective only and therefore restricted to enjoyment (cognitive and other) in process of minding. I may find it hard to grasp the exact manner in which the mental process concerned in appreciating the beauty of a melody can "blend" with the non-mental material transmitted from a distance by means of wireless influence. Still some kind of blending there is. And for my thought it takes form in a blended *interpretation* in terms which do justice alike to influence and to reference. Such a *blended interpretation* in terms of influence and of reference does seem to be what physicists, biologists, psychologists, and logicians endeavour to formulate when they meet in

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joint session to consider the modern outlook on natural science as a whole and as seen from diverse points of view on complementary lines of approach.

But rather than here attempting more explicitly to indicate some of the difficulties which preclude me from unreservedly accepting a blend of the mental and the non-mental as defined by one whom in large measure I follow as my guide and master—difficulties which he and others are able to surmount—let me in conclusion revert to the alternative definition of mind in accordance with which the adjective “mental” may be applied (with suitably adverbial qualifications), both to the processes which occur in all instances of subjectively minding and to that which is in any way objectively minded. On this definition whatsoever is minded, whether reflectively or unreflectively, is thereby in some wise “possessed by mind.” As thus possessed (in this comprehensive sense) it is no longer what it was aforesaid—that is, prior to and independently of such possession. That which has beauty, or truth, for example, does no doubt acquire this referential value as possessed by mind in reflectively appreciating it with aesthetic joy, or in intellectually judging it to be worthy of belief. But the shape of an object of vision or of touch is also, in a wide sense, possessed by mind in unreflectively perceiving it. Colour, too, is possessed by mind at the yet lower level of direct sensory acquaintance therewith. One may say: Anything that is in some way objectively in mind—seen, heard; imaged, thought of; remembered, expected; aesthetically appreciated or intellectually accepted—is in that way possessed by mind, and in that way comes within a field of psychological reference.

It is thus within a system of *reference*, as distinguished from the co-related system of *influence*, that minding and what is minded alike have being, and alike, as I think, afford evidence of the emergence of novelty in the genetic advance of evolution both physical and mental.

But the evidence in support of unpredictable novelty as emergent on both sides of the account—subjective novelty in minding no less than objective novelty in that which is minded—presupposes a “blended interpretation” in which neither influence nor reference is abstractively ignored. Few evolutionists ignore the part which influence plays in the concrescent advance of world-events. But there are some who are prone to ignore the complementary part which reference plays in a scientific interpretation of these events.

So we must ask this final question: Can we enter on a discussion of the system of influence, as physically interpreted, without retrospective *reference* to events which, as we infer, have existed in the past, and prospective *reference* to events which, as we believe, will exist in the future?

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If we cannot do so—and there are many who hold, with David Hume of old and with Professor Max Planck to-day, that any consideration of relational causation involves a discussion of the validity of prediction under prospective reference; if we cannot do so, it is only as in some way “possessed by mind” that the nature of the system of influence in the physical world is partially “revealed” to scientific knowledge and thought or even to unreflective perception.

PHILOSOPHIC HISTORY AND PROPHECY

Professor Arnold Toynbee's Outlook

HILDA D. OAKELEY, M.A., D.Lit.

PROFESSOR TOYNBEE observes in his *Study of History*¹ that as he walked down Whitehall one day in the spring of 1918, and passed the Board of Education offices which had been commandeered for a new department of the War Office, "improvised in order to make an intensive study of trench warfare," he found himself repeating the passage from St. Matthew's Gospel:

"When ye therefore shall see the abomination of desolation spoken of by Daniel the Prophet stand in the holy place (whoso readeth let him understand) . . . then shall be great tribulation, such as was not since the beginning of the world to this time. . . . And except those days should be shortened, there should no flesh be saved."

The prophecies of religious genius which seize upon our imagination when first heard so that they can never be forgotten but recur at historic moments, often seem to have a historic fulfilment, because their spiritual intensity rhythmically meets an experience similar in profundity to that which called them forth, and the factual differences fade away. Strict fulfilment of religious prophecies there has not been in history. Neither have all the methods of philosophy, or of scientific history when turned towards the future, taken us much beyond the question, "Watchman, what of the night?"

Successful prediction is a means of verification of hypotheses in science. The type of prediction based on a survey of history which seeks to understand its essential significance, and the true nature of civilization, would be different. On the one hand, no such exact verification of law or generalization in occurrences as science demands is conceivable in history, unless in very narrow fields, of special events. This is primarily because the ultimate constituents of history are wholly individual, and once for all. On the other hand, the aim of historical prophecy would be to discern whether the real and inner sources of historic development are such as necessarily to operate in the future as in the past, rather than to examine the question what events may be expected to occur assuming that those sources remain unchanged. The immense difficulty and the failures hitherto of historic prophecy are due, then, not so much to the inconceivable complexity of the data, as to the nature of the subject with which the forecast would be concerned. The data are only to be found

¹ Volume III, pp. 167-168.

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in experience, but what the experience has to reveal is the nature of those forces which have made history, the human selves struggling to transcend animal experience, and realize more fully the values which they find in the event process, the alien, contingent, or "senseless" conditions,¹ of which they must take account or perish spiritually, if not physically. The inquiry then demands categories of investigation of another type than those of science. The investigator is assisted by all his human knowledge. The great interpretations of life which have proceeded from genius in drama and epic, in religious myth and moral philosophy, will help to equip him. By the art and literature of different races light may be thrown on the nature of the creative mind in the experiments of civilization. These various sources of interpretation of man's endeavours to enrich his experience with value may be more illuminating if compared with each other. Nor must the fields of historic fact, in records, in archaeological remains, in scientific histories, be neglected.

Since it is the function of philosophy to criticize the forms and categories which make knowledge possible in the various departments, the examination of the categories or principles for the interpretation of history which result from insight gained in the ways thus indicated would seem to be the business of philosophy. It is a very different relation of philosophy to history from that assumed in the philosophies of the *a priori* schools. For these start from the postulate that metaphysical, logical, or ethical principles necessitate that history should be of such and such a character. They compel therefore the reinterpretation of historical phenomena which appear inconsistent with the required conclusions, or resort to the faith that with complete knowledge the inconsistencies would disappear. Such philosophies are discredited to-day. Equally with the attempts to treat the sequence of history as capable of being brought under universal laws, comparable to those of the empirical sciences, they exhibit the fallacy pointed out by Aristotle in his rule of method.² "It is not possible to demonstrate (in one kind of knowledge) with the principles belonging to another." Yet in the case of historic knowledge, on account of the very universality of the subject-matter, since everything comes to us as history, the more manifold and varied the sources of our categories the greater their adequacy. Even certain *a priori* postulates may be found indispensable. Such is the postulate that "value cannot perish out of the world,"³ which, in relation to human experience, signifies that civilization in some form will endure.

¹ "Senseless" in Professor Whitehead's terminology (*Adventures of Ideas*). I have elsewhere used the term "blind."

² *Posterior Analytics*, Book I, Chapter VII.

³ Belief in this principle is Höfding's definition of religion.

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Professor Toynbee's analysis of the genesis and growth of civilizations exhibits in a strikingly original way the power referred to above of using the fruits of profound experience of life in its great aspects for the construction of principles of explanation. He has so far published only the first three volumes of a work which is to comprise thirteen. But there is enough here to enable some estimate of the philosophical value of the categories employed, and to inquire whether they are such as to make possible prophecy of the kind proper to history. Only a few examples can be selected for this inquiry, but the spirit of the interpretation, in spite of the rich variety in the choice of symbolic ideas to illuminate the unconscious processes of a people's development, seems fundamentally the same throughout.

First it must be noted that Professor Toynbee takes as the "social unit" societies, not states. These societies which have a common civilization form "the intelligible objects" of historical study, whilst "national" or "city" states are parts of these. But, again, all the societies which history proper studies, are related to each other in the sense that "they are all representatives of a single species of society." This is the species of civilized societies, or civilizations, as distinguished from primitive societies. Of the species there are five living civilizations, Western, Orthodox Christian, Islamic, Hindu, and Far Eastern—and fourteen that are now extinct.¹ He rejects emphatically the misconception of "The Unity of Civilization." The thesis that the present unification of the world on a Western basis is the consummation of a single continuous process which accounts for the whole of human history requires a violent distortion of historical facts and a drastic limitation of the historian's field of vision." Perhaps to the historical grounds he gives for this negation of the doctrine of the Unity of Civilization we may add one based on the philosophic principle (which Professor Toynbee also recognizes) that the ultimate sources of civilization are the creative selves in any society. In my view it is the subject selves who are the true constituents of history, but I should agree with him that societies must be taken as the main objects with which history as a great branch of knowledge is concerned, for the individual selves are not fully knowable. Now these ultimate sources are in their very nature unique, and all events in which they are concerned are individual and never repeated. It follows that when through the pioneer advance and fellow-working of such personalities in the construction of higher forms of living, civilizations have arisen, they will be essentially individual in their character. A unity of civilization would then mean that all forms except one

¹ The number is later given as twenty-one by division of the "Orthodox Christian" and the "Far Eastern" Societies.

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were extinct. This distinctness will not, of course, as Professor Toynbee points out, prevent their comparison. His views that (a) all representatives of the species civilization are philosophically contemporaneous, and (b) all are philosophically equivalent, are also important. The first follows from the position that Time is relative, the second from the position that value is intrinsically subjective, and the members of each civilization will hold, if not that theirs is the only civilization that exists, at least that it is the only civilization that possesses any value. The relativity of value to the age and society must be admitted. The problem whether this relativity can be overcome, to the point of asserting one principle that shows itself to be absolute, is the chief philosophical problem in relation to the continuance of civilization and the survival of any one form. It appears that if there is such a principle it must lie in the nature of personality, the ultimate source of civilization. Some comparison of civilizations in respect to their value would then be philosophically justified, the criterion being the presence of creative personality and the promise of its increased control of alien factors. This is, I think, in harmony with Professor Toynbee's main views as to the genesis and growth of civilizations. He insists, indeed, in Vol. I, that all civilizations hitherto developed must on a philosophic view be regarded as "approximately equal to one another." Yet in a later volume (III) he is able to state the conclusion that "a given series of successful responses to successive challenges" (which make possible any civilization) may be taken as a manifestation of growth, "in so far as the action tends to shift from the field of the external environment—to the *for intérieur* of the growing personality or the growing civilization." And this would enable a comparison in respect to value.

Let us now examine certain of the principles of explanation which run through the work. The first broad distinction between the primitive and the civilized society is that the former appears to be static, the latter dynamic. But this contrast is found to be not permanent and fundamental, but an "accident of the time and place of observation." All human societies must be, at different stages, both static and dynamic. The primitive must once have been in motion, those that have entered upon the process of civilization will at some time come to rest. The mutation of primitive societies into civilizations, however, involves a "transition from a static condition to a dynamic activity." Professor Toynbee illustrates the recognition of this process as a kind of alternation of states in the universe, from modern philosophy (General Smuts), from psychology, sociology, Greek philosophy in Empedocles' ebb and flow of Love and Strife, and from the Chinese opposition of "Yin and Yang." Civilizations in their genesis he describes as "particular beats of a

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general rhythmical pulsation which runs through the universe." If we compare the conception thus arrived at with Herbert Spencer's idea of progress as the passage from an undifferentiated, incoherent, indefinite homogeneity to a differentiated, coherent, definite heterogeneity, we feel in Professor Toynbee's method the concreteness, the value quality, the spirit of the great experience of mankind, which is necessary to historic interpretation. Spencer gives us in contrast an abstract formula which can only be equated with real progress by means of the hypothesis that increase of complexity is identical with increase of value. But this cannot be verified. The "dynamic and static" formula does not necessarily signify the human contrast of the struggle to a higher, and the passive acceptance of existing conditions. But that this is the nerve of the contrast between civilization and primitive society is suggested by Professor Toynbee's image of the rock-climber who is going on to a higher ledge, whilst another lies prone on the ledge he has once reached by effort. This image reminds us that we must not ignore the gigantic effort of "primitive" man in rising from the sub-human to the human. Another formula which even more essentially belongs to history, as intrinsic to human experience, is that of "challenge and response." Professor Toynbee's introduction of this conception is still more philosophic in Plato's sense of the philosopher as "contemplating all time and all existence," than his introduction of the dynamic-static formula. It is, however, time and existence as interpreted by religious and poetic genius that he surveys, finding in the greatest myths, allegories, and dramas of human destiny the "challenge and response" motive. The plot of the myths to which he refers is an encounter between two superhuman personalities from which vast consequences result for man, as in the Old Testament "Fall of Man," the New Testament "Redemption of Man," the theme of Job, of Goethe's *Faust*, of Aeschylus's *Prometheus*, etc. He finds even in the astronomer's account of the origin of the Planets once more the old myth of the encounter between the sun-goddess and her ravisher. Also in Darwinism with its internal factor of Variation and external factor of Natural Selection the conflict reappears.

The outcome, in the language of mythology, is that "when one of God's creatures is tempted by the Devil, God Himself is thereby given the opportunity to re-create the world. . . . The Devil's intervention has accomplished the transition from 'Yin to Yang,' from static to dynamic." The rest in a state of seeming peace and bliss, could not give way to a new activity of creation until the divine equilibrium has been upset by the Satanic instability. The idea of the conflict between God and Satan, of the ordeal and suffering

¹ Sir James Jeans.

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of the human protagonist, are gradually applied by Professor Toynbee to the harsh experience of the human race through its highest members in the genesis of civilization. Thus the savages who had wandered into a cold climate lacking clothes, houses, fire, and instead of retreating south, began to use their minds in invention, made the first response to the challenge of the environment and learning through suffering took the first steps towards civilization. This idea is worked out in Professor Toynbee's analysis of the origins of the known civilizations. In every case he shows that it is the people who chose the harder way, the harder climatic conditions, relying on their own endurance and inventiveness, who started or hastened the advance to the higher human life. The "challenge" came to them in the shape of difficulties which without new and unpredictable efforts could not have been overcome, whilst the overcoming brought with it other unforeseen gains. We may perhaps ask, Is the keynote of these events truly given in the myths and dramas? It is at least clear that these are true expressions or symbols of certain universal characteristics of history, and of spiritual experience, the vicarious sufferings of individuals and communities, the learning and strength won through suffering—if it is not too crushing (as the path of some races has been too hard). The meaning of the author may be taken to be that genius having insight into the inner and universal principles of human life and history, the spiritual currents into which its raw material is taken up, expresses these in great imaginative creations. The experience of "challenge and response" clearly begins in the ultimate historic factors, the individual lives. From the point of view of the present writer, this is the reason for its display on a great scale in the building of civilizations, for the first reality lies in the personal striving. Nor is this inconsistent with Professor Toynbee's standpoint. But there is a tendency in his work to personify "civilization" or treat it as something more than the individuals who, like many Atlases, "bear it up." In a sense it is more than the individuals of any one time, for it consists in institutions and traditional modes of life the objectification of the energies of many generations. Yet it is nothing but stocks and stones and fading memories, except in so far as upborne and ensouled by the living minds of the present. Professor Toynbee does not conceive a society as a being which has a life of its own beyond that of its members—such as Professor Hartmann's "Objective Mind"—to take an example from recent philosophy.¹ It is constituted, in his view, by the activities of all its individuals. But for the student who takes as his central theme the idea of nation, empire, civilization, etc., as he must from the standpoint of history as record, the tendency

¹ *Das Problem des Geistigen Seins.*

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is almost irresistible to treat these as the ultimates, and thereupon constructing "laws" of their processes, which are valid as postulates for knowledge, lose sight of the possibility of historic freedom.

An interesting but rather doubtful analogy or even identity of principle between the experience of the individual soul and the process of civilization is drawn by Professor Toynbee in the method of "withdrawal and return."¹ This principle is shown to be at work in the lives of the most remarkable personalities. It is obviously found in individuals, prophets, saints, mystics, saviours of their people, great artists, and writers. The withdrawal from the world is followed by the return to be of signal service to their fellows. The concept is then transferred to societies and nations. Here it seems to me the analogy fails. "Penalized minorities" withdraw, as for instance the English non-conformists after the Civil War, from the time of the Restoration to that of the passage of the Reform Bill. They "withdraw into the realm of private business to return omnipotent as the authors of the Industrial Revolution." The English Nation withdrew from continental entanglements in 1558 to return to European relations in 1914. The vital aspect of the withdrawal of the individual, is that he retreats from the world in order to find his own soul or perceive some vision or discover some truth which is hidden from him in the constant social distraction of his superficial nature. There is no parallel motive in the society. It withdraws from one type of activity no longer successful, and, concentrating on another by intensive cultivation, may make of this a new talent. This happens also in the individual life, but the withdrawal and return features in this kind of process are only similar in unessentials to those of the mystic, etc. Here it appears to me Professor Toynbee overlooks the fact that the deepest experiences of personality cannot be transferred to a group of persons as such.

As regards the problem of historic prophecy, more light will no doubt be cast on this author's position in later volumes. The method, as it has been indicated in the first three volumes, would not admit of any strict forecasts in a scientific sense. By what means shall we gauge the quality and degree of creative energy in the response of a people to the challenge of its environment, inanimate and human? This is the more impossible since Professor Toynbee takes the position to which, in his view, history has testified again and again, that it is the creative minority, namely individuals of genius, who are responsible for the origin and growth of civilizations. But the method does not inherently preclude a conclusion of probability that certain most universal features in the history of civilization will endure. Such is the principle that all civilizations will enter

¹ Volume III, p. 248.

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upon a period of decay when the stage has been reached at which sufficient success prevents the further and fresh display of creative energy in response to new challenges. In his investigation of the principles of growth in civilizations, Professor Toynbee deals elaborately with expansion, and assembles many illustrations, from that of the Egyptian civilization to those of America before European invasion, in support of the position that expansion is no criterion of growth. He inclines in fact to the view that in the majority of cases true growth is found to be in inverse proportion to the expansion of a civilization. There appears to be some ambiguity in the notion of expansion and its relation to decay. In the early days of a people's development expansion to some extent seems a necessary movement, and Professor Toynbee dwells upon the cultural inspiration of the contact with new ground (Vol. I). Once the character of the civilization is determined, he appears to argue—expansion in general is concomitant with social disintegration (Vol. III). It may be, however, that the seed of disintegration did not lie in expansion, but in some other attendant condition, as for example, militarism—an instance which he himself gives. The phenomena included under expansion in fact require analysis, as do also the phenomena included under disintegration. This is especially evident in the criticism of the American civilization, where it is not clear whether Western civilization as a whole is lowered on account of the expansion over America, or whether the significant fact is the failure of the "new" countries to originate a new civilization, or to develop in fresh forms the finer things of the old. It is evident that in relation to this phenomenon of expansion the severest test of the permanence of the Western civilization must be applied by Professor Toynbee. We are experiencing the unprecedented event of the expansion of a single civilization in some of its aspects, especially the economic and political—(the more superficial in his view)—over the whole globe. Is there any way of avoiding the conclusion that Western civilization is approaching its end in spite of the brilliance which still attends its activities? Is this the brilliance of a setting sun? He can point to many signs of disillusionment in regard to the mechanical triumphs in which it has excelled, and many cases in history in which a high culture has not been characterized by a high level of mechanical development. The problem will clearly receive further consideration in the later part dealing with "The Prospects of the Western Civilization." At present the chief outcome of his remarkable Study seems to be as follows. The principle of historic necessity is in the ascendant where the historian's voice alone speaks. On the one hand a survey of the rise and fall of civilizations shows no single one to possess enduring conditions of stability. On the other, profound analysis

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does not support the view, that all former civilizations were but preparations or steps in the ladder culminating in our own, which therefore might be an exception to the general law and expected to survive. Professor Toynbee does not appear to give much weight to the consideration of the incalculable fragmentariness of our knowledge of history in relation to the lost knowledge of the past and the unknown of the future, but he recognizes it as a historian in so far as he never takes up a dogmatic position in the limitation of possibilities of the future. And when his voice is that of a philosopher, the principle of historic freedom appears on the horizon. By this I mean that in the words of the philosopher to whom he most frequently refers, M. Bergson, the "gates of the future are open." From this standpoint the essential is, as he very finely argues, that the spiritual principle of personality is the true source of civilization. The philosopher is not abandoning experience in affirming this truth, but he is viewing experience on its inner side as the subject who is akin to its deeper origins can view it. He may see therefore possibilities of novelty of which the historian cannot take account. The philosopher's experience, whilst it cannot contradict the historian's, may have a quality which suggests a deeper and more universal principle than the historian's "social law." This principle gaining strength in the contest with the last "challenge" of the human environment, the mechanical civilization may, before it is too late, create a "response" which will save civilization. It might be suggested, in conclusion, that Professor Toynbee's *animus* against some of the forms taken by the Western civilization seems to cause him to pass over certain signs of the reaction against these inspired by the personal principle, and to give insufficient recognition to its remarkable expressions in modern life.

ON ABSTRACT ART

IVAN W. BROOKS.

SINCE the death of Cézanne in 1906, there has been throughout the world of European art a general reawakening of a sense of the necessity for *constructive* qualities in painting. Whereas our fathers were content to speak of the "composition" of a picture, in our own day it is more usual to speak of its construction. Composition, after all, is a comparatively loose and elastic term implying a generally harmonious arrangement of the massed effect of light and dark, a juxtaposition of contrasting and balanced tones, sufficiently logical in their placing as to give a general sense of repose and unity to the work as a whole. Composition was generally understood to be dependent upon instinct and good taste on the part of the painter, and, as such, it was looked upon as a thing that could not be taught by rule of thumb. Like a sense of colour, a student either had it or he had not; and, beyond attempting to guard him from glaring error, there was little that a teacher of art could do for him in this department of his training. Perspective, which is governed by definite mathematical rules, could be taught in detail as an aid to composition, but the sense of composition itself must be allowed to develop in the student according to his talent for this side of his work. Composition classes were indeed a part of his curriculum, but the criticism which a student received at such classes amounted, in practice, to little more than general advice, given by the teacher, from his ripe experience and his developed sense of the right and wrong in this matter, to the unmaturing taste of the student. It was understood that composition could not exist without a general sense of order, but it was understood in a much looser sense than is implied by the comparatively modern use of the word "construction" that has replaced it. The artist of the modern school or schools of thought (for there is no one modern school) will have none of the old happy-go-lucky, loose thinking in the matter of construction. He has realized a need for architectural qualities in his work, and has gone so far as to seek a defined trigonometrical basis for the constructional side of it. The works of Poussin and of the painters of the Renaissance period have been analytically examined in the hope of discovering the secrets of perfect construction, and it has even been asserted that mathematical formulæ were preserved in certain studios of the past, as jealously guarded secrets, only imparted to the pupils at a certain period of their artistic initiation. Mr. Sava Popovitch, in a series of

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articles in the *Burlington Magazine*, made ingenious and complex mathematical analyses of certain works of the old masters, and the same writer has inferred a mathematical basis for the work of the ancient Chinese.

Cubism, and other movements in the regions of abstract or semi-representational art that have followed the era of Cézanne, is deeply concerned with the constructive question, with or without the co-operation of mathematics. Perspective and drawing (in the sense of drawing *ex vero*) are among the things that have been laid aside in order that a profounder and more satisfying sense of construction might be achieved. The painter has sought, not only a more architectural or logically constructed quality for his work, but also a profounder expression of truth, both by purposely distorted perspective and purposely distorted drawing. And in doing so he has not been without precedent. The absence of true perspective does not detract from the work of the Primitives, and among the masters of the late Renaissance so great a painter as El Greco knew well enough that academically accurate drawing would by no means always serve his purpose. But the question of a defined mathematical formula as a basis for construction in painting is still a matter of private speculation and theory, and the time has not yet arrived when instruction upon this point can be given in the schools. Construction, then, like "composition," is still dependent upon instinct. It is more self-conscious and insistent, however, than its predecessor, and from its insistence it has gained a certain strength, but for a foundation it must still build upon instinct rather than upon reason.

But the very fact of the artist's search for a rational, as opposed to an instinctive basis for the constructional side of his work, goes to prove in him the awakening of a quickened sense of the necessity for order in that work. For the attainment of an orderly arrangement, both in the things pertaining to the world of thought and to the things of the physical world, is an end towards which a great part of man's energy is constantly directed. In every walk of life this insistent desire for order appears; in the work of politicians and of policemen, of gardeners, grammarians, and tradesfolk; and of this natural inclination towards order is born the very artistic impulse itself. To man the created world presents a problem of infinite and incomprehensible variety. He is unable fully to grasp the sense of order underlying the whole. Consequently much that is, in reality, subject to the law of divine order will appear to him as disordered or chaotic. His comprehension will embrace only a partial recognition of the orderly arrangement of the physical world, but such fractional parts as he can appreciate he will take very particularly to himself. As a scientist, he will desire to classify these details; as an artist, he will seek to capture their rhythm. The artist in man will, in fact,

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desire to respond to as much of this physical expression of order as with his limited comprehension he has been able to grasp. By reason, of his free will he is able to exercise his power of selection, and out of what is apparently chaos he can respond to and record that which he has understood. Being made in the image of God, he can respond to God's thought.

The work which he produces becomes a symbol of the orderly beauty of the created world, a symbol which is limited in its nature and extent by his own temperament, by his own selection, and by his own power of response. His temperament may incline him towards the contemplation of trees and of landscape, and the orderly arrangement thereof; or, on the other hand, towards an appreciation of the mysterious order and harmony of the human head or of the human body, and out of these elements he will construct his symbol. But, in truth, the symbol which he is able to construct, in two dimensions or in three, is an emblem of the ordered reality of the whole created world in so far as he has been able to grasp it and to embody it in one work of art. A great artist, therefore, being a man of higher responsive intelligence than a mediocre artist, will produce a work that is not only nearer in likeness to the model, but more intimate in its response to the law of order governing the created world. It will be a better symbol of God's will and of God's creative power than his less gifted brother is able to produce. The better the artist, the truer the symbol. And from these data we are able to make our definition of a work of art as a symbol of God's creative will, a symbol brought about by man's response to the song of creation. In making a work of art, the image of God has responded to the creation of order. Man, in his turn, has defeated chaos.

In the representational art of the past, the principal sphere of the artist's intellectual activity has been in the perception of natural forms. The recording of that perception by means of the pencil or the chisel, difficult enough of itself, is nevertheless a secondary matter, and can, to a large extent, become a mechanical process between brain and hand. It is the use that he makes of perception itself that marks the artist. It is by the keenness of his perceptive sense that he is able to exercise his power of selection, and it is by his tireless, scrupulous, and insatiable quest for the very truth of a line or of a shade of colour that he has been able to produce great, as opposed to commonplace, work. The untrained or the unpractised eye does not see the lines of a piece of drapery or of a human profile as the artist does; and, in this sense, there is much truth in Blake's aphorism, "a fool sees not the same tree that a wise man sees." For this reason a great and sincere artist is frequently unrecognized in his own day and among his own people. His work, although it expresses truth in the essential and absolute sense, is perhaps unin-

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telligible to his contemporaries, simply because he has perceived more clearly than they have been able to do. Consequently his work will frequently appear to them as a distortion of truth; they are presented with a symbol which is of a new kind, and the natural inclination is to reject it. But it is here that the element of time enters into the matter, for after a certain lapse of time, men will become accustomed to this new aspect of essential truth of form or colour, and will acclaim the clear and original perception of its originator. It is probable, too, that he will have imitators who, by copying his mannerism, consciously or unconsciously, will tend to accustom the eyes of the public to the new symbolism which he has evolved. This was the case with the early Impressionists, with Whistler, and especially with Cézanne, who during his lifetime was not only unable to dispose of his work at any price, but was looked upon by his brother artists and by Zola, the friend of his boyhood, as a grotesque and incompetent painter. In the eyes of the general public he was little less than a madman. Yet in a few short years after his death, we find the works of this same Cézanne in every gallery of importance in Europe and America, and the least scrap of his painting or drawing eagerly sought for by those same collectors and dealers who, during his lifetime, would have none of him. Not only that, but so great has been his influence on subsequent painting that it is commonly said that there are very few students or artists living to-day who have not at some time, or to some extent, come under this influence. From a chance remark of his the whole Cubist movement is said to have taken its rise, though it is very doubtful if he himself would have appreciated the compliment of this implied fatherhood. Form, in its strictest and truest sense, the importance and emphasis of solidity, was his greatest concern, but he refused to allow colour to become subservient to it. He aimed indeed at presenting solidity *by means of* true colour, rather than by concentrating upon "light and shade" as painters had done in the past. He was deeply concerned with exploring the realms of shadow for the discovery of the colours secreted therein. So greatly did he value the concentration upon perception necessary to the art of painting that the least movement on the part of his sitter would exasperate and madden him. He painted a very large number of "still lives," since here at least his model could not fidget and sigh, but his apples and oranges would become mouldy and rotten long before he had gazed his fill on them.

Cézanne was no aesthete. He made no frontal attack upon Beauty for its own sake. His was the *impulsus ad similitudinem ex vero effigendam*, the passionate quest for recorded truth, both with regard to colour and to solidity. He sought eventually to impress his own acute and hard-driven sense of perception of natural form and colour

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upon a framework of the structural dignity attained by Poussin, "*à faire du Poussin sur nature.*" But this aspect of his genius (and it is by far the most important one) has been strangely neglected. There have been few among those that have followed him that have had the courage to attempt this heroic road. On the contrary, the name of Cézanne has been used to sponsor many a movement or group of the aesthetic or "Art for Art's sake" school, dependent for its momentum upon the *impulsus ad pingendum* pure and simple, the urge to paint for the sake of painting, to weave designs from the inner consciousness, to dot the canvas with a geometrical shape here and with half a fiddle there, or with half a human head wearing half a bowler hat, with scraps of newspaper and with the inevitable neo-Picassoesque guitar.

Such painting as this is less easy than that of Cézanne to reconcile with our original definition of a work of art; for we have defined a picture as a symbol of God's creative will, brought into being by man's antiphonal response to the song of creation. But in the type of work that we have indicated, it is chaos rather than ordered thought of which we are conscious; and this in spite of its studied "construction." For a work of art is more than a mere arrangement. It is a manifestation of an ordered reality in the mind of man, a statement by man concerning existing truth; furthermore, it is a public confession, made voluntarily, of the condition of the perceptive keenness of the painter. We may grant that the approximation to perfection in a picture will be dependent upon its approximation to essential truth, and that the degree of truth contained in a picture will be most easily perceptible to those that are most nearly akin in spirit to the painter himself. We may grant that the truth, presented to us by a painter of highly original mind, may not be at once perceptible to the many. We need not deny that the facets of divine truth are innumerable, nor that it has been wisely said that every great painter has concentrated upon but one of them, nor that this particular facet of truth has sometimes been presented in the past in a new and emphatic way, an *exaggerated* way, as it at first appears.

All this we may concede. But the abstract or non-representational painter, the weaver of designs from his inner consciousness, is starting his work from a different hypothesis to that of the great painters of the past. He discards the thought of the *similitudinem ex vero*, the extraction of the rhythm from existing, objective, physical truth, and puts in its place the projection of self, or, as it is commonly called, "self-expression." The truths expressed in the physical world (which are difficult enough of perception, for all their apparent obviousness) are for him insufficient and unsatisfying. It is his aim to preserve his art intact from a vulgar entanglement with matter, to elevate it to the sphere of abstract thought, and above all, to give

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out to the world an unsullied symbol of his own personality. He would be known, above all things, as a "creative" artist, the source and originator of newly created thought-forms, exclusive to himself. He is solicitous for the architectural qualities of his work, for he is essentially a "constructionist" and a man of order. He would take upon his shoulders, if not the physical and practical, at any rate the metaphysical and abstract labours of the architect, the mathematician and even the musical composer. All this he is prepared to embody in a two-dimensional work of painting, without so much as a passing glance at the physical phenomena around him. When he is at leisure to consider her, he perhaps expresses a love or even an admiration for Nature, but it is love of the kind bestowed upon an old and worn-out mare, no longer fit for breeding or for work, but given the run of a grassy paddock, where she may eke out her days in peace.

His desire for order in his work is not dependent upon the perception of order in created natural forms, and we should therefore seem to be justified in looking for its roots in the supernatural. Here it would seem that a logical union between art and religion must be hinted at if not actually achieved. But since the cultural disturbance of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, since the beginning of modern times, a definite parallel between art and the supernatural has not been easy to trace. While this essential and immemorial union has been lost to mind in a great part of Europe, religious thought and artistic thought have strayed apart into many by-ways and not a few blind alleys. The separation of art from religion has finally brought art, by way of Humanism and Classicism, Realism, Impressionism, and Post-Impressionism, into the realms of the abstract, suspended, as it were, in the ether, unsupported either by reference to nature or to religious thought. It is a curious and perhaps a healthy sign that, by means of abstract form, painting is seeking a realliance with architecture, although her method of doing so is open to question. Her strange wanderings since the Renaissance have been briefly and neatly indicated by Mr. R. D. Laxon (in a letter to *The Times* of May 23, 1933) commenting upon the views of a distinguished modern painter. "Mr. Paul Nash," he writes, "implies that 'architectonic quality' is a discovery of the 'new type of professional artist.' As the progenitor of all the visual arts architecture has, of course, handed on her qualities to her great family, of which painting has become the prodigal daughter.

"As the renaissance of painting spread westward through Europe, the easel picture, that *fille de joie*, was more and more divorced from her mother and sister arts, becoming at times a splendid courtesan as in the eighteenth century in France, but containing the seeds of decay, as anti-social things must, until in the nineteenth century

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she was such a homeless wanderer that her only hope of survival lay in rejoining her family. It seems, however, hard on her long-suffering parent and her family that now, when she is thinking of returning to the fold, she should come claiming to teach her sister arts precisely those family virtues which she profaned, but which they have never forgotten; and losing sight meanwhile of her own peculiar function of representation with emphasis and selection. Surely 'architectonic' is not a becoming word in the mouth of the fair penitent."

The abstract art of ultra-modern painters, starting as it does from a different hypothesis from that of the representational art of the past, is seeking a spiritual union with architecture, in which the original principles of architecture become integrated into the new painting itself. In this way it seeks eventually to subject the principles of the new architecture to those of the new painting. The modernist painter, by discarding his ancient function of representation, throws aside his old established method of achieving spiritual fellowship with his fellow-men. It is true that a form of sympathy can still be attained by the abstract painter among those who attempt to follow him into the strange regions where he snatches his designs from the ether; but *since his work is no longer based upon natural perception*, he has departed from the fundamental principles whereby a universal sympathy has been possible towards the art of the past. The painters who have come after Cézanne have not been faithful to the principles upon which his work was based. They have been content to discard the intimate visual contact with the natural order which he so passionately sought. The teaching of the last of the great masters has been misconstrued or falsified. No painter to-day attempts to *faire du Poussin sur nature* in the great-hearted manner envisaged by Cézanne.

Modern painters, as we have seen, have sought to achieve order in their work by means of concentrating upon the problem of construction. But their quest has led them into the regions of mathematical or abstract thought, and away from the contemplation of the physical universe. The modernist painter has looked upon Nature only to distort her, and to distort her beyond all reason. No longer a goddess, nor yet an acknowledged mother, she has become a subject for experimental contortion and for analytical dissection.

But even the brutal torsion of Nature is preferable to her utter abandonment. To make of art a thing of mental abstraction only is the last insult that can be offered to the created world. It is, moreover, the last stage upon the anti-sacramental and anti-liturgical road upon which European art set forth after the sixteenth century. From that time forth a "homeless wanderer," she sought protection in the houses of the great; but divorced, not only from architecture but from the high liturgical office that had once been hers, she

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inclined her ears to the whispers from the half-forgotten past, to the voices that had inspired her in her pre-Christian days. Pagan and Pantheist tendencies were soon to become apparent, but neither the Classical school of eighteenth-century France nor the Pantheist school of eighteenth-century England could be inexhaustible as a source of artistic fertility. It was inevitable that in her restlessness other influences should be brought to bear upon the forms in which her thought should be expressed. And it is here that we seem to find an echo of some of the ancient heresies, long since condemned, but still present upon earth, seeking, like art herself, a habitation and a form of expression.

Unless art is quite meaningless, and simply to be regarded as a luxury and a decoration, the forms that she takes to herself must be of some intellectual significance and must derive from some form of belief in ultimate things. If this is so, it is not from Pagan but rather from Manichaeism that modernist abstract art would seem to derive. The contempt and mistrust of the natural order is found in Calvinistic Puritanism as well as in abstract art. This contempt is the antithesis of the mental attitude of the early Catholic painters, Italian, French, or English, with their tender love for the natural forms of birds, beasts, and leaves. It is the antithesis of the sacramental system and the antithesis of the apostolate of St. Francis. And nineteenth-century scepticism towards the book of Genesis would seem to have inspired a school of art that has lost its faith in the fundamental doctrine of physical creation.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY.

IN the course of 1935 several books were published in Italy dealing with English philosophers. In this survey we shall take note of three of them, on Bacon, Hume, and Reid respectively. In the *Notice* prefixed to the first of these¹ we read that "the author's reason for publishing it is the lack of a complete and comprehensive biography of Bacon in his various aspects which would take into account the most recent studies of his life and thought. The author has sought in every way to realize the character of Bacon, even to seeking out the places which formed the scene of his life, in order to draw from them whatever inspiration they might give." However, after reading the book we do not think that the author has succeeded in his purpose. Rossi's essay does not make any really new contribution to Baconian studies that might modify any of the generally accepted judgments of modern criticism, nor does he succeed in giving us a synthetic, vivid, and effective view of the philosopher's personality. This latter defect results in great part from the fact that Rossi has confined himself to the examination of the more schematic and scholastic parts of Bacon's work (induction, the doctrine of forms, etc.), neglecting that rich harvest of pithy aphorisms, of evocative images, and of epigrammatic sentences, in which the genius of their author stands most fully revealed, and that explains the profound influence he exercised over his contemporaries and over posterity. Equally deficient, in a publication that lays claim to completeness, is the exploration of the contents of the Baconian works. The wide scientific panorama of the *De Augmentis*, so characteristic in its meticulous inventory of the sciences cultivated at the beginning of the seventeenth century and of those that were wanting, has been completely neglected. No mention is made of the *New Atlantis*, in which the new ideal of learning takes on a vivid semblance of real life, though the realism is transferred to Utopia. A bare mention in passing is given to the *Sylva Sylvarum*, the knowledge of which could throw much light on Bacon's confused and higgledy-piggledy manner of working, and on the strange hotch-potch of old and new that he heaps together. Finally, the bibliographical survey of modern literature is very insufficient; for example, there is no mention of the writings of Brochard and Cassirer, who have posited some of the most important problems of Baconian exegesis.

To confine ourselves to the more positive contents of Rossi's essay, the philosopher's life is narrated here with great wealth of detail—in fact it alone takes up nearly half the volume—and it helps to confirm that moderate opinion, midway between those that extol and those that denigrate his character, in which all historians are now agreed, that is that Bacon, both in public and in private life, was not endowed either with great virtues or with great vices, but was in every respect a man of his own time. He was somewhat servile with the powerful, venal in order to satisfy an inordinate need of magnificence and pomp, and not immune from those forms of corruption that customarily spring up under absolute governments. But the austere life of

¹ MARIO M. ROSSI: *Saggio su Francesco Bacon*. Napoli, Guida editore. 1935 (octavo, pp. 245).

his last years, after he had been driven from the political arena by a dishonouring condemnation, and the ardour of the scientific labours with which he was able to overcome his disgrace, redeem him in the judgment of posterity, as they redeemed him in the eyes of his contemporaries. In his examination into Bacon's doctrines likewise, Rossi's study confirms well-known interpretations and criticisms. A meagre appreciation of mathematics, a judicial and forensic, rather than scientific, conception of the methodical process of thought; excessive formalism in the articulation of the various stages of induction—such are the principal deficiencies of the *Novum Organum*. In the matter of induction, Rossi assigns particular importance to that stage that goes under the name of *vindemiatio prima*, which he identifies with what modern scientists call "working hypothesis" (p. 173). There is undoubtedly a noteworthy analogy between the two, but to speak of identity is perhaps exaggerated, because the *vindemiatio prima* is already an ascertained result and not a mere theoretical premise. And as for the goal of induction, Rossi denies that Bacon aimed at the discovery of the laws of natural events. Instead he "aimed at discovering something substantial and natural: not only the manner of happening of phenomena, but an entity, a reality concealed beneath the things and their properties, and causing them": that is, the form or forms of the real. This conclusion also seems to me excessive, because it tends to limit the value of the Baconian form to a sense which is too restricted, antiquated, and scholastic. On the other hand, Rossi recognizes elsewhere that the term "form" has at least three meanings—"a gnoseological concept (form as reality in opposition to nature as appearance); an ontological concept which depends on dynamism of the Heraclitean stamp, which, if not the only fundamental theory of Bacon (we remember his leanings towards atomism), is certainly one of the motives of his natural philosophy; and a metaphysical concept by which form is the inner law, the seminal reason of natural being of the Stoics." In our opinion this third meaning is the most valid one, but, even leaving the question undecided, its mere existence beside the others legitimizes a modern scientific interpretation of induction as a mental process having as its end the discovery of the laws of phenomena.

The second essay mentioned deals with the philosophy of Hume.¹ Its thesis is thus summed up by the author: "An examination of the doctrine of the *Treatise* and the *Inquiry*, and a comparison of them with ancient and modern scepticism, allow us to conclude that Hume was not a sceptic, not even a moderate or academic one. That is to say, there is in him a scepticism of the reason, but this is connected with his dogmatism of feeling, and is a functional and inseparable aspect of it (as, for instance, the anti-intellectualism of Bergson is an essential preliminary moment of his intuitionism). That this scepticism, or rather criticism, of the reason has, on account of the importance of its results, been isolated from the dogmatic system in which it is incorporated, and that it has become the pretext for designating Hume's system without further ado as sceptical, is understandable but not justifiable. The fact remains that Hume's doctrine is founded on truth, and precisely on the truth of the empiric, of sentiment, of intuition, as Hegel already suspected when he confronted Hume's scepticism with the scepticism of antiquity, which was far from considering sentiment or intuition as the source of truth, and, furthermore, it showed itself primarily hostile to the sensible. This dogmatism of the irrational likewise excludes any unilateral interpretation of Hume in a purely pragmatistic and biologicistic sense, according to the widespread traditional tendency of which K. Smith is the latest and most subtle

¹ G. DELLA VOLPE: *La filosofia dell'esperienza di D. Hume*. Firenze, Sansoni, 1935—1935 (2 vols. in octavo): I, pp. ix, 191; II, pp. viii, 206.

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exponent. The treatment of the problems has an essentially theoretical significance. Hume is the philosopher of the instinct, of natural beliefs, of common consciousness, in brief—of human nature" (I, pp. 188-9).

Such is the principal thesis of Della Volpe's long and elaborate study on the philosophy of Hume. And it is a substantially just and acceptable thesis, with some reservation, however, with regard to the too sharply drawn antithesis with which it is conceived, in comparison with the traditional view. Every sceptical negation always has in fact a positive counterpart which re-establishes the disturbed equilibrium of the life of the mind. In this aspect even the scepticism of antiquity differs only in degree from the scepticism of Hume, and from it likewise a positive philosophy of belief or "animal faith" can be drawn. As to Hume, the reintegration of this aspect of his thought presented itself as a particularly new and important task for the very fact that the Scottish philosopher has generally been studied as a preparatory stage in the philosophy of Kant, and in consequence he has had an inadequate and too restricted part in history. From the advent of positivism he began to be viewed in a wider perspective, when he was recognized as the progenitor of that movement of thought; and now Della Volpe's study takes up the same motive, developing it more amply so as to consider Hume as the founder of a philosophy of integral experience.

The revaluation of the positive elements is conducted by the author on parallel lines, along all the branches into which Hume's speculative activity divided itself. Thus in theoretical philosophy, the critique of the concept of cause is based on a synthetic view of the causal nexus, in antithesis to the analytical conception of Descartes, in which the effect is understood as identical with the cause and deducible from it analytically. On the contrary, Hume "has already a true intuition of the causal nexus: that it is an identity of the diverse, and, properly speaking, the unity of an empiric multiple. The capital examples of critiques (in the Kantian sense) against the causality of the rationalists are therefore to be found already in Hume. To the identity of cause and mathematical reason maintained by Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, Hume opposes the identity of cause and the empiric law; to the *causa-ratio* he opposes a type of legal cause" (I, p. 140).

Analogously, in moral philosophy the positive elements are focussed in feeling as the motor impulse of actions; in the philosophy of religion, the field having been cleared of speculative theism, philosophical criticism and religious consciousness remain in its place, clearly distinguished, "religious consciousness being rooted in the essential and universal properties of the human spirit as an awe-inspiring fantasy which unfolds in positive historical forms, from polytheism to popular theism" (II, p. 163). In this latter field the author's comparison of Hume's conception of religion with other views nearer to our own time, for instance that of Otto, is very suggestive. Indeed, there is in both the same tendency, not only to explain the fact of religious experience by immanent psychological reasons, but also to see these reasons in the awful sense of mystery with which the numen reveals himself to the consciousness of the believer.

In the third essay on Reid and the Scottish school¹ a philosophy which has been too much neglected is brought once more to light. Much esteemed and discussed in the eighteenth century, it flourished a second time a century ago through the agency of French eclecticism, which appropriated its method of psychological introspection and of eclectic reconciliation of the historical systems of philosophy, in the feeble light of the criterion of common sense. Nowadays it is forgotten and only recorded in the manuals as a fleeting and

¹ M. P. SCIACCA: *La filosofia di Tommaso Reid*. Napoli, Perelli. 1935 (octavo, pp. 247).

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secondary episode in the midst of the upheavals of the great speculative movements of the eighteenth century. However, to contact it once more through Sciacca's penetrating analysis is to gain the impression that the negative and almost contemptuous judgment that has condemned it to oblivion is far from just. Although formulated in a perhaps excessively simplified and condescending fashion, which weakens its effectiveness in part, it yet succeeds, even in opposition to the great systems of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in giving validity to certain profound exigencies, which have since been given a new lease of life, with a savour of novelty, by some philosophers of our own time, notably in England. Thus, whilst almost all the thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries posited ideas as the immediate object of the mind in perception, Reid was perhaps the only one to dispute this fallacious intermediary between the mind and its objects, which in his view renewed the age-old errors and futile multiplication of entities to which the forms and species of intention of the Scholastics had given rise. We perceive objects directly, not the ideas of objects: this was the impelling motive which drove Reid to attack the ideologues, and which was to assist in shaking their scepticism. Indeed, to posit ideas as the sole immediate object of the mind was to preclude the latter from all contact with the full reality of things and to entangle oneself within the circle of one's own fantasies. Reid's good sense did not overlook the fact that from Locke to Berkeley and Hume speculative thought had done nothing but apply the principle of ideas with ever-increasing rigour, that is to say it had cut away one by one all the bridges (substance, causality, etc.) thrown by common sense between the mind and reality. And he wished in consequence to retrace to some extent the path of philosophy, restoring what speculative subtlety had annulled. There was certainly some ingenueness in his pretension. That we perceive things immediately is sooner asserted than explained; if we ask how the qualities come to inhere in the objects, and how an immaterial spirit can take direct possession of a material reality, Reid is compelled to answer that this is a mystery. His faith in the reality of objects perceived is akin to that of the coalheaver. But this does not lessen the importance of at any rate the polemical part of his doctrine, which wages effective war against the "bifurcation of nature" into two separate and incommunicable kingdoms, to use the expression of an English philosopher of our own time, who has restated Reid's argument with great vigour. To this anti-ideological theme there is a corresponding one which completes it. The ideas having been removed, the problem remains: how is it possible to admit a reality outside ourselves, when our consciousness identifies itself with the immediate impression. Reid replies that, beyond sensation and perception, there is another faculty of the mind, an instinct, a suggestion, which causes us to believe in the existence of an external reality. It would have been interesting to examine whether, and up to what point, Reid was influenced by Hume in postulating this primitive and irrational force in the life of the mind, which was to receive ever widening recognition in the philosophies of the following ages until our own days (the "animal faith" of Santayana constitutes its latest expression). But Sciacca's interpretation does not seem to me correct when he makes an *a priori* element of consciousness in an almost Kantian signification; the *a priori* is an intellectual, logical value, which has nothing to do with instinct.

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO.

(Translated from the Italian by CONSTANCE M. ALLEN.)

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Value and Existence. By N. O. LOSSKY and JOHN S. MARSHALL. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1935. Pp. 223. Price 7s. 6d.)

Readers of *Philosophy* will probably remember Professor Lossky's article on "The Limits of Evolution" in the October number of 1927. The present book may be regarded as an application of the philosophical view, there stated in brief, to the problem of Value. This view itself is of great interest at the present time as a development of that which underlies the theology of the Greek Church and which is finding other forms of expression in such writers as Dean Inge and Dr. Temple among ourselves. It has the additional personal interest of being that on the ground of which Professor Lossky has been driven from his native country of Russia.

The first two chapters are devoted to a particularly well-informed and lucid criticism of current theories of the foundations of value. The author has little difficulty in dealing with psychological theories which trace the origin of the idea of value to subjective sources in pleasure, desire, or striving. Striving in all its forms presupposes sense of value and cannot be the source of it. Subtler, more objective theories, such as we have in G. E. Moore and Nicolai Hartmann, give him more trouble. His objection to them, as I understand him, is twofold: first the separation which they make between existence and value, as though "to be" was not in itself a value; and, secondly, the division they make between subject and object, as though there could be any value in things apart from a subject for which the value exists. Having thus cleared the way, he goes directly to a statement of the "Conditions that make Value possible." These are, in the first place, that there should exist substantial agents, relatively independent of one another, yet of such a nature that every one of them is "immanent to" every other, and is oriented to the fullest life that is possible to it within the limits of its finitude. ("That they may have life and have it more abundantly" is the motto of the book.) In the second place, that there should exist a Being or Absolute, in whom as the goal of all their striving this fullness actually dwells—in other words, in whom existence and perfection or value are one. Although he is prepared to show that these conditions hold throughout the universe from the electron up to man, Lossky confines himself mainly to the exposition of them as they are illustrated in beings like man who are endowed with the possibility of love and freedom, enabling them to apprehend absolute values and by realizing these in their behaviour realize also personality. Owing to the principle of the "immanence of all in all," such personality is impossible of achievement through isolation from nature and one's fellow-men, yet is something which, owing to freedom, is attained in different degree from the lowest to the highest. None is without the possibility of it; none under temporal and spatial conditions can ever attain it completely.

Ideas like these are familiar to us in our own idealistic writers, and one might have expected the authors to have illustrated them from this analogy. They prefer to go to Aristotle and the great medieval theologians from St. Augustine to Thomas Aquinas for confirmation. The reason, I think, is partly because they feel themselves more at home in the warmer religious atmosphere of these writers than in the colder stratosphere in which post-

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Kantian speculation habitually moves. But I think it is also partly because of a certain misunderstanding, on the part of both, of the meaning of that movement. We find Hegel accused in the Preface and on p. 200, along with Spinoza, of denying the element of transcendence in reality, Bradley and Bosanquet on p. 203 of "equating existence and value," in entire oblivion of the distinction between existence and "reality" on which the whole idealistic view is founded. Yet I should be the last to complain of the historical setting that is claimed for their doctrine. In spite of the expansion which British and American philosophy received by its alliance with Greek and German thought, I believe it has suffered from a certain insularity by failing to connect itself with the great medieval doctrine of the world as *totum, verum, pulchrum, bonum*, and I welcome the claim the book contains to find in the best thought of our own time only a continuation of that tradition.

I have left no space to follow the extremely interesting and instructive application of the central doctrine to the details of value theory contained in the later chapters; but I hope I have said enough to induce some readers to go to the book itself for further acquaintance with the kind of philosophy which Bolshevist Russia is seeking to crush to its own intellectual and spiritual impoverishment.

J. H. MUIRHEAD,

Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. Edited with an Introduction by NORMAN KEMP SMITH, D.Litt, LL.D., F.B.A. (London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. ix + 284. Price 10s. 6d.)

For any philosophy which starts from ordinary experience the only argument for the existence of God which can command interest or assent is the "argument from design." Hume's *Dialogues* are the classic discussion of this argument. The disputants are Demea, who stands for a narrow and orthodox religious position; Cleanthes, who is a sensible and thoughtful theist resting his belief on the argument from design; and Philo, a destructive sceptic. Pamphilus introduces the speakers and reports the discussion. The interest for philosophy and theology lies in the question whether the argument from design survives the attack, and for history in the question whether Cleanthes or Philo represent Hume himself. Pamphilus introduces Cleanthes as "accurate and philosophical" and Philo as a "careless sceptic," and at the end he awards the victory to Cleanthes. On this evidence, and on Hume's acceptance of theism in the *Natural History of Religion*, the great majority of commentators and historians of philosophy rest their conclusion that Cleanthes is Hume, and that the *Dialogues* therefore represent the triumph of moderate and reasonable theism over both extreme views. Professor Kemp Smith maintains in his introduction to this edition that the argument from design is completely destroyed by the sceptical attack on it and that Philo is Hume. In defending this position he shows again that happy combination of textual research, historical detective-work and philosophical insight, which on a larger scale marked his work on Kant. After a general discussion of Hume's religious upbringing and his general attitude to religion, he works out an analysis of the *Dialogues*, with comments of his own interspersed, which is as fascinating as the *Dialogues* themselves. He shows that the apparent supremacy of Cleanthes is a masterpiece of ingenious deception. Throughout the *Dialogues* his weaknesses are ruthlessly exposed and then as carefully concealed. Whenever he is in danger of exposure, Demea interrupts with a red herring to save him. He makes his strongest points by adopting arguments of Philo which,

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if carried through to a logical conclusion, would destroy his own position. In that position he remains firmly ensconced, meeting Philo's onslaught only by reiteration and an occasional change of metaphor or illustration which does not essentially alter his case and which Philo instantly exposes. The motives which led Hume to practice this brilliant deception on his readers are said to be two: The artistic one of bolstering up Cleanthes in order to give life to the dialogue form and the practical one of placating the zealots. In both aims he has succeeded superbly. In no other philosophical dialogues can anyone doubt where the author's sympathy lies. And his deception of the zealots has deceived the world. As for Hume himself, we can no longer picture his life as a transition from the scepticism of youth to the theism of maturity. The transition was a change not in his mind but in his manners, from the recklessness of youth to the *adresse* and caution of the man of the world. The commendation of Cleanthes which closes the *Dialogues* is the translation into Presbyterian language of the dedication of Descartes' *Meditations* to the Dean and Doctors of the Sorbonne. If Hume was wrong about the soul, he must have had much quiet enjoyment during the last two centuries in observing how successful his ingenuity had been, but after this edition there is no longer any reason why he should be given cause to chuckle.

J. D. MABBOTT.

Losing Religion to Find It. By ERICA LINDSAY. (London: J. M. Dent & Sons. 1935. Pp. xii + 270. Price 6s.)

I wish to recommend this book warmly to everyone who cares for the vitality either of philosophy or of religion. I cannot myself believe that either can be truly alive apart from the other. The divorce between religion and philosophy has been inevitable, no doubt; but it is none the less a scandal. Modern philosophy has received from science that freedom of thought which would rather be wrong with the available evidence than right by accident. It cannot run in harness with a religion which remains traditionally dogmatic. But the separation isolates it from a set of data which is crucial for its own success.

Mrs. Lindsay seeks to release religion from its dogmatic bondage, and to express its substance in a shape which philosophy can recognize, and by which it can be nourished. Hardly a paragraph in the book fails to convince the reader that it has been formed out of patient and direct observation. This in itself guarantees fresh insight. Yet such sincerity in the expression of religious experience is not uncommon. In this book, however, we have to deal not with an individual's awareness of her own subjectivity, but with a direct experience of objective spiritual constants which determine the structure of human life in society. Such an approach inevitably discovers the central problems of philosophy in their concrete human setting, where they are religious problems. They can then be illustrated, and not merely argued about. In its eagerness to achieve an efficient formulation of our central experience of reality, modern philosophy is apt to overlook the prior necessity of observing, in patient, concrete immediacy, what it is attempting to formulate. This, far more than any faults of logical analysis, is the source of the failure of our philosophy. Mrs. Lindsay's effort to remedy it makes this a constructive contribution both to philosophy and to religion where they are weakest; and brings them together at the point in which they meet.

Her success, in my judgment, is real but limited; and the limitation is one which might prevent a patient hearing in the quarters to which the book

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is most urgently directed. She has a sure recognition of the spiritual constants within the range of experience in which she is at home; and that range is fairly accurately defined by the romantic tradition of the age that is passing. The insurgent life of the new generation is in revolt against this tradition, and the forms which the spiritual constants take in their manifestation through it are antithetical to the older forms. The eternal values manifest themselves only through forms that change, and they can be recognized only from within. The external observation of a new form of life must fail to reveal them, and so produce the impression that its negation of their old forms is a sheer rejection of eternal Good. A person who has learned to recognize the constants of beauty within the range of expression of a Turner or a Constable finds it not easier, but more difficult, to see the same constants in the painting of a Picasso. The very sureness of intuition which enables Mrs. Lindsay to distinguish counterfeit from genuine value within the forms of life to which our society still belongs, makes it difficult for her to see and to discriminate the values in the forces which are destroying them.

I trust that those who feel with me in this will refuse to be blinded to the insight that is embodied in this book. We may believe that we shall have to lose religion more completely if we are to find it fully. But if we dismiss what Mrs. Lindsay offers us as unsuited to our sympathies, we shall lose something that we sorely need. The old manifestation of the eternal constants is not merely genuine; it is ripe and full. The new, too, may be genuine, but it is still harsh and crude.

JOHN MACMURRAY.

Plato's Theory of Knowledge. By F. M. CORNFORD. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1935. Pp. xiv + 336. Price 15s. net.)

There will be a warm welcome for this admirable book from all students of Plato and of the history of philosophical thought in general. It is a translation, with Introduction and Commentary, of two of the most important and difficult of Plato's dialogues, the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*. The method of exposition is unusual in published work, though it is precisely that generally followed by a teacher in expounding any particular text. That is to say, instead of having the dialogue summarized and discussed in an introduction and the detailed points of exposition relegated to footnotes and appendices, we have a passage translated and then an explanation or discussion of it following in the main text. The commentary on the *Theaetetus* probably occupies about as much space as the translation, and on the *Sophist* considerably more. The translation is, needless to say, scholarly and accurate, and what is more it is easy and pleasant to read. The commentary is admirably lucid, and the views on doubtful points always well balanced and judicious, though naturally no two scholars would agree on every question of interpretation.

I am not, however, altogether convinced that this method of exposition is the ideal one. At the least, I should have liked a general introduction to each dialogue, or to the two taken together in which the results of particular discussions were brought together and summarized and a general picture of the place of each dialogue in Plato's thought attempted. There is an introduction, but it is concerned with a historical sketch, which brings the situation up to the time of publication of the *Theaetetus*. It serves its purpose excellently, though I should personally hold that Professor Cornford greatly exaggerates the importance of the *Parmenides*. But it does not take the place of a general essay on the two dialogues.

Criticism of the work would have to take the form of a discussion of detailed

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points which would be out of place here. In general, I have found myself convinced by Professor Cornford's arguments, though there are still points which I find puzzling, and I should still disagree with him on certain historical questions. But his general statements on the purport of the two dialogues are admirable. In particular, he shows very judiciously why the Forms do not come into the main exposition of the *Theaetetus*, and how the *Sophist* sets out to answer the difficulties of the *Theaetetus* by the introduction of the Forms. I am very glad to see, by the way, that Professor Cornford will have none of the introduction of "propositions," in the Cambridge sense, into the interpretation of Plato, nor of the identification of Dialectic with Formal Logic, though I doubt whether Professor Taylor is really guilty of this latter confusion, in spite of some unfortunate phrases.

Altogether, one may confidently assert, whatever criticisms may be made in detail, that this book will be found a valuable, indeed an indispensable help to the interpretation of Plato.

G. C. FIELD.

- (1) *Septimana Spinozana. Acta Conventus oecumenici in memoriam Benedicti de Spinoza diei natalis trecentiesimi Hagae comitis habiti curis Societatis Spinozanae edita. (Hagae comitis apud Martinum Nijhoff, MCMXXXIII. Pp. xii + 321. Price 8 guilders net.)*
- (2) *Spinoza Festschrift. Herausgegeben von SIEGFRIED HESSING. (Heidelberg: Karl Winter. 1933. Pp. xviii + 224. Price GM. 10.)*
- (3) *Spinoza, the Man and His Thought. Addresses delivered at the Spinoza Tercentenary sponsored by the Philosophy Club of Chicago. Edited by EDWARD L. SCHaub. (Chicago: The Open Court Pub. Co. 1933. Pp. x + 61. Price 3s. 6d. net.)*

The tercentenary of Spinoza appears to have been celebrated far and wide, even in China and Japan. It would be interesting to have a complete bibliography of the extensive literature evoked by the occasion. There must be numerous papers which have not been collected in volume form. However, only the above-mentioned collections of addresses have reached the reviewer, and it may be of interest to Spinoza students to have an inventory of authors and subjects. Inevitably the contributions vary enormously in value. It would be quite easy to fill much space with criticisms of the interpretations given in some of the addresses, even if one passed over in silence the many praiseworthy things which they also contain. What is perhaps most interesting is the evidence of a widespread appreciation of the character and philosophy of Spinoza during recent decades. These collections of addresses, however, contain much more than that. They contain many happy suggestions for new lines of research, and may be recommended especially to students of philosophy who are inclined to do something in the history of the subject, and are waiting for hints as to suitable subjects for investigation. The mere enumeration of the titles of the various essays contained in the above volumes will show what a feast they spread for those who are interested in the philosophy of Spinoza.

(1) The *Septimana Spinozana* must occupy the place of honour among the collections of papers and addresses in honour of Spinoza's tercentenary. The representatives of many different nations and of many different schools of thought have contributed to its pages, and the volume is worthy of the great occasion. The volume opens with commemoration addresses by Leo Polak, Sir Frederick Pollock, and Léon Brunschvicg. These are followed by twenty-five essays on various aspects of Spinozism, and written in Dutch, English, French, German, and Italian. The Preface is written in Latin. The

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following is a list of the writers and their subjects: Carl Gebhardt: *Spinoza in unserer Zeit, Religio metaphysica, and Domus Spinozana*; Adolfo Ravà: *Il pensiero di Spinoza e i problemi dell' ora, and La pedagogia di Spinoza*; J. H. Carp: *De spinozistische Gemeenschapsgedachte*; Léon Brunschvicg: *Physique et Métaphysique*; J. Clay: *Physik und Metaphysik*; Gaston Bachelard: *Physique et Métaphysique*; S. von Dunin Borkowski: *Die Physik Spinozas*; George Santayana: *Ultimate Religion*; Ferdinand Sassen: *Wijsbegeerte en Godsdienst*; S. Alexander: *Spinoza and Philosophy of Religion*; Charles Appuhn: *Mysticisme et Humanisme*; Irwin Edman: *Poetic Insight and Religious Truth*; J. A. de Mattos Romão: *Philosophie et Religion*; J. Segond: *La philosophie du polisseur de verres*; Albert Rivaud: *Quelques remarques sur la notion d'essences dans les doctrines de Descartes et de Spinoza*; Ferdinand Tönnies: *Hobbes und Spinoza*; Julius Ebbinghaus: *Über den Grund der Beschränkung unserer Erkenntnis auf die Attribute des Denkens und der Ausdehnung bei Spinoza*; Pantaleo Carabellèse: *Il concetto spinoziano dell' errore*; Johannes Hoops: *Einflüsse Spinozas in der Literatur der Englischen Romantik*; I. Myslicki: *Spinozas Modell*; Leo Polak: *Spinoza und Kant*; H. F. Hallett: *Benedict Spinoza*.

(2) The *Spinoza-Festschrift*, though in German and published in Germany, is a tribute from Rumania. Many, though not all, of the contributions which it contains were written by Rumanian scholars, some of whom enjoy international fame. Many of the writers are Jewish *sarants*. The authors and their subjects are as follows: J. Brucar: *Spinoza und die Ewigkeit der Seele*; Martin Buber: *Spinoza und die chassidische Botschaft*; Fritz Droop: *Fünf Scenen aus dem Leben Spinozas*; S. Dubnow: *Die Gestalt*; C. Gebhardt: *Der gotische Jude*; Vasile Gherasim: *Die Bedeutung der Affektenlehre Spinozas*; Max Grünwald: *Der Lebensphilosoph Spinoza*; S. Hessing: *Die Glückseligkeit des freien Menschen*; J. Klatzkin: *Der Misverstandene*; J. Klausner: *Der jüdische Charakter der Lehre Spinozas*; Marc Marcianu: *Ein Bekenntnis*; I. Myslicki: *Spinoza und das Ideal des Menschen*; I. Niemirower: *Spinozaverehrung eines Nicht-spinozisten*; I. Petrovici: *Eine Spinozahuldigung*; Romain Rolland: *Der Lichtstrahl Spinozas*; K. Sass: *Vom grundlegenden Dualismus in Spinozas System*; N. Sokolow: *Der Jude Spinoza*; A. Zweig: *Der Schriftsteller Spinoza*. The volume concludes with three brief appreciations of Spinoza by Einstein, Freud, and Wassermann.

(3) The Chicago volume is much less ambitious than either of the preceding two volumes, but it does credit to the University of Chicago, with which the contributors are associated. It contains addresses by C. W. Morris and President Chase, and papers by the Editors of *The Monist* and *The International Journal of Ethics*. The former writes on *Spinoza, his Personality and his Doctrine of Perfection*; the latter writes on *Spinoza's Political and Moral Philosophy*. There is also a paper on *Spinoza and Religion* by S. B. Freehof.

A. WOLF.

God: A Cosmic Philosophy of Religion. By JOHN ELOF BOODIN, Professor of Philosophy, University of California at Los Angeles. (New York and London: The Macmillan Company. 1934. Pp. 240. Price 8s. 6d.)

"This volume," Professor Boodin tells us in his Foreword (p. 5), "gives the author's constructive effort to furnish an idealistic world-view in line with the progress of history and science." He "believes that it is consistent with the fundamental intuitions of Christianity, if not with its traditional theology." Protestant Christianity, indeed, "has," he thinks, "never had a theology of its own," is now "in a process of dissolution theologically," and "sometimes grasps at materialism, sugar-coated as emergence, sometimes

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falls back on a vague cosmic emotion, sometimes satisfies itself with a general humanitarianism, leaving God at most the rôle of Santa Claus." While acknowledging the greatness of the "official theologian" of the Catholic Church, St. Thomas Aquinas, he yet holds that "in the intellectual climate in which we live," there is "need of a fresh interpretation" of the synthesis which St. Thomas reached, and "in attempting such reinterpretation" he "has found the Platonic tradition in which early Christianity took form especially congenial."

No reader of Professor Boodin's book can fail to be impressed by the writer's profound sincerity, by his truly religious spirit, and by the genuine eloquence into which he sometimes rises. But the present reviewer at any rate has found himself at the end—it may be by his own fault—far from clear as to the precise nature of the "dualistic cosmology" which Professor Boodin puts forward.

It is easy to agree with him that "the God of religion cannot be conceived as merely the whole of things" (p. 22); that neither a speculative "Absolute," on the one hand, nor "a deity which emerges in the evolutionary process," on the other, is a satisfactory object of worship. "We recognise," as he says (p. 23), "a deity which is an active guiding factor in the process and through whose grace we can be saved."

He does not find such a deity in Professor Whitehead's "conceptual god," which "is supposed to furnish the principle of concretion in a multitudinous world of occasions." Yet his own notion of God reminds us in some important respects of Professor Whitehead's, for he is, if we understand Professor Boodin aright, the source of *form*, of whom it can be said (p. 179) in the language of poetry that he "breathed waves of form" into a "wild sea of chaos," which did not itself owe its origin to him. But Professor Boodin does not seem altogether content with the ultimate dualism with which he sometimes appears to leave us. It is indeed expressly affirmed (p. 187) that "the cosmic tragedy," "the failure of creation," is not "a limitation in the creative Spirit, but in the material with which the Spirit works." This is a hard saying; for does not such an intractable material constitute a limitation for the Spirit whose action it restricts? When, however, it is added (p. 188) that "God creates in order to save," and that "in a real sense there is never complete chaos" (p. 207), since Spirit, which "exists eternally in its own right," is "ever present in the cosmos," the "orderly process" of which the so-called "chaos" "is only chaos when viewed without reference to time"—in abstraction, that is from a temporal process in which it "sets the stage for the future drama"—we surely find ourselves presented with a view which has a very doubtful claim to be called a "dualism" at all.

What Professor Boodin has, I think, really at heart is to combat a tendency which he (like Dr. Schweitzer in his recent Hibbert Lectures) discovers in modern idealism from Hegel onwards to "justify the order that is" (p. 19), and so to abandon to its materialistic critics the task of presenting a programme of reform which is, in his opinion, the proper business of idealistic philosophy. A good deal of evidence might be alleged to show that this tendency is far from being characteristic of all idealism of what may be called the Hegelian type; yet it cannot be denied that there is some ground for asserting that, when it is found there, its association with that school of thought is not merely accidental. Professor Boodin would counter the tendency in question by insisting upon a factor in reality which he sometimes, as we have seen, describes in terms suggestive of a "matter" wholly alien to the Spirit which is ever seeking it to mould it to its own purposes. But sometimes he speaks of this factor otherwise—as the *individual*.

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"The individual," we are told, "has a say in the comedies and tragedies enacted in the cosmos, whether the individuals be electrons or human beings or stars" (p. 85). "Throughout nature, from matter to spirit, the individual retains the power of initiative and choice, therefore, to paraphrase Plato, God is justified and the individual is responsible" (p. 94); and again, "throughout the scale of nature there is this dualism of predictable structure and a certain individual indeterminacy" (p. 127). The world in which we find ourselves is thus "dualistic" and "we are not called upon as philosophers to create the world, but to try to understand it." Professor Boodin does not identify the indeterminacy which is thus the material of God's shaping activity with freedom. On the contrary, indeterminacy and freedom "are really opposed concepts" (p. 154). "Both, it is true, imply spontaneity as contrasted with routine. But freedom in the true sense means the capacity and will to determine one's conduct with reference to structure" and of "structure" God is the source. Unlike M. Gilson in his Gifford Lectures and Mr. M. B. Foster in his recent articles in *Mind*, Professor Boodin holds that we must rid "the scholastic tradition of its *a priori* excrescence of creation out of nothing" (p. 145). "God is present everywhere and always, as creative spirit giving form to our world." The need of redemption, which is so prominent a feature in the religion with which the belief in "creation out of nothing" has been generally associated, arises, according to our author, from the presence—not, as we have seen, of *freedom*, properly so called, but of *indeterminacy* in the matter of the world. Yet—and it is here that we feel Professor Boodin to be in the last resort less "dualistic" than he is prepared to profess himself—this "indeterminate" matter is an essential element in the eternal purpose of God. "In a large way the play goes on, one cosmic epoch preparing the stage for another, whatever may be the tragedy of individual performers. Yet the master of the show may care more for the individual actors than for the immensity and scenery of the stage" (p. 160). The plot must be to produce "free creators." "God," we read (p. 163), "is transcendent in that He exists in His own essence, always and everywhere. He is not an integration of finite parts, but enjoys a life of His own of absolute perfection. But God is immanent in that He is present to and in all finite individuals to guide, to heal, to transform into beauty, so far as the individual permits. . . . Salvation means that the finite individual may eventually become so transformed as to incarnate the intention of God in itself and thus become immortal through the love of God, though such support can be reached only prospectively under our finite limitations." This passage seems to sum up Professor Boodin's theology. We may agree with him when he goes on to say that "when we have reached the limits of our little knowledge we must confess in awe with the ancient poet: 'Clouds and darkness are round about Him.'"

No one who has meditated on these great subjects will think lightly of the difficulties which have induced Professor Boodin to abandon the conception of a creation *ex nihilo*. Yet one may doubt if this abandonment does not really result in a doctrine of God which falls short of that implied in that sense of absolute dependence which (as Schleiermacher taught) lies at the heart of the religious experience, and which finds an expression in the words "It is He that hath made us, and not we ourselves."

Why does Professor Boodin say (p. 203), speaking of the truth that "the true mystery of the cross is that love is victorious through suffering," "This is the eternal *but forgotten* truth of Christianity"? (the italics are mine). It is the more surprising that he should write thus, as he goes on in his concluding chapter, on "Divine Laughter," to attack St. Paul for his success in interpreting a "religion of joy" into a "religion of sin and expiation." Many will

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agree with him that Christianity has in the past laid a disproportionate emphasis on the aspect of man's earthly life as a "vale of tears"; but he himself is inclined, I cannot but think, to minimize unduly the importance of that sense of sin whereof this melancholy outlook is the one-sided expression.

Why, by the way, is the name of God described (p. 22) as "charged with the racial aspiration of all *Aryan* history"? If the word "God" is meant, not all "Aryan" languages use it; if "God" stands here for all words with the same meaning, surely others than "Aryans" aspire after such a Being as we call "God." Indeed, one does not (outside of Germany) expect to hear nowadays of an *Aryan race*.

On p. 120 it is assumed that the "man" who is made the centre of the world by Kant and by Protagoras is in both cases the *individual* man; but of Kant this is surely not true. And does Hegel mean (as Professor Boodin intimates on p. 57), in the famous simile of the owl of Minerva, to suggest that it has taken its flight before philosophers arrive on the scene? Is not the wise bird's flight rather a metaphor for that very arrival? What has already happened is that the shades of evening have begun to fall upon some phase of historical life which is drawing to its close.

Professor Boodin's choice of words to describe the distinguished person to whom his book is dedicated—"an inspiring and constructive leader in liberal religious thought"—indicate his own ideals and the qualities which are exhibited in his work.

C. C. J. WEBB.

Art and Morality. By O. DE SELINCOURT. (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1935. Pp. ix + 284. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

Mr. de Selincourt endeavours in his book to show that the spheres of Art and of Morality are distinct and yet intimately related, both with one another and with the other values. He begins by revealing, without much difficulty, the inadequacy of the Platonic or Tolstoian view that art is subject to moral standards (a view assumed in current controversies about censorship). He points out, *inter alia*, that art is subject to aesthetic standards only, that moral questions arise only in relation to some arts, that art is not, any more than knowledge and religion, "selfish"; that, positively, art is approved as "good"; and that morality itself has some aesthetic value.

He follows this up by two important chapters on emotion and meaning, on the liberating effects of art, and on the "revelation" which it is alleged that art gives. Assuming, with Croce, that emotion is a material for artistic form, and denying the "aesthetic emotion" hypothesis, he points out that the emotions of everyday life are the material for art, these being transformed in the work by something "happening" to them, in which they become detached and "general." Meaning, again, is primarily non-aesthetic, but is, likewise, transmuted by form: the final expressed meaning is aesthetic, but the "subject" is not. The expression is a liberation, not merely in the Aristotelian sense (which is examined critically) of elimination, but by helping us to know our emotions through the imposition of form on them. They are not ejected or repressed, but related to our whole experience, and we become released. So the arts (and this is true not only of literature) *reveal*, not didactic truth, or Absolute Spirit, or anything of that sort, but, in a combination of thought and emotion, an attitude of mind which gives insight into our place in the world. Art can reveal something not unlike truth, but it is contact with a part of reality, namely personality.

Morality is now distinguished from the personal intercourse with which it

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is sometimes confused, and which, along with art and science, forms in a sense morality's material. But morality, strictly speaking, "has no processes of its own." It is not even a "good" (neither is religion), and the value of morality is utterly dependent on the intrinsic non-moral values of art, science, and personal intercourse. This being so, the real conflict arises, not between art and morality, as if they were two things of the same kind on the same level, but between art and the other intrinsically valuable activities of contemplation.

Such a view, the author holds, in no way "degrades" morality, and he defends his thesis against those who believe in "morality for morality's sake," against deontologists; as also against utilitarian views of morality as "production." The concluding chapters contain useful comments on the problem of Good, of the definability of Good, of its nature as what is ordered, coherent and rational; and on the interrelations of goods.

I have found Mr. de Selincourt's book in many ways suggestive, but on the whole not markedly illuminating. I may be unduly prejudiced by the fact that the style and manner of approach seem to me to be involved, disfigured by too long paragraphs and by the irritating habit of doing certain phrases to death. (I counted phrases like "Nor would it be difficult . . ." till I got tired.) And Mr. de Selincourt is so anxious that what he is *going* to say shall not be thought incompatible with what he *has* said, that the reader has often to search hard for what *is* being said. I wished often that he would be more direct, more crisp, more clear.

And although I am in agreement with some of his main conclusions, I found much to question too. Of course emotional states of mind are involved in the production and appreciation of art, and are in some sense embodied in the work. But what *are* "emotions," and why do so many people assume, so easily and without analysis, that art is the expression of them? And is autognosis one of the chief functions of art? And *is* the meaning which is "revealed" chiefly an attitude of mind, the self of the artist? I am not quite clear what Mr. de Selincourt's view of "revelation" really is, and the problem is indeed a difficult one; but it needs more thorough treatment than Mr. de Selincourt gives it. The notion of "imposing" form on material, again, needs a further analysis of matter and form. As for morality, whilst it is certainly not a good apart from other goods, it seems to me false to think that a good man is a man who simply regulates well the (non-moral) "goods" of man's life. Does he not possess a "spirit" over and above these which may make of their goodness a new thing? May not morality be more like than unlike art in its transforming relation to its "material"? And if it is true that morality transcends other goods, religion seems to do so more still. To say (p. 191) that religion is not separate, but penetrates all experiences, is exactly half true.

LOUIS ARNAUD REID.

The Life and Writings of Giambattista Vico. By H. P. ADAMS. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1935. Pp. 236. Price 8s. 6d.)

The author deserves almost as much congratulation for realizing that an English book on Vico was overdue as for the very unusual excellence of the book he has supplied. For Vico has been much neglected in this country. Hitherto the only monograph has been R. Flint's in *Blackwood's Philosophical Classics* (1884 reprinted 1901). There are restricted essays in J. G. Robertson's *Studies in the Genesis of Romantic Theory* (1923) and C. E. Vaughan's *Studies in the History of Political Philosophy* (1925), and T. Whittaker con-

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tributed three articles to *Mind* in 1926 (reprinted in his *Reason*, 1934). To these I can only add the English translation of Croce's *Filosofia di G. B. Vico*. However, we have been only slightly more negligent than Germany, and even in Italy Vico did not come into his own until the nineteenth century. Nowadays the Italians make him their chief philosopher, and the new idealism there may with much truth be characterized as a synthesis of Hegel and Vico.

Mr. Adams tells admirably the story, outwardly meagre, of the poor Neapolitan professor of rhetoric who had to eke out his stipend by private coaching and by composing complimentary Latin verses for the worldly great, and who sold his diamond-set ring, probably the only valuable he possessed, to cover the cost of the printing of his masterpiece. By this masterpiece only, the *Scienza Nuova* (1725), did he wish to be known, and the eventual achievement of it was one of the few consolations of his depressed career. Why he was denied promotion to a more important chair (the stipend of his own was a sixth of that of the chair of jurisprudence) and, until shortly before his death, some sinecure with emoluments, is not clear; Mr. Adams shows that in his own city, and in Venice, too, his large talent was admitted and appreciated. Vico's life was the struggle of an impecunious, self-educated, and ailing man to compass, with a prodigy of effort and stamina and intelligence, the whole field of knowledge and subdue it to the order and light of a philosophy. In depicting this inner drama the biographer has been preceded and enabled by the autobiographer. The *Vita di Giambattista Vico*, written in the third person, was at once pronounced to be a model and is still among the most remarkable of its kind. Mr. Adams has used it well. I wish that he had also appended it in translation; though a little long for an appendix, it would not, I imagine, sell separately, yet it ought to be made available.

The book is essentially a biography and therefore takes up each of Vico's many writings in its temporal place in the life-story. For a systematic presentation of Vico's thought the student must turn to Flint or Croce. Although Vico's interests and works embrace a multiplicity of fields which are now divided among specialists, Mr. Adams discusses them all with understanding and learning. By profession an historian, he writes with authority on Vico's historical interests, and on the people and happenings of the Naples of that day, though he never allows Vico, the inner Vico, to disappear or dwindle in a wilful picture of the *milieu*. It is a long time since I came across a new book in which such varied learning is handled with such restraint, sense of proportion, and modesty. Whether the subject be the authorship of the Homeric poems, the origin of language, poetry and religion, the evolution of law in a developing society, or the content and affinities of Vico's philosophy, it is treated with relevant knowledge. His exposition of Vico's theory of poetry, for example, is a paragon of sympathetic and lucid compression. His account of the philosophy is, so far as I am able to judge, very just in general—a Neoplatonism enriched with a scrupulous curiosity and respect for historical fact, seeking in history both the *rationale* and the mental faculties through which this *rationale* moves towards realization; a philosophy reacting in the spirit of Plato and of Bacon (one of Vico's heroes), the one prescribing metaphysical system, the other inductive conscience, but both encyclopaedic and humanistic, against the dominant Cartesian emphasis on the physical world and on the dry light of reason as the only lamp of knowledge. Only when he comes to a comparative philosophical estimate does Mr. Adams lay himself open to question by philosophical specialists. For instance, Vico's doctrine that we know only what we make does not constitute him a precursor of Kant: that mathematical entities are fictions and are perfectly known because they are fictions is much older than Vico, is not distinctive of Kant,

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and in Kant results from a different stimulus and procedure and rests on a subtler and deeper ground—and it is the ground that makes Kant Kant. Mr. Adams accepts whole-heartedly the current Italian estimate of Vico, as he has every right to do, but I wish he had had space to try to vindicate its validity outside the context of nationalist sentiment in which it has grown up. The wish, however, may be unfair, since such a task would involve comparisons too closely and technically argued to be in place in a general biography.

Books of this kind, learned but well-proportioned, brief, and really filling a gap, are all too rare nowadays. So also is the distinguished style of Mr. Adams's writing, the quiet and pregnant style of a mature mind too sensitive to use devices and too gifted to need them. It has been a high pleasure to read his pages.

T. E. JESSOP.

Civilization and the Growth of the Law. By W. A. ROBSON, Ph.D., LL.M.
(London: Macmillan & Co. 1935. Pp. xv + 354. Price 12s. 6d.)

Like all the work which comes from the pen of Dr. Robson, this book possesses a creative assurance which is peculiarly grateful in a field of study much liable to aridity of treatment. The author has set out, to use his own words, "to show how legal and political institutions have been influenced by magic, superstition, religion and science." With this object in view, he proceeds first to consider the origins of law. "However far back we go into the twilight of history, there is always some form of law in existence." The code of Hammurabi of Babylon, two thousand years B.C., is already a mature one, restricting vengeance and providing that wrong be redressed by law.

If indeed, as Dr. Robson says, without law men cannot live together, it would seem that the rudiments of law are to be found in all societies, however primitive. The ruler is always associated with the administration of justice and the notion of the divinity of the ruler, which survives in the modern constitution of Japan and is implicit in so much tradition, indicates the close association of the lawgiver and expounder with assumed supernatural authority. From the case of isolated decrees received from a Divine Agent, law develops into a general code of rules, but, nevertheless, the opinion that such rules reflect a superhuman origin is maintained. The mosaic precepts and the assumption by the ancients of Apollo and Jupiter to be the real lawgivers rests upon this superstition. The digest of Justinian approves the speech of Demosthenes that law is devised and governed by God, and when it is recognized that laws are not directly God-given, yet they come from human beings upon whom God has conferred secular authority. Such a view, says Dr. Robson, is expressed in St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans. Divine revelation and human necessities form the double foundation of early Roman Law, and of course Jewish Law is even more definitely theological.

The notion of Divine Justice develops later, but as distinguished from arbitrary ordinance as an ideal of abstract perfection, it is implicit in mediaeval legislation, becoming concrete in such criminal jurisdiction as ordeal by battle or by fire.

With the progress of human thought, says the author, the idea had developed that Divine Will is identical with perfect Justice, and once it was believed that Justice was an inherent attribute of the heavenly power, the business of establishing it became a task to which man could address himself without misgiving.

Dr. Robson sets out in the second part of his book to explain how the

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framework of ideas of any particular society concerning the constitution of the universe affect their legal conceptions. In mediaeval eyes the world was a single organism, an incarnation under the sovereign rule of God, but, side by side with this belief was the Aristotelian notion of the law of nature as the guiding principle of the universe. It is indeed in contrast to the religious outlook, a pantheistic idea making the universe itself the immanent Deity, and excluding His transcendence.

Under scholastic influence, particularly that of St. Thomas Aquinas, these two notions of the natural and the divine law were temporarily reconciled, but with the loss of the full Catholic philosophy, views more or less pantheistic, become dominant. To Spinoza, nature is God; and from a law of nature it was not difficult to extract a municipal law for each growing nationality, a juridical conception so characteristic of society after the breakdown of the unity of Christendom. Thus the universality of justice and law both divine and natural was in danger of being lost, and the notion of the sovereign state tends to take its place.

This book assists the reader to realize all the legal consequences which followed upon the decay of the notion of universal justice. Relativity in ethics as in science react upon juristic conceptions and international law becomes a thing of shreds and patches. Dr. Robson does not point out the final consummation of this development, which some now assert has ended in the virtual disappearance of law in a large part of Europe, so that in so many places to-day it may be sadly said there is no certainty of tenure either for property or for life, and no philosophy of general jurisprudence to help to regain it.

May it be that the decay of process ultimate supernatural sanctions which Dr. Robson appears to regard without disquiet, is the ultimate cause of the present collapse of law and legal institutions over so vast an area, and may it not be possible that post-mediaeval development, so far from being a progress in the civilization of man, is indeed a reaction to a more savage and irrational state.

The final impression derived from this book is that until recently man has not tried the experiment of conducting his affairs without some system of law or custom. This conclusion may be considered alongside the statement of Mr. Lippman, the American publicist, that until recently man has never attempted to live without some religion.

HENRY SLESSER.

An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method. By MORRIS R. COHEN and ERNEST NAGEL. (London: G. Routledge & Sons. 1934. Pp. xii + 467. Price 15s. net.)

It is a curious fact that whilst the progress of Logic is in the direction of increasing rigour, increasing generality, and increasing system, the best contemporary expositions leave us with a certain impression of disorder. To visualize the matter the procedure is as follows. The contemporary logician sets to work by excavating and restoring some very venerable foundations. There follows the erection of some scaffolding, and through this scaffolding one begins to see the severe but elegant outlines of a very modern building. But before this structure is complete something curious happens. Work commences on a strange and incongruous wing. This is apt to grow and spread and encircle the principal structure with rambling excrescences until the whole assumes a form combining the features of a power station with those of a Victorian Gothic mansion. In point of fact it is a temple constructed to the

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honour of Aristotle, Frege, and John Stuart Mill. In fairness it must be stated that for its peculiarities its architects are in no way to blame. The construction serves its purpose in so far as it reflects the state of contemporary logical studies, and more particularly contemporary examination needs. It is the best that can be done in the face of an extremely difficult problem.

For some considerable time prior to the current thirties it was the monotonous refrain of teachers of the subject that there existed no adequate introduction to contemporary logic. Logical studies were in transition, and no one seems prepared to assume responsibility for a premature crystallization in textbook form of doctrines still in process of development. Moreover, even a very provisional formulation would not be easy to present. But the attempt could not be indefinitely postponed. In 1930 there appeared Stebbing's pioneer work, *A Modern Introduction to Logic*. This was soon followed by Eaton's *General Logic*, which was followed in turn by the present reviewer's *Principles of Logic*. And now we have *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method* from the joint pens of Morris Cohen and Ernest Nagel.

Obviously, the present writer is not the appropriate person to attempt any estimate of the relative merits of these works for the purposes for which they are intended. He is, however, sufficiently well placed to appreciate the significance of some of the features which represent alternative solutions to a common predicament.

The predicament was this. The "crying need" was for an exposition which should be (i) reasonably up to date, (ii) reasonably comprehensive, (iii) reasonably simple, and (iv) reasonably brief. The saving adjective here is "reasonably," since without it there is little doubt that these authors would have been committed to attempting the impossible.

From internal evidence it is clear that on the general questions of content and on the general lines of reconstruction these several independent writers find themselves enjoying a rather remarkable measure of agreement. They agree, first of all, that the point of departure must be the traditional Aristotelian system, and that of this a considerable body of doctrine must be preserved. They agree further that the main lines of reconstruction are those presented by the generalized theory of deduction as exhibited in *Principia Mathematica*. They appear to agree, moreover, that rather radical "reconditioning" is required in the theory of induction, though the form such reconditioning should assume is a matter on which they display their greatest independent variety. The most extreme divergence is that between the exposition of Eaton's *General Logic* and that which is offered in the present volume. In the former the bias is in the direction of simplification and exclusion, whilst in the latter the problems of induction occupy the larger half of the volume.

The work opens with a lively introductory chapter on *The Subject Matter of Logic*. Thereafter the exposition is divided into two books—a smaller Book I: *Formal Logic*, and a larger Book II: *Applied Logic and Scientific Method*.

Book I commences with a lucid and simple exposition of some of the principal current notions relevant to the analysis and classification of propositions, and of the relations between propositions (Chs. III and IV). Then follows, in two chapters, a straightforward and conventional (as it should be) exposition of the doctrine of the syllogism and its elaborations. Chapter VI contains an introductory treatment of *Generalized or Mathematical Logic*, and Chapter VII a rather more advanced but very interestingly presented discussion of *The Nature of a Logical or Mathematical System*. Chapter VIII introduces *Probable Inference*, and in this one form of the frequency theory

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is defended. The concluding chapter of Book I, *Some Problems of Logic*, is somewhat of the nature of a collection of odds and ends—the Paradox of Inference, the charge of *petitio principii* against the syllogism, the Laws of Thought, and the basis of logical principles in the nature of things.

Book II is the Victorian mansion lavishly furnished and full of interesting nooks and corners, but in which it is a little difficult to find one's way about and preserve a sense of direction. With few preliminaries a good start is made by a discussion of the rôle of hypotheses in science (Ch. XII). Progress is arrested, however, by a chapter not so much irrelevant as disproportionate for its context on *Classification and Definition* (Ch. XIII). We move forward again at a brisker rate in a reasonably detailed but not too detailed chapter on *The Methods of Experimental Inquiry* (Ch. XIII).

In Chapter XIV something of a nature of fresh start is made in raising the question: What is inductive reasoning? This chapter introduces the problem of sampling and of reasoning from analysis. Then follows a chapter on *Measurement* and a chapter on *Statistical Methods*. At this point the authors might with advantage, perhaps, have proceeded direct to the concluding chapter of their book, but this is delayed by the intervention of discussions on *Probable Inference in History and Allied Inquiries*, on *Logic and Critical Evaluation*, and a chapter on *Fallacies*. To what extent discussions of the applications of logic to specialized branches of science should find a place in a general introduction to the subject is a matter on which there can be reasonable difference of opinion, but it is difficult to see why the historical sciences should be selected for special consideration, and still more difficult to justify excursions into the sphere of morals and aesthetics. The trouble is that such topics cannot be treated to advantage without considerable preliminary expositions wholly inappropriate to a general textbook of logic. The difficulty serves to draw attention to a really serious gap in logical literature. What is needed is a whole series of works on the applications of the science, on mathematical logic, on the logic of the physical sciences, on the logical problems of psychology, of sociology, and so forth. The lack of adequate literature of this kind has reacted unfavourably on the balance of many otherwise orderly expositions of general theory. This is not the place in which to open a discussion of the details of logical doctrine contained in this work. Contemporary logicians are not unanimous, and on the controversial issues the authors are entitled to their opinions, which are always clearly presented and defended.

They have produced a work which should contribute much to a revival of a general interest in logic. To a greater extent than in any other work with which the reviewer is acquainted, a fair balance is struck between the interests of the university student and the interests of the general reader—to both of whom the work should serve to communicate its authors' appreciation of "the realistic formalism of Aristotle, the scientific penetration of Pierce, the pedagogical soundness of Dewey, and the mathematical rigour of Russell."

C. A. MACE.

The Origins of Religion. By RATA. V. KARSTEN, Ph.D. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1935. Pp. vii + 328. Price 12s. 6d.)

This book might almost be described as the protest of a consistent animist against the heresy of "pre animism"; for the subject crops up on every other page. My difficulty as a reviewer is that I am myself credited with the origination of the heresy in question, and so have to bear the brunt of a good many of the author's strictures. I would plead in self-defence that a short

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paper read before the British Association in 1899 and published in *Folklore* in the following year does not represent the last word that I have said on the subject; having, for instance, devoted no less than three volumes to it within the last three years. I cannot but hope, then, that some day—say, about 1970—one of my brother-anthropologists may happen to read one or another of these latter-day efforts of mine, and will thereupon discover that my views have undergone a certain development in the course of the twentieth century. In fact, Professor Karsten's criticisms make me suspect that he takes me for one of his ghosts who has long given up all interest in living and growing.

Having spent some six years among the Indians of South America, Professor Karsten has come to be recognized as not only a first-hand but a first-rate authority on the institutions and beliefs of this part of the world; and, if he finds that animism will suffice to explain their religion, I for one would not venture to question his opinion. But outside his special province he has, like the rest of us, to deal with second-hand evidence; and even as near as North America he has to explain away notions of the *orenda* and *manitu* type to which others more familiar with that religion have certainly given a pre-animistic sense. In any case, moreover, he professes to expound the "origins" of religion, and to analyse the workings of the "primitive" mind—nothing that he is likely to have met with in his travels. Now I think it a pity that we anthropologists are not more ready to acknowledge the speculative nature of our attempts to reconstruct the beginnings of culture, even if we go no further back than a generalized savage composed partly of authentic prehistoric remains and partly of presumed ethnological survivals. I should, indeed, feel more respect for Professor Karsten's animism if he were not so dogmatic about it. As it is, he stands somewhat alone, since in taking over animism from Tylor he convicts the latter of intellectualistic leanings; while, although a follower of Westernmark, he is shocked to find him pre-animistically inclined in the matter of animal worship. If only, then, he would insert the word "perhaps" a hundred times in the pages of an excellent book which I have read with great profit to myself, and, I admit, with not a few heart-searchings, all would be well. My immediate object, as I explained at the time when first formulating the notion of a pre-animistic form of religion, was to provide a provisional heading under which could be classified a number of facts hitherto more or less neglected. Perhaps it has served this purpose all too well, so that animism has been robbed of some part of its legitimate heritage; in which case Professor Karsten's work ought to go far towards readjusting the balance. But that Man could not feel awe, and act upon it, in regard to objects of outstanding interest until he had discovered a soul in himself, and could impute it as such to the objects in question, is a contention at once very sweeping and very difficult to prove.

R. R. MARETT.

Aesthetic and Psychology. By CHARLES MAURON. Translated from the French by Roger Fry and Katherine John. (London: Hogarth Press. 1935. Pp. 110. Price 4s. 6d.)

This translation was planned and begun by Roger Fry before his death. He had a great admiration for M. Mauron's work, and if, as we seem justified in supposing, he found himself in substantial agreement with the development of his own view of the function of art which we have here, the book, small though it be, is of importance in any attempt to estimate his contribution to aesthetic philosophy. True, M. Mauron makes no claim to speak

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as a philosopher. In the first sentences he disowns the metaphysical attempt to find a standard of aesthetic values, and would fain confine himself to psychology. But, as is common in such cases, he finds himself before the end carried beyond psychology to a view of art as the revelation of "a reality richer in unforeseen correspondences than the ordinary world," whose "inward voices" it seeks to "echo," or whose "inner landscapes" it seeks to paint. And if this is not a metaphysic, one may ask what is? M. Mauron takes as his point of departure Roger Fry's well-known view that in every true work of art there exists in the total impression which it makes "an original kernel" which is not resolvable into anything that springs from the satisfaction of instincts or desires, but which is in its essence purely contemplative. Assuming, as he did, that science also is contemplative, Fry was thus led to compare aesthetic pleasure, as resulting from the recognition of order and the harmony of relations, with that derived from "the contemplation of intellectual constructions united by logical inevitability," such as we have in science. But, sensible of the difference between the cold-bloodedness of science and the warm emotional character of art, he was tempted to seek for a solution of this contrast in the suggestion that beauty gets its force from the appeal to vague reminiscences of the substratum of emotion that colours man's practical life.

Starting from this apparent ambiguity in Fry's teaching, M. Mauron, while admitting that both science and art are contemplative, tries to show that there is nevertheless an essential difference between them. Though the scientist is "personally disinterested," his intelligence is not, seeing that "the necessities of foresight created science and still govern it," and that thus in the end "the spiritual attitude of the scientist is that of a man of action." The artist, on the other hand, "contemplates the universe without any idea of making use of it," with the consequence that "his eyes are so focused as to concentrate his whole attention on the present." In the central chapter the author goes on to develop what he calls the "Consequences" of this the aesthetic attitude under the three heads of "increased sensitiveness; the multiplication of echoes; and the dissolution of the practical organization of reality giving place to other possible organizations," that may satisfy the ceaseless urge of rational mind to find order and interrelation in apparent Chaos. In successive chapters under the suggestive titles of "The Pleasures of Sensibility," "Expressive Art," and "The Pleasures of Organization," M. Mauron develops his thesis with a subtlety and a wealth of illustration from music and painting which baffle reproduction here. But I hope that the editor will find room for a single quotation from the "Conclusion," characteristic alike of the author's modesty and his insight: "There is nothing to prove that the division, sensibility—mental echoes—organizing reason, is the right one. It merely seemed to me the most convenient and the closest to my own experience. Similarly it seemed to me that every mechanism in us had its own pleasure in living—if I may so call it; that if we supplied our sensibility with differences to perceive, our instincts or memory with motives of activity, our reason with correspondences to distinguish, the performance of those functions would inevitably give birth to primitive and simple pleasures, like those of a child excited by its own restlessness. This view is strongly supported by the fact that pleasure accompanies the stimulus rather than the satisfaction. Indeed, it may be that all excitement which is free from fear and does not absorb the whole energy of the organism so as to cause suffering to the other mechanisms which remain inactive is necessarily accompanied by joy. It may even be that joy has no other definition."

As said at the beginning, a view of this kind, with the emphasis it lays on

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the stimulus coming from the world without rather than on the satisfaction of any instinct or desire that owes its origin to practical needs individual or social, is a welcome contribution to aesthetic philosophy, aligning the author with the sound tradition that finds in the works of poet, artist, or musician a revelation of the inner nature of the world he seeks to portray. It need hardly be added that a translation in the names of Fry and John is itself a work of art.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

Religion in Virgil. By CYRIL BAILEY. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Humphrey Milford, 1935. Price 15s. net.)

There are books to which one refers from time to time because of their learning; others which are kept at hand, when they have been read through, to read them again for their charm, as a friend's conversation is sought. This modest volume, the permanent record of the Sather Classical Lectures in 1932, has a claim to appear in both these categories. It combines erudition with total absence of pedantry, and literary appreciation with critical insight and powers of analysis none the less real because they do not display themselves in long rows of statistics or formidable tables of the relative frequency of this and the percentages of that. It is a man of taste talking about a poet to those who are minded to hear him; and it happens that the taste is fortified with scholarship and a knowledge, not only of Latin and literature, but of philosophy and ancient religion.

To know what one of the great minds, ancient or modern, felt concerning the world and its inhabitants, visible and invisible, can never be a matter of indifference, nor can his conclusions become obsolete, as those of a scientist may. Vergil has the added importance that his influence, both in his own age and later, has been enormous and continues to be great, reaching many who are not sympathetic to formal philosophical teaching and impatient of dogmatic theologies. To ask, therefore, what his religion was is to treat a problem which has permanent interest, but a problem complicated by the necessity of seeing him against the background of his time and disentangling what is personal in him both from mere echoing of current ideas and from conventional mythological machinery which he, as a poet, could no more avoid using than he could express himself in a language not then spoken.

Therefore the author goes very properly to work when he begins by defining, in his first chapter, what is meant by "magic, omen, and prophecy," spends the next two chapters over old Italian religion, passes to the State cult of Rome, deals in Chapters V-VII with the Graeco-Roman gods, in Chapter VIII with deities Oriental and cosmological and with emperor-worship, gives another chapter to the question of "Fate and the gods," with an appendix on "the meaning of *Fortuna* in Virgil," treats next of "the dead and the underworld," and then gives us sixteen pages of "conclusion," in which the results arrived at are excellently summed up. Throughout the work an attempt is made to differentiate what Vergil thought and felt, his own personal religion or religious philosophy, from what he merely echoed. The instrument used is a simple one, little more than the author's necessarily subjective impressions; but, when handled by a trained mind long and thoroughly acquainted with the subject, such an instrument is quite as potent as many which make a greater parade of scientific accuracy and cold-blooded analysis.

Dr. Bailey's feeling, then, is that Vergil had for the old traditional Italian cults, the so-called "religion of Numa," a "tender affection" (p. 303), founded, not on mere sentiment for the practices among which he had been brought

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up, as a modern who no longer has any connection with an organized religion may still have a liking for a hymn learned in childhood or a liturgy revered by his parents, but on a "recognition of its spiritual value," that value consisting largely in its very vagueness. Vergil has an affection for the traditional deities of the woods and fields; but he is still more interested in and devoted to the ancestral ritual, which he knew with a thoroughness that impressed ancient commentators and furnishes welcome material for moderns who would learn the forms which the piety of the countryside took. For the conventional great gods and the conventional manner of approaching them he had much less deep feeling; for the picturesque anthropomorphic figures he had least of all; they were pretty, even beautiful, subjects for his fancy, but not objects either of solid belief or of profound emotion; nor had they been so, to any educated man, for centuries. But, for Vergil as for Varro and many other men of good will just then, even the State cult was not dead and might yet be the vehicle, albeit in a form which the understanding would interpret after their own fashion and not as its originators had done, of high thought and spiritual values. Apollo and his divine archery might be no more than a lovely figure of venerable tradition; it by no means followed that no superhuman power had watched over Augustus or guided the fortunes of the decisive day at Actium.

So also with the beliefs concerning the dead. No one, certainly not Dr. Bailey, supposes that Vergil imagined it literally true that, if one went through certain prescribed rites and knew where to find a particular opening in the ground, he would come to a place where the ghosts of his ancestors flitted about in unsubstantial happiness or lay in supernatural torments. But this is not to say that Vergil assumed merely for poetical purposes the existence of the human soul. Rather "he takes the traditions of folk-lore and myth and using them as his framework, refines them to the measure of his own philosophic vision" (p. 315). That the soul, that man, dead or alive, was capable of "ultimate triumph coming through suffering" (p. 318), the author supposes to have been a serious belief of the poet, and the reviewer entirely agrees with him. In the case of so exceptional a man as the Emperor, Vergil did not flatter when he hailed him as a god, but rather, in the expression of a real belief, "outran the official pace" (p. 196), and was rather checked than incited by his knowledge of the official views on this subject. The Providence which ruled his universe, whatever traditional names of Fate and Fortune he might give it, could and did show itself through such a personality with such a mission; and such a man had genuinely in him not a little which could fairly be called divine.

These then, in barest outline and with omission of a hundred controversial points of philological, historical, or philosophic detail, are the ideas concerning God and man which Dr. Bailey finds in the poet who was hailed as a prophet and a saint by many centuries of godly men, much though their own beliefs differed from one another's and from his; who was to Horace an *anima candida*, while the Middle Ages greeted him with *da Christo testimonium*.

H. J. ROSE.

The Relations of Morality to Religion. By W. G. DE BURGH. Annual Philosophical Lecture, Henriette Hertz Trust, British Academy, 1935. From the Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. XXI. (London: Humphrey Milford, 1935. 1 p. 27. Price 2s.)

The writer of this notice finds himself so closely in agreement with the view of the relations of morality to religion and of religion to philosophy which is expounded by Professor de Burgh in his recent lecture delivered

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before the British Academy that there is little left for him to do, when he has given a brief account of the contents of the lecture, but to "say ditto" to the lecturer. Professor de Burgh shows very clearly that morality and religion are mutually independent forms of experience, and that the relation between them, "however intimate it may prove to be, is not one of necessary connexion" (p. 5). Morality is autonomous, as Kant held; and it is justly observed that this philosopher's "postulation" of God does nothing to imperil its autonomy (p. 4). Morality does not grow into religion by a process of mere expansion. The love of man which, for religion, is rooted in the love of God (p. 10), cannot be reached, as M. Bergson has pointed out in his recent remarkable book, *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion*, by the extension over a wider area of the love we bear toward those who are fellow-members with ourselves of a "closed" society (pp. 10, 11). Religion again does not, like morality, essentially belong to the sphere of practice, as Bradley held, and as Mr. Oakshott has recently "reaffirmed with uncompromising vigour" (p. 15). "While" it "implies conduct as well as knowledge, just as morality implies knowledge as well as conduct, the theoretical moment is for religion all-important" (p. 13). "In religious experience . . . action is always for the sake of knowledge." "The religious life in its essence is the life eternal, which is to know God" (p. 15). Bradley's own admission that "faith in the real being of God" is "the mark which distinguishes religion from morality" "is fatal to the view that religion is exclusively a form of practice" (p. 17). Yet Professor de Burgh will not identify religion with mysticism, and criticizes M. Bergson for sometimes seeming to do so (p. 11). Practice, if not primary in religion, is indispensable to it, since "only in worshipping God do we learn to know him" (p. 18), and it is "when, as in Plato and Spinoza" philosophy "proclaims a way of life" that "it passes over into religion" (p. 20). I may here remark in passing that, in his interesting observations on Spinoza (p. 22), Professor de Burgh finds in some statements of the *Ethics* more than I can convince myself is really there; but this is not to deny that the temper of the great Jewish thinker is, as Professor de Burgh says, profoundly religious, whether his doctrine be held fully to justify this temper or no.

Though metaphysics and religion are rival claimants to universal knowledge, "and neither claimant can brook the intrusion of a rival within its borders" (p. 24), yet a reconciliation is possible. "They traverse common ground, but they view the scene from a different angle, and, for all their co-operation, pursue different paths. Religion is theocentric, and regards the world and man in the light of the Creator's revelation of himself. Metaphysics, on the other hand, takes its start from within the created universe, and only at long last, if ever, and then by aid of religious experience, acknowledges its dependence upon God. Metaphysical knowledge, again, is impersonal; it is 'about' things, which it interprets through general concepts; while religious knowledge comes by personal contact between God and the individual" (p. 25). "It is because God is thus known by personal contact that the way of religion lies open alike to the learned and the unlearned, while metaphysics is the exclusive privilege of an intellectual *élite*" (p. 26). I might perhaps hesitate over one or two expressions in these sentences; but I believe that substantially they state the truth about the relations of philosophy and religion in their fully developed forms.

Professor de Burgh has the gift of coining phrases which stick in the memory. I will quote two such. One about Pascal's hard saying, "*Il faut s'abêtir*": "The great musician, too, will practice scales" (p. 12); another about "humanism": "If man would enter upon his kingdom, he must forgo the claim to be its king."

CLEMENT C. J. WEBB.

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The Philosophy of a Biologist. By J. S. HALDANE, C.H., M.D., F.R.S. (Oxford at the Clarendon Press: Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. xii + 155. Price 6s.)

This short book of 150 pages constitutes in some sort Dr. J. S. Haldane's philosophical *testamentum* and *confessio fidei*; and so, while it does not, I think, and does not pretend to, add much that is new to his former writings, it is a moving and impressively sincere summary of an eminent scientist and philosopher's reading of life.

After a short introductory chapter we have three chapters which "place" first the physical sciences, then biology, and finally psychology, in relation to that survey and appraisalment of the whole of experience in which the author finds the essence of philosophy. A fourth chapter does the same for "religion," and a short "retrospect" ends the book.

The moral of the first chapter—the abstract and therefore partial character of physical science—is unexceptionable, but it contains statements of very dubious validity. It is not true (though often stated) that for modern physics time is merely an additional dimension of space (p. 18); nor that (p. 21) "there can be no greater velocity than that of light." Sir A. Eddington's example of the imaginary searchlight casting a beam upon Neptune and rotating once a minute reminds us of the error of this. The end of the beam will have a much greater velocity. Dr. Haldane's further remark (p. 21) that "the universe which is capable of being perceived is the only universe which has any meaning for us," is, as it stands, quite untrue.

In the next (biological) chapter he is upon ground that he has made his own, and expounds the view commended at greater length in his longer works. Neither mechanism nor "vitalism" are satisfactory types of interpretation of the facts of life. The former leaves unexplained the capital fact of maintained co-ordination of structure and function: the latter presents us with an irruption of a new principle into a "mechanical" world; and this does less than justice to the status of biological science. If I may put it so, Dr. Haldane holds that the biological interpretation does not intervene upon, but supersedes, in large measure, the mechanical, as our grasp becomes more concrete and intimate; just as it is in turn superseded by the psychological point of view, in which the key-conception of personality replaces that of organism. This is a familiar and attractive point of view, but it is not without its difficulties. I have no space to develop them here: a central one is the fact that the lower category has both to be superseded (because the higher cannot be confined to a mere department of experience), and yet retained to provide an environment or matter to give scope and meaning to the higher. And I do not think that Dr. Haldane has at all done justice to the significance of "organic" philosophies like Whitehead's, which seems to me to avoid certain difficulties that beset his own.

The chapter upon Religion strikes a familiar note, for here the author writes in the "idealist" tradition. To-day it is good to hear the case for a "religious" interpretation of experience put with such candour and such conviction.

Finally, mention should be made of the clear and expert account of what may be called the psycho-physiology of sensory processes, especially the susceptibility to light and to colour. This is a field of research which was neglected by the traditional psycho-physics, and it certainly constitutes an important contribution to the philosophy of organic process.

J. W. HARVEY.

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The Metaphysics of Berkeley critically examined in the Light of Modern Philosophy. By G. W. KAVEESHWAR. (High School, Khandwa, Central Provinces, India: A. Kaveeshwar. 1933. Pp. vi + 360. Price 5s. 6d.)

Berkeley, it appears, has been extremely well received in Indian universities as a guide to the study of philosophical problems. The boldness of his conclusions, the ingenuity with which he reaches them, their untenable but almost irrefutable character, the teasing ambiguity of his central terms, and the simplicity and enduring charm of his language, make him one of the best of philosophical pedagogues. It is interesting to find our western experience confirmed in the East. Mr. Kaveeshwar has accordingly undertaken to provide an exposition of Berkeley for Indian students. At the same time he has tried to make them conscious and appreciative of the treasures of their own national heritage by indicating parallels between Berkeley's thought and that of one of the ancient Indian schools. On these parallels, which the author regards as the special feature of his book but which are not so prominent as the preface seems to promise, I can make no comment, for I have no knowledge whatever of Indian philosophy and could not hope to have without mastering the Sanskrit from which it appears to be largely inseparable. The book, however, is entirely justified without reference to any local need or interests: it is an admirable exposition of the leading themes in Berkeley's *Principles* and *Dialogues*. The alternation between exposition and criticism is sometimes so swift that perhaps the line between them will not always be clear to a beginner; repetitions are rather numerous, but have probably a pedagogic value; and the level of the discussion varies from elementary to advanced as though the author had not kept one audience constantly in view. But the competence is constant, the English smooth, idiomatic, and graceful, and the whole is enlivened with imagination and enthusiasm. I respect the achievement. The author's only fault is a curious deference to western authorities ("modern psychology" is one of them), not in following them but in the way he refers to them: he gives ample proof of right to stand without their support and to differ from them without apology.

Since the book deserves to pass into a second edition, I venture to ask Mr. Kaveeshwar to consider the following points: (1) on pp. 124 ff. he supposes that Berkeley had defined *all* "esse" as "percipi" and therefore convicts him of an absurdity. But when Berkeley said that the "esse" of things is their "percipi," the general context shows that he was speaking of perceived things only. The "esse" of spirit is for him always "percipere." The emphasis on perception falls only where perceptible entities are alleged. (2) On pp. 64 f. and 77 the usual charge is repeated that Berkeley's doctrine of "notions" was introduced only in the second edition of the *Principles* and that it contravenes his first doctrine. But it was only the term, not the doctrine, that the second edition added, and there is no inconsistency unless we wrongly suppose that Berkeley's fundamental view is that *all* objects of knowledge are sensory ideas. The sentence added to the end of sec. 27 of the *Principles* goes no further than the previous sentence; and, by the way, the italicizing of "notions" here in Fraser's edition is Fraser's doing, not Berkeley's. (3) On pp. 107-117 the charge that Berkeley after all relapsed into the error he was trying to refute, namely, the supposition of an imperceptible cause of ideas, surely rests on a confusion. He refused to believe in a cause which is both an idea and imperceptible because an idea is essentially perceptible. He accepted a spiritual cause because his empirical logic required him to assign ideas whose cause was not directly experienced to the only *type* of cause that is directly experienced. Idea as cause goes beyond the analogy of

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experience; as unperceived it is a contradiction in terms; whereas spirit as cause and as unperceived is free from both these objections. It is not an unperceived but an unexperienced type of causality that he would not countenance. (4) I notice two trifling errors—a statement on p. 329 that Berkeley italicized "consider" in *Principles*, Intro., sec. 7, and the title of Adamson's work listed in the bibliography has gone awry.

I hope that a second edition will be needed, and that it will be produced by a professional publishing house. The present edition has been courageously carried out by a small country printing press.

T. E. JESSOP.

Law and the Social Sciences. By HUNTINGTON CAIRNS. Foreword by Roscoe Pound. (International Library of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1935. Pp. xiv + 279. Price 12s. 6d.)

The author of this book is strongly impressed with the change that in recent times has come over legal theory and practice owing to the abandonment in many responsible quarters of the view that the law should be as independent as possible of the social sciences; and he has set himself the task of making explicit the consequences of this abandonment by describing some of the more important bearings of the social sciences on legal questions. He selects for consideration the sciences of anthropology, economics, sociology, psychology, and political theory, devoting a chapter to each of them. The chief difficulties in the way of any such enterprise are perhaps the great extent of the ground to be covered and the consequent temptation to draw over-hasty analogies between the two fields that are being compared. Of both these difficulties Mr. Cairns is well aware; and he has been notably successful in avoiding the second of them. As might be expected, however, the first has proved somewhat more intractable. Many of the discussions contain interesting matter, and they are usually well-informed, especially in respect of the recent literature of the subjects with which they deal; and it is perhaps inevitable that the book should contain no general thesis beyond the bare idea that there are relations between law and the social sciences. But there is little continuous argument, even in the separate chapters; and many of the discussions are not obviously relevant to the main purpose of the book. In fact quite a number of questions belonging to the different social sciences are discussed at considerable length—often indeed quite suggestively—without any attempt to exhibit their bearing on questions of law or jurisprudence.

O. DE SELINCOURT.

Psychology and Psychotherapy. By WILLIAM BROWN. (London: Edward Arnold and Co. 1934. Pp. vii + 252. Price 12s. 6d.)

Dr. William Brown first published a book with this title in 1921. It was deservedly successful and was re-issued later. This is now called a "Third Edition"; but as the author himself points out it is to all intents and purposes a new work. In the first book, hot on the heels of the Great War, there was more psychotherapy than psychology. In this one the balance is restored. Every serious reader will see that psychology and psychopathology are not

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two subjects, each with its own, sometimes conflicting, set of principles, but a single consistent study of human thinking and behaviour. Six of the primary chapters of the book and almost all of the Appendix are entirely new, and a considerable part of the remainder has been re-written. Even now there is room for a more explicit connection of some of the topics dealt with: one moves perhaps a little violently from *The Psycho-Neuroses of War* to the *Treatment of Alcoholism*; from a study of *Personal Influence* to the *Psychology of Peace and War*; from *The Relation of Mind to Brain* to *Psychical Research*, and especially from a *Record of a Deep Mental Analysis* to three chapters on statistical psychology. But the thread of connection is present, and a reader who will take the trouble to do some thinking for himself will perhaps learn all the more from the fact that he is left to explore for himself considerable stretches of pathway from one topic to another.

I find the new parts of the book definitely the more stimulating and attractive. More than most psychologists, Dr. Brown has kept his psychological thinking in close touch with pressing problems of real life, and he has much to say about the muddles of our present social order which is worth the most careful attention. One thing is to be regretted. Several of the chapters in the book are based upon single lectures or articles each of which deals in a rather general way with some very wide topic. Hence, though they are full of most interesting suggestions, nothing is very thoroughly worked out. Here, for instance, one finds the germ of an excellent psychology of social leadership, many significant remarks about psychological influences that work towards war or peace, a briefly sketched but attractive theory of suggestion. It is much to be hoped that some day Dr. Brown will find time to work his views on these and other matters of great contemporary interest into a more thorough and systematic discussion. For example, that suggestion may be an outcome of aggressiveness as much as of submission is certainly true, and deserves fuller consideration and illustration than it is given. And again, that many of the social dangers of war spring far less from fear and inferiority than from assertion and vigorous self-development seems to me to be indisputable. In these, and in many other ways, this good book is perhaps a promise of a still better one to come.

The three final chapters of the Appendix deal, in a somewhat technical manner, with original developments of the statistical work of the London school. The trouble about these is not that they are really out of place, for they represent contributions of great value to a movement which is of vast and practical importance in modern psychology. But they are introduced and presented practically without comment, and without any attempt to link them up with the more general discussions which form the bulk of the book. Hence they seem to stand apart from the main text, and even to be hauled in by force, as if they had to go somewhere and might as well go here as anywhere else. All this could, and perhaps will, be set right some day. In the meantime, this new edition of an established book is vastly better than the preceding issues, and should be widely read and highly valued.

F. C. BARTLETT.

Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre. By Dr. HANS REICHENBACH. (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff's Uitgeversmaatschappij, N.Y. 1935. Pp. ix + 451. 11.50 H.Fl. Brosch.)

This work is certainly the most important treatise on the Theory of Probability which has appeared since Mr. J. M. Keynes's book; in some ways,

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indeed, it may justly claim to be the most important treatise ever published on the subject, combining the highest degree of logical rigour with great comprehensiveness, and considerable philosophical profundity. It completes and corrects the work of von Mises, Tornier, and others, including the author's own, in attempting to fit the Theory of Probability into the framework of modern formal logic, and to clarify it by the use of the mathematical theory of sets. This work has been largely carried on under the influence of the philosophical school of Carnap, to whom the author expresses his indebtedness. The present book is particularly valuable for the full discussion of most of the objections which have been raised against a frequency theory of probability, and the clear and modest evaluation of what such a theory can achieve.

Dr. Reichenbach starts with a short exposition of those parts of formal logic which he uses in the book. He then defines probability, not as frequency, but by a purely axiomatic method. Probability consists, in this way, of a relation between certain types of proposition, a relation satisfying certain axioms—which he has reduced to a very small number and easily intelligible form. He proves that the frequency interpretation does satisfy these axioms, but the separation of the two has the greatest value in helping the reader to understand at each stage what are the assumptions made. The philosophical remarks in the early part of the book are, however, rather sketchy, and should not be taken too seriously.

The main bulk of the book consists of the purely formal development of the mathematics of probability from the axioms, illustrated in terms of the frequency interpretation, and extended to the field of "continuous probability." The notations used are extremely compact, and the mathematics always elegant as well as exact. The most important section is that on Bernoulli's Theorem, which forms an essential link in Dr. Reichenbach's discussion of the meaning and application of the idea of probability.

This discussion, which occupies the last quarter of the book, is extremely fascinating. We are presented, after eliminating a number of plausible solutions, with a dilemma. On the one hand, the frequency interpretation appears to be necessary. This arises through the use of Bernoulli's Theorem, with the help of which Dr. Reichenbach is able to show that the probability of an event must be equal to its frequency in a normal sequence, provided we accept what certainly seems to be the weakest possible link between probability and experience. A normal sequence in this sense, is one in which the probabilities (in the axiomatic meaning) of the event are properly independent of its position in the sequence. Dr. Reichenbach's method of giving precision to this intuitive idea will well repay attention. The link with experience is given by the special axiom that if an event has a probability unity then it will occur at least once in an infinite series of experiments! On the other side of the dilemma it is clearly shown that the existence, and still more the value, of a limit in the frequency of occurrence of an event cannot be established or disproved by any finite number of experiments; and therefore essentially cannot be decided at all.

In order to escape from this dilemma, Dr. Reichenbach is driven to the conclusion that statements about such limits do not fall under the logic of true and false, but require a "many-valued" logic to evaluate them. Such a many-valued logic, which corresponds to the idea of "plausibility" perhaps rather than to probability, can be given a strict formal basis. In its simplest form it is such that statements of higher order—statements that is about the exact values to be assigned to the elementary propositions of the system—do fall under the logic of true and false. Dr. Reichenbach shows, however,

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that in order to fit in with the requirements of science and everyday life we must cut ourselves free from this limitation. All the statements we make then are not to be considered as "true," but as the best possible or as approximate statements, which, with only partial evidence, we "posit" or bet on. He shows that the laws of probability will give us best possible results, by means of the Principle of Induction, in the sense that *in the end* they will approach more and more nearly to the truth; and that we can approach the truth still more quickly if we make use of statements of higher order, in the form of inductions from inductions, to correct our first approximations in any one field. We can approach the truth, that is, if the truth is there; in Dr. Reichenbach's sense, if the events of the universe are arranged in sequences with limits, or in sequences composed of such sequences. If this is not the case, he alleges, there is no way of getting at anything, and so we are no worse off for using the method of Induction.

The essential assumption, it will be seen, is that the universe consists of infinite sequences of similar events, and that what we want for practical life, and for science, is to find out what will happen in the end. The method is capable of giving us no assurance that this will happen on the whole in the near future. It is surely arguable that no sequence of similar events can extend infinitely. Dr. Reichenbach instances taking the temperature at a fixed time every day at a certain spot of the earth's surface, suggesting that we can go on after the break-up of the earth by taking a definite region of space. But does not this example rather suggest that all prescriptions will after a time cease to prescribe anything? Is not the reference to infinity at best a device by which we fix on our best possible predictions, which we then take to apply not to the infinite future, but to the immediate future? And it seems as if we must be on surer ground in extrapolating our results only for a short time into the future than by always extrapolating to infinity.

It may be doubted, too, whether the faith in the method of Induction which Dr. Reichenbach proclaims, can really be justified by such a modest method as his. We shall get to the answer, he says, if the answer exists; which means, as he has proved, if the universe is so constituted that the Principle of Induction applies to it. But does this distinguish it from the Oracle, as he thinks? Will not the Oracle tell us the right answer if the universe is so constituted that oracles are sound? The only distinction is that the method of Induction cannot destroy itself, since it does not claim to be right every time.

A hope may lie in the possibility of removing the reference to infinity, which might perhaps be done almost without alteration of the notation and method of Dr. Reichenbach's book. Should this be so, we would be on the road to uniting the "subjective" theories of Probability with the "objective," by a method which would prescribe to us the best possible guess, and the degree of belief with which we should hold it, from the empirical data at our disposal.

A. G. D. WATSON.

An Enquiry into Moral Notions. By JOHN LAIRD, F.B.A., LL.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1935. Pp. 318. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

Professor Laird's latest work on ethics consists of three parts, dealing respectively with the ideas of virtue, duty, and benefit; and the method of treatment in each runs on somewhat parallel lines. The words, however, which the author uses in reference to a portion of his own argument can be

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applied to the whole discussion: the course of the argument is "too sinuous and too complicated to lend itself readily to condensation." Consequently, the nature of the contents can be indicated only in very general outline.

Each of the above ideas provides respectively the subject-matter of a theory of virtue, a theory of duty, and a theory of benefit; and as Professor Laird holds that virtue is not simply identical with duty or benefit, although connected with both, and since therefore theories of virtue, duty, and benefit are not coincident, he wishes to inquire how far each of these theories can be said to cover the whole field of ethics, or to provide the sole foundation for ethics. He conducts the reader, often tired and limping painfully, through a detailed analysis, attempting classifications of virtues, duties, and benefits; considering how far volition enters into virtue and obligation, or into morality; having an exhilarating tilt at the maxim "ought implies can," insisting upon the distinction between final good and axiological good or value, and upon the fundamental character of the latter ethically; examining the question whether knowledge of value is a matter of insight or of feeling; and emphasizing the conception of "relational goods" as a class of goods, and finding much help from it in meeting difficulties in the theory of benefit.

In the course of the discussion it soon appears that benefit is a favourite in the race. An ethic of virtue, although freed from several untenable criticisms, is burdened with considerable handicaps; and the instances in which such an ethic seems strongest can be as effectively dealt with by a theory of benefit. An ethic of duty, though it can deal with the question as to which is the greater obligation in the case of a conflict, cannot, however, do so with the same confidence as the other theories, for considerations of virtue and benefit enter into the determination of gravity and magnitude of obligations; it is involved in difficulties because it assumes a highly questionable dogma regarding the voluntariness of every obligation and the non-voluntariness of every motive; and there is a *strong general presumption* that one of the requisites of every moral obligation is that it should aim at some benefit. An ethic of benefit, discussed first as utilitarianism, is defended on the point of moral arithmetic, for, while the deontological notion "righter" has no criteria, the utilitarian notion "better" has such criteria in the form of amount, degree, and kind. Nevertheless, the contentions of the New Intuitionists, whom Professor Laird keeps under review, do force the conclusion, based on a difficulty about what is included in the idea of an "optimific act," that utilitarianism, if not proved insufficient, is also not proved sufficient; and a further examination of it reveals its untenability on several counts. All three theories alike fail to formulate any clear test for a demarcation between the moral and the non-moral. The untenability of utilitarianism is not an argument in favour of either of the other two theories; nor does it close the door against another form of a theory of benefit, which, accepting the distinction between final and axiological good, is prepared to admit "relational good" into the conception of good, and which could therefore be made both tenable and inclusive of the substance of a theory of duty.

Such a summary fails completely to do justice to Professor Laird's exhaustive and illuminating discussion; and it were to be desired that a wider public than professional philosophers could be induced to read it. It is no doubt a study in what may be called Pure Ethics; but it does to the thoughtful reader bring out how involved and complex are some of the issues which many are apt to believe simple and precise, and on which they are prone to be very opinionative. It is doubtful, however, whether the book will make the desired wider appeal. Apart from Professor Laird's tendency to use a terrifying terminology, the reader, especially in parts one and two, tends amidst the

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winding argument to miss direction, and is saved only by the help afforded by the preface; unsophisticated persons may feel that there is too much acuteness and subtlety, directed primarily against other philosophers like the New Intuitionists; and the present age is not one, although of course it may be mistaken here, inclined to accept patiently the implications of the term *axiological*, upon which Professor Laird insists. On the other hand, his insistence upon "relational goods" may find support in Plato, who, for instance, places justice under the conception of *good*, and defines it in relational terms. His discussion of virtue, however, seems to stop short and veer off at an interesting point, for, if it is held that virtue must be understood in terms of *acts*, and that the notion of virtue as something inward and durable is due to a questionable metaphysico-scientific procedure, an important issue concerning the relation of virtue to the other notions arises.

But various considerations, such as the idea of "situation" which the New Intuitionists and Professor Laird himself at times use, but which seems to be in need of much fuller analysis, the difficulty of a clear demarcation between the moral and the non-moral, and the author's own admission that "most ethical theories, pursued with relentless logic, would transform the received ethical code, and would not merely supply a reason for it," suggest that the question concerning the sphere of ethics has not been fully answered, and must be considered afresh. There is in the discussion a perplexing indecisiveness about *pros* and *cons* which probably reflects confusion in the moral experience of mankind. And what are the ethical notions with which ethics is concerned? Are they those of a particular epoch or class, or of philosophers like Professor Laird himself? It seems that there is a two-fold question at issue—one about the meanings of ethical terms, and one about the validity of these meanings. It does not appear that Professor Laird considers validity at all, unless he defends himself on the ground of having a genuine insight into value, but, this defence apart, what may be called his Pure Ethics does strike one as what a physical science would be if a physicist confined himself to a discussion of the elucidation and inter-relationships of popular ideas about the universe, and such a procedure might give rise to endless controversies, like those between moral philosophers, due to varying emphasis upon one or other of these popular notions. Though Professor Laird's treatment shows intellectual subtlety combined with literary force and clarity, and will appeal to all those who delight in these qualities and have been trained in dialectical gymnastic, it remains doubtful whether a discussion taking the form of a pure ethic has more than a strictly limited value.

B. M. LAING.

Transcendence and the Logical Difficulties of Transcendence: A Logical Analysis.

By BENT SCHULTZER. (Copenhagen: Levin and Munksgaard; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1935. 1'p. xv + 301. Price 12s. 6d.)

This book is a treatise submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, though it is a much more important piece of work than the majority of such productions. It is published in English, into which it was translated from the original Danish by Miss Annie I. Fausbøll, M.A., and it was printed in Denmark.

It seems to me to be a highly promising contribution to philosophy: it is too much a systematic anatomy of a set of historical philosophical theories

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for it to rank as itself a contribution of quite first-rate importance. But the exposition and application of the principles of this anatomy are such as to satisfy me that in Dr. Schultzer (I hope the title is correct) Denmark possesses a new philosopher of really interesting potentialities.

Before coming to the contents of the book I want to say a word or two about its production. It is very clearly printed and well indexed. The translator has done her work so well that there are very few passages where one is reminded that the book was written in another tongue. I personally dislike the practice, adopted here, of employing block-capitals for the printing of proper names, section-headings, and paragraph-headings. It makes me feel that the author is shouting at me "Do not skip this bit, whatever else you skip." But this is a trivial question of taste only. In all respects that matter, the publication seems highly creditable.

The book is an analysis of the central nerve of an argument or family of arguments which we find constantly recurring in a great variety of shapes and contexts throughout the history of philosophy, the argument, we may loosely call it, for the being of philosophic ultimates. Dr. Schultzer thinks that in any of its forms it contains the seeds of inevitable antinomies and paralogsms; and his object is to show how the formal structure of all arguments of the one general type entails these antinomies and paralogsms.

It is therefore both an essay in the history of a part of philosophy, or else of a trend in it, and a formalized and generalized logical analysis of a type of argument.

Dr. Schultzer's intellectual affiliations are, I gather, as follows. Chiefly he is influenced by Kant, and especially by the Dialectic in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Indeed, his programme, methods, and conclusions are in close and acknowledged liaison with those of Kant in that part of the *Critique*. Modern forms of empiricism, and positivism as well as modern formal logic are sympathetic to him, as "absolutistic" philosophies (as he calls them) are not. But he is not an election-agent for any particular "ism."

His knowledge and understanding of the history of philosophy seem to me to be full, though happily not exhaustive. I should mention that wide though he casts his net for typical cases of varieties of the argument for philosophic "ultimates," he does not vouchsafe any views at all about the sorts of "absolutism" which we might vaguely label as Hegelian. But that his range is wide is shown by the fact that he finds cases of the transcendence-difficulties all down the line from Parmenides to Husserl and the New Realists; and recognition of them in philosophers as different from one another as Kant, Schopenhauer, Mach, and Carnap and Zeno.

Dr. Schultzer's central doctrines are as follows. There runs, throughout the history of philosophy, a certain current of argumentation, taking different courses in different periods, and moving with different forces in different philosophers, which I loosely describe as the argument for the being of philosophic ultimates. Some argue for ultimate axioms, the sources of all demonstrations, but themselves indemonstrable. Others argue for ultimate indefinable terms, the elements of all definitions but themselves indefinable. Others for a First Cause, causing all else, itself the effect of nothing—unless of itself. Others for a First Substance; others for ultimate indivisibles such as Democritean atoms. Others for the Sufficient Reason; others for Absolute Space, Absolute Positions, and Motion; others for Ultimate Particulars; others for an Ultimate or Absolute End; others for the Double Ultimates of Form and Matter, Subject and Object; others for the Ultimate Given. And so on. Dr. Schultzer's first object is to bring out the several Notions of necessity which are more or less covertly and confusedly employed as the rails on

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which run the typical philosophical arguments for the conclusions that there exist or subsist these several sorts of "ultimates." For, all the time, it is his central purpose to examine the common logical structures of whole families of philosophical theories. Indeed, it is this programme, together with his very considerable success in carrying it out, which gives his book that feeling of philosophic power which I find in it.

He exposes three notions of necessity which have separately or jointly underlain the historical theories which he is inspecting, though Dr. Schultzer does not affirm that all of these notions are valid. The three notions are: (1) the modal notion of necessity, namely the sense in which truths or judgments have been labelled as necessary or apodeictic by logicians, (2) the ontological notion of necessity, namely the sense in which some philosophers speak of the necessary *existence* of something; and (3) the relational notion of necessity, namely the sense in which philosophers speak of necessary relations or, more often, necessary connections. Their antitheses would be to (1) assertoric and problematic, to (2) contingent or possible, and to (3) casual or fortuitous.

A philosopher might have employed all three notions at once, distinguishing them. For example, he might say "It is a necessary (apodeictic) truth that there must exist a necessary connection between so and so and such and such." Doubtless we should frown at such a practice; but Dr. Schultzer's only point here is that the practice has occurred.

One or a combination of these notions is to be found, Dr. Schultzer argues, from a good selection of examples, in all of the typical arguments for the being of philosophic ultimates. For these arguments are all of the general pattern, "A presupposes B as its condition, B in the same way presupposes C . . . and *this presupposition-series must stop somewhere.*" Now "A presupposes B" can only mean "if or because A is, B *must* be." And this "must" will be the modal type if A and B are truths or propositions and of the ontological type if they are entities.

Thus philosophers have argued from destructible physical objects to indestructible parts, from observed relative motion to absolute Motion and Space, from causal series to a first cause, from fallible complex cognitive experiences to infallible sensings of sense-data, from introspections to a Pure Ego, and so forth. However, it is only to introduce his main subject of inquiry that Dr. Schultzer explores these notions of necessity and the historical types of their employment in arguments for philosophic ultimates. His main interest is in something which is the resultant of this process. Namely, when a philosopher's argument seems to have established the being of an ultimate he is forced to make propositions about this ultimate and these propositions will either be in contradiction with the nerve of the argument which seemed to establish it, or generate an infinite regress of the vicious kind, or generate a vicious circle. And this unhappy result is detectable historically in all the varieties of the argument which are historically eminent, however disparate the sorts of the ultimates may be.

Dr. Schultzer's problem of transcendence is to show why these antinomies and paralogsms are bound to arise in all cases of propositions about ultimates "established" by arguments of this pattern. He is, in a word, both generalizing and formalizing Kant's destructive arguments in the third part of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

I might here make two remarks about his use of the word "transcendence." First, he is not solely concerned, though he is partly concerned with the issue between Realism and Solipsism, to which issue the word is sometimes restricted. Whether there is a physical world transcending our sense-

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experiences is only a relatively subordinate species of Dr. Schultzer's quite general problem. And, second, Dr. Schultzer is not only concerned to analyse the arguments and the resultant antinomies and paralogisms that belong to the old-fashioned rationalistic metaphysics; he finds perfectly analogous antinomies and paralogisms arising from the subterranean premisses of e.g., Newton, empiricist epistemologists and some neo-Kantians.

"Transcendence" is (if I interpret Dr. Schultzer correctly) the name which he gives to that character which an "ultimate" will be bound to have which makes it different from any of the members in the presupposition-series or determination-series which seemed to be bound to terminate in that "ultimate."

To use a metaphor, philosophers find a chain-link. They argue that it must hang off another such link and that to another. But if the chain is to hang at all, it must in the end hang off a hook which is not itself just another link in the chain. If they argue either that the hook supports the chain by being linked to something else, or by being linked to itself, or by not being or needing a support, their difficulties are transcendence-difficulties; for they are trying both to affirm and in the same breath to deny that the hook is a member of the links which it supports. And similarly if they argue that the hook can only support the top-most link if there is either another link or another hook between them. The hook "transcends" the links of the chain in that it is not one of them, and so that "hanging-off" cannot be asserted of it in the way in which it is asserted of them. But if not, the argument to the hook's existence from the suspensions of this or that link is already broken-backed. That is, the resultant antinomies and paralogisms are due to a fallacy in the argument by determination-series; and it is of the several varieties of this fallacy that Dr. Schultzer is trying to give a generalized and formalized account.

Take for example the argument for a first cause. We find events in the world, each of which we take to be an effect of a prior event in the world; we then argue to a first cause which for that reason cannot be analogous to the other cause-events in the world, namely that it is not subject to the principle which directed the whole argument, that whatever causes something else must be itself caused by something else. Had we not accepted that principle we should not have looked for the start of the causal chain; and having accepted it, we cannot then affirm the existence of an uncaused cause, if we take "existence" and "cause" in the same sense as we took them in our premisses. A first cause, then, "transcends" the series of ordinary causes and effects. By definition it both must and cannot be a member of that series.

Similarly philosophers have argued for absolute positions in absolute space. We observe one object as being in a certain spatial relation to a second, and this to a third and that to a fourth. . . . But this cannot go on for ever. Therefore there must be a final term, namely the relation of the first object; and so of all, to a fixed point in absolute Space. Now fixed points in absolute Space are not observable, so the spatial relations between a physical object and such a point (whether occupation or adjacency to or distance from) are not observable either. So the argument contained the two propositions: (1) only relative position is determinable; and (2) absolute determination of position is possible. That is, propositions about determinate positions in absolute Space cannot occur in the assertions of surveyors or astronomers and yet the original philosophical argument for absolute Space required by implication just this. Absolute position both cannot and must enter into actual position-fixations.

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Let me take another case. Some philosophers have held that there must be ultimate axioms, from which whatever is demonstrable is to be deduced; but the axioms themselves are not deducible. They can nowhere appear as consequents. Of all other truths, or anyhow all other truths of a certain class, we know that they are true by seeing that they follow from the axioms. How then do we know the truth of the axioms? The only answers given are: (1) that they are self-evident, and (2) that we *feel* convinced of them. Both are vicious; for both generate the syllogism "What is self-evident (or else convincing) is necessarily true; this axiom is self-evident (or else convincing); therefore it is true." That is, the truth of the axiom has been *deduced* in a syllogism of which the major premiss is at best in no better plight than was the axiom itself. But, more important, the axiom has been restored to the fold of propositions of which the verifiability lay in their deducibility, which was just what we had promised ourselves to prevent. They both must belong to the field from which we made the regressive argument to ultimate axioms, and cannot belong to that field.

I cannot condense Dr. Schultzer's formal analysis of the types of arguments that have existed or might exist for the being of philosophic ultimates, nor with his exhibitions of the types of antinomies and paralogisms which inevitably ensue on those arguments. Nor can I expound the application of his anatomic principles to the numerous other specimens which he examines, such as the theory of indefinable terms, indivisible atoms, form and matter in metaphysics, form and content in epistemology, ultimate substance, the Pure Ego, pure data and so forth.

Let those who are uneasy about the soundness of the grounds on which the being of any of these ultimates rests, read Dr. Schultzer's own words on the matter. Naturally his analysis tends to be more penetrating in the case of theories of which time has given us some perspective. The rails on which our own speculations run are of necessity invisible to us who are travelling in the train. And anyhow it is, I think, a correct view of Dr. Schultzer, that the absolutistic temper of philosophic thought is at the moment in relative abeyance before the temper which he calls "relativistic." Which gives me an opening for one more word. Dr. Schultzer does not, in the main, profess to be defending a particular theory, so much as to be providing an anatomy of a family of philosophical arguments, which are all of one general logical type. He frankly allows, however, that he is himself inclined towards a "relativistic" solution of the problems of which, he thinks, the absolutistic solutions have been unsuccessful and unsuccessful by an internal necessity. The nature of such a "relativistic" solution is not fully expounded by him; though I think that the general line of it would be of this Kantian pattern. Substitute for theories which postulate that there are these transcendent "ultimates" regulative principles which shall hold up as the carrot before the nose of scientific inquiry determinate programmes of search. Change the "ultimates" from termini to routes and so secure charts immanent to the procedure of research instead of will-of-the-wisps external and sometimes treacherous to it.

Dr. Schultzer's next work should be in the direction of making definite his relativistic view, of which he (like Kant) at present only gives us hints. The systematic anatomy of a set of historical theories is valuable and educative work, but I want to get more of Dr. Schultzer's own positive thoughts—and I shall be surprised and disappointed if they are not forthcoming.

[As a possible help to Dr. Schultzer or his publishers I append a list of (chiefly) misprints which I have found. All but two are trivial, and I record

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them for the sake of relative completeness only. Their fewness seems to me highly commendable, considering that the translation and printing are by Danish hands, and the work itself is rich in details of nomenclature, references, etc. Generally I shall merely give the page and the word, correctly spelled, which is misprinted in the text.

P. 13, *pictured*; p. 14, *universalia*; pp. 15 and 48, *universale* is the correct singular of *universalia*; p. 20, *false* instead of *fallacious*; p. 33 (line 9), *as*; p. 41, *necessaria*; p. 43 (middle), *progressive* for *regressive*?; p. 53 (middle), *hypothetical*: if . . .; p. 79, *axioms*; p. 85, *Anfangsgründe*; p. 101, *psychological*; p. 155, *Meiklejohn* and also pp. 161 and 34; p. 159 (second word) *an*; p. 185, *a fortiori*? p. 204, *separated*; p. 247, *physics*; p. 255 (line 6), *of for from*; p. 256, *Russell*; p. 273, *direct*; p. 277, *possess*; p. 282, *noumenon*; p. 289, *Bewusstseinslage*; p. 301, *Zeno* p. 269; and on p. 21 (last word) is *practical* correct?]

GILBERT RYLE.

Guide to Philosophy. By C. E. M. JOAD. (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd. 1936. 1 p. 592. Price 6s.)

This is a book which I should hitherto have been inclined to think could not be written. Even yet it is something of a mystery to me how Mr. Joad has contrived to pull it off.

The crucial difficulty is this. Since there is no common body of knowledge that can be labelled "philosophy," a philosophical *Baedeker* can fulfil its function only by giving an account of all the different theories entertained by important thinkers or schools of thought upon all the major issues of philosophy. Now if the account given be merely descriptive, presenting conclusions in comparative isolation from their premises, the field can, no doubt, be covered fairly easily in a single volume. But the resulting catalogue will not be a guide-book to "philosophy." The very meaning of philosophical doctrines is so inseparably bound up with the grounds of their adoption that a large measure of the "why" as well as the "that" must be vouchsafed to the general reader if the book is to guide rather than mislead. On the other hand, if one does seriously attempt to give a reasoned statement of all the important views on all of philosophy's important problems, one is much more likely to end up with a work on the scale of Hastings's *Encyclopaedia* than of Mr. Joad's *Guide*.

Yet the plain fact is that Mr. Joad has, in under 600 pages, managed somehow to cover at least a large part of the ground in an extremely effective manner. The general reader who gives concentrated attention to this book really will learn a good deal about "philosophy." It is true that Mr. Joad lightens his task by virtually restricting philosophy to metaphysics and epistemology. Ethical and political philosophy and the philosophy of religion find no place in the formal scheme, logic is dealt with almost solely in relation to the problem of knowledge, and the treatment of aesthetics is so brief and (as Mr. Joad admits) so personal that it can hardly be called a "guide." But even within these limits the book is a remarkable feat of compression.

A large part of Mr. Joad's success is doubtless due to his plan of procedure. In the first two of the book's three parts ("Theory of Knowledge" and "Critical Metaphysics") the issues raised, he tells us, "are treated on merits, and the views of particular philosophers are introduced only when they happen to be peculiarly relevant to the problem under discussion." By thus subordinating philosophers to philosophy, and by a very skilful arrangement of the order of his topics, Mr. Joad is able to observe strict economy of space

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and yet expound a wide variety of theories in a way which leaves the impression of a genuine "march of reason."

In Part III, however, which is entitled "Constructive Metaphysics," Mr. Joad does allow himself some formal treatment of outstanding systems. A great deal of space is given to the Platonic theory of Ideas, and to the application of it, in a developed form, to the philosophy of modern physics and to aesthetics. We are offered also "outlines" of the philosophies of Kant, Hegel, Bergson, and Whitehead. These outlines, while adroitly executed, are inevitably somewhat sketchy in effect. But no doubt something of the sort had to be supplied, if only in deference to the very proper respect in which these great names are held by the educated public.

It would not be useful to mention, without thoroughly discussing, the few instances—and they are few—of statements or interpretations in the text from which one feels inclined to dissent. But there are one or two slips of a presumably verbal character of which notice may be taken. On page 54 a "not" has surely gone missing, where Mr. Joad, speaking of Hume's doctrine of the Association of Ideas, says that "the uniting principle . . . is due to the agency of the mind." And the first footnote to page 371 will make sense only if for the words "a criticism of Berkeley's theory of abstract ideas" we substitute some such words as "Berkeley's criticism of the theory of abstract ideas."

This admirable book should have the effect, I think, of augmenting substantially the membership of the *B.I.P.* For it can hardly fail to whet the appetite of the reader who has any natural taste for philosophic inquiry. The intellectual sympathy which Mr. Joad displays in expounding views with which one knows that he disagrees is particularly valuable. Most writers of introductory books on philosophy, no doubt, have striven to be impartial. But impartiality, even if achieved, is not enough. One may make the very best case one can for an opponent's theory and yet—if intellectual sympathy be lacking—present a mere caricature. Mr. Joad's book seems to me conspicuously free from this defect, and I recommend it most heartily.

C. A. CAMPBELL.

The Last Puritan. By GEORGE SANTAYANA. (London: Constable & Co. 1935. Pp. 721. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

Mr. Santayana's polished pen has produced soliloquies, poems, dialogues of the dead, and essays in characterization in addition to his substantial and famous books on aesthetics and on metaphysics. Now he has published "a memoir in the form of a novel."

Anyone who supposes that because Mr. Santayana turns his books on philosophy into works of art, he is bound to turn a work of art into a book on philosophy would be seriously mistaken in this instance. The memoir of Oliver Alden really is a novel. True, it may also be an allegory. "As to moral complications in Oliver," the author says, "you must allow me my diagnosis. He was the child of an elderly and weary man, and of a thin-spun race; from his mother he got only his bigness and athleticism, which notoriously don't wear well. A moral nature burdened and overstrung, and a critical faculty fearless but helplessly subjective—isn't that the true tragedy of your ultimate puritan?" Or, again: "In Oliver puritanism worked itself out to its logical end. He convinced himself on puritan grounds that it was wrong to be a puritan. . . . That was the tragedy of it. Thought it his clear duty to give puritanism up, but couldn't." These statements, however, occur in the

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epilogue and in the prologue respectively. When the book is under way, its momentum prevents such detached scrutiny.

Certainly, there is some philosophizing. The "elderly and weary" Peter Alden had a mind. Caleb Weatherbee, because he was a cripple, was allowed to be expansive. One of Oliver's student essays upon Platonism is reproduced. Jim Darnley, a little too appositely called "Lord Jim," was full of philosophy. (The flaws in his character produced that outlet, and his father the vicar, without these flaws, was an Augustinian.) Something may be learned from the book regarding the philosophy of Harvard in the great days when the present century was young, something also of the contrast between American education and the education at Eton and in Oxford; and the theme of Catholic versus Puritan may be studied in the contrast between Mario and Oliver.

Nevertheless, the story can be enjoyed without its fable, and has a healthy tendency to smother the fable whatever that fable may be. The firmness of its grip, indeed (taken unallegorically), is rather surprising. The women, I think, are only characters dressed as such, always excepting Mrs. Alden. Oliver perhaps was unlucky in that matter, especially perhaps when he met the courtesan. But if the reader thinks of skipping he finds himself firmly but unobtrusively prevented.

The reason in part lies in the style. In his philosophical writings Mr. Santayana may be overfond of tempering the austerity of his metaphysical chambers with a profusion of small but precious *objets d'art*. In this book he resists that temptation. His characters, it is true, seldom chat; but they talk, nearly always, without preciousness, and the narrative matches them in this respect. Consequently I shall not quote from the book. My quotations came from the prologue and the epilogue; and these, except for the allegory they profess to explain, are only diverticula.

JOHN LAIRD.

Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi Fasc. XII, Quaestiones supra Ethicam de Causis nunc primum edidit Robert Steele, collaborante Ferdinand Delorme O.F.M. Accedit Liber de Causis a Roberto Steele de novo recognitus. (Oxonii e Typographico Clarendoniano MCXXXV. Pp. xxiv + 104. Price 17s. 6d.)

The so-called book *de Causis*, or to give it its earlier name, the *Liber de expositione bonitatis purae*, has a curious history. It is, in fact, as St. Thomas seems to have been the first to perceive, a version of an Arabic original, itself consisting of some thirty-two theses excerpted from the *Elements of Theology* of the Neo-Platonist Proclus, and modified by the identification of the Neo-Platonic "One" with the personal transcendent God of Islam. The authorship of the Arabic text appears to be still a riddle, and perhaps an insoluble riddle. The Latin translation is known to be the work of Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187). In spite of the markedly Neo-Platonic and un-Aristotelian character of the theses, the whole was supposed, when it first became known in the West, to be the work of Aristotle, and though this was soon discovered to be a mistake, it was still assumed, both by Roger Bacon and Albert the Great, that the enunciations of the propositions are due to him, though the proofs subjoined to them are by some other hand; perhaps, as the colophon in some of the MSS. suggests, by Alfarabi, or perhaps, as Albert thought, a certain David the Jew, of whom nothing seems to be known, drawing on Avicenna, Algazel, and Alfarabi. As the Introduction to the present volume points out,

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the original title of the Latin version caused it to escape the suspicions and consequent ecclesiastical censures which fell upon the newly recovered Aristotelian Physics and Metaphysics in the first decades of the thirteenth century. Hence it was eagerly studied and lectured upon as a supposed authentic record of the teaching of the great philosopher, and thus played a historically important part in that process of giving Aristotle's philosophy a Platonic colouring, without which it could hardly have become, as it did, a standing background for the thought of Christian philosophers. The real nature of the book was only discerned when St. Thomas, profiting by the scholarship of his coadjutor, William of Moerbeke, was able to identify the work of Proclus as its original and to compare the Arabic-Latin excerpt, or compilation, with the source from which it had been derived.

In point of fact, the thirty-two propositions of the *de Concis* represent only a seventh part, or rather more, of the book of Proclus. Proclus has there set himself to digest the Neo-Platonism of the Athenian school to which he belonged into a series of over two hundred propositions, each accompanied with its demonstration *more geometrico*. His treatise is a compendious handbook to the whole Neo-Platonic system, not indeed as it was originally conceived by its one great original mind, Plotinus, but as it had taken shape in the course of two centuries under the influence—often a baleful influence—first of Iamblichus and then of Syrianus, the immediate teacher of Proclus himself. The propositions which reappear in the Arabic work deal exclusively with one part of this vast metaphysical construction, the theory of the derivation of the hierarchy of "intelligences" and "souls" from the primary supreme "One" or "Absolute." It is a consequence of this that the book contains no reference to the most characteristic doctrine of Syrianus and Proclus, that of the "gods," or "divine henads," which could hardly have been adapted by any feasible device to Moslem monotheism, whereas the "intelligences" can be readily, if not quite legitimately, disposed of by identifying them at once with the "angels," and these with the "unmoved movers" of the celestial spheres in Aristotle's cosmology. Presumably it is the impossibility of fitting in the "divine henads" into either the theology of Islam or the metaphysics of Aristotle which explains why the unknown Arabic compiler limited his borrowings from Proclus so narrowly.

I cannot recommend the study of Bacon's lectures on this singular volume to anyone but students with a special interest in the history of thirteenth-century philosophy. Unlike his younger contemporary, St. Thomas, Bacon does not seem to me ever to shine as a commentator, and least of all in this particular instance. He makes no attempt to understand the spirit and drift of the work he is expounding as a whole, as St. Thomas does in his commentary on the same text, and this is perhaps why he can acquiesce so completely in the notion that the propositions he is discussing come from Aristotle. His method is the unprofitable one of merely taking each thesis in isolation, asking himself what objections he can devise to it on Peripatetic principles, and how those objections may be got rid of, again on what are, or are supposed to be, strictly Aristotelian lines. The method is, in a way, common to all scholastic commentators, but in Bacon's hands it is accompanied neither by the really minute and careful analysis of the text under discussion which is characteristic of St. Thomas, nor by Thomas's very real insight into the "architectonic" of a philosophical system. Consequently, whatever logical acumen may be displayed in the course of such discussions, their result is bound to be mere sterility. There is, or was, a popular impression that such sterility is a curse of the philosophy of the schoolmen in general, but that Bacon is a splendid exception. That view, so common in the nineteenth cen-

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tury among enthusiasts who seem to have had very little acquaintance with what they commended, will not, I believe, survive the publication of the *Opera Inedita*, or, at any rate, not the study of them made possible by their publication. Apart from his knowledge in optics, Bacon seems to have had no remarkable stock of scientific knowledge, and the notion of him as a would-be liberator of the scientific genius from the domination of Aristotelian metaphysics is the merest of myths. On the contrary, it is he, much rather than Bonaventura or Albert or Thomas, who stands most deeply committed to the superstition that "the philosopher" is to all intents inerrant, and his interpretation of "the philosopher" is much more bound up with the traditions of the Arabian exegetes than theirs. How can any philosophy be other than sterile if it proceeds on the assumption that there is nothing now left for philosophy as such to do beyond drawing out in detail the exact logical implications of theses already laid down by Aristotle? And this is the assumption made, not by St. Thomas, but repeatedly by Brother Roger.

A word or two must suffice about the way in which the editors of the volume have executed their task. The text, like so much of what they have previously printed, comes from the now well-known Amiens MS. As the apparatus supplied by the editors shows, this MS.—apparently prepared for the Paris stationers—is very far from impeccable. The editors have themselves thought it necessary to "emend" pretty frequently in their text, as well as to append a further list of emendations at the close of the volume (I do not know on what principle it has been determined which of two equally certain corrections shall be printed in the text and which reserved for the appendix). In most cases their emendations will be found to be clearly necessary (though not in all, e.g., at pp. 13, 11; 94, 10; 115, 18; 158, 23; a little reflection on the sense intended by the writer should show that the text received as that of the MS. is absolutely correct). But it has to be added that quite a considerable further number of minor emendations—most of them, fortunately, fairly obvious, have to be made by the reader for himself, if he is to understand the author's reasoning. As I have supplied a pretty full list of such corrections in a recent issue of *Mind*, I beg to be excused from dealing with the matter here. The editors, I think, are not themselves quite clear as to their precise function as editors of a hitherto unprinted work. They might, of course, take the line that their task is that of paleographers pure and simple; they have merely to print what the scribe of their MS. wrote, or meant to write, whether it represents what Bacon himself said or not. Had they followed this view consistently, however, they could not have made the numerous corrections which they have made (and in my own view, quite properly). Or they might take, as I should myself bid, the very different view that in a work like this it is necessary to get behind the errors of the scribe to what their author said (when this can be certainly ascertained). On that view, they should have printed as their text a great many "emendations" which an attentive reading will show to be absolutely demanded by the context, though Messrs. Steele and Delorme do not mention them even in their Appendix. Whatever the explanation of their methods, they unfortunately tend to produce the impression that their text has not been subjected before printing to careful and competent perusal, with close attention to the writer's argument. Yet surely that is no more than we have a right to expect in an editor of the works of a famous Oxford man for which the University of Oxford, in a way, has made herself responsible. (For justification of these necessary, though reluctant, observations, I must refer the reader to the detailed list of *Corrigenda* which I have given elsewhere.)

A. E. TAYLOR.

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The Source of Civilization. By GERALD HEARD. (London: Jonathan Cape 1935. Pp. 431. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

It would be a wiser and a kinder world if everyone could take it upon himself to write a book about the ills of human society. Even if such a task were made part of the routine of the conventional higher education, it would create a psychological aristocracy at least willing, if not able, to understand each other's emotional bias, and thus better prepared to shape the courses of their striving in a direction at least agreeable to a majority. Mr. Heard has taken Man as distributed in all time and space for his study, and, as he points out in his preface, insists on a due recognition of the instinctive, as opposed to the rationalistic, basis of human society; whereupon he makes it a chief point that the application of force plays little, if any, part among the causes of social cohesion. Where he appears to err, however, is in his failure to consider the social import of the threats as opposed to the use of force. For instance, the two basic crimes, incest and intestine murder, may not be common; and it may be that evolved instincts, as well as social pressure, stand at the back of such primal prohibitions. But it cannot be gainsaid that the traditional punishment for either is death, or at least excommunication, both of them forms of sanction fortified by the danger of unleashing an inherent group-aggressiveness. The tribe turns on the criminal breaker of a major taboo with all the fury of a wolf pack when it does to death a wounded mate. Such manifestations of almost blind wrath may be, in a sense, pathological; but so, after all, was every organic or social aberration that has been in the long run eliminated by the relentless verdict of natural selection.

Nevertheless, Mr. Heard's main thesis is a sound one, namely, that rationality is ultimately the product of unconscious—and, he would probably agree, unconsciously aggressive—stimuli. Hence, like a great tree, culture stands in constant danger of extinction; for the roots must ever find nutriment in a deeper subsoil of tenderness if the top is not to wither in the harsh light of a critical rationalism. Thus death and destruction must follow whenever the logician kicks against the pricks of a profounder and, as it were, mystic understanding.

Apart from this general warning, the reader is left somewhat free to construct his own social remedies; and likewise to speculate further on his own account concerning the aetiology of this disease of the unsheathed sword. Is it the maladjustment of a changing society to a fixed species of Man whose evolutionary clock has run down? This seems to be the author's impression. But may not evolution be with us here and now? And what of the ontogenetic, as opposed to the phylogenetic, reactions of an organism to the changes of its environment? May it not be, then, that the recent leap in cultural advance may have reorientated the instincts in a manner no longer compatible with the outworn strait-waistcoat of primitive cultural taboos. The new individualized system of technological specialization and economic rivalry, and perhaps other environmental influences directly affecting the body and mind by way of the better food thus provided, may have stimulated an aggressiveness which the older cultural institutions prove unable either to canalize or to control. Pragmatically, the sword and the chalice start as symbols of equal value. Why, then, should humanity be met by the point of the one each time it attempts to grasp the other? Can it be that aggression and love, being complementary, are severally unable to exist alone? If so, perhaps a rise in the tide of human affection, no less than an increase of instinctively pugnacity, has strengthened the arm with which each man is sworn to defend that which he holds most dear.

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In conclusion, let it suffice to state that the reader will find here an elaborate apparatus of sociological information and argument well designed to disturb any complacent tolerance of things as they are.

J. R. DE LA H. MARETT.

Introduction to Philosophy. By GEORGE THOMAS WHITE PATRICK, Ph.D.
Revised with the assistance of FRANK MILLER CHAPMAN, Ph.D.
(London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1935. 1p. x + 482. Price 10s. 6d.)

This book is a notable example of a type in which—since instruction in the U.S.A. relies more upon textbooks than is customary in Great Britain—American authors excel. While it will certainly meet the need of the inquiring layman, its primary purpose will be found in the class-room. It is, perhaps, an open question whether our students would be better off if, in our philosophical schools, we were to utilize such a comprehensive introduction as this; nevertheless, there can be no doubt at all that if they were to add to a reading of these pages sufficient reference to the ample bibliographies appended, our students would indeed be well “introduced” to their theme. It might very well be argued that our pass-men would be the gainers by such a move; while for honours students our more personal and (perhaps) more critical methods still offer better meat.

Their method is described as “objective” by which the authors mean that they assume the right to describe the world and man, their growth and nature, without confusing the student at the outset by epistemological and kindred inquiries. Thus much of the book belongs to science and “general knowledge” rather than to what is now generally deemed philosophy. For example, “The Earth is one of nine planets revolving round the sun . . .” etc. The greater part of the book, however, deals with problems properly philosophical, under the three headings, “Theories of Reality,” “The Nature of Mind and Knowledge,” and “The Higher Values.”

The character and scope of this book precludes comment upon points of detail, while generalities can only tend to be vacuous. It is obvious that the more advanced student—for whom the book is not intended—will be less satisfied with some portions than with others; but it is unlikely that a reasonably sympathetic reader will anywhere lose his sense of the competence, skill, and industry of the author and his coadjutor. A long section on “What is the Mind?”—which presents a strongly functional view—is, in my opinion, very good indeed. There is, on the other hand, some loose judgment. What, for example, can one make of this, occurring in an otherwise sober criticism of pragmatism? “Philosophy hitherto has been very much an avocation of a few select ‘highbrows,’ who frequented college and university classrooms, distant from the practical interests of common men. . . . If we are shocked at the extravagances and paradoxes of the Pragmatists, it is well to remember that nothing but a jolt like this would have brought philosophy down to earth” (p. 379). It is quite incredible that the authors would care to defend this truly monstrous utterance. Was J. S. Mill or John Locke “in the clouds”? Or were these no philosophers? Who, knowing anything of them, and liking or disliking their theories, could doubt the reality and effect of the “idealists’” concern for social and moral matter? Is it an accident that Plato (an intellectualist of the intellectualists in Dewey’s view) devotes vastly more attention

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to civic, educational, and moral questions than to any, or perhaps to all, other themes?

Their "objective" method involves the authors in some repetition which another approach might conceivably have avoided. In discussing idealism as a theory of reality Berkeley's position is so baldly stated as to seem simply silly (pp. 214-16); while in a subsequent section (pp. 344-51), dealing primarily with epistemology, the foundations and ramifications of the Bishop's philosophy are disclosed, and the whole shown to be very far from ridiculous.

Setting aside these points of detail and the important problem as to whether its type is really suited to its theme—or whether philosophy is a textbook subject—this book can only be regarded, in its kind, as a wholly admirable production.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

Immanuel Kant on Philosophy in General. Translated with Four Introductory Essays by HUMAYUN KABIR. (Calcutta University Press, 1935. Pp. cl + 90. Price Rs. 5 or 9s.)

This consists of a translation of the tentative Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* that Kant wrote but never himself published, preceded by four introductory essays by the translator.

A very arbitrary abstract of this "first introduction" was given by Beck in the explanatory notes on the *Critical Philosophy* that he published in 1794, and in the same form it appeared again in Starke's collection of Kant's minor writings (*Kleine Schriften*, Leipzig, 1833). It was the latter who gave it the title *On Philosophy in General*, which does not appear to have Kant's authority. A full text of the manuscript appears in vol. v of Cassirer's edition of Kant, and there is a convenient separate edition by Lehmann published in 1927 by Felix Meiner.

Starke's title may have served its purpose in his collection, but it is unfortunate that this translation should be hidden under a name that has no connection with the third *Critique* and consequently obscures its considerable importance for the student of Kant.

Any translation is inevitably to some extent an interpretation, and Mr. Kabir tends naturally to translate in the sense that one would expect from the views he expresses in the Introductory Essays. These essays are therefore important not only for what they say of Kant but as an indication of how best to understand the translation. On the whole the English version follows the principle of carefully rendering the appropriate English word for the German, though it is, of course, debatable how far this method succeeds in putting the English reader in the state of mind in which he would be had he read the German. For instance, the substitution in a syntactical structure fundamentally similar of the English for the German names of the Faculties gives in English an impression of personifying the Faculties that is not conveyed by the original. But that is the problem of all translators, and need not in this case handicap the reader who acquaints himself with the Introductory Essays.

These Essays are in the main a discussion of the relation to each other of the three *Critiques*, and run on the traditional lines, though underlying the writer's general position there seems to be an interpretation of the relation of the Phenomenal and the Noumenal that is surely extreme. On his view Appearances are not Appearances of Things-in-themselves, but the two seem to be different alternative realms standing in not altogether dissimilar rela-

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tions to a knower. This tacitly affects his views on all topics, but is occasionally explicit as in his discussion of Freedom and Causality in the second essay, where he says: "It is no explanation to refer the necessity to the phenomenal and the freedom the noumenal character of things. . . . The only way out is to recognize the difference between them [freedom and necessity] as one of degree. *That is phenomenal in which the aspect of freedom is negligible, while the noumenal is that in which causality is not the most important element*" (author's italics). This seems to give up the explanatory advantages that Kant's view on the more usual interpretation undoubtedly possesses.

The author's heavily adjectival style distracts attention from the subject and may lead one to misinterpret him. This is, of course, not a difficulty in the translation itself, and Mr. Kabir is to be thanked for his helpful version.


W. A. SINCLAIR.

Jesus and the Moralists. By E. W. HIRST, M.A., B.Sc., Lecturer in Christian Ethics in the University of Manchester. (London: Epworth Press, 1935. Pp. 189. Price 5s. net.)

A Student's Philosophy of Religion (revised edition). By WM. KELLEY WRIGHT (New York and London: The Macmillan Co. 1935. Pp. xvi + 506. Price 12s. 6d.)

I imagine that a number of students of ethics reading Mr. Hirst's title will pass by on the other side of what they are assured is a religious, not an ethical study. If the title had been "J. S. Mill and the Moralists," they would have stopped to read. Yet as simple historical fact, Jesus of Nazareth has had more influence on the ethical ideas of the world than any other moral teacher or than all of them collectively. It is an amazing example of our water-tight minds, that keep science and religion in separate quarters with thick bulkheads (one might play on that word) between them, that any textbook of ethics will copiously refer to Mill and probably only incidentally to Jesus. The separation between ethics as a science and Christian ethics is one of those things which some future generation will have to be told and told again in order to believe it was ever possible.

Mr. Hirst's book in some degree bridges this needless chasm. He begins with a general account of the moral principles of Jesus, and continues with contrasting Hellenism and Stoicism with Christian Ethics. Next come Rationalism, Hedonism, and Self-realization, and finally some present-day tendencies, all of which are taken comparatively with Christian moral ideals. Mr. Hirst is in no sense an apologist, though his own standpoint is that of Christian ideals. But his purpose is comparative, not forensic, and he is more concerned to state the relationship between Christian and other ethical systems than to argue the merits of the one or other. If one has any criticism to make it is that in the last chapters Mr. Hirst deals with a number of writers such as G. B. Shaw, Aldous Huxley, D. H. Lawrence, whose relation to ethical theory is, to say the least, ephemeral, rather than with the New Intuitionism, with Professor Laird, who is not mentioned, and Hartmann, whose views are but scantily summarized. But this is to complain that we have not had more, which is ungracious when there is so much that is admirable in Mr. Hirst's book. It is much to be hoped that what Mr. Hirst has begun, he or others will continue. Christian and secular ethical theories need each other, if there is to be any hope of a synoptic view of morality. No European ethics



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to-day can possibly be independent of Christian morality, even if its dependence is shown by reaction against it. The lack of co-ordination between the two is a serious defect which Mr. Hirst's essay effectively challenges.

Professor Wright's book is a re-edition of the volume that appeared in 1922, with three new chapters and various emendations. It is extraordinarily comprehensive. Taken strictly upon its title, it may be challenged as containing a great deal that properly belongs to the Comparative Study of Religion rather than to the philosophy of religion, and quite a fair-sized section is Church history. Another section is psychological. Despite the length of the book as a whole, it is inevitable that many questions such as reason and revelation, divine personality, morality, and religion, and so forth are inadequately treated. Deism gets a page. Whitehead's interesting conception of God is not mentioned and there are other omissions for which the introduction of so much non-philosophical matter is responsible. On the other hand, Professor Wright's intention is to provide materials from which the student can build up his own views, and in that respect he succeeds admirably. At the same time, in the vexed questions of the origins of religion it is not possible to enter into the issues as a whole, and what is said must necessarily be too summary to be sufficient. It is not what Professor Wright gives us that can be criticised. It is simply his laudable desire to equip his student as fully as possible that leads him to make his book a miniature encyclopaedia of religion and ethics rather than a philosophy of religion.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity. By ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY and GEORGE BOAS. With supplementary essays by W. F. ALBRIGHT and P. E. DUMONT. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1935. Pp. xv + 482. Price \$5: 22s.)

The book, the first of a series, explores ancient literature for evidence of what is termed "primitivism." This seems to consist primarily in the tendency to laud antiquity and to use it as a foil whereby the unsatisfactoriness of present conditions is exhibited by means of a sharp contrast. The advantage of placing the golden age in the past, rather than in the future, is that it is thereby shown to be compatible with human nature that this more blessed state of things should be attainable. Just so, in the thought of the seventeenth century the state of nature was, on the whole, exalted, although there were scientifically minded persons who had a clearer notion of what primeval savagery must have been like. Mr. Lovejoy has ransacked the classics for passages conceived in this vein, and brings out very clearly the value to the idealist of such an imagined state of human perfection, however vaguely, localized in time and space. On the other hand, he also deals with authors whose point of view was not philosophical but historical; and these precursors of modern anthropology are not surely to be accused of blind primitivism in the sense of the tendency to glorify the past. For such a writer as Hippocrates, for instance, or for the matter of that even Herodotus, despite his desire to tell a good story, is really concerned to explore things as they have truly been, or as they actually were beyond the limits of Mediterranean civilization.

Meanwhile, wholehearted praise must be given to the thoroughness of the documentation and to the accuracy of the scholarship whereby the meaning

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of the ancient texts is made clear. There is a quite unexpected amount of interest in the past discoverable in the writers of antiquity, some of them very little known to fame; and none of them is overlooked here. Whereas four hundred and twenty pages are given to the Greeks and Romans, supplementary essays by Professors Albright and Dumont, which deal with Western Asia (Mesopotamia, Israel, and Egypt) and Ancient India respectively, cover but twenty-six pages altogether, yet do so in such a suggestive way that it is clear that primitivism is a universal tendency of mankind. This must suffice as a summary notice of a book so full of illustrative detail that a very careful study is required; more especially, perhaps, when the later Greek philosophers come to be considered, with their rather ambiguous insistence on "conformity to nature." As for the subdivisions of primitivism which distinguish finitist and infinitist theories and so on, not to speak of something which goes by the portentous name of "animalitarianism," these somewhat pedantic attempts at classification do not seriously detract from the value of a work which will appeal not only to classical scholars, but to all who study the human mind and more especially its speculative and visionary impulses.

J. R. DE LA H. MARETT.

Studies in Philosophy. By G. C. FIELD, M.A., D.Litt., Professor of Philosophy in the University of Bristol. (Bristol: J. W. Arrowsmith, Ltd. 1935. Pp. 250. Price 10s. 6d.)

All the twelve lectures and essays in this volume have been previously published, but many readers will be grateful to have them collected. Professor Field covers a wide range of subjects, and he has something of Plato's gift for discussing subtle questions in the current language of educated men, so that he can be read with pleasure by the amateur as well as by the professed student of philosophy. This volume can be cordially recommended to all who are interested in metaphysics, psychology, and ethics.

F. M. CORNFORD.

Books received also:—

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- J. STEEKSMAN, *Philosophical Inquiry*. London: C. W. Daniel Co. 1935. Pp. 168. 5s.
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- G. N. BELKNAP, *Religion in Plato's States*. U.S.A.: University of Oregon Publication. 1935. Pp. 16.
- G. MAYER, *Friedrich Engels (A Biography)*. London: Chapman & Hall Ltd. 1936. Pp. viii + 323. 15s.
- W. D. ROSS, *Aristotle's Physics*. A revised text with introduction and commentary. Oxford at the Clarendon Press. 1936. Pp. xii + 750. 36s.
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- J. R. DE LA H. MARETT, B.Sc. *Race, Sex and Environment. A Study of Mineral Deficiency in Human Evolution.* London: Hutchinson & Co. 1936. Pp. 342. 21s.
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- A. H. COMPTON. *The Freedom of Man.* New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1935. 1'p. xi + 153. 2 dollars; 9s.
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- R. R. MARETT, D.Sc., LL.D. *Head, Heart and Hands in Human Evolution.* London: Hutchinson & Co. 1935. 1'p. 303. 10s. 6d.
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- E. THOMAS. *A View of All Existence. Comprising New Interpretations and a Logical Plea.* London: Watts & Co. 1936. 1'p. 570. 7s. 6d.
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NEW BOOKS

- N. ABERCROMBIE, M.A., D.Phil. *The Origins of Jansenism*. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. Pp. xii + 341. 15s.
- C. E. RAVEN, D.D. *Evolution and the Christian Concept of God*. (Riddell Memorial Lectures, 1935.) London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1936. Pp. 56. 2s. 6d.
- L. RUSU, D.-ès-L. *Essai sur la Création Artistique*. Paris: F. Alcan. 1935. Pp. 460. Frs. 50.
- Œuvres de Laberthonnière* publiées par les soins de Louis Canet. Etudes sur Descartes. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin. 1935. Vol. I. Pp. viii + 467; Vol. II. Pp. 379. Frs. 70 deux vols.
- M. BLONDEL, *L'Être et les Êtres*. Paris: F. Alcan. 1935. Pp. 540. Frs. 50.
- L. ROBIN, *Platon*. Paris: F. Alcan. 1935. Pp. viii + 364. Frs. 35.
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- Vauvenargues' *Réflexions et Maximes*. London: Cambridge University Press. 1936. Pp. 73.
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- L. RUSU, D.-ès-L. *Le Sens de l'Existence dans la Poésie Populaire Roumaine*. Paris: F. Alcan. 1935. Pp. 119. Frs. 15.
- W. MITSCHERLICH, *Die Lehre von den Beweglichen und Starren Begriffen Erläutert an der Wirtschaftswissenschaft*. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer. 1936. Pp. xv + 451. Rm. 10.
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THE NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY
(Congrès Descartes)

Organized by the Société Française de Philosophie under the presidency of
M. Henri Bergson
will be held in Paris in 1937 (August 1st-6th)

THE Congress of 1937 will commemorate the third centenary of the appearance of Descartes's *Discours de la Méthode*, and the Committee propose as the central problem for written communications and discussions that of the unity of method among diverse mental activities, treated under the following heads:—

1. The Present State of Cartesian Studies.
2. The Unity of Science:—
 - (a) Methodology and the Methods of the Special Sciences;
 - (b) The History of the Problem in Antiquity, in the Middle Ages and in Modern Times.
3. Logic and Mathematics.
4. Causality and Determinism in Physics and Biology: Probability and Statistics.
5. The Relations of Body and Mind.
6. Value, Ethical, Social and Aesthetical Norms, and Reality.

Section 1 will alone be devoted to a historical study of Descartes, Section 2 (*b*) to the history of philosophy. The problems proposed throughout the remainder of the programme, though raised in a general form by Descartes, will be treated not historically but from the standpoint of their present position and interest.

Invitations are extended for participation either as "active members" or as "associate members" (fees payable, respectively, 80 Fr. and 40 Fr.). The former alone take active part in the work of the Congress and receive a copy of its *Actes*. The latter attend its sessions and enjoy, with "active members," gratuitous admission to the *Exposition Internationale*, a reduction of 60 per cent. in the price of return tickets on French railways to and from the Congress, a reduction of 50 per cent. in the price of tickets for railway travelling during the period of the Congress, certain privileges for receptions and theatres in Paris.

Communications should reach Professor Emile Bréhier, 40 rue de l'Yvette, Paris XVI, not later than February 1, 1937. Programme and further information is obtainable from Dr. R. Bayer, 26 avenue Théophile-Gautier, Paris XVI.

S. V. K.

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

DESCRIPTION AND EXPLANATION

MY DEAR EDITOR,

I suggest that the distinction between description and explanation is that between values concerning which men agree and values concerning which they differ.

Everyone recognizes the difference between a true and complete statement of facts and a false or incomplete statement; everyone prefers the former. The purely descriptive part of science consists of a series of statements about scientific facts; everyone judges in the same way the value of these statements relative to their alternatives. There is complete agreement concerning the relative value of alternative "descriptions."

But there is complete disagreement concerning the absolute value of facts or, more accurately, their value relative to other things. To the scientist facts have a very great intrinsic importance; the keen curiosity of scientists about facts of every kind is the origin and inspiration of all science. The scientist delights in recording, remembering, and contemplating facts. A bare statement of facts is so complicated that he cannot contemplate it; he seeks therefore rules, relating the facts to each other, which enable him to contemplate facts as a whole. These rules, relating facts to each other and not to anything else, are not merely an explanation of the facts; they are the only possible explanation; they satisfy completely his intellectual desires concerning the part of the universe that is of greatest importance to him.

Others find little or no intrinsic value in facts. If they found no value at all, they would not concern themselves with science; science would be left to scientists and no question would ever arise concerning the value of its "explanations." But facts have a value for them; they have a utilitarian value for everyone; to mathematicians facts are often the starting-point of interesting investigations. (It is a curious circumstance, but for our purpose irrelevant, that mathematicians, in following out arguments suggested by facts, often hit on rules relating facts to each other for which scientists have sought in vain.) They are not content with rules relating facts to each other; they want to relate facts to other things, namely the things in which they find intrinsic value. The explanations of science, just because they are explanations to those with a sense of the intrinsic value of facts, are no explanation at all to those who lack that sense.

The question whether one valuation is right and the other wrong seems to me meaningless; the values concerned are ultimate; there is no common valuation to which both can be referred. I see no harm in philosophers and mathematicians seeking to find in science a significance other than that which scientists attribute to it; indeed, it may actually help science, as does the interest of mathematicians. The harm arises only when philosophers seek to prove that science cannot have for scientists the significance on which depends the very existence of science.

Yours sincerely,

NORMAN R. CAMPBELL.

WATFORD,
HERTS.

January, 1936.

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TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

MY DEAR EDITOR,

In the limited space at my disposal, allow me to comment briefly on only one of the issues raised by Professor Hallett in his review of my book *The Philosophy of Spinoza* in *Philosophy* for July 1935.

Professor Hallett objects to my contention that Descartes's description of the contrast between the geometrical method as employed by him in metaphysics and the syllogistic method as employed by the Schoolmen is, on the showing of his own words, nothing but the Aristotelian distinction between a scientific syllogism and a syllogism which is dialectical and contentious. He argues that it is improper to speak of geometrical demonstrations as syllogistic and testifies to his "uncomfortable feeling" which "almost reaches certainty" that I have "not . . . understood the logical principle involved." I dare say that the dogmatism of his assertion and his "uncomfortable feeling" do credit to his supreme faith in his own convictions, but they do not represent the true status of the problem. Aristotle, in fact, did consider geometrical demonstrations as syllogistic and the matter is still a subject of discussion among logicians. Professor Hallett's statement that "no geometrical proof is syllogistic except in incidental features such as the quotation of the authority of a prior truth" reflects the following statement in Joseph's *Introduction to Logic* (ed. 1916), p. 311: "In geometry we never syllogize except when we rely upon the result of a previous demonstration whose steps we do not realize in the case before us." Without going into the question whether even on the basis of Joseph's statement it is wrong to describe Descartes's geometrical method as syllogistic, I need only refer to discussions on the subject in such works as Ueberweg's *System of Logic*, pp. 397 ff.; Sigwart's *Logic*, I, pp. 362 ff., II, p. 190; Erdmann's *Logik* (3rd ed.), pp. 681 ff.; and Joyce's *Principles of Logic*, pp. 186, 199, to show that the matter is not so simple and one-sided as the reviewer imagines. Joyce, on p. 199, states the case as follows: "Several recent logicians have maintained that much of the reasoning employed in mathematics is not syllogistic. . . . We believe this view to be erroneous." Whatever merit or demerit my characterization of Descartes's geometrical method may have, it certainly cannot be impugned on the basis of the argument advanced by Professor Hallett.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY A. WOLFSON.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

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INSTITUTE NOTES

During the past term Mr. T. M. Knox, M.A., of Jesus College, Oxford, has delivered an interesting course of lectures on "Philosophy and Practical Life."

The Addresses at the Evening Meetings have been as follows: "God and the Ultimate Values," by the Dean of St. Paul's; "Vice and Illusion," by Professor Gilbert Murray.

Members are asked to take notice that the first of the WRIGHT MEMORIAL LECTURES will be given by Professor Ernest Barker on May 7th at 5.45. Title of the lecture: "The Romantic Factor in Modern Politics."

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[Suggested]

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I bequeath to THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY the sum of.....free of duty, to be applied to the purposes of that Institute, and I declare that the receipt of the Honorary Secretary or other proper officer for the time being of that Institute, shall be a sufficient discharge for the same.

PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

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VICE AND ILLUSION

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VICE

PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY

It is a pleasure to all of us to hold forth upon subjects about which we know very little. It is particularly a temptation to university professors to get away from the subjects of their own chairs and lecture as dogmatically as their nature demands on subjects of other people's chairs. That is why I am speaking to-night about Psychology. As to Vice, the case is a little different. Even if my own experience is regrettably limited, I have for some years studied the Chairman, and I bring my observations before a society full of persons whose range and profundity of knowledge will be sufficient to correct any hasty generalizations on my part.

What do I mean by "Vice"? Well, to start with, we observe as a matter of fact that, apart from actual crimes, or deep-seated wickedness, human life is constantly wrecked and ruined by three main bad habits: drink and drugs, sexual excesses, and gambling. What is the common element in these? A superficial analysis treats it as mere sensuality or pursuit of physical pleasure: that applies very little to any of them, and not at all to gambling. For example, if it were the mere physical pleasure of drinking that made the drunkard, we should expect to find the same effects from gluttony: to hear of young men who lost their employment and beat their wives owing to an inordinate love of cheese or roast grouse, which does not occur. People may ruin themselves, no doubt, through sloth or laziness, but only in a slow and negative way: it is failure rather than wreckage.

Consider some of the characteristic effects of drink or drugs upon behaviour. I knew a man, otherwise of good character, who drank and lost his job, more than once, through drinking. His friends

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found other possible jobs for him, in which of course everything depended upon his making an impression of sobriety and general trustworthiness, at any rate at the beginning. We found that when he went up to be interviewed for the appointment he turned up drunk. Could he not have kept sober for that one day? Of course he could. But what happened on each occasion was the same. He wanted to make a good impression. He felt nervous. His courage ebbed. He took a drink to steady himself, and felt better, but not quite right. So he took more and more, and appeared at the interview helpless.

Take another case. There is a particular form of blindness produced by nicotine poisoning. A distinguished Scotch oculist once told me that when patients came to him suffering from the early symptoms of this malady, he would explain the situation to them and tell them that their only chance of keeping their sight was to give up smoking: if they continued to smoke they would go blind. Nearly all, he said, did continue to smoke and did go blind. Perhaps one out of ten succeeded in changing his habits. If one tries to guess at the psychological process in their minds, perhaps it was this. The thought of coming blindness was painful, worrying. The worry would be charmed away by a pipe; and one pipe could not make any difference to the disease.

There is something curious at work here. Something at any rate different from mere sensuality. It is not mere self-indulgence. There is an element of madness or delusion.

I remember—and this is the one lurid confession that I have to lay before the Institute this evening—one experience of my own with drugs. I had hay-fever badly, and had made it even worse by moving a lot of books which were full of dust, and kept me sneezing and running at the eyes all night. I had been recommended to squirt hazeline up my nostrils, and since this was painful, to dilute the hazeline with a 5 per cent solution of cocaine. So I took this remedy freely, and since my nostrils were particularly sensitive freely increased the proportion of cocaine. It was lovely! All pain went. All worry and depression, all sense of disappointment and fear of the future melted away. I was not exactly in high spirits, but I was in a sort of celestial calm. I scarcely thought, but such thoughts as I had were beautiful. In the course of the morning a visitor came in and talked to me. This I felt to be tiresome. I resented the effort of having to attend to what he said, especially since it did not and could not matter in the least. Whatever sounds or noises he might utter could not matter to me.

It seemed that I was happy: that to me
A livelier emerald twinkled in the grass,
A deeper sapphire melted into the sea.

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You will perhaps be disappointed to hear that, just about this point, it dawned on me that I was under the influence, and that my delightful hay-fever cure was open to objection. So I stopped it.

Nevertheless, that brief hour of illusion made me realize as never before the state of mind of the drug-addict or the drunkard. These things, while their effect lasts, transmute the world. That is why they are beyond price, irresistible. It is not that they give the victim pleasure: it is that, whereas without them he may have been poor, unsuccessful, disliked, ill-thought-of, contemptible, disappointed, after taking them he becomes a sort of celestial being, his illusions fulfilled, and his megalomania satisfied. They have made for him a new heaven and a new earth.

I am speaking of the psychological side of the experience. From the physical side there are other considerations to be borne in mind, particularly the effect of all these drugs, from alcohol and tobacco to cocaine and opium, in causing a craving for themselves. That raises other problems, which for the moment I leave aside.

It may be said that my explanation applies well enough to one particular group of vices, drugs and drink, but what about the others? I believe it applies to all of them, though not quite in the same degree.

In the case of sexual temptations there is no doubt a physical instinct and a strong natural desire concerned. This may easily become excessive. But I greatly doubt whether the mere excess of a natural instinct would by itself produce half the destruction which we now see produced. On the basis of the physical instinct there is reared an immense superstructure of illusion, of self-flattery, of mutual flattery, curiously like the illusion produced by drugs. Tolstoy says of the prostitute Maslova that she had great self-respect and self-admiration: she believed that she possessed certain qualities which were immensely in request. People praised her in extravagant language, and showed their sincerity by paying very high prices for the pleasure of her society. She lived in an atmosphere of illusion. On a reading party I was once thrown into the society of an undergraduate of my own age who was involved in continuous amatory intrigues. (He was sent down after his first year.) I remember that he had a passionate love-poem, with a space ingeniously left in the first line of each verse so that almost any reasonable female Christian name would suit the metre. And he made good use of it. He sometimes favoured me with his confidence, and I remember being struck by the same thought that I am trying to put before you now. He was possessed by a real passion; and that passion was not love, nor yet mere desire in a low physical sense. It was vanity, or self-adoration or megalomania; the wish to be assured that he was something unique and splendid, beyond the common run of human kind. I

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remember his looking at himself in the glass and murmuring, "I am an ugly little devil, really. I wonder what it is they all see in me." But he knew in his heart, or rather he always wanted to be assured and re-assured, that the thing they all saw in him was the real man, the secret splendid truth, which then irradiated his world for him. It was this longing that made him so fickle. He had sported with Amaryllis, and Amaryllis had assured him ecstatically that he was a wonderful being. But then Amaryllis loved him; he had taken pains to make her do so; he would like another opinion, a disinterested opinion. If that were equally ecstatic he would be content. So he approached Euphemia.

Does the same explanation apply to gambling? I think it does, though obviously its physical basis is not a craving for sensual pleasure, but quite another element, the love of excitement and danger. I knew a man who is reported to have said that the greatest pleasure he knew was a cavalry charge, and the next greatest playing for a stake too high for him ever to pay. I doubt if most of us would enjoy either. But there is in the gambler a very strong element of day-dream. He sees himself rich. He puts in for the Melbourne Cup and imagines himself winning thirty thousand pounds at a blow, and doing all the wonderful things with it that he means to do. There is also, I suspect, a curious day-dream element making him think himself the favourite of Heaven, sure to win, or at least more likely to win than anyone else; making him believe that he has signs and hints vouchsafed to him, or else that he happens to possess—without much experience, it may be—one of the highest and most admirable of human qualities, a gift for spotting horses. The gambler, like the other persons we have analysed, has a vision of himself which he tries to realize by illusory methods.

This day-dream of self-adoration, this longing—by illegitimate and unreal paths—to feel the thrill of one's own splendour and greatness plays a large part in many other ways of behaviour which are not regularly labelled as vices: or rather, it selects as a root or base some natural animal instinct, and then clings to it like a parasite and puts forth a luxuriant growth. Notably it is so in sport. We start with the normal pleasure in killing its prey that belongs to the predatory beast. But then come refinements. There goes a bird high in the air, swift and beautiful and far above my pursuit. "Ah, that is what it thinks, is it? A touch of my finger and it falls bleeding and helpless, and acknowledging its master."

I knew a man who went to Iceland on purpose to shoot a Great Northern Diver. He wanted to shoot it because it was so beautiful a bird, and so rare, and had such a lovely deep bell-like cry. Mere rationalists would think that those were reasons for not killing it, and indeed for preventing anyone else from killing it; but the

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average sportsman feels otherwise, and it is hard to explain his feeling except on some lines of self-glorification. Why is it more of a pleasure to shoot hundreds of live pigeons as they rise from a box than to shoot dummy pigeons tossed up by a spring? Because the latter is a mere proof of my skill; the former shows me as master of things, inflicting agony and death, with a curl of the finger. One observes that certain notorious megalomaniacs particularly enjoy hunting-parties in which hundreds and hundreds of animals, as fine and beautiful animals as possible, are driven past and killed, killed, killed as they pass. One of them, General Göring, as I see in the Press, has just erected a monument to himself as "the Meisterjäger of Germany from the wild beasts of Germany" in gratitude and admiration. I must thank him for so aptly illustrating my point.

Cruelty is frequently incidental to megalomania, but is of course different. I imagine Streicher and his followers do feel more and more proud of themselves as they see little Jewish girls in tears and Jewish writers unable to write because both their thumbs are broken. It is perhaps difficult to be quite sure that you are something splendid and superhuman in power unless you can instantly destroy those who have doubts on that subject; or, indeed, unless—whether anyone doubts you or not—unless you can kill people with a nod and inspire terror as you pass. That is why most megalomaniacs want to be conquerors. *Et qui nolunt occidere quenquam Posse volunt*. Though you may not want to kill anyone, you wish that you had the power to do so; and how can you be sure that you have the power unless you sometimes use it?

So far these vices which we have analysed seem to have had two elements in common: *first*, a more or less complete disregard of the wishes and welfare of other people. This is obvious. In the drug addict it is a complete unconsciousness of other people; in the type we have considered last it extends to positive and widespread cruelty. But this quality is common to most if not all forms of anti-social conduct; so we need not dwell upon it further. The *second* and more characteristic element is Illusion. All these vices aim at creating a high degree of what psychologists call "positive self-feeling": at rescuing the man from his troubles, anxieties, failures, humiliations and fears, and so transmuting his whole environment. The drugs make him serene and at peace with the world. The sexual conquests make him an admired and beloved being, unique among his fellows; the gambling habit makes him bold, adventurous, and rich: the slaughter of beasts and men, and all the various exercises of tyranny, make him feel that he is a great man, towering above the herd that trembles before him. And then, in all of them alike, this sweetness or pride or glory turns out to be only an illusion. Either it disappears, leaving nothing behind,

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as with the drug addict who simply awakes from his dream into naked misery, or the gambler who finds himself ruined; else, without absolutely disappearing, it just turns to dust and ashes in his mouth. I have never seen this collapse of the cloud castles more vividly described than in an old Egyptian tale, which so fascinated me many years ago that I translated it. The Priest of Ptah, Setne, had committed a sin against the dead for which, it was prophesied, "His dreams would make him pay." One day he sees at Bubastis the most beautiful woman he had ever seen in his life, apparently a priestess of Pasht. He contrives to meet her. He finds her, more beautiful than ever, in a splendid palace on the verge of the desert in Per-bast, beyond the houses of the dead. She seems to love him, and he is wonderfully happy; but "she is no common woman," he must first sign a paper putting away his wife. He signs. Then, his present children must not be rivals to her future children. He must disown them. He does so. He is troubled, but she is more radiantly beautiful than ever. Then she needs more.

"These children, knowing all to me thou art,
Hate me. Let them be mine, to take apart
And do my will upon them." And he said
"Do all the abomination of thy heart."

She slew them then and from her window fine
Flung them. And far below he heard the whine
Of dogs that tore, and curling cats of Bast
Which lapped their blood. And Setne drank his wine.

Despair seizes him. He has lost everything: but—

"Hast thou not me, she said, in place of all?
Come therefore." And she led him through the hall
To a fair couch, ebony and ivory.
And down he lay and spread swift arms withal

To clasp her. And within his arms outspread
Sudden, she withered, withered: and her head,
It had no eyes, and downward all her jaw
Dropped, like the jaws of the uncared-for dead.

And Setne strove to rise, but cloud on cloud
Held him; hot wind and hate and laughter loud
And one that wept for a world's glory gone,
And dust, dust, dust. And Setne shrieked aloud;

And saw, and lo, all naked in the day
In a waste place of bricks and shards he lay,
And clutched a burning kiln. And near him passed
The way, and much folk jeering on the way.

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I quote the passage for two reasons. It illustrates the element of illusion and disillusion which I have put forward as more responsible than mere sensuality for the damage caused by what we call Vices. And secondly, coming from the ancient world, it illustrates the intensity with which ancient thought fixed on Illusion, deception, *Māya*, *Atê*, as the root of most evil. It is not we who have first seen this. The experience of the human race for thousands of years has felt the power, the seductiveness, the terrible destructive force of illusion, and seems to cry out to all who will listen that the Truth is hard, but it is only the Truth that saves. "Things are what they are, and their consequences will be what they will be. Why, then, should we seek to be deceived?"

Is that to be our conclusion? Bishop Butler's words are impressive. One would like to obey them and banish from our lives this infernal Siren of Illusion. But are they true? Did not Bishop Butler himself draw much of his influence from his acceptance of doctrines which very few people believe to be true? Do not almost all people accept the traditional religious beliefs of the country in which they happen to be born, Catholic, Protestant, Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, or whatever it may be? Is it not logically demonstrable that all but one of these systems must be in large part illusory, and far from certain that there is no illusory element in the remaining one? Must we not admit that passionate faith, the faith that makes devotees and martyrs, whether to sect, nationality, or political party, comprises often and perhaps generally a large element of illusion? In many cases it leads to a kind of megalomania, such as we see in most revolutions and dictatorships; sometimes to a belief that the possessor is in intimate and almost confidential relations with the Most High. Carlyle has observed that when Cromwell differed from his Council, he generally referred the matter to God in earnest prayer, and that God always decided against the Council. We need not dwell on the obviously bad effects of this Illusion, its megalomania, arrogance, and intolerance, especially in religion. It has led to cruel persecutions and savage wars. Indeed, it has probably produced more hatred of man against man than any other cause, except the struggle for life itself. That is granted. But the problem that troubles us is that in a number of cases, religious or philosophical or civic, this element of Illusion which we were inclined to condemn so unreservedly, turns out to be good. The world would be a poorer place without it.

Let us consider what point we have reached. "Things are what they are, and their consequences will be what they will be. Why, then, should we seek to be deceived?" Why, indeed. The ancient philosophers all caution us against the power of illusion. Socrates,

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as we know, took virtue to be identical with knowledge. You simply could not know that A was better than B, and yet prefer B. All vice was the result of false opinion. Euripides and others corrected this paradox. It is not through mere lack of knowledge that life is wrecked. Plenty of bad people have wits enough. It is because they do not hold out against temptation. They seek their own pleasure and forget τὸ καλόν. None the less, the Socratic view kept reappearing in the later philosophies. They all intellectualized their ethical problems, and were rather too anxious to prove that the wicked man was merely a deluded fool. Epicurus—rather like Norman Angell—thought all the main problems of life quite simple and obvious, if only men would not muddle themselves with artificial sophistries. Zeno identified Virtue with Wisdom (φρόνησις); the bad man was unwise, or, if you preferred so to phrase it, insane—the victim of delusions. Zeno did apparently admit that the passions were not exactly the same things as bad arguments, but the harm about them was that they “distorted the reason.” The Neoplatonists go even further. They want to base themselves on absolute knowledge, naked truth, and the absence of all illusion.

This is all very well, but, as a matter of fact, when we read these philosophers and admire them and feel their greatness, it is not so much their intellectual exactitude that moves us; it is their burning faith, their obstinate and heroic self-deception. When Epicurus, dying of a very painful disease, manages to write a short letter to a friend explaining how happy his last days of life are, and how his bodily pains, which have now reached their extreme, are overcome by the pleasure of his thoughts and memories: when Zeno argues with fiery conviction that riches and poverty, pain and pleasure, health and sickness, are neither good nor bad, but matters of perfect indifference; it is difficult not to admit that they have reached that state of inspired Illusion which we associate with saints, mystics, fanatics, *id genus omne*, more than with disinterested seekers after truth. It is a case of Faith rather than Science.

This kind of illusion is not confined to religion and philosophy. William James has studied it not only in its religious manifestations, but in various details of ordinary life. We all remember his illustration of the man confronted with a chasm to jump which is just at the limit of his physical strength. If he faces the facts and loses heart he will probably fail; if he feels that God is with him and therefore he must succeed, there is a good chance that he will manage that jump. Virgil saw the point plainly enough: *Possunt quia posse videntur*.

What is this Illusion which forms so important an element in life? What did Balzac mean by the title of his book *Illusions Perdues*? Why is it, on the whole, a bad thing to be disillusioned? I

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doubt if the phrase is an accurate one. I do not believe that the young man who still has his illusions does to a great extent entertain a number of false beliefs which the disillusioned man has tested and rejected in favour of true beliefs about the same subjects. I should suggest rather that the young man, being confronted by a very large and indefinite mass of ordeals or challenges, faces them with the courage and confidence that come from youth and high spirits, while the disillusioned man faces his challenges with the low spirits and lack of confidence which come from disappointment. No doubt some intellectual judgments are involved, a belief that "The governor is bound to give me a rise when I just tell him the facts," or, conversely, that "Only a fool would expect the governor to care whether I starve or not." A good many of these beliefs are mere emotions disguised in the form of intellectual judgements. But the intellectual beliefs are there. And if it is a bad thing to lose your illusions, if it is a good thing to have the sort of faith that moves mountains, it looks as if we were forced into a position extremely painful to any philosopher, that in certain fairly numerous cases it is better to be wrong than right, better to deceive ourselves than to face the truth.

Let us consider this painful conclusion a little further. First, we must keep distinct in our minds the moral qualities which lead to the illusion and the illusion itself. It is no answer to our problem to say: the courage of the martyr is good, but his intellectual mistake bad. Sometimes, of course, that is so. The courage of Ras Seyum's men makes them rush to destruction with swords and spears against artillery and aeroplanes. The courage is admirable, but the illusion which it produces deplorable. But in many cases the actual illusion, the false belief based on false information, seems to be good.

In ordinary practical life it is often considered better not to let a person know the whole truth. A patient with heart-disease is often deliberately deceived by his doctor on the ground that to know the truth would make the disease worse. A body of soldiers left in a desperate position may fight better and have a better chance of escape if they are cheered up by deliberate false information. I need hardly labour the point. It is only too freely and eagerly accepted. Consider in time of war how nearly all the Governments of the world lie like . . . like Governments.

I suspect that in all these cases where Illusion seems to be a good thing there are two elements which are of special importance. One is the weakness of human nature; weakness of intellect, or weakness of character, and weakness varying greatly from one individual to another in respect of particular crises. Some men are stimulated by danger, some paralysed. Some would yield to this or that temptation if they knew they had the chance of it. Some will face misfortune, but not the treachery of a friend. But there

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is a second element constantly interwoven with this consideration of the weakness of human nature: viz., that in a great many of the cases concerned it is difficult or impossible to convey in proper proportion the whole truth. If moralists will often leave an obvious delusion uncorrected or will even enunciate an emphatic falsehood with a good object, they do so chiefly in religious or political matters. And their defenders will maintain that, owing to the complexities of the subject *plus* the weakness of human nature, the Illusion thus fostered is nearer to the truth than the wholesale breakdown of belief that would result from scrupulous truthfulness.

I notice a curious example in a book which I mention with all respect, Pym's *Psychology and the Christian Life*. Dr. Pym undertakes a somewhat hard task in reconciling Freud and the Thirty-nine Articles, but that is not my point. He is speaking of resistance to temptation or the conquering of bad habits. In the old days we were told to use our will and make a moral effort. The Greek philosophers always speak of man "conquering" his temptations or "being conquered" by them. And Christian teaching has followed them. But the modern psychologists tell us we must not make any struggle against temptation. If Will and Imagination are at strife, Imagination always wins. Dr. Pym boldly accepts this slippery result, and says, "Do not bother about your will or resistance to temptation. Do not even depend on your faith in God, and believe that faith will save you." "God will do it without any help from you." "God will use you as His instrument" (pp. 36, 37).

This is a very interesting development of the older defence of certain Illusions on the ground that Faith will move mountains, or *possunt quia posse videntur*. Dr. Pym sees that it is obviously no good telling a man that he ought to have faith. The thing is to make him have it. Consequently he takes the line of telling him with authority and emphasis that, whether he believes it or not, the thing which Dr. Pym wants him to believe is true. It is no good saying to the soldiers in the forlorn hope, "If you will only believe firmly that reinforcements are coming you will very likely get through." The proper method is for the commanding officer to come forward with a radiant smile and a bogus telephone message: "The enemy are surrounded; reinforcements of sixty thousand fresh troops will be with us in three hours." I remember a woman in Scotland who was an enthusiastic social worker in causes which often exposed her to hardship and even humiliation. She told my wife that, when she had had some severe disappointment, she would sit alone in the dark holding out her right hand, and that in course of time Jesus Christ came and pressed it and she felt new courage. Most of us would agree that this belief was an illusion, and, further, that it was best not to disturb it. And I think our agreement would be based on two grounds: first, that owing to various intellectual

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weaknesses in her nature or her education, if we succeeded in convincing this woman that Jesus did not come and hold her hand, she would lose heart and—intellectually speaking—draw all sorts of wrong conclusions from the particular negative true proposition which we had drummed into her, so that her conception of the whole situation would be even further from the truth than before. A despairing attitude towards her problems would imply a number of intellectual beliefs which would on the whole be falsier than those implied by a courageous attitude . . . provided, of course, that her general aim was a good one, and in accordance with facts.

If we try to distinguish the pursuit of illusion which constitutes vice, and the pursuit of illusion which produces social or religious or artistic enthusiasm, I do not feel clear what exact tests we can lay down; but I would suggest three:

1. The enthusiast gets to his illusion by means of a real effort at understanding his problems, or, at least, of meeting his challenges: he cares intensely, he ponders deeply, and, though the motives and influences working on him may be greatly mixed, the illusion which results is a *bona fide* result of mental and moral effort. The drug addict, or drunkard—or those about me who, according to Tolstoy, are trying to drown their consciences by the use of tobacco—are seeking the illusion itself, or at any rate finding it by some merely mechanical and non-rational method, and not through an unsuccessful effort at understanding something too hard for them.

2. The illusions which accompany Vices, and which are to a great extent the end and aim of the vicious practice, are just those from which, for good social conduct, we ought to keep free. We all start life by excessive selfishness, excessive self-esteem. To a baby, so I am told by experts, his own desires and satisfactions constitute the whole world; it is that Illusion from which experience and moral effort gradually and imperfectly emancipate us. Drink, drugs, sensuality, gambling, cruelty, all bring us back towards the complete anti-social selfishness of the baby. The illusions of the enthusiast, though sometimes pernicious, practically always have the supposed welfare of others somewhere near the centre of the picture.

I am not sure whether we ought to add a third distinction. The Illusions that accompany Vice are not only particularly baseless—some of the good Illusions seem baseless enough—but they are, just because they put the subject into an anti-social attitude—particularly subject to rude awakenings. Like Setne, the drunkard or drug addict or gambler, when his dream is broken, does feel that dust, dust, dust is all about him, the world's glory gone, and much folk jeering on the road.

However, it seems clear that Virtue has its illusions as well as Vice. Think of what we call Nursery Morality with its highly simplified and specialized rules: that you must not be rude, not be dis-

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obedient, not bolt your food, not quarrel, etc.; its illusory picture of a world, in which Those who are good are happy, in which all grown-ups, and especially father and mother, are always good. (I leave aside for the moment the reflection that experience often brings to elderly people, that after all Nursery Morality was in practice pretty correct, and nearer truth than that of the fashionable novelist.) Apart from that, is not the real justification of this Illusory Picture of the world the fact that the child, for whom it is meant, is not capable of anything like a complete and exact picture of the real world—none of us are—and this illusory picture has been found by the traditional wisdom of many generations of nurses to be the sort of picture that conduces to the well-being of the nursery world? I suspect that the normal virtuous conception of life, as entertained and expounded by clergymen, schoolmasters, and well-behaved persons generally, is something similar to this nursery picture, and can be justified on exactly the same grounds. We must have some general working hypothesis. We have neither the opportunities nor the intellectual power to form a strictly adequate conception of the world or the problems of human life, and consequently we most of us accept a traditional conception: we think what the wisdom, duly mixed with folly, of our ancestors has considered it good for us to think, and has found on the whole to be conducive to human welfare. That is the normal basis, perhaps the only possible basis, for our attitude to life. The rough-and-ready picture of the world and its problems, as preached in the nursery or the churches or the law courts, aims at practical service rather than philosophic truth. Then in practice it is brought up with a clash against the real world, and something has to be done. Stupid people do not see the clash. Bad people drop the difficult or idealist parts of the tradition, and accept convenient alternatives. Victims of vice, being out of touch with their social environment, plunge into self-glorifying Illusions. Enthusiasts and fanatics, when contradicted by facts, try by force of will and emotion to deny the facts or change them. They may or may not succeed. But we who would be philosophers and men of science are bound by a special allegiance. We must put Truth always first and not second; and wherever it can be ascertained, base our lives upon it. In the immense uncharted region where exact truth is unattainable and men guide themselves mostly by approximations and metaphors, we must be on our guard against our own undetected illusions, and knowing that we cannot escape from them altogether, at least try to make sure that they do not deaden our consciences or our common sense. Let us seek Truth, as much Truth as we can find; let us at least never betray it; but Truth itself compels us to recognize that in the end of the account

MAGNA EST ILLUSIO ET PREVALABIT.

GREAT THINKERS

(VIII) SPINOZA

PROFESSOR W. G. DE BURGH

I

THE student of Spinoza is faced by a peculiar difficulty. On opening the *Ethics*—Spinoza's chief work, completed for publication shortly before his death in 1674—he finds a system of metaphysics set forth in geometrical form, starting from definitions, axioms, and postulates, and advancing synthetically from first principles to a detailed interpretation of the universe. The difficulty lies not in the language—Spinoza's Latin is easy to construe, and there are translations—nor in the lack of literary graces; his style indeed is singularly impressive in its austere dignity. It lies rather in this, that the method of exposition conveys a misleading suggestion of dogmatism and finality, and conceals almost all traces of the patient inquiries that issued in the finished structure. If once the principles of the system are admitted, the rest appears to follow by logical necessity. But by what processes of thought was Spinoza led to those principles? This is the problem that besets the reader: in order to understand the *Ethics*, he must penetrate behind the text of the propositions to their significance as answers to the questions that were stirring in Spinoza's mind. And here, for all the light thrown by earlier writings—especially the *Short Treatise on God, Man, and his Well-being* (1656-1660) and the fragment on *The Improvement of the Intellect* (1661-1662)—and by the researches of modern scholars, much is still left for conjectural interpretation. Why, then, did Spinoza adopt the geometrical method of exposition? Certainly he shared Descartes's belief that mathematics furnished the model of demonstrative reasoning for all branches of knowledge. That he did not, however, regard the method as an infallible guarantee is evidenced by the fact that already, in 1663, he had presented Descartes's philosophy in geometrical form, while holding many of its doctrines to be erroneous. Spinoza's motive lay rather in his passionate desire to present the order of the world and the nature of man in their timeless reality, independently of human purposes and interests. He set himself to rid metaphysics of anthropomorphism, in face not only of popular theology, Jewish and Christian, but of the then dominant philosophy of Descartes. Descartes, while excluding final causes from the science of physical nature, held that the divine purposes in

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creation lay beyond the grasp of the human mind. In Spinoza's eyes, to credit God with purposes while pronouncing those purposes unknowable was to take refuge in an *asylum ignorantiae*. "The human mind," he declares, "has adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God." God, thus truly known, is known as a being who unfolds His eternal nature in the structure of the universe with a necessity that leaves no place for determination by all-too-human preferences. Ends and means, goods and evils, are relative to man's imperfect apprehension under the form of time. Man fondly imagines himself as exercising an *imperium in imperio*, independently of God, but this imagination is devoid of truth. Spinoza will show him as he really is, interpreting his nature and passions impersonally "as though it were a question of lines, planes, or bodies." He chose the geometrical order of presentment, as excluding any appeal to teleology and as reflecting, more nearly than any other form of reasoning, the timeless perfection of the real.

Apart from this formal obstacle, there is, of course, the graver difficulty, attendant on the study of all great thinkers, of grasping the meaning of Spinoza's main doctrines. They are hard to conceive in thought; harder still to interpret without prolonged discussion. Such are the notions of God's indivisible extension, of His infinity of Attributes, of His eternity in relation to its inadequate expression under the forms of duration and time, of finite individuals as the diversifications of His unique and all-embracing individuality. Consider, for example, one of the most perplexing of Spinoza's doctrines, the two-fold reference of the term *idea*. This will serve as an introduction to his views on two important problems, the nature of knowledge and the relation between body and mind. For Spinoza, an idea is not, as it was for Descartes, an object passively apprehended by the mind, but an act of judgment, involving affirmation of its content; an idea that is adequate or true is the criterion of its own truth. "As light makes manifest both itself and darkness, so truth is the norm both of itself and of what is false" (II, 43 S).¹ Moreover, each idea is the mental side of an act of the body, the bodily act and the mental being distinct aspects of a single mode of the one infinite substance, God. They are not two modes, of body and mind respectively, standing in a one—one relationship, but a single mode, reflected now in God's essential Attribute of extension, now in His essential Attribute of Thought, as a single point is situated both on the convex and on the concave of a curve. Here we have Spinoza's answer to the mind-body problem, which had been left in a precarious position by Descartes and his immediate successors. Spinoza recognizes the real dis-

¹ All references in the text, unless otherwise specified, are to the *Ethics*. S refers to the Scholium, C to the Corollary, appended to a given proposition.

tion and transcends it. He escapes, on the one hand, from the difficulties of causal interaction, on the other, from the Cartesian dualism of substances and the absurdities of Occasionalism. But in his use of the term *idea* there is a further reference to the body which is far harder to understand. Spinoza maintains that the knower's body is not merely the extended side of his act of thought; it is also the *ideatum* or object known. Paul's mind, we are told, is the idea of Paul's body; when Paul thinks of Peter, his idea of Peter "indicates rather the constitution of Paul's body than the nature of Peter" (II, 17 S). What meaning are we to attach to this doctrine? In what sense can it be true that, when I look at or conceive a fellow creature, I am looking at or conceiving my own organism? Now Spinoza certainly cannot be charged with the crudities of Representative Perception. Nor is he simply stating, what all thinkers of his age took for granted, that in sense-awareness what is perceived is infected with qualities, e.g. of sound, colour, or taste, that are relative to the percipient. For the doctrine in question holds, not only on the level of sense-perception, but on that of clear and distinct thought. Spinoza means that the finite human mind knows its object, not in its full truth as God knows it, but from the angle, so to speak, of a fragment of God's being; and, further, that this stamp of finitude is set on the whole content of what is known. My mind and my body, when rightly understood, do not form a self-contained entity, "cut off by a hatchet" from the minds and bodies of other individuals, as seems to the inadequate picture-thinking of sense. They form indeed a real individual, but as a unique mode of God's whole thinking and extended nature; so that to know them truly implies knowledge of their context, inclusive of all other minds and bodies in the universe. As Professor Hallett has put it, the statement that the mind knows only its own body means that it knows its body as responding more or less adequately to Nature as a whole. But this view that Paul, in knowing *any* body, be it Peter's or Paul's own, knows it and the whole world of body from the angle of the knowing subject, so that what he knows reflects his own nature rather than that of the object known, does not mean that the human mind can never grasp the truth. It means only that it can never grasp the truth in its infinite fulness as it is known by God. Of course, since God is all in all things, my true thinking is the act of God thinking in me. But God thinking in a finite mind is one thing, God thinking as God, another. Spinoza draws a clear distinction between God's thought *quatenus infinitus est* and His thought *quatenus constituit essentiam humanae mentis*. In the one case He thinks the universe, so to speak, from all angles at once, *uno intuitu*; in the other, from the angle of an individual human mind. It is in the latter sense that Paul's knowledge of Peter

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can be said to express Paul's nature rather than Peter's, or—since the body is, directly or indirectly, the object (*ideatum*) of every thought—to express the nature of Paul's body rather than that of Peter's. This theory of knowledge is doubtless open to criticism; the brief summary we have given will at least convince the reader that the study of Spinoza is no easy task.

Yet, for all its difficulty, Spinoza's philosophy promises a rich reward to those who have the patience to understand it. To him, as to the thinkers of ancient Greece, philosophy was before all else a way of life. Again, like the prophets of his own race, he has a message to proclaim, of salvation for the human soul. He called his great work the *Ethics*, to show clearly that the metaphysical construction in the First Part, and the dispassionate analysis of man's knowledge and emotional nature in the Second and Third Parts, were but the preparation for the doctrine of the mind's liberation from bondage unfolded in Parts IV and V. From his youth up, Spinoza's heart had been athirst for the living God. In the opening pages of his treatise on method, he lifts for a moment the curtain that veils his spiritual history, to tell how in early manhood he had reviewed the various ends that men desire—wealth, honour, and bodily pleasures—to discover in them but vain and transitory sources of distraction; and how his search had led him to the conviction that only in the love of an eternal and infinite reality could the soul find abiding joy and rest. "Happiness and misery," he writes, "lie wholly in this alone, in the nature of the object on which we fix our love." It is the doctrine, elaborated in the *Ethics*, that knowledge is impotent, unless it stirs desire. From the love of perishable objects spring strife, sorrow, envy, fear, hatred, evil passions that perturb the mind. "But love towards eternal and infinite substance (*erga rem aeternam et infinitam*) feeds the mind with pure delight, and is wholly free from every taint of sorrow; herein must lie the supreme goal of our desire, to be sought with all our strength." And he goes on to tell how this saving experience, vouchsafed at first in rare moments of insight, became with effort habitual and dominant. It is a love, be it understood, that has its source in knowledge. Spinoza's way of salvation, like Plato's, is the way of intellect. The beatific vision comes only as the crown of prolonged scientific thinking. Like Plato, he realized that it was impossible for the multitude to be philosophical. His message is for those who have ears to hear. There is something in Spinoza of the intellectual aristocrat, looking down from a far height on the vulgar follies of mankind, with pity not unmingled with scorn. This is what parts the spirit of Spinoza from that of Christianity. He was profoundly religious; but his religion was that of the intellect: alike in his life and in his doctrine, he was a saint of rationalism.

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II

It is the doctrine that matters. Our interest in Spinoza's life is limited to the growth of his philosophy. Born at Amsterdam in 1632, into a colony of Jewish refugees from Spain, he lived peaceably under the tolerant rule of the Dutch Republic, and died of consumption at the Hague in 1674. He earned his livelihood as a polisher of lenses, refusing all offers of academic or monetary assistance rather than compromise his independence. Though a contemplative by temper and habit, he was no recluse; his letters show him associating genially with a large circle both of intellectuals and of men of affairs. His friends recognized in him a nature of rare purity of intention and firmness of purpose, wholly indifferent to worldly gain or glory, one whose evenness of spirit was unmoved by temporal vicissitudes and inspired by a single-minded devotion to things eternal. Spinoza's thoughts on these eternal things were the fruit of his own reflection; none of the influences that helped to their development impaired their marked originality. Of these influences, the chief were the Jewish Platonist tradition and the philosophy of Descartes. Nurtured in the religious inheritance of his race, Spinoza became at an early age an accomplished Hebrew scholar and, as was evidenced after by the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (1670), an acute precursor of the higher criticism of the Old Testament. It is not surprising that his intellectual daring and fearless integrity roused suspicion among the orthodox, leading to his excommunication by the Amsterdam synagogue in 1656. The legacy of Jewish medieval Platonism which had been transmitted to thinkers and poets of the Renaissance left a deep mark upon his mature philosophy. The doctrines of the emanation of all things from the One, the primal source of being and perfection; of the necessary law whereby the products of its inexhaustible energy are generated unilaterally, without derogation to its absolute self-dependence; of freedom as consisting in this absolute self-dependence; of evil as negativity, i.e. as deficiency of reality in the parts of the universe when torn from their context in the perfect whole; of time as the broken light of eternity for man's finite apprehension; of the restoration of the soul by the way of knowledge to union with the One in intellectual love;—all these were fragments of the great Neo-Platonic tradition, bequeathed to Spinoza by the Jewish thinkers of the Middle Ages. Nor was he unfamiliar with Christian medieval thought. We find him in 1662 instructing a pupil in scholastic metaphysics and Cartesian physics. The second main influence on the growth of Spinoza's philosophy was Descartes. Descartes, too, as M. Gilson has fully shown, drew largely on the storehouse of his medieval precursors,

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and, as a mathematician, was naturally on the side of the Platonists against the Aristotelians. But it is a grave error to label Spinoza a Cartesian; as we have said, he was *nullo addictus magistro*, and his divergences from Descartes are as striking as his obligations. Broadly speaking, he accepted the Cartesian physics in principle, while rejecting many of its details; in metaphysics and theory of knowledge he took over from Descartes the real distinction of thought and extension, of mind and body, the criterion of clear and distinct conception, the inadequacy of sense apprehension in comparison with conceptual truth, and the category of Substance and Mode as the key to the structure of reality. His chief divergences from Descartes may be summarized as follows. (1) His thoroughgoing Monism. Rejecting the doctrine of discrete concepts, each of which is just itself and not another, and therewith the dualism of distinct substances, body and mind, Spinoza affirmed one infinite and self-dependent Substance, God, who alone is conceived with perfect clarity and truth; thought and extension being interpreted as Attributes of the one and only Substance. (2) His insistence on God's immanent causality. For the transcendent Creator, whom Descartes, in common with Jewish and Christian theologians, held to have brought a contingent world into being *ex nihilo* by a fiat of will, Spinoza substituted a God causally immanent in the effects which flow timelessly from His being with the same necessity as do the properties of a geometrical figure from its essence. (3) His consequent exclusion of all contingency from Nature and of all freedom of choice from the sphere of human action. (4) The ascription to God of extension as an essential Attribute. (5) The doctrine that all modal being is eternal in God and the relegation of time from the status of a determinant factor in the universe to that of an appearance (*auxilium imaginationis*) relative to man's inadequate apprehension by way of sense. As we have already pointed out, Spinoza never dallied with the Cartesian theory of Representative Perception.

Other influences on Spinoza's thought were secondary and incidental; e.g. of Bacon, in the field of logical method, and of Hobbes, in that of political theory. To the last-mentioned subject he devoted much attention; as is witnessed by the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* and the unfinished *Tractatus Politicus*. We cannot dwell on these speculations in this article, but will confine ourselves to the *Ethics*, and therein (A) to Spinoza's metaphysic of reality and (B) to its application to the moral life of man.

III

(A) "Whoever is in God, and without God nothing can be or be conceived" (I, 15). For, whatever is must be either Substance or

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a Mode of Substance, i.e. it must be either self-dependent in being and conception or dependent for its being on Substance, through which also it is conceived (I, Deff. 3, 5, Ax. 1). Spinoza, as we have said, regarded with Descartes this distinction as ultimate; in other words, he regarded the logical relation of Subject and Predicate as expressing the structure of reality. To question this assumption is to question the very basis of Spinoza's metaphysics. Further, there can be only one Substance, which must be infinite. Were it limited, it would cease to be self-dependent, i.e. it would be no longer Substance. Were there more than one infinite Substance, the natures of each would overlap, infecting both with finitude. Spinoza is thus committed at the outset to a monistic philosophy. The one infinite Substance he calls God, or, less frequently, Nature (*Deus sive Natura*). This Absolute being is a self-conscious (and extended) individual; though the term "person" is rejected as anthropomorphic, he is able to be known and loved by men, and to reciprocate men's knowledge and love. "The (human) mind's intellectual love towards God is a part of the infinite love, wherewith God loves Himself. . . . Hence it follows that God, in so far as He loves Himself, loves men, and consequently that God's love towards men and the mind's intellectual love towards God are one and the same" (V, 36 and C.).

God, the infinite Substance, is defined as "consisting of infinite Attributes, each of which expresses His eternal and infinite essence" (I, Def. 6). The Attributes, therefore, belong to God essentially, each of them expressing a distinct character of His being and covering, so to speak, His whole being under that character. There is nothing in God that is not thinking, nothing that is not extended; but His thinking is not His extension, nor is His extension His thought. We may recall the analogy of the convex and the concave aspects of the curve. Diversity thus enters into the essence of Substance, which is as really many—ininitely many—as it is one. Of the infinite Attributes, expressing the inexhaustible richness of God's being, two only, extension and thought, are known to man. Descartes's created substances, *res extensa* and *res cogitans*, are thus dethroned from substantiality. It must be remembered that the extension ascribed by Spinoza to God is infinite and indivisible, differing radically from the spatiality of material objects. Lastly, though man knows God through only two of His Attributes, all are intrinsically knowable; there is nothing in God's essence that is opaque to mind. God knows Himself in *all* his Attributes. For Spinoza, as for Plato, what is most real is most knowable and what is most knowable is most real.

From God's essential nature, i.e. from His Attributes, flow the dependent Modes, or, rather, the system of Modes as reflected in each Attribute. God is essentially active in self-maintenance

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and self-expression, overflowing of His infinite plenitude of being in infinite productive energy. To God as timelessly productive (the Attributes) Spinoza applies the scholastic term *Natura Naturans*; to God as the timeless effects of His productivity (the Modes) the term *Natura Naturata*. "From the necessity of the divine nature infinite things must follow in infinite ways, i.e. everything that can fall under infinite intellect" (I, 16). In God all possibilities are actualized; "He lacked not matter for creating everything, from the highest to the lowest grade of perfection; or, speaking more strictly, the laws of Nature herself were so ample as to suffice for the production of all that can fall under any infinite intellect" (I, App.). Everything in *Natura Naturata* is necessary; there is no place for contingency or purposive selection. God indeed is free, for He exists solely by the necessity of His own nature, and His actions are determined by Himself alone (I, Def. 7). But His freedom is poles removed from freedom of choice. It lies in His self-causality. Spinoza's favourite analogy of the logical necessity with which geometrical properties follow from the definition of the figure is manifestly inadequate to express this dynamic productivity of God. Its core of truth is the timelessness of both processes. Spinoza's terminology must not mislead us; when he speaks of cause, he means ground or reason (*causa seu ratio*), using the word to enforce the paradox that not only the essences of all things but their existence is the eternal effect of God's agency, in whom essence and existence are one. It is in this sense that he speaks of God as the efficient cause of His modes (I, 16 C). Moreover, the modal effects are themselves God. Whence else could they derive their being? Thus God is the immanent, not the transient, cause of all things (I, 18). Here too we must be on our guard. God is not a transient cause after the manner of Descartes's Creator, who brings the world into existence as something other than, and contingent to, Himself. But to reject external transience is not to proclaim a doctrine of sheer immanence. The neo-Platonic synthesis of immanence and transcendence comes much closer to Spinoza's meaning. Plotinus and Proclus, too, held that all things are in the One and draw their being necessarily from its nature. They too rejected contingency and volitional creation, while upholding unilateral causality and, therewith, the transcendence of the One. So for Spinoza the modal effects (*natura naturata*) depend upon the cause (*natura naturans*), but not conversely. God as cause is *in se*; they are *in alio* (I, Def. 1); "Substance is prior by nature to its affections," i.e. to its modes (I, 1). If we would consider Substance "truly," we must leave its affections aside and know it in the purity of its self-dependence (I, 5). Only when thus conceived does God reveal Himself in the concrete fullness of His individuality.

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Of this self-revelation more presently; we pass to the modal systems of *Natura Naturata*. Each mode of God, existing timelessly within each of His infinite Attributes, is, within each Attribute, a fragment of an infinite modal system. We have seen that it is one and the same mode that is reflected coincidentally in all the Attributes. Spinoza's position therefore is not that of psycho-physical parallelism. Nor does it allow of inter-action. For, since each Attribute is self-contained, having nothing in common with any other, modes of the Attribute of thought are to be explained wholly in terms of that modal system, without reference to their *ideata* in the modal system of extension. We saw, too, that the relation between the several modes is not external but intrinsic, so that adequate knowledge of a given mind or body involves knowledge of the whole system of minds or bodies with which it is integrated. Further, the modes under each Attribute form a hierarchical order. From the Attribute, we are told, there follows directly an "immediate infinite and eternal mode," and from this a "mediate infinite and eternal mode"; both these infinite modes covering the whole modal system. Thus, from the Attribute of Extension, there flow, immediately, "motion and rest," and, mediated by this mode, "the structure (*facies*) of the universe in its entirety" (see Ep. 32, to Oldenburg). Finite modes are individual wholes, constituting subordinate differentiations within these primary and all-pervasive entities. Similarly, within the modal system of Ideas. Spinoza's theory is doubtless very difficult, nor is it set forth with the detail that we would desire; but the principle at least is clear, that there are grades of perfection or reality, exhibited both in the relation of *Natura Naturans* to *Natura Naturata*, and, with richer complexity, within *Natura Naturata* itself. Spinoza frankly confesses that the terms "whole" and "part" are inadequate to express this relationship. He conceives extended Nature as an individual, mirrored, alike in its wholeness and in its individuality, in the hierarchy of its constituent members; and likewise, God's infinite thought as mirrored in finite minds and thoughts, each of which possesses individuality in the measure of its wholeness. For the structure of the modal system in one Attribute is identical with the modal structure in every other. *Ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum*" (II, 7). It follows that not only the human body, but all bodies, have their mind-aspect: *Omnia, quamvis diversis gradibus, animata sunt* (II, 13 S). The modes of thought, however, possess the peculiarity of self-consciousness and have themselves, as well as the knower's body, for their object. To know, says Spinoza, is to know that we know, and so forth; i.e. an *idea*, which is the act of knowing the body as its *ideatum*, becomes in that very act an *ideatum* to itself.

A further question presses on us in regard to Spinoza's theory of

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Natura Naturata. We have been speaking hitherto of the modes of God, infinite and finite, in their timeless reality. What, then, about the world as it comes to us in sense-experience, as a series of events in time? What, for Spinoza, is the status of the "world of presentation," of what he terms the "common order of Nature"? We must confine ourselves to a dogmatic statement of what seems to be Spinoza's view. The spatio-temporal world, as we perceive it, is no mere illusion. The image of the sun as at 200 feet distance is true as far as it goes; we do actually see thus, and, when we know the fuller truth of science, we understand that, given the conditions, the image cannot be otherwise. Error arises only when we judge that the sun is really at that pictured distance. In view of Spinoza's doctrine that an idea is always an act of judgment, the error is not easy to explain. The world of presentation, though real in its measure, carries us but a very little way towards the truth it claims to represent. It is a fragment, apprehended in detachment from its context, arbitrarily isolated from the system of which it forms a part. Time is a form of this imperfect apprehension. Think out the system of *Natura Naturata*, and the semblance of time will be transcended in knowledge of the timeless reality. It is a basic assumption of Spinoza's metaphysic that eternity must needs manifest itself, for man's inadequate apprehension, under the form of temporal duration. How this is so, he is avowedly unable to explain; that it is so, is to be accepted as certain truth. To give a full *rationale* of experience is possible only for the infinite intellect of God.

IV

In the knowledge of God's eternal perfection and of his own reality as an eternal mode of God, lies man's salvation. That individuality consists in eternity is the central thought of Spinoza's *Ethics*. "In God there is given of necessity an idea, which expresses the essence of this and of that human body under the form of eternity" (V, 22). There is no thought here of Pantheistic absorption; in the experience of union with God a man realizes his full individuality. In the experience he is, and knows himself to be, eternal; not everlasting, nor immortal, for eternity excludes any thought of temporal duration. We have noted that man attains this goal by way of knowledge. All other forms of conscious experience—emotion, desire, volition—depend on the adequacy or inadequacy of intellectual apprehension. *Theoria* entails *praxis*; rather, it is itself *praxis*, for to have an idea is already an act of self-realization. "Our mind is partly active, partly passive; in so far as it has adequate ideas, it is of necessity active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it is of necessity passive." "The mind's actions arise solely from its

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adequate ideas; but its passions depend solely on its inadequate ideas" (III, 1 and 3). In this activity of self-knowledge and self-maintenance, man finds liberation from bondage and achieves virtue and felicity.

The conditions of this spiritual pilgrimage and the steps in its accomplishment are described in Parts III, IV, and V of the *Ethics*. We see men at the start, like Plato's prisoners in the cave, shackled in a land of shadows, and impotent to rid themselves of the bonds of circumstance and passion. How a being who, though deficient in reality, is yet a mode of God's eternal perfection, can be thus victimized by error; and how, if once so placed, he can ever enter upon the path of liberation—are problems wellnigh insoluble within the bounds of Spinoza's system. But, assuming the possibility, let us note the stages of the process by which inadequate knowledge is transmuted into adequate, and therewith slavery to passion into the active emotion of love towards God. "An emotion," Spinoza tells us, "cannot be controlled or removed save by a contrary emotion stronger than that which is to be controlled" (IV, 7). Knowledge does not suffice of itself; its liberating efficacy is due to its emotional correlate. When we know a passion for what it truly is, a necessary link in the order of nature, it ceases to be a passion and is transformed into the contrary active emotion. A, for example, hates B as the apparent cause of his diminished vitality or pain; but the knowledge that B's act was a necessary moment in the eternal order dissolves the hatred by arousing the contrary sense of heightened being together with the idea of God as its cause, i.e. an active emotion of love to God. "That emotion which is a passion ceases to be a passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof" (V, 3). In comprehending a present sorrow as in truth God's timeless decree, it ceases to afflict us; we are purged of vain regret and find rest in sharing in the divine love. *E la sua voluntate è nostra pace*.

Spinoza distinguishes three grades of knowledge, carrying with them three grades of moral progress. There is, first, the grade of *Imaginatio*, from which all men start, covering the whole field of sense-experience. On this initial plane, the mind apprehends itself and the surrounding world as an aggregate of events in time, in an unending chain of local and temporal conjunction, forming "the common order of nature." Empirical inductions and class-concepts, as well as table-talk and hearsay, fall within its scope; the "idols" of Bacon's *Novum Organum* were undoubtedly present to Spinoza's mind. Time, Number, and Measure are its distinctive instruments (*auxilia imaginationis*). Though, as we have noted, the knowledge it yields is not necessarily false, it is riddled with subjectivity, the product of psychological association and chance coincidence. The mind is at the mercy of whatever happens to affect

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the body at the moment and of the traces left by prior affections upon the organism. The ethical correlate of this kind of knowledge is a life swayed by fitful gusts of passion, without principle or rational control, the life of Plato's "democratic" soul, which is "everything by starts and nothing long," or, at the worst, of the "tyrannical soul," enslaved to one bestial appetite.

Against this dark background of man's natural servitude emerges the second grade of apprehension, that of *ratio* or scientific knowledge. The mind rises to apprehend the world as a realm of necessary and timeless truths, deducible, as are the properties of a geometrical figure, from simple self-evident principles. Our own individuality, and that of all other things, is resolved into a structure of universal law. Spinoza's *Ethics* is an example of this type of knowing. On this level, all ideas are true. "The essence of reason (*ratio*) is nought save our mind in so far as it clearly and distinctly understands" (IV, 26). Time has vanished with imaginative thinking; all is known in the timeless order of *Natura Naturata*. "It is of the nature of reason to contemplate things as necessary, and not as contingent. Moreover, it perceives this necessity of things truly, as it is in itself. But this necessity of things is the very necessity of God's eternal nature. Therefore it is of the nature of reason to contemplate things under this form of eternity" (II, 44, C 2). The corresponding life is one governed wholly by active emotion. "By this power of rightly ordering and systematizing the bodily affections we can escape from being easily affected by evil emotions. For greater strength is needed to constrain emotions which are ordered and systematized in accordance with their order in respect to the intellect than those which are uncertain and shifting" (V, 10 S). It is a life of social co-operation, directed to a common good. The individualism which brings Spinoza's political theory, on the level of *Imaginatio*, into close relationship with that of Hobbes, is now transcended in a view of society organized on the basis of reason, that stretches far beyond Hobbes' horizon. But the rational life is none the less one of pleasurable self-realization. Since pleasure is defined as the sense of transition from a lower to a higher grade of perfection, and love as pleasure accompanied by the thought of its cause; and since on the plane of *ratio* the cause is known to be God; it follows that the life of reason is characterized by love of God. "He who clearly and distinctly understands his emotions, loves God; and loves Him the more, the more he understands himself and his emotions" (V, 15). As this love flows from the knowledge of God's immanence in *all* things, it is the strongest and most constant of the emotions. There is no directly contrary emotion that can destroy it. "Since it (i.e. *amor Dei*) is the highest good which we can seek under the guidance of reason, and one common to all mankind, we desire that all shall

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delight therein; it cannot therefore be tainted by the emotion of envy or of jealousy, but contrariwise must be fostered the more, the more men share our joy" (V, 20).

But knowledge, Spinoza tells us, is possible on a yet higher plane. "Reason by itself," he writes in the *Treatise on the Improvement of the Intellect*, "will not be the means whereby we attain to our perfection." Beyond *ratio*, though springing from it as its source, is the knowledge of *scientia intuitiva*. At this third grade, the mind rises above mediate and discursive thinking. For Spinoza, as for Plato, the field of intellectual activity is wider than that of ratiocination. On the side of the knower, the knowledge in question is intuitive vision; on the side of the object known, God and His modes are grasped, not as a system of universal laws, but in their eternal individuality. God for Spinoza is the One in Many, and the Many are as real as the One. In *scientia intuitiva*, the human thinker apprehends God's unity in difference by a timeless act of vision, and therein is, and knows himself to be, eternal. That in this experience he realizes to the full his individual personality is clearly indicated by Spinoza in the closing propositions of Part V. In the *Scholium* to Prop. 20 he tells us that henceforward he will consider the Love of God *quatenus ad solam mentem refertur*, apart from its relation to the body. The implications of this statement are greatly dark, and we wonder how Spinoza would have developed the doctrine that the human *body* "cannot suffer destruction but somewhat of it remains that is eternal." Both the concepts of Love of God and Eternity undergo significant, if subtle, modification. The earlier definition of *Amor*, "pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause," is obviously inapplicable on the plane of intuitive knowledge; God is not an external cause, nor is man's love for Him to be described as pleasure. For pleasure is the sense of transition to greater perfection, and here transition is superseded in attainment. "Although this Love of God has no beginning, yet it has all the perfections of Love, just as if it had come to be in time. . . . Nor is there here any difference, save that the mind has had these perfections, which we imagined to be added to it, from all eternity, and that accompanied by the idea of God as eternal cause. But if pleasure consists in transition to greater perfection, felicity (*beatitudo*) must assuredly consist in this, that the mind is in actual possession of perfection" (V, 33). Nor is there any longer a place for the distinction, never clearly expounded by Spinoza, between the cognitive and emotional aspects of conscious life; the *amor Dei* of the grade of *ratio* now becomes *amor Dei intellectualis*. So, too, what was then known "under a certain form (*sub quadam specie*) of eternity" is now known, without qualifying restriction, *sub specie aeternitatis*. Once more; on the lower level of *ratio*, since God is *expers passionum*,

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"he who loves God cannot endeavour that God may love him in return" (V, 19). In *scientia intuitiva*, love, as we have seen, acquires a richer meaning; with the transformation of pleasure into felicity, the relation between God and man becomes one of reciprocal communion. In the words already quoted, "God, in so far as He loves Himself, loves men; and consequently God's love towards men and the mind's intellectual love towards God are one and the same." The relationship is of individual to individual, and the eternity therein realized is likewise an individual experience. *Sentimus experimurque nos* (the plural, here and in V, 36 C, is unambiguous) *aeternos esse*: "we have conscious experience of our (individual) eternity." Spinoza's way of life culminates in personal fruition. "Thus we clearly comprehend wherein lies our salvation, that is to say, our felicity or freedom; to wit, in constant and eternal love towards God, or, in other words, in God's love towards men. This love or felicity is called in the sacred writings 'the Glory of God,' and with good reason. For whether this Love be referred to God or to our mind, it can rightly be termed 'peace of mind' (*acquiescentia animi*), and this is the same as glory" (V, 36 S).

V

No attempt has been made in the foregoing outline to discuss the validity of Spinoza's philosophy. A few of the difficulties have been indicated in passing; others will readily occur to the mind of the discerning reader. We find, for instance, that Spinoza himself towards the close of his life was troubled over the theory of Extension. In the last of his extant letters (Ep. 83), in answer to Tschirnhaus, he writes: "As regards your question, whether the variety of things can be demonstrated *a priori* from the concept of extension alone, I think I have already shown with sufficient clearness that this is impossible; and that consequently matter has been ill defined by Descartes through extension, but that it ought necessarily to be explained through an attribute expressing eternal and infinite essence. But I will perhaps discuss these questions with you more clearly at some future time, if my life is spared. For up to now I have never been able to set any of my thoughts on these things in order." The statement is brief and cryptic, save in the implication of an appeal to experience and in the rejection of Descartes's view of extension as a quiescent mass and of motion as due to God's action *ab extra*. Little light is thrown on the problems that vex the mind of the modern student. What does Spinoza mean by the indivisible extension that is attributed to God? Or by its dynamic efficacy, as possessor of timeless causal energy? How can motion be conceived apart from time, as an infinite and eternal mode flowing immediately

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from God's extension? And in what sense can finite extended bodies be eternal? It would be rash to suppose that Spinoza was contemplating such a radical revision of his metaphysics as a solution of these questions would have involved. Yet it is impossible to read the Second Part of the *Ethics* without gathering the impression that his thought is moving on lines that herald the latest developments of modern physics. He was certainly not a victim to what Professor Whitehead has called "the fallacy of simple location." The corpuscular atomism outlined in the pages following on II, 13 is admittedly provisional.

The difficulty just referred to lies rather in understanding Spinoza's theory than in any demonstrable incoherence in his system. When we ask, however, as to the validity of his ethical doctrine, the case is otherwise. Of the possibility of moral liberation by way of knowledge he was assured by personal experience. Were it not so, the whole faith that inspired him to write the *Ethics* would have been vain. Yet the experience and the faith alike seem irreconcilable with the principles of his metaphysics. If time be but "an aid of the imagination," that vanishes for clearer knowledge in eternity, what real significance can we attach to the transition from a state of ignorance and vice to that of virtue? Doubtless Spinoza believed that there was place for transition and movement, construed in some non-temporal sense, within timeless fruition, and the belief has been championed by some of his modern commentators; but is it capable of intelligible meaning? The problem of evil, too, is on our hands. For, unless moral experience be robbed of all significance, moral evil, and the intellectual error from which it springs, must have a positive status in reality. Error is not mere ignorance, or vice mere deficiency of goodness. Yet, on Spinoza's principles, they must be explained away as sheer negation. How can God stand, as moral experience demands, in detachment from the law of His own being? Even if the appearance of positivity in evil be regarded as an illusion, it must yet fall, as illusion, within God. Or, to put the problem in yet another form, does not Spinoza's thorough-going determinism, with its insistent rejection of freedom of choice, cut the ground from under his belief in moral redemption? That he allows full scope for the higher freedom, that of self-dependence and self-causality, proper to God and to those who in God have attained perfection, will not save him from the impasse; what is at stake is the possibility of passing out of the state of bondage and entering upon the road to such attainment. These questions were raised in correspondence with Spinoza by van Blyenbergh, a worthy and rather simple-minded burgher of Amsterdam. Van Blyenbergh was no philosopher, and in the event his verbose and tedious letters provoked Spinoza to cut short the controversy in despair. Modern

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commentators have, almost with one voice, dismissed van Blyenbergh's objections as those of an ignorant amateur, unworthy of the great philosopher's attention. But they remained unanswered, for the simple reason that no possible answer could be given to them. Moral experience is inexplicable on the basis of Spinoza's metaphysic. He could neither account for the fact of vice, nor, granting the fact, for the victim's liberation from enslavement. If deliverance be possible—and, as we have said, Spinoza never dreamt of questioning it—it can only be by driving a breach through the nexus of determinism. As a living Italian critic, Guzzo, has acutely shown, the breach occurs in the very section of the *Ethics* where the mechanism of Spinoza's theory is most pronounced, in the 43rd Proposition of Part III. The mechanistic doctrine of emotion requires that if A is hated, or loved, by B, he must hate, or love, B in return (III, 40). A little later (III, 43) we read that "hatred is increased by reciprocated hatred, and on the other hand can (*potest*) be destroyed by love." The first of these two clauses follows strictly from the mechanism. A, being hated by B, hates B back, and B's original hatred is strengthened as a consequence of the reciprocation. But how are we to understand the second clause? If A, when hated by B, responds with love, naturally B's hatred is diminished or annulled by the response. But how *can* A respond with love? The mechanism necessitates a response of hatred; yet we are told that a contrary response of love is possible. Spinoza has unwittingly, by help of a seemingly innocent "*potest*," severed the deterministic chain and, by so doing, rendered feasible the initiation of the saving process of liberation. To reply that the response of hatred is prompted by imaginative thinking, while that of love springs from knowledge of reason, is true but unavailing. The difficulty is only thrown a stage farther back. The issue is how man can ever rise, conformably to Spinoza's system, from a lower plane of knowledge to a higher. Spinoza's way of life, in short, reveals a far-reaching incoherence in his philosophy. Nor have the efforts, either of Spinoza or of his modern interpreters, to dispel the criticism proved, in our opinion, satisfactory.

But Spinoza's greatness as a philosopher does not rest on the finality of his doctrines. A metaphysical system can only claim to be final under pain of self-contradiction; for, as Hegel said in words that Spinoza would willingly have endorsed, "the life of mind is not one that shuns death and keeps clear of destruction; it endures its death, and in death maintains its being." Nor does his greatness depend on his influence on succeeding generations. Spinoza recked lightly of transitory honour, and to measure his worth *sub specie durationis* savours of impertinence. For a century after his death, his message was ignored or misunderstood. With the dawn of the

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German Enlightenment, he came into his own. His fame has grown steadily ever since. To-day all serious thinkers acknowledge him for their master. It has been said that every philosopher has two philosophies, his own and Spinoza's. Those who are most conscious of the difficulties of the *Ethics* can yet draw from its study something of the eternal peace in which Spinoza found the cure for his "mortal sickness." For the true source of his greatness lies beyond "the splendours of the firmament of time," in the flight of speculative genius whereby "a mind, for ever wandering through strange seas of thought, alone" won timeless fruition in the knowledge and love of God.

NOTE

The best English version of the *Ethics* is by Hale White (Oxford Press). The *Ethics*, together with the fragment on *The Improvement of the Intellect*, is also translated in the *Everyman* Series. Students are recommended to consult Professor Joachim's *Study of the Ethics of Spinoza* (Clarendon Press) and Professor Hallett's *Aeternitas* (Clarendon Press). For those who can read Italian, Guzzo: *Il pensiero di Spinoza* (Vallechi, Firenze) is a valuable commentary on all Spinoza's writings.

REASON AND INTUITION

PROFESSOR J. L. STOCKS

ONE of the strangest of the many strange habits of philosophers, which mark them out as the Ishmaels of the scientific world, is their refusal to agree as to the precise meaning of the words they use. No philosopher, it seems, is bound by the definitions given by predecessors or contemporaries of even the most central terms; each has to define his terms for himself. The resulting situation certainly lends itself to ridicule and caricature, as in the legend of the theological disputants who arrived after long argument at the conclusion that when the one said "God" he meant what the other meant when he said "Devil." Still it is probable that this idiosyncrasy of philosophers has some real ground in the special nature of the task on which they are engaged, and is not a mere exhibition of aimless malice or sheer incompetence. Whether that is so or not, one of the consequences of this situation is that the titles of philosophic discourses are apt to be singularly unilluminating: as an indication of the problem to be raised they are, to say the least, highly ambiguous. How the reader may understand the title of this paper I do not know; but the question which I had in mind in choosing it was this. There is at the present moment in European thought generally a quite evident current of opinion hostile to "reason" and "rationalism." It is not altogether a new movement: it can easily be traced back for thirty years or more, and, in a more general sense, for more than a century: but it has increased noticeably in force and activity since the war. The movement is by no means purely theoretical; in fact, as often in such cases, it is easy to argue that the theoretical side of it is secondary, and that certain practical tendencies constitute the central fact. Political movements like Syndicalism and Fascism openly proclaim their enmity to reason, and in Germany the political orthodoxy of to-day represents Liberalism and Marxism as closely connected variants of a root heresy called rationalism. It is not my purpose to discuss these political tendencies—nor the related ethical tendencies, which are equally obvious and familiar, though not so easy to define with precision. I wish to concern myself only with the theoretical revolt against reason, and with that particularly in the form in which it opposes to reason a supposedly superior form of cognition called intuition. I want to ask how this opposition

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is to be understood, whether it can be justified, and if so whether the superior status is rightly accorded to intuition.

My general purpose in this paper is to challenge the current opposition of reason and intuition. I propose to argue that in any plausible sense which can be given to these terms they must be regarded as complementary, not as rivals; and in particular that (a) reason depends on intuition and (b) intuition depends on reason.

I. MEANING OF THE TWO TERMS

In the absence of agreed definitions, to which reference has been made, it is necessary to begin with some preliminary determination of the sense or senses in which the terms will be used. Here previous usage is the safest guide. The word reason has a long and varied history, and by one line of tradition, which goes back to the Greeks, summarizes all that differentiates man from the lower animals. That sense is too wide for our purpose, for reason in that sense will express itself in the practical field and in other non-cognitive or not purely cognitive activities. It is reason, in that sense, that domesticates animals, tills the ground, and builds cities. Even if reason is restricted to the cognitive field, as covering all that is distinctively human, it must include the intuition which is said to be the rival of reason. A narrower sense of the word is evidently needed. The word must stand, *first*, for a cognitive act or power, and, *secondly*, for an act or power which is not co-extensive with cognition: otherwise there would be nothing for it to oppose. The *Oxford Dictionary* recognizes only one use of the word which satisfies this requirement, and this it marks as obsolete. The definition given is "the act of reasoning or argumentation." Following this clue, I think we shall not be wrong in supposing that those who oppose reason to intuition, to the disadvantage of reason, mean to include in the sphere of reason whatever in the way of knowledge or belief can be secured by reasoning.

Intuition is a much more modern and less familiar term. Attempts have been made at times to give it technical precision; but here again the tradition is rather confusing. It is derived from a verb which means "looking at," and its extended use must be presumed to have originated as a metaphor from sight. It would stand, presumably, for a mental inspection in which a direct revelation is made to the mind, comparable to the direct revelation which accompanies the exposure of a physical object to the eye. We find the word in use in the early days of modern philosophy, e.g. in the writings of Descartes and Locke, to designate the apprehension of general truths which are self-evident and need no proof. It was obvious that there must be such truths: otherwise how could

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demonstration start? And it was equally obvious that such truths could not be directly credited to sight or any other sense. A quasi-sight of the mind, a mental inspection is supplied to fill the gap. This was the normal use of the term in the eighteenth century, and when Richard Price gave it prominence for the first time in ethical theory, he was consciously basing himself on this tradition. He was asserting (in his own words) "an immediate perception of morality without any deductions of reasoning." The moral intuition was for him an intellectual act, containing its own evidence, and not requiring or admitting of direct substantiation from without. In this use intuition is opposed to demonstration, and it is in a sense regarded as superior to it: for it is a simple act, while the other is a laborious and complicated process of reasoning, and the act is the foundation and starting-point of the process. We thus obtain *principles*, which are all-important. "This kind of knowledge," said Locke, "is the clearest and most certain that human frailty is capable of. This part of knowledge is irresistible, and like bright sunshine forces itself immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way . . . the mind is presently filled with the clear light of it" (*Essay*, IV, ii). Intuition, though opposed to demonstration and reasoning, is the necessary basis of these, and all their certainty is derived from it. Where they succeed, it is by spreading this bright light, weakening it perhaps a little in the process.

Price's extension of the term to ethics first complicated the tradition: for whatever the fundamental truths of ethics may be, clearly they are not self-evident principles which serve as the basis of demonstrative reasoning. A further complication was introduced when the term was adopted as the English equivalent for the Kantian *Anschauung*. The famous saying *Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind* was rendered "intuitions¹ without conceptions are blind." Here intuition stands for what is given or forced on the mind from without, as opposed to the conceptual framework which is supplied by the mind from its own resources. Intuition now includes sensation or sense-intuition, and the opposition between what is given and what is taken or supplied replaces the opposition between what is self-evident and what receives or requires demonstration. Intuition is still underivative, immediate, irresistible, but it cannot now of itself give us any proposition at all. Judgment can only take place when the matter of intuition is given conceptual form. Intuition

¹ Not always. Some translators prefer the word "perception." Professor Prichard, for instance, in his book *Kant's Theory of Knowledge* always uses this equivalent. But the latest and best translation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, by Professor Kemp Smith, uses "intuition," and it is increasingly prevalent.

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is no longer an act of mind: the typical act is judgment. It has become an abstraction—the name for one of two complementary factors which can be detected by analysis in that familiar act. Intuition thus regarded tends to become a power to seize and hold in mind the *appearance* of an object, primarily of an object with which we have direct contact through the senses, secondarily of any other object which can be said to be taken in in one mental view. In its secondary applications the object of intuition may be something like a mathematical series, the thinking self, or God, which is not a physical object at all and therefore not accessible to sensuous intuition.

The inadequacy of the word intuition as an equivalent for Kant's *Anschauung* lies precisely in the fact that in our use the non-sensuous or not-purely-sensuous application is primary, and the sensuous application is secondary or non-existent, while in his use the application to the sense field is primary and all other applications derivative from it. This can be well seen in a passage from a recent English work on Perception. In Mr. H. H. Price's admirable book published two years ago under that title he spends a long time on a careful analysis of sense data and other factors in the perceptual situation, and then adds that he feels obliged further to credit the perceptual act with what he calls a "pseudo-intuitive" character. He explains that for him "genuine intuition" is rather the *result* of active thinking than its precondition. It is the function by which we build up and keep in mind subjects for our judgments. This is for him the primary meaning of the word. But he is prepared to extend it, with the reservation expressed in the prefix "pseudo," to sensory apprehension. His reasons for this are given in a passage which I will quote in full, because it throws much light on the connotation which the word intuition has now come to possess. He opposes "intuitive" to "discursive" consciousness.¹ "In discursive consciousness," he says, "there is a passage of the mind from one item to another related item, for instance, from a subject to a concept under which we classify it, or from premises to conclusion. . . . And when we have discursive consciousness of a whole or complex of any sort (as in counting), although the whole may be vaguely present to the mind from the first, yet definite consciousness of the whole comes *after* consciousness of the parts. In intuitive consciousness, on the other hand, consciousness of the whole comes *before* definite consciousness of the parts. And there is no passage of the mind; whatever we intuit is present all at once. We might say that intuitive consciousness is 'totalistic,' not

¹ This opposition is of course very ancient, going back to the Aristotelian opposition of *νοῦς* and *διάνοια*, in which the latter term is approximately equivalent to reasoning or the capacity for it.

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'progressive' or 'additive.' " He adds the further mark that intuition lacks the activity of "seeking" or "following" which is characteristic of its opposite. It is not passivity, but yet it is also not activity. "The mind rests, as it were, on its object." Here, it will be observed, the reversal of which I spoke is complete. A word which first had direct application to sense-perception and was applied by a metaphorical extension to thought, here applies directly to a function of thought and is extended metaphorically to cover an analogous feature of sense-perception.

I believe that any significant use of the term intuition must be in close relation to the description given by Mr. Price. Intuition in this sense has no obvious claim to be described as the source of self-evident propositions. This older use of the word seems in fact to be becoming obsolete, but it must not be forgotten, because it is apt to turn up unexpectedly and confuse the issue. Thus in Ethics intuitionist is still used as the name of a school, and the characteristic tenet of the school is often taken to be the belief in self-evident principles of action. This clearly depends on giving intuition its older sense. Dean Rashdall's analysis of ethical intuitionism in his *Theory of Good and Evil* (1907, I, iv), presupposes the older sense throughout; that is why he thinks of intuition with special reference to the end of action, for the end, as Aristotle observed, is the starting-point of the argument of which the act is the conclusion. It takes the position in the practical syllogism which the basic principles of a science take in the syllogism of that science. This shows that the older use still persists.

If now we may sum up the line of interpretation represented by Mr. Price in his own word "totalistic," and refer to the other line of tradition by the word "self-evident,"¹ we may provisionally conclude that the use of the term should be governed by reference to one or both of these marks, at the same time noting that on present evidence it does not appear that either of these marks directly involves the other, or even that they can be significantly regarded as combined in one mental act.

II. THE DEPENDENCE OF REASON ON INTUITION

If reason stands for the power to produce certainty or probability by means of argument, it is evident that it will be responsible for everything that deserves the name science and a good deal that is not commonly given that name. Its sphere will include mathematics and the most purely theoretical sciences, those which have

¹ But there are two kinds of self-evident: (a) general principles, e.g. axioms of geometry, (b) what is directly assured by observation, the evidence of sense.

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a predominantly deductive character; but it will also include the more empirical sciences, those which rest mainly on induction. Unless some further restriction of the term reason is found possible, it is not easy to exclude even history: for the historian also is occupied in weighing evidence and has to argue his conclusions. But those who depreciate reason do not appear to have history in mind; and it may reasonably be maintained that the aim of the historian is differentiated from that of the scientist by the fact that the historian is occupied in determining the individual character of a period or movement, while the scientist seeks general laws governing individual behaviour. If we qualify our description of reason accordingly, it becomes the power to produce general truths or probabilities by argument, and its sphere will then be co-extensive with science and the possible applications of the scientific method.

Now clearly every argument must start somewhere. This argument may rest on a previous argument, but, if an infinite regress is to be avoided, there must be an ultimate starting-point, which does not need or is taken as not needing proof. Our tradition therefore represents reason as dependent on intuition in one or both of its two forms, either in the form of apprehension of self-evident principles, as in mathematics, or in the form of empirical perception. In the former case the whole process is guaranteed by the self-evidence of the starting-point and the rigour of the demonstration which follows: in the latter case a high degree of probability may be attained by the exhibition of precise conformity on a sufficient scale between the deductions from the hypothetical principles and the observed events. Also it has frequently been asserted that intuition is operative continuously throughout every process of reasoning, since each step in the reasoning, taken by itself, is an intuition, self-evident and needing no external justification.

The champion of intuition may well reply that all this, however true it may be, is beside the point and does not touch his case, because the intuition which he regards as superior to reason is neither assurance in regard to what is presented to sense nor apprehension of self-evident general principles. To him I would reply that if intuition is given some such sense as Mr. Price gives it—what we have called its totalistic sense—in this sense also it must be regarded as an indispensable ingredient in the judgment of reason. How does the thinker, I ask, hold together the successive moments of his thought? His argument is a process occupying, it may be, a considerable stretch of time. In a physical process one imagines that the past is simply dead and gone, that all that is real and effective is carried forward through the successive terms to a single definable issue in the last. But in the case of a mental reasoning process this simply will not do. There is certainly an issue, a con-

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clusion; but it is not asserted in its own right; it is not a view or vision secured by the path which constitutes the process. It depends for its truth, even perhaps for its meaning, on what was revealed in the course of the process, and it is not adequately asserted unless it is asserted in its dependence on all that. How, I ask, does the thinker hold all this in view? I answer that to explain this we require intuition in its characteristic function of making possible the keeping of a whole in mind, i.e. in the totalistic sense. We cannot suppose that the thinker, as he proceeds to each new proposition, remembers all the propositions which he has previously asserted, and it is equally impossible to suppose that he has forgotten them: he has them, evidently, in some real sense in mind. As propositions, as assertions, they are dead and gone; but their work remains. Each proposition, as it is asserted, has its felt source and confirmation in an intuition of the relevant whole, and contributes something to the development of that intuition, so that, when the development is fruitful, other assertions are possible thereafter which were not possible before. When the aim of the connected statement is mere description, the control of the intuition is obvious: the successive sentences stand in external relation to one another, united only by the intuition which is their common ground and product. Where the aim is proof, the control of the intuition is, I submit, not less necessary, but it is masked by the logical relations which give the series an *asserted* bond of union.¹ My contention is that these logical relations, together with all else that is, or can be, genuinely asserted, have their ground in an intuition.

I am tempted to give this theorem a yet wider range. What is the essential advantage of ripeness and maturity in any science, in competition with adventurous youth? Not merely, surely, wider knowledge, greater experience, a richer store of precedents and parallels; still less, greater acuteness in making deductions and in devising hypotheses and expedients. In some of these respects, certainly the last, youth may well have the advantage. Given equal abilities, a mature student tends to find problems simpler than his junior: he is less distracted by side issues and goes straighter to the point. He is surer of his ground. And the reason for this may no doubt partly be that he has already had his successes and has gained confidence from them; but it is, I suggest, much more that he has a fuller, richer intuition of the science in which he is working, of the developing system to which his work is a contribution. That intuition has been built up by years of thought and effort, much of which the man himself has long forgotten, but all of which has contributed to the result. It is the control of this intuition that

¹ "Since," "because," "therefore," "nevertheless," are examples of what I call asserted bonds of union.

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makes him so sure of his ground, so steady in his aim, so wise in guidance. It is this that gives his handling of a problem so curious a resemblance to the operation of unquestioning instinct.

In all these various ways man's power of reasoning is hedged about with immediacies, any or all of which may be given the name intuition. Reasoning is no autonomous, self-directing power, but conditioned in its expression from beginning to end by these. The function of reasoning may in fact be described without inaccuracy as precisely the development of intuition. It is possible of course that intuition admits of other developments, some of which may be more valuable and important. That remains to be seen, and for a complete answer to that question it would be necessary to determine the metaphysical status of general truth such as the sciences establish. It is sufficient, however, for the present to record the conclusion that reason is dependent on intuition and pass to the other side of the question.

III. INTUITION IS DEPENDENT ON REASON

By treating reason as a general name for that region of thought and knowledge in which reasoning is central, we were able to identify it approximately with science. None of the suggestions so far considered as to the nature of intuition enable us to identify a rival region in which intuition predominates. But some such region is wanted if the current opposition of intuition to reason is to be justified, or even understood. We have already argued that all judgments rest on intuition; and some of these from the systems which are collectively credited to reason. We have to find others, which, whether capable of systematization or not, may be credited to intuition. Thus we want a development of intuition in which the intuitive character of the starting-point is retained, so that the result is a higher and more developed intuition in a sense in which the reasoned judgment of the scientist is not.

The only clue worth following is that offered by Mr. Price's totalistic intuition. Judgments possessing some such character may be found in very close relation to sensation. "In knowledge by sense," says Hobbes (I, 66), "the whole object is more known than any part thereof. . . . And therefore in any knowledge of the $\delta\tau\iota$, or that any thing *is*, the beginning of our search is from the whole idea; and contrarily, in our knowledge of the $\delta\iota\acute{o}\tau\iota$, or of the causes, of any thing, that is, in the sciences, we have more knowledge of the causes of the parts than of the whole. For the cause of the whole is compounded of the causes of the parts; but it is necessary that we know the things that are to be compounded, before we can know the whole compound." Hobbes is of course a rationalist,

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and he is not questioning but justifying scientific analysis. Yet he seems to recognize a certain superiority in that superficial knowledge of the whole from which the analysis starts over the probably more accurate knowledge of the parts which is the immediate achievement of the scientist. Those who champion intuition would probably accept Hobbes's assertion that if we want knowledge of causes we must proceed by some such analysis. But they would probably deny the implication of his statement that by such analysis the knowledge of the compound is arrived at. They would contend that we have here the characteristic delusion of rationalistic science in the unquestioned belief that correct analysis results in the knowledge of the analysed whole. In their view the need and value of intuition depends on this, that it gives a knowledge of wholes in their integrity which the methods of reason can never give.

A criticism of reason similar to this and a similar conception of the kind of rectification necessary is implied in Spinoza's description of the goal of thought as *Scientia Intuitiva*, intuitive knowledge. The recovery of individuality, lost or submerged in the previous scientific stages of thought, is in fact Spinoza's leading idea. Mr. Roth describes *scientia intuitiva* (Spinoza, p. 233) as "intuitive insight into individual essence." "Abstract recognition," he writes (p. 140), "passes into concrete appreciation. Man is then conscious of nature as a unity, but not as before from the outside. He feels it in himself; he understands its wholeness in and from his own being. He thus not only contemplates externally the ways of the universe in which, like everything else, he is caught up. He not only sees himself as one item in the detail controlled by an all-embracing cosmic order. Nature for him is more than an abstract whole of general laws. It is a concrete system of self-directing individualities. He knows himself in it as an individual, and realizes his place in it among other individuals. He grasps both himself and things, not in their universal aspect only, but in their unique singularity. He has absorbed the truths of the discursive reasoning of science and passed beyond it to the intuitive apprehension of philosophy."

It is important to notice that Spinoza's intuition, as described in these sentences, while undoubtedly conceived as something higher than what we have been calling reason, is yet in no rivalry with it, or opposition to it. It represents a further goal, but one only to be reached by the incorporation of all that reason can contribute. Thus Spinoza may be said to endorse by implication the criticism outlined above that scientific analysis can never reach the knowledge of the whole which it seeks, but to reject the suggested inference that such knowledge requires a method independent of reason. What Spinoza sketches is an ideal completion of the work of science, and his difficulty in finding concrete examples of intuitive

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knowledge springs presumably from the fact that human thought on the lower scientific level is still so imperfectly developed.

It is not the process character, the discursiveness, of reason which is now in question, but the generality of the truths which it reveals, and intuition is offered in contrast or as supplement not for its immediacy but as achieving the apprehension and appreciation of the individual. This being so, it is pertinent to ask whether already in our imperfect state of development we have not some knowledge of the individual. For in that case we shall not need to wait till science has done its work to get some notion of the structure of a thought in which individuality is apprehended, and if such apprehension is rightly called intuitive, we may find some substantial basis for the alleged rivalry of reason and intuition.

To this question I should reply that we certainly possess and constantly achieve knowledge of the individual, that many of our most massive certainties and probabilities depend on it; and, in particular, that history and biography represent a systematization of such knowledge, that all practice and theory of art is another expression of it, and that without it human action would lose altogether its moral, though not perhaps its economic, character. The knowledge aimed at and to some extent achieved in these activities is certainly something that science, as such, cannot give and does not claim to give—i.e. the questions asked are not included among those which the scientist tries to answer. But it does not follow that the scientist is precluded from making any contribution to the answer of the questions that *are* asked, only that any contribution he makes must be subordinate. There are special difficulties in the case of art and aesthetic judgment, which must be passed over here. I would only say that the aesthetic judgment seems to me to be the product of abstraction, though of a different order from the abstractions of science. Therefore I put it on one side. The other two types of judgment mentioned, the historical and the practical, are in no sense abstract; and if they represent the work of intuition, they represent, I submit, an intuition which is in no rivalry or opposition to reason but welcomes every contribution which reason can make to the solution of their proper problems.

This is best seen in the practical judgment, i.e. in the judgment of a man faced by a concrete situation in which action is demanded and deciding on which of various possible lines it will be best to act. Best seen here, because it is obvious that no side of the complex fact can safely be ignored, because in short here it is most imperatively brought home to us that (as Butler says) "things are what they are and their consequences will be what they will be." In such a situation the ultimate issue, which is being prepared throughout the process of deliberation, is an individual response to an individual

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(particular) situation. This is the issue and it is this after the event that forms the subject of moral valuation when the act is judged good or bad. But beforehand in the process of deliberation the action may be seen in other lights. Viewed economically, in reference to this and that satisfaction, the bearing of any proposal can be pretty exactly calculated. On this side values are commensurate, and the balance of loss and gain is fairly easily struck. Here reason is supreme in the sense that the knowledge applied and the methods used are scientific in character, and an irrefutably demonstrated conclusion is not out of the question. Thus if the action involves, e.g. the provision of necessary food, the results of scientific investigation as to the nutritive value of various foods will naturally be taken into account. But when all the calculations have been worked out, the real decision remains to be taken. The agent has finally to decide whether he will or will not act on the line shown to involve such and such possibilities of gain or loss. He has eventually to reach the position where he says "this is the thing to do." No amount of reasoning will bring him to that point. Here, I suggest, intuition is needed to supplement and complete the work of reason, and it is needed because what is in question throughout is, as I said before, an individual response to a particular situation. But that intuition is dependent on the rational analysis and conditioned by it: it is not a certainty, arising from mere inspection, to which reason makes and can make no contribution. On the other hand, since analysis can never exhaust the individual, no logical relation can be established between the final intuition and the arguments which preceded it. The arguments lack final cogency: they are only (to borrow a phrase from Leibniz) inclining reasons. The final intuition remains unproven and unprovable.

This practical intuition I give as an example of Mr. Price's "genuine" intuition, which is the *result* of active thinking. The name intuition is, I think, appropriate, but it is no enemy or rival of reason. Its function is different, but in the performance of that function it welcomes whatever light reason can give. Intuition in this sense, in short, once more is dependent on reason.

IV. CONCLUSION

The time has now come for a final judgment on the issues of this controversy. In the foregoing I have been chiefly occupied in showing the interdependence of reason and intuition. But the discussion has been hampered throughout by two factors—first, by the acceptance, for the sake of argument, of what I personally regard as an awkward and improper restriction of reason to the field of argument or express inference; secondly, by the difficulty

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of avoiding ambiguity in the word intuition. The first point I will reserve for the moment. As to the second, a critic would have some justification for objecting that the intuition on which reason is said to be dependent is not quite the same as the intuition which is said to be dependent on reason, so that the thesis of interdependence (he might say) breaks down. This charge of equivocation would not be very easy to meet. But after all it is not very important that that it should be met. Even if it is upheld, the main point remains untouched, that whatever sense is given to the word intuition, it is always found in intimate relation to the reasoning process, never in sheer opposition to it. It will be remembered that we distinguished two main tendencies in the use of the word, to which we gave the labels "self-evident" and "totalistic." Perhaps we may be allowed now to substitute the word "immediate" for "self-evident." It is a rather more expressive term and applies more naturally to sensation which has to come in. Making that substitution, we may, I think, say that any general description of the activity of thought (which is also, it must be remembered, the actuality of knowledge)—that any such general description is false which does not include, in addition to inference and reasoning, *both* senses of intuition. Thought starts from the immediate and ends in the totality, which is and must be individual. Reason (as defined) falls between these two poles and is incidental to the passage of thought from the one to the other. It is therefore fundamentally conditioned by both.

The totalistic intuition, then, it is asserted, is the goal, and this intuition is superior to reason. Some correction may be necessary for metaphysical differences, but in principle Spinoza's ideal of a *scientia intuitiva* is accepted. Is not this, it may be asked, an endorsement of the case against reason and of the contemporary reaction against rationalism? Well, if rationalism stands for the view that the world can be known and life lived by something like a set of geometrical theorems, it deserves summary rejection. If it supplements this *a priori* geometry only by the more modest and tentative construction of empirical science, it still deserves rejection. For general truths are not enough. They do not give knowledge of the individual; and the individual is real. But if rationalism stands for the conviction that whatever can be scientifically analysed and examined should be submitted to such examination, that the fear and distrust of reason is a major crime against humanity, that civilization consists in and depends on nothing so much as on the prevalence of such rational analysis and the assistance and protection of those who practise it, then rationalism stands for health and sanity and should have the support of every thinking man. An intuition which claims sacrosanctity and declines the test of reason

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is, as Locke and Mill both protested, a moral and social offence, a mere misnomer for blind prejudice and crass superstition.

Finally, I come back to Reason and the question what it stands for. Why do we regard rejection of reason as a crime? The answer is simple and was well known to the Greeks of the fifth century before Christ. The λόγος of Heraclitus of Ephesus, first ancestor in the line of descent which culminates in the λόγος doctrine of the Fourth Gospel, was called by him the "common" or "universal." "Though the Word," he wrote, "is common, most men live as if each had his private wisdom" (*fr.* 92). By it alone we are saved from confusion and anarchy, as a city by its laws (*fr.* 91). He calls it also eternal (*fr.* 2). Reason stands in truth for what men have in common, for the ability to transcend the limitations of time and space, to discount the effects of position and perspective. The intuition which is opposed to reason is the "private wisdom" of Heraclitus, the wilful refusal to attempt the universality which reason aims at, the defiant assertion of personal and collective particularisms as necessities of life. Such rejection of reason is a crime, not merely an error, because the striving for community and universality is the foundation of all genuine morality. The situation of man is surely plain enough. By his senses and by the appetites which are correlated with them he is at the mercy of his physical environment. From this bondage, so far as he is reasonable, he seeks to deliver himself, so that he may "look abroad into universality." The escape is at times painful and difficult, and among his fellow-sufferers there are not only many who are sceptical as to the possibility of escape, but also some who denounce the very attempt at escape as selfishness and treachery. They say his duty is to hug his chains till they are chains no longer. To such doubts and scruples the truly reasonable man is obstinately deaf. He persists in seeking the common ground, inspired by the faith that truth independent of place and position is attainable to man. Such faith is rightly called faith in reason: for reason in the narrower sense is the instrument by which deliverance is sought and in the wider sense it is the freedom which is the goal. In the narrower sense it may be opposed to intuition, but only in the way in which analysis and synthesis may be opposed as complementary processes within a developing whole of thought: in the wider sense it includes the intuition which is at once its product and its justification.

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF A PASSAGE IN PLATO'S *REPUBLIC*

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IN Book VII, p. 520, Socrates describes the arguments by which the philosophers must be induced to "return to the cave," that is to say, to resume the practical business of politics from which they have escaped into the better life of contemplation. They must be shown that this sacrifice is a debt which they owe to the city in return for the opportunity which it has afforded them of becoming philosophers. "Will our pupils,"¹ he continues, "when they hear this, refuse to share in turn the toils of state, when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their time with one another in the heaven of ideas?" "Impossible," Glaucon replies; "for they are just men, and the commands which we impose on them are just; there can be no doubt that every one of them will take office as a stern necessity, and not like our present ministers of state" (*δίκαια γὰρ δὴ δίκαιοις ἐπιτάττομεν. παντὸς μὲν μᾶλλον ὥς ἐπ' ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῶν ἕκαστος εἶσι τὸ ἄρχειν*). "Yes, my friend, and there lies the point," says Socrates, "you must contrive for your rulers another and a better life than that of a ruler, and then you may have a well-ordered state."

It has often been recognized that the injunction to the philosophers to return to the cave is the point above all others in which Plato transcends the limits of Platonism. I wish to use the passage which I have quoted to illustrate this.

It is remarkable because it contains the conception, expressed, to my knowledge, nowhere else in Greek philosophy, of Moral Obligation,² or Duty. Greek moral philosophy in general defined right action as that which was conducive to the agent's highest good; such action lacks a characteristic essential to an act of duty, in that the obligation to perform the latter is irrespective of the agent's good. In the *Republic* all the acts in the life of a Guardian up to the point at which he is bidden to return to the cave are judged by the former standard, they are determined as right or wrong according as they are or are not means to his highest good,

¹ 520d, Jowett's trans.

² I should say rather "Athenian," since I do not propose to take notice of any philosophy except that of the Socratic, Platonic, and Aristotelian tradition.

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which is the achievement of the best life. But the command to return to the cave both is and is clearly recognized to be¹ a command to surrender a better life for a worse one. If this act therefore is right, it is right in a different sense from that of conducing to his highest good.²

What is it which makes this sacrifice of the highest good nevertheless right? In the passage which I have quoted, Plato says, "Justice" (*δίκαια γὰρ δὴ δίκαιοις ἐπιτάττομεν*). Justice is certainly a common enough conception in Plato's pages, and if it should appear that this act is just only in the same sense in which other acts of the rulers, and any acts of the subjects in the state, may be termed just, it would be necessary to surrender the contention that this act embodies a conception unique in Plato, and shares with actions done in obedience to duty a characteristic which is lacking to the generality of actions which Plato designates as just. It is worth while, therefore, to inquire a little into Plato's general conception of justice, to see whether it is really adequate to cover this case.

This inquiry is met at the outset by the following difficulty: it does not clearly appear in what relation Plato held justice to stand to the Good. It is indeed indubitable that he held justice to be a means to the highest good, but when that is granted, two alternative possibilities remain open: the first, that he defined the just act as that act which conduces to the highest good, so that its being a means to a good end is what alone constitutes it just; the second, that he defined justice by some other criterion, but held that there was a necessary connection between the justice of the act and its tendency to achieve the highest good of the agent.³ The point may be expressed in a convenient jargon as follows: granted that the just act necessarily conduces to the highest good of the agent, the question still remains open, whether that is for Plato an analytic or a synthetic proposition. The question cannot be

¹ "Ἐπειτ', ἔφη, ἀδικήσομεν αὐτούς, καὶ ποιήσομεν χεῖρον ζῆν, δυνατόν αὐτοῖς ἐν ἄμεινον.

² It is thus an exception to Professor Prichard's dictum (*Duty and Interest*, p. 10) that Plato implies "that it is impossible for any action to be really just, i.e. a duty, unless it is to the advantage of the agent." Professor Prichard assumes that throughout the *Republic* the word *δίκαιος*, when applied to actions, means "right" or "morally obligatory," and he concludes Plato's doctrine to be that such actions are necessarily conducive to the agent's good. Granted his assumption, I think his conclusion would follow, provided only that he would except the passage now under consideration; but I would reject his assumption, and prefer to express the facts by saying that *δίκαιος* has not the meaning of "morally obligatory" in any passage of the *Republic* except this.

³ Cf. Prichard, *op. cit.*, pp. 12 ff.

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solved by appealing to Plato's own definition of justice as "doing one's own work" (τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν), because there is an ambiguity in that definition. If "his own work" is defined by reference to the agent's soul, and means the work in which his nature finds the fullest realization of which it is capable, the proposition that justice conduces to his highest good is analytic, because the full realization of his nature is his highest good. But if "his work" is defined by reference to his place in the city, and means the work which the well-being of the whole society requires from him, then the proposition in question is synthetic.

I do not myself believe that either interpretation can claim to exhaust Plato's meaning, because I think both meanings are present in confusion together in the *Republic*. However that may be, I shall make no attempt to decide the question, but assuming each interpretation in turn, I shall ask whether either affords a definition of justice according to which the return of the rulers to the cave would not be more than just.

The former alternative need not detain us long, for it implies that there is no criterion of justice except its tendency to conduce to the highest good of the agent, and we have already remarked that the returning guardian must sacrifice his highest good. If "the work," to do which is justice, is the work in which the doer's nature is fulfilled, the guardian is not doing it when he comes back to the cave. If, therefore, his return is to be called just, it is just in a sense quite different from that defined.

If we adopt the second alternative, we must ask by what criterion, other than that of conducing to good, the just act is to be defined. The criterion is given by the second alternative interpretation of the phrase "doing his own work"; that act will be just by which a man best performs the function proper to his position in the state. It might seem at first sight that such a definition of justice would cover the self-sacrifice of the guardians. Their position would remain even then an exceptional one in this respect, namely that in their case alone justice does not conduce to happiness (as the justice of the subjects always does), but demands its sacrifice; but it might be held that their act differed from any just act of a subject only in its results, not in its principle. This peculiarity would indeed be sufficiently striking in itself to provoke an inquiry into its ground; but I shall not pursue that inquiry, because the assumption that the principle itself is identical in both cases, is mistaken.

Granted that a man occupies a certain position within a state, he is bound by the rules of justice to perform the functions proper to his station. But they apply to him only *qua* occupant of such and such a station; he is to do "his own work," but what in any

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given case his own work may be, depends wholly upon the station which he occupies. Membership of the city being, therefore, the condition of a man's being subject to the rules of justice, the act of becoming a member, which is his subjection of himself to their operation, cannot itself be prescribed by them; or, to occupy a certain station cannot be one of the duties of that station. But the return of the rulers to "the cave" is precisely the act of assuming membership of the state.

The definition of justice as "the doing one's own work" implies a prior membership of a society; the obligation of joining a society cannot be a duty arising from membership of it; if, therefore, the act of assuming membership in the state is still to be called (as Plato calls it) "just," this can only be upon the ground of a community existing prior to the formation of a political society, between the rulers and those with whom they join. This duty, then, if the implications are drawn, will be found to exhibit the peculiar characteristic of moral obligation, that it depends upon the community of man with man, not upon that of citizen and citizen.

The duties incumbent on a man in virtue of his station in the city are determined by the law (*νόμος*) of the city, so that justice implies obedience to a *Nomos*. The act by which a man subjects himself to the *Nomos* of a city cannot be prescribed by that *Nomos*. If, therefore, it is nevertheless a duty, it is a duty prescribed by a law prior to, and independent of, that of the state. To be thus prior and independent is the peculiar characteristic of the Moral Law.

The point to which I wish to draw attention is the following: what this doctrine of Plato presupposes, Christianity revealed. That all men are as such members of one society, and that they owe obedience to a law of conduct prior to all positive laws are two of the principal doctrines of the Christian revelation. This is the source from which modern philosophy derived the ethics of duty which was almost lacking from the moral philosophy of Greece. Thus of the Kantian ethics, for example, it would not be untrue to say that it assigns to all acts of all men the character which Plato assigns (if only by implication) to a single act of a single class. Kant makes explicit the presuppositions of moral obligation. Among them are the subjection of all men to a universal moral law, and common membership of all men one with another in a "Kingdom of Ends"—principles clearly identical with doctrines revealed in Christianity.

In the lives of the subject-classes in Plato's city there is no act analogous to that by which the rulers assume (or resume) membership of it, because they are members of the city by nature and

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not by choice. In order to make such a choice (and that is, in order to act in the full sense as a moral agent), the ruler must be capable of a life other than the political, since he could not be said to choose that to which there was no alternative. This condition of moral action is not merely implicit, as the former two were, in Plato's doctrine, but is expressly asserted by him to be fulfilled. "You must contrive for your rulers another and a better life than that of a ruler";¹ the rulers must be men who have "other honours and a better life than the political" (*βίον ἀμείνω τοῦ πολιτικοῦ*).²

In asserting this, Plato was flatly contradicting the fundamental principle of the classical Greek political philosophy, namely that man is by nature a member of a state, or a "political animal." He is anticipating a doctrine which was an integral part of the Christian revelation, and which became, when it was adopted thence into philosophy, the fundamental principle of all modern political theories. It appears in Christianity as the doctrine that man is heir to eternal life; this is the "better life than the political," which redeems him from a natural immersion in the latter. In modern political theory it appears as the doctrine of the Social Contract of which, if the wrappings are discarded, the essential principle will be found to be that man's membership of the state is voluntary, not natural.

If we take together all those points in which Plato is found in this passage to transcend, whether by assertion or only by implication, the normal limits of Greek thought, it appears that his argument either anticipates or requires three doctrines—those of the brotherhood of man, of the moral law, and of eternal life—which were both central to Christianity and the root of much that is distinctively modern in moral and political theory. But there is another doctrine, equally contained in Christianity and equally presupposed in modern moral and political theory, of which we have so far discovered no hint in Plato: that namely of the equality of man. The "better life than the political," the voluntary membership of the state, the subjection to a moral obligation—the farthest to which Plato's thought reaches, or can be made to stretch, is (or so it appears) to the attribution of these things to the guardian class. The subject-classes, in being cut off from philosophy, are cut off from the one condition which makes them possible, since the philosophical is the only life which Plato can conceive to be better than the political.³ They therefore are neither members of the city

¹ From the passage quoted above.

² 521b.

³ Cf. 521b: *ἔχρισ οὖν μίον ἄλλον τινα πολιτικῶν ἀρχῶν καταφρονοῦντα ἢ τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας φιλοσοφίας;*

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by their own will,¹ nor subject to any law but the law of the state. So long as we concentrate attention upon these consequences we are bound to conclude that Plato had not extricated himself from the Greek view of natural inequality which finds its classical formulation in Aristotle's saying that some men are born to rule, others to be ruled.

The expression of Plato's belief in inequality is his threefold division of the state into classes, and this is the root of those consequences in his political theory which most offend a modern judgment. Its implications, rigorously drawn, are that the lowest class is incapable of the highest human virtues, namely courage and wisdom, and that this class is excluded from the liberal education, moral and intellectual, of which the end is the development of these virtues. We need not suppose that a Greek judgment would have been equally outraged by these conclusions; they could hardly be very shocking to a people who believed slavery to be natural, and identified education with leisure. But it would, of course, be a caricature of the *Republic* ruthlessly to draw the implications of the class-division, and to present these as Plato's whole doctrine. It is both easy and necessary to point out many passages in the *Republic* implying consequences utterly incompatible with these. Most of these incompatible consequences may be seen, I think, to flow from Plato's conviction that the virtue of justice at least is common to every member of the state. The *virtue* of justice is not merely a mechanical conformity to rules of action imposed from without, it is a disposition of the soul. Plato defines it as the right ordering of the three elements within the soul, Reasonable, Spirited, and Appetitive. If, therefore, a member of the Third Class is capable of this virtue, his soul must be equipped with all three faculties, and he must be as complete a man as any ruler. Let us by all means stress this tendency in Plato (I will label it the "equalitarian" for convenience); it is certainly part, perhaps the most important part, of his teaching. But the more we do so, the more glaring becomes the incompatibility between the two parts of Plato's teaching. If the subject is by nature as complete a man as any ruler, why can he not be trained to become one? But if he can, the whole basis of Plato's class-division is dissolved. If the subject can be just, he must be endowed with the two faculties of Reason and Spirit: why, then, can he not acquire the two virtues of Wisdom and Courage?

¹ This does not mean that they are not willing members of it, but that consent is not a condition of their membership. Their willingness depends upon the formation in them of such a disposition ("Justice in the soul"), that they fulfil the law at last not against the grain. But the formation of this disposition is the result of life in the state, not vice versa.

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Attempts are sometimes made to soften these incongruities. I do not myself believe that any such attempt can stand investigation, but this is not the place to try to refute them. I shall conclude instead with a protest against a high-handed method of treating Plato, which is not the more justifiable for the fact that it is sanctioned by tradition.

This method proceeds from the assumption that Plato, since he is admittedly a very great philosopher, must have been at the least an enlightened man. His judgment must, therefore, have been fundamentally in agreement with that of enlightened men of other ages, say of the present. He must be held, consequently, to have meant seriously only those parts of his doctrine which an enlightened man of to-day could mean seriously; the remainder (it is a very large remainder) must be either softened and interpreted into conformity with this, or, where that is not possible, dismissed as an inexplicable aberration, or mere mistake. Applied to the question which we have just been considering, this method would lead the critic to select the "equalitarian" side of Plato's teaching, as representing what Plato fundamentally must have meant, because *we* (though we may deny it verbally) assume the principle of the equality of man in all our thought upon moral and political topics. The next step is to assume that whatever in Plato apparently contradicts this principle (in this case, the division into classes), cannot really do so; hence Plato must be interpreted as intending no deeper division between the classes than is compatible with the fundamental equality of their members, no deeper division, e.g. than that between the classes of a modern state.

But to take this step is to falsify Plato. That there should be, in a modern state, a separate class of philosophers, does not imply that they are in any way superior as men to the other members of it; but that is only because in modern states philosophy has not been, as it was for Plato, the only path to a "better life than the political." There had to come another path to such a "better life," and one, further, accessible to all men equally, irrespective of their philosophical capacity or of their position in the state, before the modern idea of the equality of men and the relative subordination of class distinctions was possible. But that conception was one first explicitly uttered in the Christian doctrine that all men equally are capable of participation in Eternal Life. It is a mere historical anachronism to suppose that Plato, lacking the revelation of the doctrine, nevertheless drew the full consequences of it. What is to be wondered at is not that Plato has some passages which are incompatible with the equality of man, but rather that he has some which are not.

One of the worst consequences of the above-mentioned method

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of interpreting ancient philosophers, is that it makes it impossible to do justice to the historical importance of Christianity. If Christianity has been, as it has, the most important single influence in shaping not only the practice but the theory of the modern world, we must expect it to have altered men's ways of thinking not only superficially, but fundamentally. What we call an enlightened judgment is a judgment (whether or not of a Christian), nevertheless formed in the school of Christianity. It is not lightly to be assumed of any pre-Christian philosopher, however great, that he was in secure possession of an enlightenment which became after Christianity the common birthright of educated men.

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KENNETH HENDERSON, M.A., B.LITT.

HE upon whom has descended the "amor intellectualis Dei" must make up his mind to walk much alone. In the world of "intellectuals" he is at present "out of the swim," and his work must be done against the prevailing current. And among the generality of religious people, he is regarded as rather a disturbing presence in matters of faith, apt to fall short, apparently, of their own standards in the service of God. "The love of the mind for God" has little popular esteem in English-speaking Christianity. The nineteenth century valued feeling as the chief element in religion, and the emphasis of to-day is on the practical service of the will. But in our tradition, from Colet and the Cambridge Platonists to Westcott and von Hügel, the "amor intellectualis Dei" has produced a line of great men of God, and surely will never be without its witnesses. Their message is a two-fold one. First that every experience of life can be "produced" into an experience of God by an effort of personality in which creative thought and constructive imagination has its part, second that this "love of the mind" is natural in some degree to all men, and an end in itself, giving to each lover an original vision. "It is Origen," writes Dean Inge, "who in words thrilling alike by their humility and confidence, proclaims that 'as the eye seeks the light, as our body craves for food, so our mind is impressed with the natural desire of knowing the truth of God and the causes of what we observe.'"¹

To see the Holy Spirit at work within the Time Spirit, the striving of God in the turmoil of surrounding circumstance, to discern God as "the persuasive element" in history and nature reaching towards perfection; this is the opening out of that respect for our age which is our one hope of working with its characteristic mentality to realize its possibilities for God. It is in this vision of respect for the present world that intellect joins itself to will and feeling to contend for that which is of God against that which is not of God.

But the "plain man" is far from recognizing that "the love of the mind for God" must be an end in itself before it can have an instrumental value; that a strenuous honesty and nobility of thought, a longing for personal illumination and wisdom, is as vital to healthy Christian individualism as strong emotion and diligence in good works. "It ill becomes us to make our intellectual faculties Gibeonites

¹ *The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought.*

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—hewers of wood and drawers of water for the will and the emotions,” writes Dean Inge in the book already quoted. And St. Thomas Aquinas writes: “Intellectus speculativus est qui, quod apprehendat, non ordinat ad opus, sed ad solam veritatis considerationem.”

Fortunately the “amor intellectualis Dei” is in itself an energy and a defence for loneliness. Yet this love is a missionary passion. It desires always to communicate its own experiences and discoveries both from a necessity of its own nature and because it is the perception that all the people of God are called to this perpetual climb to enlarge their seeing of God, and are capable of it in varying degrees. The “amor intellectualis” is not the strained preoccupation of the uncertain “highbrow,” but, as von Hügel insists of mysticism, it is an energy in some measure natural to all, a movement of spiritual life from “this world” problems back to their origins of inspiration and meaning, and forward again to “this world” tasks. It is an eager and sensitive receptivity to the intimations of Beauty and Wisdom, and no mere concern with abstractions. “The invisible things are understood by the things that are made,” and God may speak from a life, a political movement, or a leaf. It is in part a search for clues to the deeds by which we may know the doctrine. It is in faith that God’s word comes to us, in the service of our day, through a personal effort uniting insight and criticism. This unity of insight and criticism is the way of revelation.

The plain man may object that this love requires special equipment. It is true that any spirit once lit by this “amor intellectualis Dei” will feel an urge towards continual self-education and self-development. But that is true also of those whose authentic religion is mostly feeling or will. He who loves God with his mind will probably be driven for fellowship and progress to an increasingly strenuous companionship of books. But this love is not essentially a matter of books, or the study of systematic theology, except so far as these are needed to clear and sustain one’s own energy of seeing. Christianity has always held that education is necessary to clear the way, and why should not a man work at his religion if it possesses him, offering the prayer of hard work to the Holy Spirit? But “the love of the mind for God” is not academic study, though it may, perhaps must, use study. We may not “take the lesson for the prize.” Dean Inge quotes Whichcote: “The knowledge of divinity that appears in systems and models is but a poor wan light, but the powerful energy of divine knowledge displays itself in purified souls; here we shall find the true land of truth of which the ancient philosophy speaks. To seek our divinity merely in books and writings is to seek the living among the dead. No; seek for God within thine own soul; He is best discerned, as Plotinus phraseth it; by an intellectual touch of Him: we must see with our eyes and hear with

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our ears, and our hands must handle the word of life, that I may express it in St. John's words." But once this "amor intellectualis" is established within us, it will make its own living converse with books and friends. The life of the mind is a social life, and though it must pass through stretches of loneliness, it will seek all the companionship it can find.

But in these days, wherein faith in thought itself has grown flickering and feeble, and action and emotions are welcomed as escapes from thought and refuges against reasoning, we must justify the necessity of intellectual activity in Christian individualism before we can make converts to the "amor intellectualis Dei." The mind must win its way across the plain of utility before it can reach the foot of the "world's great altar stairs."

All genuine character calls for some degree of individualism. And all individualism must to some degree rationalize its convictions in order to feel confident of them. An unrationalized faith is often edged with panic. The beliefs of one area of the mind will try to find consistency with what we have reason to believe in other regions of the mental life. Religious beliefs will try moreover to draw into their service increase of vitality from these other beliefs. Central religious experiences will look abroad to scientific and political theories for a congenial "world view," and "downwards" for a technique that will make them workable in living. Central religious convictions will seek for social theories and programmes of good-will.

As Whitehead writes: "From the earliest Greek theologians to Jerome and Augustine: from Augustine to Aquinas: from Aquinas to Luther, Calvin, and Suarez: from Suarez to Leibniz and John Locke: every great religious movement was accompanied by a noble rationalistic justification. You may disagree with the theologians—indeed, it is impossible to agree with all of them—but you cannot complain that they have been unwilling to indulge in rational argument."¹ Intellectual energy is intellectual courage, and to some measure of it all Christians are called. Nor need this thinking be divorced from popular appeal. Everyone desires to be rational, and as Glover says, "Man is incurably rational, he cannot leave his religion alone."²

Naïveté in itself is not to be glorified. The simplicity and directness of the unsophisticated good-will is often very appealing. But the dangers surrounding a naïve faith are great and gross—"cocksureness," lethargy, intolerance, obscurantism, and emotional self-indulgence. *Naïveté* can be very brittle, and itself is a limitation of the scope and contact of the faith that it contains. An unnecessary *naïveté* may be a form of infantilism, a failure and a refusal to face the whole task of Christian living and the development of Christian

¹ *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 27.

² *Progress in Religion*.

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character. There is certainly no scriptural justification for the impression that God has a special blessing for the emotions and will that is denied to the mind. The "heart" in the Bible is the symbol of understanding or the conscious personality; there are nearly twenty times as many allusions to it as to the symbols of the emotions. Fixed emotional attitudes are subject to staleness, stagnation, and monotony; divorced from reason they sour into intolerance. Only mental activity can give variety, largeness, and freedom to the spiritual life. We need the mind to transfer the feelings and the will from one place to another. And we need the best that we are capable of in the way of rationalization to win the clean, clear, calm assurance of being honest.

Moreover, if as Plato taught and our Christian religion implies, God is for us the "persuasive element" in the perpetual creation of our world, it is in the activity which discerns that persuasiveness everywhere at work, and joins us with its energies that we are chiefly fellow-workers with God. In that activity reason and example have inseparable parts to play. "Reverence God in thyself," wrote Whichcote, "for God is more in the mind of man than in any part of the world besides."

The claim that "thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy mind" arouses many hostilities. The churchman, whose obedience to authority in doctrine is absolute, needs reminding that, in these days when Christianity has again become a "separated" faith, he must rationalize his allegiance if he is to possess it with assurance, and that all his critical and imaginative powers will be required to gather in the spiritual wisdom that his Church brings to him, and to live that wisdom in his peculiar and unique circumstances. The individual who objects that it is unfair to insist on the necessity of a power so unequally distributed as that of the intellect needs reminding that gifts of will and feeling are no less unequally divided, and in these matters also the less gifted, giving all they have of what they lack, must draw for strength and leadership on those more greatly endowed. The emotionalist, who objects that the critical activity switches off the current of feeling, needs reminding of the narrowness and self-indulgence of a faith too narrowly emotional, its dangers of intolerance and obscurantism. Criticism without devotion can only talk "around and about" religion, it is true, but only criticism can purify feeling and intuition and make willing as effective as it can be.

But, it may be asked, has not God made the ultimate truth so simple that it is intelligible to the simplest who approach in faith? So Christians believe. "He that loveth is of God." But if that love can the more fully appreciate the range and depth of the Eternal Wisdom and the better bring that Wisdom to the aid of others by using the intellect and developing the intellect for that use, can it

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withhold that offering? And if we can love better through some knowledge of psychology, preventive medicine, literature, economics, shall we omit these powers from our service if we can bring them within our grasp?

There is also an impression among the devout that the "intellectual" is more likely to miss his way than the "plain man." It is true that no one is unprejudiced about anything, and that a man moves in the direction that he faces, but among those who have a disposition towards God, the whole effort of Christian training should be directed to breaking down that artificial and mischievous barrier between the "intellectual" and the "plain man." "The reason of man is the habitation of God," said Abelard, and that saying can be more fully appreciated when we come to explore the positive content of "the love of the mind for God."

But the bitterest grievance against the "intellectual" in religion arises out of the controversy between traditionalists and modernists which is the true religious crisis of to-day. In earthen vessels of antique pattern, in wine-skins hallowed by age, the traditionalist holds the "water of life." He fears that if these are split by the critical action of the intellect or shattered by the ferment of thought, this life-giving water will evaporate. The modernist would point to a perpetual stream flowing from a source which can be reached by climbing. But clinging to his experience in traditional forms, the traditionalist says in effect, using the phrase in its theological meaning, "I'm damned if I'll listen." The controversy is vital, not in the sense that the future of Christianity depends on the question whether there be one Isaiah or three, or even on the issue whether the Incarnation depends on the Virgin Birth or the Empty Tomb.

The issue is crucial whether faith can accept the "open vision" of spiritual insight and common sense, whether inspiration is a perpetual "Now," or whether it must be segregated into some hallowed moments of the past which gave dogmatic finality at Jerusalem, Nicea, Chalcedon, or Trent. Whether faith is the right to stop thinking, or whether living truth requires the perpetual prayer of hard work to the Holy Spirit—this issue sets before us the choice of life or death. Is the Catholic Faith at some moment behind us, or does it beckon in the promise of syntheses ever richer and more profound, and in discoveries new, fresh, and authentic to the individual, call us to an ever-deepening widening fellowship, a more complete possession of the Truth? Of our private world of circumstance and thought we must ever ask:

Is this our ultimate stage or starting place
To try man's foot if it will creep or climb,
'Mid obstacles in seeming, points that prove
Advantage for who vaults from low to high
And makes the stumbling block a stepping stone?¹

¹ Browning, *The Ring and the Book*.

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But is not this process dangerous—this process of questioning habits of thought that give us a sense of security? It has its moments of danger when doubt of the finality of the familiar forms of faith seems like a mist that sweeps across the eyes, a trembling of the ground underneath the feet. In his religious progress the pilgrim may find himself at a ford compelled to wrestle with the Dark Angel of What Might be True. And if the wrestling be faithful it may leave some temporary lameness, some loss of former certainty on certain points. But in this time, one of the great periods of transition in Christian faith, we must stay to wrestle faithfully, crying aloud to our enormous problems like Jacob to the Angel, "I will not let thee go until thou bless me." The danger in such wrestling is rather to the temper of self-confident assurance in the moment than to ultimate faith. He,

Within whose circle of experience burns
The central truth, Power, Wisdom, Goodness-God,¹

may be shaken concerning such matters as his cherished conception of the authority of the Bible, or the claims of his Church, or particular definitions of the Incarnation and Atonement, or his formulae for social justice, but the central vitality of his ultimate belief will gather to itself wisdom more truthful, if less tidy and less assured, out of the struggle. And even the ultimate belief will mean more if it is fought for rather than taken for granted.

Spiritual truth, once discovered, is timeless. Moses' discovery of the righteousness of God is eternally valid, for example, but his limitation of Jahweh to the deity over Israel is not valid against first Isaiah's vision of Jahweh as the God of all peoples. Freed from faulty definition, from accretions of local and period philosophies, from dependence on doubtful historic assertions, "the truth once delivered to the saints" is expanded into new perceptions, gathered up into fresh formulations, to be criticized in their turn.

There is a real conflict of mood between those for whom movement and critical effort is of the very nature of truthfulness and those for whom religion is the emotional enjoyment and the reiteration of what they possess. The thinker pauses and questions confidently, believing the self-communicating Word will speak; the emotionalist wishes to make complete uncritical surrender of intellect and will. The religious life at its deepest and fullest will include both needs—possession of the eternal, and on all its manifestations, the use of those tests of probability, evidence, and insight that are the new and peculiar virtues of our own age. But man is "coined small," and in every individual one mood—motion or rest—will predominate.

The traditionalist often assumes that the modernist cannot be

¹ Browning, *The Ring and the Book*.

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humble because he is not submissive to authority, that the new ways cannot have missionary virtue because the old modes have had missionary virtue. To the traditionalist the modernist seems to concern himself with thought and scholarship and criticism rather than with saving and redeeming sinners. The answer is, of course, that in the armies of God the specialist must be allowed to do his own work, and that unless people think you are telling them the truth, and have yourself a hearty respect for truth, they will not allow you near enough to influence them at all. The critic must be used by the missionary, even if the critic is not himself pre-eminently a missionary. But there is no ultimate reason why he should not be. Honesty is an absolutely primary missionary virtue to-day. The last seventy years has seen an immense development of the critical faculty in mankind. No other question arises until we have answered to "What have we the best reason to believe is true?"

The supreme reward of "*amor intellectualis Dei*" is a hard-won simplicity, clarity, and realism of vision. That is the ultimate answer to the distrust of the "intellectual." The emphasis is on "hard-won." Take the short cut of mere assent and you have a commonplace, a platitude, but with Paul and Aquinas face the full complexity of life to wrest from it its principles for you, its revelations to you, its claims upon you, and you have—maybe still in words long familiar and long accepted—a unique and original discovery. This discovery will be given length and width of meaning by the journey that you have taken, its value and its power to help will lie in the experience through which it has been achieved, it will be given working usefulness by the multitude of its contacts with the facts through which you have journeyed, it will be given confidence and self-respect by the tests to which it has been subject.

He whose service is a rational service believes that the use of criticism within religion has yielded glorious results. It has cut a great heritage of vitality free from those filaments of rationalism which in the past drew into its service the knowledge and theories of the past, but which are now dead with that part of the past which is dead. Such, for example, is the three-storied universe of Genesis and the feudal and Roman law in past theories of the Atonement. This outburst of criticism, this newly developed power of the human mind, has released the fundamental magnanimities of Christian teaching from their bonds, it has recovered the direct realism of Jesus, and is restoring His mind as the dominating influence on Christianity—the test of its past, and the living core attracting to its service the finest thinking of the present, and the promises of the future wherever they may be found. It has restored a hard and honestly won simplicity of faith, the more confident and workable in that it is aware of its own limits, and knows where honest agnosti-

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cism must begin. This is the basis for a Catholicism yet to be achieved, for in itself this simple faith is a critical and appreciative approach to every great Christian personality, a means of extracting that which cannot be shaken from every unique appreciation of God in life.

The entrance into this fellowship with past and present, in which there are no barriers of authority or fear, is a going out from closed rooms, an emergence into an air which is always fresh and moving, though winds at times may be stormy, where the light is always from the sun, though clouds may gather and disperse. And if we may change the metaphor, so far from the quest being a departure from humility, the journey finds its characteristic spirit and dynamic in a daring humility. The disciplined submission to evidence on questions of fact, the constant sense of the incompleteness of one's personality, the insufficiency of one's theories, the inadequacy of one's language to comprehend the Reality that is breaking in on one's mind, the sense of something attainable ever beyond each stage of one's thinking—these thrust through every pause and rest of complacency. A worship that understands itself and reflects upon itself is the most profound form of self-discovery. The "stretch" and the "lift" of personality reveals at once its capacities and weaknesses, and in revealing the necessary conflicts summons the energies quickly to those points.

Faith is not the right to stop thinking, the claim to comfort which it appears to so many minds. It is the "testing of things hoped for, the proving of things not seen." Often, it is true, the mind which concentrates itself in an intense effort of reasoning and argument may suddenly emerge into a clear and simple vision of truth. We see the process at work in Browning, and St. Thomas Aquinas set aside his immense controversial labours with the words: "I can write no more; I have seen things which make all my writings like straw." But these visions were given to men who earned them, who fought for them hard and fairly and faithfully. They came to men who sought not comfort, but truth.

The mind is seldom avoidable in God's service. It had better be enjoyed.

Thus far we have been writing of the instrumental value of "the love of the mind for God." But this "instrumental" joy is not quite the same thing as the "*amor intellectualis Dei*." We have been cutting our way towards the mountain through the undergrowth of the plain; it is time that we began our ascent.

Where, then, dwells the happiness of "the love of the mind for God"? First, let us take the joys of the ascent. The climb begins in a calm love of thought and a serene faith in thought as the means whereby the "*Logos*," the Reasoning of the Universe, discloses

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itself to man. Man's mind can measure the diameter of stars some hundreds of light-years away because, as Lord Haldane points out in his *Reign of Relativity*, there is a reasoning in Nature akin to our own. We find the same idea in the work of Eddington and Jeans. Therefore, says Lord Haldane, we should trust our religious intuitions to give us an insight into the nature of Reality. And these, at their highest, converge. "The saints do not contradict each other," says Dean Inge. "The great saints have been great metaphysicians," says Joubert. When we contemplate the work of the great poets, mystics, and philosophers, whose illuminations are of irresistible authority for us because of the responses which they evoke in us, it is hard to resist the doctrine of Henry More, the Cambridge Platonist, "that there is faculty in the soul which he calls Divine Sagacity, whereby the truth may be known by intuition. Divine Sagacity is evidently much the same as the Neoplatonic Nous. It is that organ which all possess, but only a few use."¹

The irresistibility of Truth, especially when it is revealed as beauty, confirms this belief that we have the power to know God by a natural affinity. "The Truth of Supreme Beauty lies beyond the dictionary meanings of words," Whitehead writes. "The quest of truth is justified for him by the faith that it will reveal Beauty at the uttermost depth of Reality."² The sense of motion and expectancy in the discovery of beauty is fulfilment and peace. This calm irresistibility of Truth as the illumination of Goodness and Beauty, as the invincible affirmation of our affinity with Goodness and Beauty is supremely expressed by St. Augustine. "Thou didst strike my heart with Thy word and I loved Thee."³ And again: "I entered the secret chamber of my soul, and behold the light that never changes, above the eye of my soul, above my intelligence. It was altogether different from any earthly illumination. It was above me because it made me, and I was lower because I was made by it."⁴

But the saints cannot do all the work for us that is necessary to make their discoveries our own. "The intermediate stage is a process of making our own by free inquiry the spiritual truth by which we decided, through faith, to stand," writes Dean Inge.⁵ The final stage is the vision of our own. This vision must be honestly won, even if honesty makes it incomplete. He who feels the world's sin and pain so keenly and exclusively that he is prevented thereby from the faith that God is Love is perhaps nearer the kingdom than he to whom this faith is merely an emotional refuge. To see "through a glass darkly" God as Love is to see "that there is no evil so great

¹ Inge: *The Platonic Tradition*, p. 57.

² Whitehead: *The Adventure of Ideas*.

³ *Confessions*.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *The Platonic Tradition*, p. 18.

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but that the effort to overcome it may create a good greater than would have been possible if the evil had never been there."¹

The "amor intellectualis Dei" is not the same thing as the delight in speculation for its own sake, for it is at once a quest and an arrival. It is indeed permeated by faith in God which is an assurance of the ultimate unity of goodness and power. But such an assurance makes one free of the whole world of speculation. The athletic delight in speculation, the expectancy of intellectual curiosity, the joyous shocks of discovery offer themselves on every side. For one can learn incessantly from all strong thinkers, however much of their systems we may reject. It is not necessary to accept the whole thesis of St. Thomas Aquinas or Bertrand Russell to be able to gather in joyfully their flashes of inspiration and insight.

But, it may be objected, is not this world of speculation a region of chaos and contradiction? It is that only to a superficial view. One cannot reconcile the beliefs of Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, William James, and A. N. Whitehead, for example, into a tidy and comprehensive system of doctrine. They are using different "picture languages," they are starting their inquiries at different points and working upwards from different problems; some of their ideas and perhaps nearly all their "pictures" are incompatible, in that as they stand they cannot be pieced together in one vision of Reality. But each thinker is dealing greatly with the witness of life to that which lies beyond life. The fundamental idea of each of the great philosophies is a beam of light revealing patterns and meanings in some region of the welter of daily experience. Each central thesis, however inconsistent with the others, had best be accepted as a basic discovery concerning the nature of the Universe. And the seeker for the fullness of the truth of God can believe that these beams of illumination, split into diverging rays by the crystals of personality, derive from the white radiance of eternity and meet in a realm from which they come beyond our seeing.

O Thou as represented here to me
In such conception as my soul allows —
Under thy measureless, my atom width! —
Man's mind, what is it but a convex glass
Wherein are gathered all the scattered points
Picked out of the immensity of sky,
To re-unite there, be our heaven for earth,
Our known unknown, our God revealed to man?
Existent somewhere, somehow as a whole;
Here, as a whole proportioned to our sense.²

"Perfect love casteth out fear." Once we possess this assurance

¹ Pringle Pattison: *The Idea of God*.

² Browning: *The Ring and the Book: The Pope*.

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of the ultimate unity of goodness and power, we can go down with any cause that has virtue in it, in a calm assurance. We can watch or share, with tranquillity, in the breaking up of "thought pictures" and ideas that have brought spiritual life to millions for centuries, well knowing that better pictures may be constructed out of the discarded materials. For faith in thought as the mediator of truth goes with the realization of the inadequacy of language. Our language is a mosaic of physical images. It can never do full justice to any idea outside of the handling of material things. And the central convictions of religious experience, such, for example, as the belief that God is Love and that magnanimity is the voice of truth and God's own common sense in human affairs, and that God is to be discerned "in the face of Jesus Christ"—these are always throwing out filaments of rationalization, linking them to the best social theories and the best scientific opinion of our day. Such filaments are always breaking, but they will grow again to make contact with the new working theories reshaping themselves out of the obsolescent ones. But religious thought to-day is more cautious in committing itself to any one scientific world view, and gratefully and greatly stimulated as it is by the changing temper and the transformed philosophic outlook of science, it receives the ideas of Whitehead, Eddington, and Jeans into its own core of illumination, and does not try to write them into a formal and classic theology.

The changing temper of science has had this great effect on the "amor intellectualis Dei." It has taken out of religious thinking the heat and the hardness that belonged to the time when science presented, with uncompromising dogmatism, a mechanistic "world-view" intolerant of freedom and responsibility, and a view of human life as internecine struggle which denied to goodwill any status in the nature of things. Then for a time the only course that seemed possible to religious people was to harden the shell of traditional theory which enshrined their experience of deeper things. There are many and great difficulties to be resolved in the attempt to fashion a new world-outlook that will reconcile the findings of a religion with a scientific philosophy, but "the universe begins to look more like a great thought than a great machine."¹ It is certainly easier to-day for a man thinking his faith to think calmly and candidly as an "intellectual gentleman."

But the "amor intellectualis Dei" does not consist alone of the athletic joy of speculation. There is open to it an historic enjoyment, disciplined but eager for the companionship and vitality of the past. Within the Bible itself we may bring close to us by modern scholarship the dusty roads of Galilee, the figure of the Master, the great personalities of the Old Testament, and the historic crises of faith

¹ Jeans: *The Mysterious Universe*.

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from which they spoke. And beyond the Bible there is a line of noble personalities carrying a world of splendid beauty and sublimity to our own day. It is time that some scholar dug out and collected the gleaming gems of thought from the Fathers and the mediaeval saints.

Yet another mood of the "amor intellectualis" is the delight of appreciating critical scholarship so well described by Francis Bacon: "For myself I found that I was fitted for nothing so well as for the study of Truth; as having a mind nimble and versatile enough to catch the resemblance of things (which is the chief point), and at the same time steady enough to fix and distinguish their subtler differences; as being gifted by nature with desire to seek, patience to doubt, fondness to meditate, slowness to act, readiness to reconsider, carefulness to dispose and set in order; and as being a man that neither affects what is new nor admires what is old and that hates every kind of imposture. So I thought my nature had a kind of familiarity and relationship with Truth." All these qualities are required in the tremendously difficult task of working out a technique for the eager spirits who strive that the principles of Christianity may prevail in the complex turmoil of modern political, social, and industrial life. These worship a God "whom to serve is to rule."

All these, then, are the athletic joys of the ascent—the quiet faith in thought, the absence of fear, the delight in the widening views, the transcending of past achievement, the acquired instinct of soundness directing the placing of the feet, the freedom of the fellowship of climbers, the clear, unobstructed view which rewards the summit—"the naked intuition of eternal truth which is always the same, which never rises or sets, but always stands still in the vertical, and fills the whole horizon of the soul with a mild and gentle light."

In what words shall we attempt to define that vision? There we shall find God as Friend—not an Individual concealing his face, or a venerable Figure with a white beard, but Personal in the sense of being the Answer to Personality. And the Answer thus seen—clear of thronging obscurities, but making all detail luminous, pouring in clear sunshine upon the whole landscape of human life and affairs, and enlightening all who will look upward—is that God is Magnanimity. To the lifted eye the vision is one of Absolute simplicity and peace, to the eye following down, the light from this vision is the truth shining through all the turmoil and confusion of human aims and occupations. Herein the play of shadows mark the points where this light is interrupted and refused. We cannot remain in the clear glow. For the full enjoyment of the "amor intellectualis Dei," the intellectual part, cannot be the whole of life. The will and the sympathies, the duties and affections must mediate it and pay for it. We must rise from the love of life and nature, in its striving

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detail, to the clear vision of God, and return to this faithfulness again, seeing, with the vision we have won, God in the patterns of the dawn, in a new stage in the development of central banking, in a piece of hard-won reforming legislation, in a dusty bit of faithful administration.

I do not think this ascent and descent has ever been described so wonderfully as by Plato in the *Symposium*; where Diotima speaks (the translation is Bridges'): "He who has been instructed thus far in the science of love, and has been led to see beautiful things in their due order and rank, when he comes toward the end of his discipline will suddenly catch sight of a wondrous thing, beautiful with the absolute Beauty;—and this, Socrates, is the end of all those earlier labours;—he will see a Beauty eternal, not growing or decaying, not waxing or waning, nor depending on time or circumstance or place, . . . but Beauty absolute, separate, simple, everlasting; which lending of its virtue to all beautiful things that we see born to decay, itself suffers neither increase nor diminution, nor any other change. . . ."

"And this is the right way wherein he should go or be guided in his love; he should begin by loving earthly things for the sake of the absolute loveliness, ascending to that as it were by degrees or steps, from the first to the second, and thence to all fair forms; and from fair forms to fair conduct, and from fair conduct to fair principles, until from fair principles he finally arrives at the ultimate principle of all, and learns what absolute beauty is. Are you not convinced that he who thus sees beauty as only it can be seen will be specially fortunèd? And that since he is in contact not with images but realities, he will give birth not to images, but to very Truth itself? And being thus the parent and nurse of true virtue it will be his lot to become a friend of God, and, so far as any man can be, immortal and absolute?"

Augustine, in his great account of the mystic vision at Ostia, deals faithfully with the intellectual part in that heavenly vision: "We went on to explore in turn all things material, even the very heaven where sun and moon and stars give light upon the earth: and thus ascending by meditation and speech and admiration of Thy works, we were drawing yet nearer and had come to our own minds, and left them behind, that we might arrive at the country of unfailing plenty, where Thou feedest Thy people for ever in pastures of truth; there where life is the Wisdom by which all those Thy works are made, that have been or shall be; Wisdom uncreate, the same now as it ever was, and the same to be for evermore."

Thus lifted by successive appreciations of the Logos, the Reasoning of God, we are drawn to God Himself. Through this loving, eager, confident, original wakefulness of the mind, "the Lord shall be unto Thee an everlasting Light, and thy God thy glory."

RUSSELL AND McTAGGART

MARGARET MACDONALD

IN his Introduction to McTaggart's *Philosophical Studies*,¹ Dr. S. V. Keeling complains that in the interests of a prejudice in favour of science and scientific methods, Russell and his followers have denied the possibility of solving metaphysical problems without giving any philosophical reason for this proscription. And by "metaphysical problems," Dr. Keeling seems to mean (as against Russell and in agreement with McTaggart) ethical problems about the amount of good and evil in the world, the nature of human beings and their destiny, the hopes of men about immortality, and hence the "ultimate analysis of Time," etc.² Science is not concerned with such problems, and moreover it is the business of philosophy to "justify" induction and cannot itself employ a scientific method. Dr. Keeling therefore urges a return to the rationalism of McTaggart and the attempt to solve such problems by the deductive method. I want to say why this seems to me impossible and why such problems are insoluble unless they can be interpreted empirically and left to the investigation of the special sciences. I shall refer first to the most important feature of present empirical philosophy, then discuss metaphysical and other deductive systems, and finally dispute McTaggart's claim that the Self *must* be known by acquaintance and not by description, which Dr. Keeling regards, mistakenly, as it seems to me, the final refutation of this part of "positivistic phenomenalism."³ By this procedure I do not intend to justify or defend analytic philosophy but merely to re-compare its method with that of McTaggart. I do not wish to maintain that anyone can be logically compelled to adopt any particular method in philosophy—or in anything else—indeed, one of the questions at issue is the nature of the *a priori*, and the sense in which any proposition *must* be accepted.

¹ *Philosophical Studies*, McTaggart (edited S. V. Keeling), Arnold, 1934.

² *Op. cit.*, Introduction, pp. 11, 16.

³ I have not discussed "the problem of induction" or the question of "justifying" the methods of science. It seems to me a special problem of logic, and I cannot see how its solution can be advanced by recourse to metaphysical theories about the non-temporal nature of "ultimate reality" since temporal order is of the essence of causal connection and inductive generalization. It may be indeed that there is no "problem" here at all, but that as Ramsey thought (*Foundations of Mathematics*, p. 197) "induction is one of the ultimate sources of knowledge as memory is." It is certainly difficult to see how induction can ever be "justified" by deduction, without ceasing to be induction.

It seems a pity that in concentrating on some of the more obvious mistakes of Russell, Dr. Keeling completely ignores later developments of the position which he describes as "positivism, overweening phenomenalism, and mere patching up of Hume."¹ Russell's use of the term "scientific method" in the sense in which scientific method is to be introduced into philosophy is certainly not very clear. It cannot be the business of philosophy to formulate natural laws or make generalizations for the purpose of predicting future experience. If this were so, then however "general" its problems were² philosophy would just be another inductive science. But Russell identifies scientific method in philosophy with the "logical-analytic method" which has been developed and applied by his followers³ and is not inductive. Nor is it deductive, but it is a means of elucidating the meaning of expressions. Thus the *fundamental* difference between present criticism of dogmatic metaphysics and that of former positivism and Kantianism is the recognition of the part played by *language* in the setting and attempted solution of philosophical problems. McTaggart asserts that feeling as well as intellect must be allowed to set philosophical problems, though only reason may solve them,⁴ but what he did not consider was whether problems in philosophy are not frequently set by neither feeling nor reason, but simply by a misuse of language. This was first most clearly shown by Russell's Theory of Descriptions which dissolved many puzzles about subsistent non-existents. All philosophers use language, but none, until recently, has philosophized about it very seriously. But what leads us to regard language as the key to the solution of all philosophical problems? Not a perverse phenomenalism nor a contempt for reason, but simply the practice of philosophers themselves. For it would be agreed that there is a sense in which philosophers do not discover new facts, as scientists do, or dispute the existence of anything at all. And this is shown by their behaviour and their use of ordinary language. A chair may "really" be a set of God's ideas or a mode of the eternal attribute of extension which manifests the perfect nature of Substance, but whichever view I hold about its "real" nature I shall use the word "chair" in ordinary life in exactly the same sense as does the plain man, for whom a chair is "something to sit on." The question

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 17, 24.

² *Mysticism and Logic*, B. Russell, p. 110, "On Scientific Method in Philosophy." Russell distinguishes between a scientific and a philosophical problem by the fact that "A philosophical problem must be general." It must not be limited in application to a particular set of events or objects in any particular portion of space and time.

³ Cf. writings of J. Wisdom, L. S. Stebbing, A. J. Ayer, etc.

⁴ *Philosophical Studies*, Introduction, p. 11.

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then arises, may not these different philosophical theories be merely different "languages" which may or may not be applied to experience, and not expressions of any discovery about the "real" nature of a chair, which is never given in experience? This seems to be confirmed by the efforts of philosophers themselves to explain how we can "misperceive" so constantly a set of God's ideas as a material object. That we do thus see a set of ideas as extended without ever discovering the fact, it is felt, must be accounted for. But if we consider the ordinary use of language, this is seen at once to be a pseudo-problem or else the words "error" and "illusion" are being used in senses which have not been explained. For by "error" and "illusion" we mean something which can be corrected by further experience. When I know that what I believed was a ghost is "really" gauze and coloured light, I have discovered my error and shall alter my behaviour accordingly. But when I have "discovered" that a chair is "really" a set of God's ideas, I have discovered nothing which alters my behaviour in the least. In what sense, therefore, was I previously in error?¹ There seems, then, to be no genuine choice between these philosophical languages at all. This will become clearer when we discuss the connection of McTaggart's system with empirical fact. Language is an instrument whose use is learned by means of ostensive definitions and which is understood primarily in terms of what is thus given in direct experience, sensible or introspectible. The uses and possible uses of words are expressible in definitions which may be regarded as "rules" similar to those of

¹ It is perhaps needless to point out that this is an entirely different position from that which arises with scientific "imperceptibles." That my table is composed of atoms and electrons is a statement which can be verified. It is a way of saying that if I put my table in such and such circumstances certain phenomena will result. The use of imperceptibles in science is a technique for dealing with change, i.e. for connecting, e.g. a square, brown object with a heap of ashes when my table has been burned. Such hypotheses cannot be used to deny the existence of bodies as ordinarily perceived without denying their own foundations. It is another linguistic trap that we express such a proposition as "This table is a collection of whirling atoms" as if it were of the same form as "This table is brown" and so convey the impression that the latter contradicts the former and expresses a continual misperception of it as the "real" scientific nature of the table. That such a view is mistaken we can discover only by considering how we do in fact use such propositions and what is their function in our language. We have seen that the function of the former is to enable us to predict what will happen when this table is brought into certain causal connections with other material objects, not to prove that it is not a material object at all. The function of the latter is to describe what is given us in immediate sensible experience. Or if it is a hypothesis (as the logical positivists sometimes affirm) it is one of entirely different type from the former. The snare of the metaphysical proposition "A table is a set of God's ideas" is that it looks like the scientific proposition but performs no such function of enabling us to predict future experience.

grammar, for the correct use of such words within a certain context. So that when McTaggart bases his proof that Time is unreal on the assumption that " x is present," " x is past," " x is future" are of the same form as " x is white," the reply is to see that these propositions are used differently in our language, which reveals their different "grammars" or rules. To confuse them will not result in a startling proposition about the world, viz. that there are no temporal facts of the form, "My birth is past and my death is future," but merely in saying nothing, or in laying down a new rule whose use has not been explained to us. The situation is comparable to that of a man who tries to play draughts by treating some of the pieces as chessmen and moving them accordingly, while moving the rest in accordance with the rules of draughts. The result will either be no game at all, or a new game whose rules must be explained and will not of themselves elucidate the rules of chess and draughts. To the analytic philosopher it seems more probable that philosophers are misunderstanding the use of language when they come to paradoxical conclusions than that there is anything "more real" than ordinary experience or that pre-existence and immortality can be mathematically demonstrated. Neither Russell nor his followers wish to deny categorically that metaphysical problems have meaning; they ask what is it they do mean. No one can give a language sense except its users, and if metaphysicians can give such sense to "Time is unreal," "God exists" that we can see the connections of these expressions with those of ordinary language, then metaphysical propositions will have sense, but they will have ceased to be metaphysical. For we so use language that a proposition whose truth or falsity cannot be tested in experience is not regarded as giving us information about the world at all.

McTaggart defined philosophy as "the systematic study of the ultimate nature of reality,"¹ and the object of such study, as we have already seen, was to justify a religious belief, "a conviction of harmony between ourselves and the universe."² This requires knowledge of everything that exists, and of the relation between ourselves and other existents. But this inquiry seems to start with a linguistic fallacy. For how is the phrase "the universe" being used? It has a substantival air, and the universe is then regarded as a substance and a subject of predicates by McTaggart, so that the phrase is put linguistically on a level with "the Houses of Parliament" and "The Bank of England," while to see that they are used differently one need only ask how we should discover the truth of propositions in whose expression these phrases occurred. If, however, "the universe" is a shorthand expression for "everything that exists" it does not seem sensible to say that there is a feeling of harmony

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 273.

² *Ibid.*, Introduction, p. 10.

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between me and the Falls of Niagara or the inhabitants of New York, whom I have never seen. Yet these are presumably among the things that exist. What I wish to consider, however, is the method by which McTaggart proposes to justify this conviction and to obtain knowledge of everything that "really" exists. He cannot do so by examining everything that exists, nor by induction, for that gives only probable knowledge about what characteristics will be revealed in the future to sense experience and introspection, and what is required is certain knowledge about what "ultimately" exists. The only alternative is an *a priori* method. So, despite Kant, McTaggart repeated the attempt to deduce from so-called empirically certain propositions and definitions what ultimate characteristics *must* be possessed by everything that exists. He did not, however, examine the nature of this "must," but assumed that his conclusions would be accepted as giving certain knowledge about the world. This is precisely what has been disputed by the logical positivists. We said that a proposition will give us information about the world if its truth or falsity can be empirically tested. There are, however, some propositions which cannot be so tested, which we call *a priori*. If $2 + 2 = 4$ gives us information about entities which are Numbers, we can certainly never discover this. Nor do we know anything about the weather if we know only that it is either raining or not raining. The propositions of logic and mathematics, like definitions and other symbolic structures which cannot be denied without contradiction, may be regarded as giving us rules in accordance with which we may use the language of experience. Thus $2 + 2 = 4$ does not give us a certain truth about Numbers, but shows us that it will be sensible to say that if there are two people in this room and they each have two feet, then there are four feet in this room, and that it will be nonsense to say there are five feet. To say there *could not*, therefore, be five feet in this room is quite different from saying that on account of its altitude there could not be a monastery at the top of Everest. The latter proposition may be tested in experience and would be falsified by taking oxygen to the top of Everest, but if Mill's demon added one foot to every two pairs our arithmetic might be inconvenient, but would not be false. That is to say, I tell you nothing about the nature of feet by saying that if there are four of them then there are $2 + 2$ of them, but merely apply the rule for substituting one set of signs for another. Similarly, the principle of the syllogism gives us a rule according to which we say Karl Marx *must have been* discontented because he was a socialist and all socialists are discontented. This does not assert a mysterious logical connection between socialists and discontent, for whether all socialists are discontented we can know only by experience. The syllogism shows that we have framed a

language which allows us to state the conclusion when the premisses have been stated, or understood. Russell and others have shown that there may be many different principles of inference in accordance with which different "languages" or symbolic systems may be elaborated which may or may not be applicable to experience, but the propositions in them will not be any the less *a priori* and certainly true. This may be a mistaken view, but at least some examination of the *a priori* might be expected of philosophers who advise us to return to the deductive method for the solution of philosophical problems. It does seem, however, absurd to say that anything *must* be the case which I cannot control, but I cannot control what I shall experience, but only the language which I choose as most convenient to apply to it.¹

This view certainly seems to be confirmed by considering the nature of deductive systems. A deductive system as developed from primitive propositions in accordance with rules or principles of inference and substitution is completely abstract.² It may be developed from a proposition of the form, "Take a class of elements K and a relation R such that, etc." Whether it can be interpreted and applied in experience will depend upon whether there are objects related by relations having the properties specified. Since its application is so limited, it is not surprising that all deductive metaphysical systems so far have ended by denying reality to most of common experience. But nothing follows logically about the existence of things to which a deductive system does not apply. They are certainly not thereby made illusory. It is true that the temptation to think this is so is strong, even in science, when experiences of colour and sound are dismissed as "epiphenomena" because propositions about them cannot be included in the system of physical science, but that is just a mistake. The truth is that to say a deductive system "applies" to the facts is to say that it gives a systematic language which enables us to make predictions, but the objects to which it applies are not thereby more "ultimate" or more real than those to which it does not. So regarded, a deductive system is like any other language in which some things can be said and some cannot.

But philosophers would not accept this view of metaphysical deductive systems. They are not content to say that "If anything has the characteristics *a, b, c*, then it will have the characteristics *d, e, f*," they want to say that "Only that which has the characteristics *a, b, c*, can exist at all, or "Everything which exists (or really

¹ For this view of the *a priori*, cf. Wittgenstein: *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Kegan Paul, 1922. Carnap: *The Unity of Science* (trans. M. Black), Psyche Miniatures, 1934, 28. 6d. Carnap: *Philosophy and Logical Syntax*, Psyche Miniatures, 1935, and other writings of the Vienna School.

² Cf. L. S. Stebbing, *Proc. Aris. Soc.*, 1932 and 1933.

exists) must have the characteristics *a, b, c.*" They would deny that a metaphysical system was abstract or that it could be applied in the ordinary sense. Rather it claims to describe for us *the* system of the universe. But it cannot be proved that everything *must* have the characteristics *a, b, c*, unless it is known that at least something *does* have the characteristics *a, b, c* (or at least some of them). It is assumed therefore that if the primitive propositions of a metaphysical deductive system include an alleged self-evidently certain existential proposition such as "I exist" or "God exists," then the system will be a valid revelation of the characteristics which *must* be possessed by everything which exists. What happens, of course, is that the system is developed in terms of such propositions and what cannot be deduced from the characteristics of "God" or of "I" is "unreal." The only possible alternative would be to include primitive propositions of *every* type of object whose existence can be empirically certified, and it is not suggested that this has been or could be done in the present state of knowledge. But it is surely absurd to legislate for the universe from a limited number of propositions and the deductions from them. Non-Euclidean space is not "unreal" because its characteristics cannot be deduced from the primitive propositions of Euclid but from those of some other system, nor are matter and sense data "unreal" because McTaggart's Principle of Determining Correspondence cannot be applied to them. It is evident, then, that a metaphysician cannot determine what *must* exist except in terms of properties with some of which he is already acquainted, i.e. which do exist. But short of examining everything in the world and knowing what will happen to-morrow, what can be meant by saying that any qualities with which I am acquainted *must* continue to be experienced? It seems even more clear that in saying that only things which have certain properties are "real" or "exist," the metaphysician is merely telling us how he intends in future to use the words "real" and "exist"; he is not substituting a colony of souls or a set of God's ideas for a solid square table, nor proving that the Battle of Waterloo is not really past. He is giving us a new notation in which to express these facts, and we must ask whether it is of any use. What can we predict about the behaviour of a table from knowing that it is "really" a colony of souls and how can such behaviour be tested?


McTaggart is indeed a very good example of this metaphysical procedure.¹ He begins by asserting that "Something exists" is certainly true. If this is doubted or denied, then the doubt or denial will certainly exist. But these are mental events. It appears, then, that the type or model of that which exists is a mental event. I am not sure whether McTaggart intends to assert this, though the develop-

¹ Cf. *Op. cit.*, *Essay XI*, p. 273, et seq.

ment of his system seems to confirm it. He appeals again to perception in asserting that what exists is differentiated. Existence, he maintains, is a quality, though everything which exists has some other quality besides existence; the notion of quality entails that of substance (i.e. on our view that whenever he uses the word "quality" he will use the word "substance" as correlative to it) and that certain things must be true of substances and their parts, e.g. they must be related by the relation of Determining Correspondence,¹ and cannot exist in time. He then seems to attempt to apply his system, for he says:² "Only three sorts of substance appear to be given us in experience—matter, sense data, and spirit. We do not know and we cannot imagine any others." He decides that the parts of matter and sense data cannot be related by Determining Correspondence, but that those of selves (or spirits) and their perceptions can. He concludes, therefore, that all that exist are selves and their perceptions, none of which exists in time or occurs at a time though they have certain relations to each other which are misperceived as temporal. Matter, sense data, judgments, assumptions, images are equally unreal. Now I was aware of none of this when I judged that "Nothing exists" and thereby implied the existence of a certain belief and the truth of the proposition "Something exists" as an axiom of this system. In asserting that "Nothing exists" or even that "I exist," I seemed to be making a judgment which occurred at a time, but in developing his system McTaggart denies that these characteristics which perceptually certified these occurrences really do exist. How, then, can such beliefs or judgments justify the assertion that "Something exists" as a primitive proposition and the existential basis of this system? The reasoning seems to be of the form, "I am acquainted with X, which has the characteristics *a*, *b*, *c*, therefore something exists, but the characteristics *a*, *b*, *c* do not exist." McTaggart's reply, I suppose, would be that in asserting that "Something exists" I am aware of only one "ultimate" characteristic, that of "being existent," and since the existence of any quality implies that of a substance which has the quality, therefore X exists although its other qualities revealed to perception are unreal. But in what sense is the characteristic of "being existent" given in experience at all? To discover whether there is a book on my shelf I do not look for an instance of "being existent" but for instance of a certain shape, colour, size, etc. This is, of course, a truism since Kant, but it seems

¹ The relation of Determining Correspondence is such that sufficient descriptions of the primary parts of a substance A (which include descriptions of their relations to each other and to A) will determine sufficient descriptions of the parts of the parts of A throughout an infinite series. *Cl. Op. cit.*, p. 279.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 283.



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important to reiterate it in this connection since, unless existence is a quality with which I am directly acquainted, there is no perceptual basis to McTaggart's system at all for all other qualities of which I am directly aware when I say that something exists he subsequently proves to be unreal. And to assert that existence and reality are predicates is again to treat "this exists" as of the same form as "this is white," which certainly requires justification and receives none from McTaggart. To what, then, does his system apply?

The process of applying symbolic systems to the facts is somewhat obscure, and I do not profess to know its complete analysis. But what does seem to be clear is that whether any other system applies to anything or not can be *tested*. If Euclid's geometry applies to perceptual space, then the angles of any figure which I call triangular will measure approximately 180 degrees, and this can be discovered by measuring them. Both the figure and its measurements are given in perceptual experience. But if something exists, i.e. is given in experience for McTaggart then, as already pointed out, the characters by which it is known to exist are proved to be illusory, while from the fact that it exists (or has the pseudo-characteristic of "being existent") conclusions are drawn about its "real" characteristics which can never be tested at all, viz. that it does not exist in time and is a self or a perception of a self, though it "appears" to be a red sense datum. Nor can the existence of such characters be indirectly verified as can the hypotheses of the physicist about electrons or of the psychologist about the unconscious. It is very difficult to see in what sense the metaphysician claims to be giving us knowledge about the world or how his conclusions are linked to the empirically certified proposition which is one of those from which he starts. A metaphysical deductive system is a logical hybrid, not completely hypothetical, and yet incapable of being intelligibly applied to what it is claimed does exist. But if "deductive system" is used for a metaphysical system in the same sense in which it is used, e.g. for a system of geometry, then its conclusions, deduced with the help of the perceptual proposition on which it claims to be based, must themselves be empirically verifiable, and there will then be no question of anything "more ultimate" than ordinary experience. The system will apply to some facts and not to others, that is all. Otherwise, we are merely being given a set of rules for the translation of sentences about material objects and temporal facts into sentences about misperceptions of souls and positions in an eternal "C" series without being shown what purpose such a translation serves. Its only possible justification would seem to be that it gives certain emotional satisfactions about the "harmony" of the universe with human beings. If "deductive system" is being used in some other sense in which

such a system does give us knowledge of what is beyond empirical observation, we have not been told what that sense is.

Meanwhile, we return to the position of Russell that the construction of a system adequate to the whole of what exists must depend on the development of the special sciences and cannot be obtained by *a priori* reasoning from inadequate premisses.

In claiming that his system applied to selves and their perceptions, McTaggart asserted that each person knows himself by acquaintance, of which he put forward an independent proof¹ which is regarded by Dr. Keeling as a conclusive refutation of positivism. This seems to me to be mistaken. McTaggart's argument is as follows: I understand many propositions in which the word "I" occurs, and I know that some of them are true. I must, then, know the constituents of such propositions. These constituents must be known either by acquaintance or by description. If I know myself only by description then in asserting that "I am hungry," two descriptions will be involved, viz. "the person who is hungry" and "the person who asserts that she is hungry." How, then, could I know that these two descriptions belong to one and the same person? Not by a further description, for that would lead to an infinite regress of descriptions, e.g. that I knew myself as "the person who asserts that in asserting that she is hungry she is the same as the person who is hungry," *ad infinitum*. But, *ex hypothesi*, I do know each of the constituents in the true proposition in which the word "I" occurs. I must then directly perceive myself. I must know by acquaintance that I am the person to whom the descriptions apply. Philosophers like Hume and Russell, who hold that the self is a bundle of states or a logical construction out of its states, must hold that the self is known only by description and are led into the infinite regress described above.

If I have stated McTaggart's view correctly, it is certainly not easy to see what sort of question he is asking. We know of course what it would be like for me to be hungry and for someone else to say that I am hungry. And I can tell a lie. I can say "I am hungry," when in fact I am not so that I know that the proposition "The person who says she is hungry is the person who is hungry," is false. But what sort of proposition would it be to say "I am hungry, but perhaps it is not really I who assert this"? Yet this is the proposition that McTaggart seems to think might be true unless I know myself by acquaintance. The positivist philosopher might reply that when McTaggart claims that I must know myself by acquaintance he is not giving us information about a simple object known in a peculiar way, but he is pointing out that our rules for the use of "I" are such that this absurd sentence is excluded from our language. We so use the word "I" in English that it would be nonsense for me

¹ *Op. cit.*, *Essay III*, on "Personality," p. 69 *et seq.*

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to say "I am hungry, but perhaps it is someone else who is asserting that I am hungry." To say that if this is true, then I must be directly aware of an object to which two descriptions apply is misleading since it suggests that there is some independent evidence of the existence of such an object when in fact there is none. My evidence for the fact that I am directly acquainted with a colour is not merely that I say "I see red," but also that I could point to an example of the colour and say "That is the colour I am seeing," but I cannot point to "I" or describe it. I can only use the word "I" in certain contexts.

It is true that McTaggart asserts that what I perceive when I perceive myself is the simple and indefinable quality of personality. So that I always know when I know "I" that I have the simple and indefinable quality of "being a person," though presumably, for McTaggart, I am something other than such a quality. But is the proposition "I am a person" a genuine proposition at all? What information does it give us? It would surely be meaningless to say "I am not a person" as it would be to say that "Red is not a colour" or "A sound has no pitch." We do not know what situations in the world would make such propositions true as we do, e.g., know that if the Prime Minister is in Scotland the proposition, "The Prime Minister is not in London," will be true. It makes sense to say the Prime Minister is in London because he may be elsewhere, and it is possible that we should discover where he is, as we cannot discover a sound without pitch or an "I" that is not a person (on this view). But if it were *inconceivable* that the Prime Minister should ever leave London, then it would give no more information to say that the Prime Minister was in London than to say he was in his skin, for a person who understood the phrase "the Prime Minister" would *ipso facto* understand it as used for "object in London."

It appears, then, that an expression such as "Red is a colour" does not express a proposition about the possession of a property "colour" by something called "Red," but one about the *word* "Red," viz. that it is a colour word and is used in accordance with our rules for colour words as distinct, e.g., from sound words so that to say, "This shade of red has pitch E flat," will be nonsense. And similarly for the proposition about "I." To say, "I have the unique and indefinable quality of being a person," is simply to say that "I" is a "human object word" or "person word" if that be preferred, i.e. that it is combined with other words in certain ways determined by the rules of our language; it does not give us information about an entity beyond the reach of empirical observation or introspection which is "myself." To say that "I know myself by acquaintance," or, as McTaggart says, "I *must* know myself by acquaintance," means that I do or intend to use the word "I" according to different

grammatical rules than those according to which I use the words "sun," "chair," or "the first English Queen." For it is quite obvious that it is not indisputable that the self is known by direct introspection. That it is has been asserted by some philosophers and psychologists and denied by as many more. That is why McTaggart tried to settle the matter by logical proof. But we have seen that logical proof shows something about the rules of language and not about the facts to which the rules are applied. The positivist philosopher, therefore, will remain quite unconvinced by McTaggart's claim to have settled the matter by certain knowledge of a substance whose existence is not empirically verifiable.

It seems much more likely that we use the word "I" in many different ways, and McTaggart is certainly right in pointing out that we do not always use it as equivalent to "succession of bodily states" or even "succession of mental states." The mistake is to go on to suppose that we therefore use it for *some other* state or entity known in a peculiar way. But we may use some words differently from others without using them for *something* different. This is difficult to see because we are so used to the idea that words, especially those which function in sentences as nouns, adjectives, and verbs, must stand for or refer directly or indirectly to elements of facts in some fairly straightforward way. The only way to discover whether this always is so or not would be to examine the criteria which we do or would accept for the truth of the propositions in whose expression such words occur.

E.g. the simple behaviourist translation of "I have pain" or "I see red" into "My body has a pain," "My body is red-seeing" is unsatisfactory unless we know more about the use of "my body" in such translations. A certain combination of limbs, trunk, head, and organs constitutes the body of M. Macdonald. Must it follow that whenever e.g. I have a pain, a certain part of this physical combination is to be held responsible for it, still less that it can properly be said to "feel" the pain? It always makes sense to ask a person who has a pain where it is. The reply might be "In this leg" or "In this tooth," accompanied by pointing to part of his body. But it might be accompanied by pointing to the floor or the bedclothes if a man seemed to feel pain in a leg which had been amputated. We should reply, "You can't have a pain *there*; you must be mistaken," and should proceed perhaps to remove his pain by treating some other part of his body. But suppose whenever I complained of rheumatic pains and you asked where they were I always pointed to the arm of the chair, and when you massaged the chair I felt better.¹ Is this inconceivable, and if it happened would the chair be part of "my" body? In other words, isn't it only an empirical fact that when-

¹ I owe this example to Dr. Wittgenstein's lectures.

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ever "I" have a pain it is cured by treating the body of M. Macdonald and not some other physical object? If you insist that any pain which I feel is caused by the action of this object on the nervous system of M. Macdonald I should reply that this too is an empirical fact, and like any other causal connection might be imagined otherwise than it is. So that "I have a pain," "I am seeing red," "I feel hungry," and similar propositions are not simply equivalent to "The body of M. Macdonald is in a certain state," although *in fact* it is usually the case that when one of the first sort of propositions is true the second is true also.

But, of course, "I" may be used in propositions which do refer simply to a part of this body. If I say "I have a scratch on my arm" I do call your attention to a part of my body. I could have conveyed the same information by saying "There is a scratch here," accompanied by pointing, without using "I" at all, though it is very usual to use the form with "I." But since this translation is easy it does not interest us philosophically.

McTaggart's point might be put in another way by saying that although in usages like "I am hungry," "I feel pain," I may be mistaken about my bodily states, I can never be mistaken about myself. You may convince me that a pain is not in my amputated leg, but you can never convince me that it is not I who feel the pain. "It is not my leg which causes the pain which I have" may be true, but "It is not I who have the pain which I have" is nonsense because it is self-contradictory. But if it is self-contradictory to say "It is not I who have this pain," it is tautologous, i.e. it conveys no information to say "It is I who have this pain," for who else could it be? To doubt this would be as if a Chairman who had asked "those in favour" of a motion to raise their hands, were to ask, "Are these people really in favour?" (where lying was not in question). This would be a meaningless question since by definition raising the hand was a sign of being in favour. Similarly, to say that I have pain is to say that it is "I" who have it and who assert that I have it, unless I am lying. But it does not follow that "I" is used sometimes to refer to a body and sometimes to something else, viz. a Self. To see this we need only consider the sense in which we ordinarily use such a phrase as "used for something else." We can say the word "bridge" is used for a structure over a river and for something else, viz., a game of cards; or the word "race" is used for a contest and for something else, viz. a group of people related in a certain way. In all such cases we can give verification-criteria for what the "something else" in question is. We can give sensible evidence of the existence of the different objects or states of affairs indicated. But what sensible evidence can be given of the existence of the two objects (or two aspects of one object if an "embodied

self" is preferred), the body of M. Macdonald and something else named by "I." Nevertheless, the word "I" is perfectly properly used in the examples given, just as the hand was rightly raised to support the Chairman's motion, but its function is not that of naming an entity inaccessible to sense perception or introspection, since we have given no meaning in English to the phrase "naming an entity unknown to sense perception or introspection." Of course McTaggart can adopt this phrase as the result of a rule for the translation of certain sentences containing the word "I," but it is not a rule already in use, and he has discovered no new facts which make its introduction necessary. In fact, this use of the word "I" seems much more like that of the gesture in response to "Who is in favour?", "Who has a pain?" than like the use of the words "this" and "that" to which it has sometimes been compared. We should be much less concerned to maintain that such a gesture referred to a unique constituent of any states of affairs, yet its function is perfectly understood.

Finally, there is the use of "I" which resembles that of words for physical objects. It is in a similar sense that I and this typewriter occupied the same places here yesterday. For the fact that I am the same person as I was yesterday certain criteria concerned with bodily similarity, behaviour, and memory would be accepted, and I might now doubt whether both I and the typewriter were the same as yesterday's objects.

The upshot is, that the only sense in which we *must* use words seems to be the sense in which we *must* kick the ball between the posts in order to secure a goal in football. We must use them in accordance with the rules of the game accepted by the other players or make an illicit move, i.e. talk nonsense. But the rules of the game are determined by human choice and convenience within the limits of empirical fact, and not by necessary, metaphysical connections between rubber balls and wooden posts. So, too, is our use of language, and there is no metaphysical problem of our knowledge of the self and our use of "I." We use "I" in empirical situations which can be investigated and to make propositions which can be communicated. We can also examine actual and possible uses of the word "I" and so far conduct a philosophical and *a priori* inquiry about the grammar of our language. But this will not, as McTaggart supposed, give us certain knowledge about the metaphysical nature of something called the Self, for it will not give us any information about the world at all, any more than the rules of the F.A. will tell us what the Arsenal players will in fact *do* on the field next year.

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RECENT INTERPRETATION OF CARTESIANISM

THE Ninth International Congress of Philosophy is to be held in Paris next midsummer in commemoration of the third centenary of the publication of the *Discourse on Method*, and the recent publication of several important works on Cartesianism has raised in an impressive way issues which fall within the purview of the first of the six sections of that Congress, viz. that on 'The Present State of Cartesian Studies.' In particular, the studies of Laberthonnière, Serrus and Mouy¹ demand the attentive consideration of delegates participating in the work of that section.

Every philosophical doctrine, Laberthonnière conceives, aims at offering a meaning for human existence; consequently every such doctrine is ultimately "œuvre morale". The common view that it is primarily a body of interconnected propositions following from fundamental principles or axioms is importantly wrong, for the appearance of rigour lent by the logic inherent in a system is always subordinate to the intention or spirit which animates it. Therefore its truth can never be the truth of any abstract principle; indeed "sa vérité, c'est d'être viable." It is in this conviction that Laberthonnière strives, throughout the 800 pages of his *Etudes*, to lay under contribution all parts of Cartesian doctrine—methodology, metaphysics, psychology, ethics and theodicy—with the one object of determining the full sense and import of Descartes's answer to the problem of human destiny. And to this end his course is set by the reflection that though there are several principles or attitudes *de vie morale* which characterize and differentiate philosophies most profoundly they are ultimately reducible to two, according as the animating conviction is "vivre pour le temps" or "vivre pour l'éternité." That Descartes elected the former alternative is not open to doubt, and it is this temper of mind that explains the attitude adopted towards his problems and that predetermines the direction and significance of his detailed doctrine. For that temper of mind, Laberthonnière thinks, was not primarily intellectualist but essentially practical—utilitarian and reformative. An interpretation of Cartesianism dominated by this belief strikes one perhaps as unpromising, but it is carried through so vigorously that its suggestiveness and originality cannot be denied. Descartes's declarations about the unity of all knowledge, the very generality he claimed for the applicability of his method, the formalistic character of his metaphysics and psychology, taken in conjunction with his view of the solidarity of metaphysics and science, seem hardly to lend plausibility to a 'non-intellectualist' interpretation. But Laberthonnière is little impressed by these things. Whether they express

¹ *Œuvres de Laberthonnière*, publiées par les soins de Louis Canet. *Etudes sur Descartes*. Paris: Vrin. 2 vols. Pp. 467, 379. 1915. 70 fr. C. SERRUS, *La Méthode de Descartes et son Application à la Métaphysique*. Paris: Alcan. Pp. 125. 1933. 12 fr. P. MOUY, *Le Développement de la Philosophie cartésienne: 1646-1712*. Ouvrage couronné par l'Académie des Sciences morales et politiques. Paris: Vrin. 1934. Pp. 340. 40 fr. DESCARTES, *Lettres sur la Morale*, Correspondance avec la Princesse Elisabeth, Chanut et la Reine Christine. Texte présenté, revu et annoté par Jacques Chevalier. Paris: Boivin. 1935. Pp. xxvi, 332. 30 fr.

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his intention or not, the real character of his occupation cannot be argued from them. He is not "le speculatif qui s'isole," nor "un esprit pur" which, conceiving philosophy as a happy hunting ground for the exploitation of a scientific method, would find the attainment of knowledge its own proper and satisfying end. On the contrary, what Laberthonnière thinks gave the method its value in Descartes's eyes, and what inspired his particular researches, is the conviction that knowledge is the principle and the means "pour faire et pour agir,"—his whole philosophy "est suspendue à l'idée de découvrir les fins, les conditions et les règles de l'action humaine." The end of his science is not, as with the Greeks, the contemplation of its object but the possession and utilization of that object for the amelioration and development of human life. From which it follows, that Descartes envisaged the existence of evil as proposing not a theoretical but a practical problem, and one which the advance of science would dissipate. Human ills are temporary and not inherent defects of the human compound, and their elimination is an essential part of Descartes's "dream of conquest by science." It is in the human compound of mind and matter, and in the natural world, both conceived in a positivistic sense and without any non-natural intermediary to modify or improve them, that he first proclaims the possibility of bringing about a terrestrial perfection and salvation.

With this view of the nature of the task Descartes set before himself, Laberthonnière attempts to show how it determined not only the broader conclusions of his philosophy but also distinct doctrines which superficially appear to be quite unconnected with such an ethical intention.

On the one hand, the *séparatisme* of God and man inherent in Descartes's new secular view of human destiny and duty by which man is left to fashion for himself without divine assistance a future in which God has no part, on the other hand, the double dualism of the conscious self and God and of the self and Nature—both issue directly from the primary affirmation of the Cogito. From the manner of its introduction the Cartesian doubt is easily seen to imply of itself from the outset the very separation which is eventually reached. For "to begin deliberately with an act of doubt is to admit that we must first of all place ourselves exclusively at the standpoint of the subject." In this initial position alone both the *séparatisme* and the dualism are virtually contained; the Cartesian metaphysic merely shows *in extenso* that it is so contained, by introducing no further and independent substances except by intermediary ideas that are modes of the only substance whose existence is ever directly known. Thus dualism is not Descartes's last word: within it there is that *séparatisme* which does not preclude but allows for a relationship of the self with Nature and with God, though that relation is but an external one. The situation of man in the world as Laberthonnière neatly puts it, is that "he is aware of God behind him, conditioning all, sustaining all, but he no longer sees God before him." Man has a natural destiny into the fulfilment of which God does not enter: it is precisely for this reason that human action is free.

Only a few of the consequences following can be summarily indicated here:—Descartes, in championing the cause of a secular science, offers no apologia for the sovereignty of theology but is content to affirm its compatibility and is only concerned to defend his physics. Knowledge of God is used wholly in the interests of science, at no point is science used in the interests of a knowledge of God. Further, the character of his method is intelligible only when interpreted by his ultimate aim. The conception of a mathematical physics is his final end and first concern. For although Descartes regards all science as being of the *composé* (a compound of simpler elements in certain relation-

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ships) by analogy with mathematics, he none the less conceives mathematics by analogy with mathematical physics. For this type of physics is *presupposed* in his doctrine of analysis. Again, in his metaphysics, the *séparatisme* determines his attitude to theology and his neutrality concerning divine purpose, and this in turn explains the hypothetical character of his conclusions on personal immortality. His metaphysics is thus constructed for the sake of his physics, which is to say, for Laberthonnière, for the sake of man's successful intervention and control of Nature and in his own temporal interests; the metaphysics is not constructed to justify or explain religion or theology, and it fails to lead man to a blessedness that is eternal. "The religion of which God is thus the object resembles the religion of primitive man: heaven with its potentialities are envisaged as a means for life on earth, not life on earth envisaged as a means to heaven." Lastly, the alternative of "*vivre pour le temps*" which Descartes had elected explains his inability to replace the "*morale provisoire*" by a tenable "*morale définitive*." The latter remains a desideratum which he later recognizes to be unattainable because of the impossibility of reducing everything to distinct ideas. Henceforth his dream of sovereignty by means of science yields to a recognition of man's ultimate subjection. Here Laberthonnière sees a further consequence of Descartes's failure—a spiritual failure—and not merely an intellectual one, or better, a failure that is intellectual *because* it is spiritual.

Whatever judgment on Laberthonnière's evaluation the reader may finally form with the accumulated evidence and argumentation of these volumes before him—whether he decide that on account of Descartes's express utterances about his proper aim and occupation, or despite these, Laberthonnière's thesis is a timely correction of the usual 'intellectualist' interpretation, or that it is not at all events much in the question of the validity and connection of Descartes's method and his natural science seems capable of examination in a 'neutral' manner, without raising the issue of their ultimate orientation. So much indeed Laberthonnière himself would seem to allow in proposing the very unusual view that the method issues from the physics, and not the physics from the method. By this I take him to mean that unless Descartes had already seen the physical world as completely geometrical and mechanistic he would have propounded no method at all or else one of a very different character from the method he had propounded. But so soon as we recall that in the best and fullest statement of his method (the *Regular*) Descartes has as much to say about the 'ontal' presuppositions of his method as he has about the process or procedure itself, what at first sight seemed startling and suggestive in Laberthonnière's declaration is seen to amount to little. My own view is, briefly, that there is no logical precedence but co-implication between them. The 'brain-wave' on the 'memorable night at Ulm' was an intuition whose content virtually contained *both*—method and mechanism—indissolubly united, though their distinction was not then perceived. Descartes's effort in succeeding years to clarify and explicate the detail of that intuition is effected by his showing at one time how the formal character of the physical world exacts, in order to become known, the employment of certain cognitive powers in certain ways and in a certain order; and in showing at another time how (by using those powers in that order) clear and exact knowledge has been attained of a Nature which, *tout nue*, is only spatial in character and mechanical in operation. All this, it seems to me, Descartes first supposed and later thought he had confirmed. To estimate the worth of his intuition is possible only by examining critically its 'rationalization' into those Cartesian theories we call methodological and mechanistic. And the former purports to be applicable not only to physical existents but to existents of any kind.

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To institute such an examination is the purpose of M. Serrus's admirable work, conducted in the very 'modern' manner familiar to those who have read his larger work on logico-grammatical parallelism. It is by this parallelism that we constantly tend to think reality in terms of subjects having attributes. M. Serrus would not subscribe to Laberthonnière's inversion (cf. last paragraph), but decides that the *Regulae* expounds what is incontestably "the method of mathematics." It is applicable to whatever exhibits quantity and order, but to have extended its use to metaphysics is Descartes's great error. For Descartes claimed that although the *Dioptric*, the *Meteors*, etc., were fair samples of the fecundity of his method, it was no less to be seen at work in the *Meditations*. But in these Descartes proceeded *à la scolastique*, syllogizing from self-evident propositions and indemonstrable principles—so much being apparent from the *order* in which the problems are treated and from his constant use of characterizing propositions, with which alone the syllogism can proceed. And it is here that M. Serrus sees but the baneful influence of a dead past. So what is genuine methodology in Descartes must be cut away from what is merely scholastic survival; it is to the former "that we owe our intellectual liberation . . . and modern logic." The profound meaning of his revolution in science is that he first conceived "a mathematics liberated *au maximum* from sense imagination and founded in a limited number of principles, from which all the rest is logically deducible." For M. Serrus the genuine and original part is the doctrine of analysis and synthesis, in Descartes's sense of the words. Both are "non-aristotelian." This science of order, which resumes his *pura Mathesis*, "represents, with the theory of groups, what quite incontestably is really logical in modern mathematics." But Descartes unfortunately retained much of the dead-wood of Scholasticism, and so got 'caught' between two irreconcilable notions of judgment. The one, based directly on relations, had not then been separated out, the other was the traditional view "from which our own time is far from being liberated." Now M. Serrus maintains very plausibly that, whatever Descartes himself may have supposed the method 'proper' (i.e. the rules of analysis and synthesis) has valid application only to relational propositions. The 'dead' part of the method incorporates all that involves resort to indemonstrable principles certified by their self-evidence and (later) justified by God's existence. And it is this 'dead' part which has to represent the method in his metaphysics. M. Serrus's contention might be summarized thus: When it is asked whether Descartes did or did not apply his method in metaphysics, the question is ambiguous. He *did* apply it in so far as he utilized what is really scholastic in it, but it is precisely that which is not properly *his* method. He *did not* apply it, in so far as he failed to use what is really original, profound and of lasting influence in it, for this part of it is *impossible* of application in metaphysics. It is impossible because the kind of conclusions sought in the metaphysics are either propositions asserting existence (both 'necessary' and 'possible') or those asserting attributes of subjects:—all of them other than relational propositions. But the very success of his method in the mathematical and natural sciences is due to these being hypothetico-deductive systems in which logical coherence alone is concerned. For they contain no assertions of existence, contingent or necessary, nor introduce attributive propositions. They raise no question of a criterion of truth and are indifferent to the truth of their axioms, and to that of their principles. The principles of Cartesian metaphysics, on the other hand, are general propositions "which can be utilized only in the syllogism," and this is "un raisonnement infécond." So, M. Serrus sums up, Descartes had devoted himself to "the impossible task of constructing deductively a metaphysics based on the relations which the verb 'to be' introduces into the

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proposition, and the verb 'to be' even taken in different senses." Thus he did not effect what he supposed he had effected—the mathematization of metaphysics. Descartes, *malgré lui*, was the destructor of the very theses he thought to establish. The Kantian element in Cartesianism, M. Serrus suggests, was "trop nouveau," and failed to 'grip' contemporaries. The 'Ontological' roof stood for the past, the Cogito represented the future. The failure of Descartes has shown us according to M. Serrus, that "though strictly speaking metaphysics has its logic, it is not the logic of science," and he believes "with Kant that metaphysics cannot claim to be a science."

Passing from Descartes's theory of science to his particular researches in physics, M. Paul Mouy has produced what is likely to prove for a long while the standard work on Descartes's influence on professional physicists in the half-century following his death. M. Mouy draws into distinct focus the whole tableau of the diffusion of Cartesianism in France, in which we discern the actual character of Descartes's influence (quite other than he anticipated or desired). In an Introduction of seventy pages he explains the significance of the physical results reached by Descartes himself, passes to the *Treatise of Regius* (the first work in Cartesian science not composed by Descartes), thence traces the sinuous but continuous current of Cartesian physics, physiology and anatomy, always sensitive to what is distinctive in the contributions of such figures as Cordemoy and De la Forge and Rohault. With them we witness the rise of a new school intent on extending and correcting the detail of their founder's work. But these natural philosophers were not, excepting Rohault, experimenters, and Rohault died too young to prove his capacity. Neither Paris nor Holland could produce an experimenter, yet the very kind of reception Descartes had anticipated and wished for his physical work was that it should be submitted to that experimental testing which he had lacked time and money to undertake sufficiently himself. "We find many professors and compilers but no men of science." The modifications eventually introduced into Cartesian physics arise precisely from a more experimental treatment of such topics as the law of impact. M. Mouy regards the prevailing supposition that Cartesian science was finally overthrown in the early years of the eighteenth century an excessive one. Malebranche absorbed what was still living in it and "built upon thoroughly Cartesian bases a magnificent scientific edifice which only the modesty of its constructor prevented from appearing in its real significance and brilliancy." A decline sets in with Leibniz's attack on the law of the conservation of motion and with Newton's refutation of the hypothesis of vortices. What remained—and for M. Mouy still remains—constant and dominant is the original Cartesian thesis that Physics is nothing but Geometry.

S. V. KEELING.

PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY

In The Theory of Mobile and Static Ideas,¹ WALDEMAR MITSCHERLICH (Professor of Political Science at Halle) puts forward some general views about knowledge and then applies them to economic theory. He maintains that science includes both "static" and "mobile" ideas. On the one hand we have ideas which remain the same, or at least only change through increasing knowledge. These are mostly ideas of natural objects. The natural

¹ *Die Lehre von den beweglichen und Starren Begriffen*. Verlag W. Kohlhammer. Stuttgart, Berlin, 1936. Pp xv + 451.

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world appears to be unchanging—gold and electricity, birth and death, summer and winter, etc., are to-day what they were thousands of years ago. An idea which applies to such objects at any one time applies at any time; it has universal validity. But, on the other hand, some of our ideas apply to objects at one time and not at another. These are mostly ideas of objects constructed by men. Such objects are continually changing. At every period we find different religions, different works of art, different societies, and so on. And these changing objects can only be represented by changing ideas. But it would be misleading, Mitscherlich continues, to leave the matter at this point, for no object is really permanent. The difference in our ideas is partly due to different rates of change among objects, and partly to difference in our attitude. For we are interested in the permanent aspects of nature, but in the changing aspects of art, religion, and other objects created by man.

After this introduction Mitscherlich turns to economic theory, and maintains that it consists for the most part of mobile ideas. Every epoch has its distinctive theory, distinctive because determined by the needs of the epoch and the economic structure which they shape. We can look at economic questions from two points of view. We can take a cross section and generalize about a given period, or we can consider a succession of periods. Even the first type of inquiry involves changing ideas, mainly because the principle which we use to select our period depends on contemporary interests. But the importance of changing ideas comes out most forcibly when we consider a succession of periods. We then see how economic theories arise out of economic systems, and Mitscherlich devotes the rest of his book to supporting this view.

The main general points about this dependence are as follows: The economic structure of a period is the product of unconscious forces. The theory brings these forces into consciousness, and in this way itself influences the course of events to a certain extent. But as time passes different needs arise and the structure gradually alters. When this alteration has reached a certain point the theory is seen to be inapplicable, and a more adequate one takes its place. Mitscherlich strongly repudiates the view that the change from one system to another is a matter of development. It is simply change, for each system is new. And, accordingly, the differences in theory are not due to increasing insight into economic conditions, as many people suppose. It is simply a question of change. One theory differs from another because it applies to different objects.

Mitscherlich supports this view by an historical survey which extends from medieval times to the present day. He wants to avoid dividing the periods by a principle which only has contemporary validity. For this purpose he takes the theories themselves as his starting-point, and then surveys the situation in which they arose. Thus, for example, he considers the mercantile theory. It arose after the close of the Middle Ages in a period where the main aim was to achieve State unity. The mercantile period was an age of authority in which the individual is simply member of a State. Three important developments took place which formed the main supports of State unity and State control—centralized government by officials, a standing army, and the unification of economic life. Thus the central point for economic theory was the question, what does an economic system require to be united with the State? And this determines the theory in all its details. For example, during this period money is established as a medium of exchange and is used to strengthen the State. It is considered very important to possess money as distinct from goods, and accordingly the mercantile theory advocates a balance of exports over imports.

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But in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries we find quite a different theory and quite a different situation. The individual is struggling to free himself from social restraints, and the needs of the time explain why this struggle occurs. It is a period of rapid development. Scientific discoveries revolutionize industrial life. The State fails to keep pace with this development, and its restrictions stand in the way of industrial prosperity. The situation demands free scope for individual activity, and industry for the first time becomes an end in itself. Scientific discoveries also have a profound effect on general beliefs, and the need for a change of outlook also explains the importance attached to the individual. The economic theory arises very naturally out of this situation. It maintains that self-interest is the mainspring of action, and that individual activity should not be checked. There is no discord between the interests of the individual and of the community. If each person pursues his own good general harmony will result, whereas any interference will lead to disaster. All particular laws, the theory of free competition, of supply and demand, etc., rest on these assumptions.

After this historical survey Mitscherlich applies his thesis to the present day. Only here, as he says, there are special difficulties, for the object is still changing and the theory has not yet crystallized. We know, however, that the idea of the community is central. But we find this idea both in a radical and moderate form, that is to say, in communism on the one hand, in national socialism on the other. In its radical form it lays too much stress on mechanism and rationality—which is unhistoric. And here Mitscherlich dismisses it, for he only wants to discuss the moderate form. In this we find appreciation of mystical and irrational factors, an idea which Mitscherlich commends (but is it static or mobile?). Thus the present period has certain affinities with the medieval and mercantile periods. But, on the other hand, the modern State is far more conscious of itself, the feeling of national individuality and national solidarity is very strong.

The author then points to concrete ways in which the community idea expresses itself, in unions, cartels, co-operative stores, etc., and he gives an interesting survey of industrial conditions from this point of view. And he points out how the same idea is found in economic ethics, that there is, for example, a great feeling of mutual responsibility between the State and its members, and a feeling that each individual should work for the good of all. We get these ethical views embodied in unions, pensions, care of infants, etc. Economic egoism is no longer wanted, and has died. It is thus inevitable that the economic theory of individualism should be inadequate. Mitscherlich concludes by discussing a number of economic questions, and in particular the theory of the returns from land, labour, and capital.

OTTO NEURATH has a pamphlet in the series *Einheitswissenschaft*, which asks, What do we understand by rational economic inquiry? One of his main objects is to introduce a precise terminology. He points out that in economic disputes one often does not know whether two people are speaking about different matters or contradicting each other about the same. And the use of mathematical calculations does not help if premises and concepts are confused.

He introduces a number of terms, among them *Lebensstimmung* and *Lebenslage*. The *Lebenslage* of an individual is made up of such factors as the number of rooms in which he lives, the number of hours he works, the amount of food he eats, and so on. If he is well fed, healthy, and happy his *Lebensstimmung* is "lively"; if he is badly fed and ill it is "depressed." We can arrange *Lebensstimmungen* on a scale of higher and lower, and this gives us a

¹ Was bedeutet rationale Wirtschaftsbetrachtung? Verlag Gerold & Co. Wien, 1935 Pp. 46.

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scale for *Lebenslagen*. One *Lebenslage* is higher than another if it produces a higher *Lebensstimmung*.

The height of a *Lebenslage* clearly depends in part on the way activity is organized. Suppose a countryman surrounded by fields, marshes, cattle, etc. He may drain the marshes before he tills the fields, or vice versa. Whether he does the one or the other will profoundly affect the height of his *Lebensstimmung*, and so of his *Lebenslage*. The aim of rational economic inquiry, and this is one of Neurath's main points, is to discover the influence of specific schemes and measures on the welfare of a society, and more precisely on the *Lebenslagen* of its members. This will of course involve the classification of *Lebenslagen* into types, for we cannot consider each individual separately.

His other main point is that we cannot represent a *Lebenslage* by means of one element alone, and in particular that we cannot represent it by means of money. The concepts of costs, profit, and loss are only valid for commercial reckoning. In order to tell whether one *Lebenslage* is higher than another we must reckon with a number of specific factors. People tend to think that this is unscientific, but we find it in highly rationalized undertakings. The captain of a battleship who sets out to win a battle considers a large number of different factors—the direction of the journey, the speed of the boat, the range of the guns, and so on. He has no formula for expressing one of them in terms of another. And similarly when we want to discover how a specific scheme will affect society we have to consider a number of different factors—such as hours of work, living conditions, opportunities for recreation, and so on.

An interesting little book by EDGAR WIND¹ has been reprinted from the "Lectures of the Warburg Library." The author wants to show that the philosophic and artistic differences of the eighteenth century were two phases of one conflict, or, as one might put it, express the same conflict in different ways. It is a conflict between two ideals, the sceptical and the heroic.

Wind gives an account of Hume's ethical outlook. He points out that Hume values the natural and condemns the excessive, whether the excess be in pride or humility. Excess of either kind (enthusiasm or superstition) is artificial, and can only be maintained at great effort. The ideal does not lie in heroism but in humanity and tolerance. Natural inclination to good is worth far more than principle. On the other hand, we have the ideals of Johnson and Beattie, in which heroism, effort, and action on principle play the main part.

Wind then considers literary controversies. Hume believed that art requires greater refinement than we find in ordinary speech. But to be affected is far worse than to be unduly natural. Burke, on the other side, finds greater interest in the sublime than in the beautiful, in the overwhelming and supernatural as against the harmonious and agreeable. There was a great deal of controversy about figures of speech. Since metaphor and hyperbole excite strong feelings, they were condemned by one side and praised by the other. There was a corresponding controversy in the field of painting, where the "historical" or "allegorical" portrait was alternately praised or condemned. Wind refers to Goldsmith's essays on metaphor and hyperbole and to his caricature of the historical portrait in the *Vicar of Wakefield*.

It is significant that Reynolds preferred the historical portrait, whereas we can find none in the works of Gainsborough.

After noting this point Wind elaborates his thesis that the works of these two painters express the conflict between the heroic and sceptical ideals. Reynolds is an advocate of the grand style. An artist who paints in this style

¹ *Humanitätsidee und heroisiertes Porträt in der Englischen Kultur des 18. Jahrhunderts.*

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must represent heroic subjects. He must also aim at a "general idea" or type, avoiding details which suggest particular persons. Reynolds strongly advises artists to copy old masters, and recommends the practice of "quoting" from their works, a practice which he follows himself. And he believes that artists should be men of general culture well versed in literature. In all these respects Gainsborough is a complete contrast. He paints in a simple and natural style; he finds his inspiration in the streets and fields; he looks on painting as a craft, and contrasts the artist sharply with the gentleman. Reynolds complains that he is lacking in poetic invention.

After making these general points Wind compares the portraits of these painters in great detail. His main point is to show that Reynolds always tries to ennoble and dramatize his subjects, while Gainsborough presents them in some natural attitude. For example, Reynolds paints Master Coke as the infant Hannibal, looking prophetically into the future. He paints Mrs. Siddons as the Tragic Muse, seated on a throne between Pity and Terror. The composition is strongly reminiscent of Michael Angelo. And he paints Lord Heathfield as the defender of Gibraltar. His figure stands out sharply against a background darkened by powder, the key of the fortress is in his hand, and cannons appear in the background. On the other hand, Gainsborough in the portrait of his daughters keep the scene as natural as possible, two girls in ordinary dress are chasing a butterfly. The scene is lyrical. There is nothing sublime in his portrait of Mrs. Siddons, which is just the portrait of an elegant woman. And he paints Dr. Schomberg holding a walking-stick and hat. There is nothing whatever to suggest his profession, and the figure does not so much stand out against the landscape background as form part of it.

Wind considers a large number of portraits, and his comparisons are more detailed than these examples suggest. In giving interpretations he frequently touches on the ideas and practices of the period. There are ninety illustrations at the end of the book, so we can follow his descriptions quite easily.

HELEN KNIGHT.

NEW BOOKS

The Purpose of God. By W. R. MATTHEWS, K.C.V.O., D.Lit., D.D., Dean of St. Paul's, Fellow of King's College, London. (London: Nisbet & Co. 1935. Pp. xi + 182. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

In this book, which contains the substance of a course of lectures delivered last year in the University of Glasgow, the new Dean of St. Paul's (and students of philosophy may congratulate themselves that in this high office "philosopher philosopher succeeds") discusses the famous Argument from Design, which has played so large a part in the history of philosophical theology, "not only historically, but also with reference to the implications of modern science." While traversing ground which perhaps has been too often surveyed to afford much opportunity for striking originality, it is remarkably free from tedious repetition of familiar facts and arguments and is an excellent example of the independent thought, sound judgment, and clear exposition which we expect to find in any work by Dr. Matthews.

The first chapter, although its title is "The Argument from Design in the Philosophy of Theism," is in fact chiefly devoted to the other two traditional arguments for the existence of God, the Ontological and the Cosmological. The principle of the Ontological Argument is restated in the form: "If there is any truth, there is absolute truth, and if there is absolute truth there is absolute Reality" (p. 24); and its defect as an argument for the existence of the God of religion is indicated by the remark that while "the possibility of truth does depend on there being an Absolute Reality," "the possibility of making value judgments does not depend upon the real existence of an Absolute Good" (p. 26).

The second chapter (admirably lucid and sensible), on the "classical formulations" of the Design Argument, is followed by one on "general objections" to that Argument. Among these the criticisms of Hume are first considered. It is ingeniously argued that the view of the world, propounded by Philo in the *Dialogues on Natural Religion*, as constituted by a finite number of particles undergoing perpetual rearrangement in an eternal duration, is not really compatible with asserting the actual order which we find existing to be the result of chance, since, unless the "particles" be determinate in their properties, they are not numerable units at all, and if they are determinate, there is already a real order antecedent to the fortuitous distribution of them throughout an infinite time which Hume suggests would inevitably produce (and that an infinite number of times) the particular order which we observe.

Having dealt with the hypothesis that the world-order is due to chance, Dr. Matthews turns to the "immanent teleology" (including along with this "emergent evolution"—a phrase of which he justly says that it is "a good description, but no explanation") acknowledged by many thinkers who reject theism, and contends that it demands a "transcendental theology" to make sense of it. The Teleological Argument thus having been shown capable of surviving the chief objections brought against it, our author goes on in Chapter IV to reconsider it. He observes that, with the new perspectives opened to us by the progress of natural science, "our home has become so large that we can no longer be comfortable in it" (p. 98). Already, in the nineteenth century, we were aware of the overwhelming vastness of the

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material universe; we are now called upon to doubt its stability and even (with the religious teachers of an older day) its permanence. "That 'the world passeth away' seems to be an assured result of modern knowledge. . . . The impression grows upon us that we are in a world which is alien to our values, indifferent to our hopes, and, if purposive at all, is directed towards ends for which we are irrelevant. In short, it is not easy to believe in the relevance of man" (p. 99). But, after all, "whatever else the universe may be, however mysterious in its complexity, . . . its most astonishing and significant character is that it contains minds which begin to understand it, to form estimates of it, and . . . are advancing in their knowledge of it" (p. 102). Dr. Matthews goes on to show, following here Professor Stout, that "the progress of scientific knowledge, and indeed all human activity of a rational kind presupposes as a condition the existence of a telological order, . . . 'not only that there are general laws, but that these laws are discoverable with increasing adequacy, precision, and certainty.' But this would be impossible unless 'the course and constitution of nature were pre-adapted to our intelligence'" (p. 108). Yet "it might turn out that, as Hume thought, there was a good case for the existence of Creative Mind, but no case for supposing that this Mind was worthy of our trust or reverence, except perhaps in the sense of its infinite resourcefulness" (p. 112). But further consideration does not encourage the suggestion that our judgments of truth are not only distinguishable but wholly separate from our judgments of value. On the contrary, "the more adequately a mind approximates to an ideal of the pure intellect, so much the more completely is it directed towards truth as an absolute value and a dominant interest" (p. 114), and "mind, when most completely mind" seems to "recognize that there are values which possess absolute authority" (p. 115). As Sorley has said, To truth, beauty, and goodness "as well as to nature the mind of man is adapted; and this adaptation can neither be explained nor explained away by biological laws" (p. 118), and, though no doubt "few would be content to believe that truth is 'unattainable,'" while "many believe that they can easily dispense with the conception of absolute value" (p. 115), yet "we do not find that most of those who dwell upon the relativity of all moral judgments deny in practice that there is some standard of conduct which has an absolute claim upon them," "some things which they would die rather than do or consent to" (p. 119).

Teleology thus defended, Dr. Matthews passes in Chapter V to consider more in detail how "a teleological universe" may be conceived. "There is no need," he says, "to identify the teleological view of the world with an absolute predestination. For we may suppose that the end which is being realized in the world process includes the development of freedom." (p. 128). Indeed, "the very fact that we cannot triumphantly demonstrate the teleological order of the whole is a consideration in favour of the religious view of the world" (p. 130). For "the sense of sin is inseparably bound up with a teleological view of the world . . . it presupposes a cosmic purpose, and if we take it to be well founded and not illusion, it is the revelation in personal life of the existence of that purpose . . . no religious philosophy can have the aim of showing that the whole course of events and the whole system of the universe, including men and their actions, are teleologically ordered. In all the higher religions the promise of redemption from the world is more fundamental than the faith that the world is providentially ordered" (p. 143). "It may seem difficult to reconcile the belief that the world is the sphere in which divine purpose is realized with the assertion that we need to be saved from the world. But the apparent contradiction vanishes when we

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realize that a part of the divine purpose is the creation of man and that . . . man, as he stands, is incomplete, an unfinished creation. To reach his true being and to become what, in the cosmic purpose, he is to be, he must be taken up into the new life which has appeared in Christ" (p. 143). "To the failure of response to creation must be attributed many of the waverings and vicissitudes of the course of history." But nevertheless "history has some meaning. It discloses a direction. There is something significant going on—the progressive creation of man" (p. 152).

The concluding chapter has the same title as the whole book—"The Purpose of God." It opens with an able criticism of Prof. Nicolai Hartmann's account of the antinomies which he affirms to exist between religion and ethics. The keynote of Dr. Matthews's own theory is contained in his remark that "in the loftiest reaches of development . . . the purpose of God finds fulfilment not by completion but by persuasion" (p. 157). From this point of view history can be allowed an importance which in a philosophy such as (for example) Bosanquet's cannot concede to it; and, in Dr. Matthews's opinion, "if we attach any ultimate significance to history we shall have to choose between some form of the doctrine of recurrence and some form of eschatology" (p. 164). But "eschatology does not . . . represent the Kingdom which is the meaning of history as an historical event; what is historical is the vanishing of the present order to give place to the revelation of the Kingdom" (p. 165).

It is obvious that for a thinker who regards history in this way theocracy must be the goal of our political aspirations, although hitherto attempts at it "have been built upon a false conception of the nature of the rule of God" (p. 168). "The doctrine of God's self-sufficiency" must "be rejected" (p. 173); and we must take seriously the declaration of a New Testament writer that "we love Him because He first loved us" (p. 174). (It is perhaps worthy of note that, although the lectures reproduced in *The Purpose of God* were delivered on a foundation designed for the defence of Christianity, no reference is made here, where it might have been expected, to the Christian doctrine of the triune nature of God.) But, while the Kingdom of God, conceived as a fellowship of persons, is "a flowering of the purposive life which is in the world," it does not afford "a completely adequate idea for the explanation of the teleological movement of created things" (p. 175). "The universe is not only the 'vale of soul-making,' it is not only the home of man . . . the training ground for his home beyond . . . it is all these things, but it is much more, . . . the work of a sublime Artist who expresses Himself in its majesty and its beauty, and its sublimity is part of its justification" (p. 177).

Dr. Matthews is aware that he may be charged of having given too little attention to the problem of evil (p. vii); and he promises us in the future a separate work from his pen upon this difficult subject. He has not, however, failed to indicate in the book before us the kind of lines upon which his discussion may be expected to proceed.

Why, by the way, does Dr. Matthews think (p. 47) that Cicero was mistaken in attributing to Aristotle the famous statement of the Argument from Design translated by him *De Natura Deorum*, ii, 37? Although it is true that Valentin Rose included it in his *Aristotle's Pseudepigraphus*, holding as he did that all the more "Platonic" passages that have come down to us as Aristotle's (and even *Metaph.* 1 among them) were falsely ascribed to him, few Aristotelian scholars would now hesitate to regard the dialogue *On Philosophy*, from which the quotation in Cicero is taken, as really his.

C. C. J. WEBB.

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Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi. Fasc. XIII. *Questiones supra libros octo Physicorum Aristotelis nunc primum edidit Ferdinand M. Delorme, O.F.M. collaborante Robert Steele.* (Oxonii: 1935. Pp. xxxix + 439. Price 30s.)

This, the thirteenth *fasciculus* of the edition of Roger Bacon's works now in course of publication by the Clarendon Press, is the seventh and last of those containing the academic teaching given at Paris by the *Doctor mirabilis* in the middle of the thirteenth century and preserved to us in the Amiens MS. 406. The indefatigable transcriber of what is understood to be a text singularly difficult to decipher, Mr. Robert Steele, has prefixed a Latin dedication to the British Academy, under whose auspices and with whose financial support the great undertaking of which it forms part has been carried on. In the French introduction which follows, P. Delorme discusses the order of these Paris courses; this on the *Physics*—there is another on the same works already published—he holds to be the seventh in chronological order of twelve on treatises passing under the name of Aristotle, whereof eight are included in the Amiens MS. and have now appeared in the Oxford edition, while two referred to in these, as extant or as promised, are missing—unless indeed that on the *De Generatione et Corruptione* is to be identified, as P. Delorme suspects, with an anonymous work found in a MS. belonging to the College of St. Isidore at Rome and attributed by the Quaracchi editors of St. Bonaventura to Walter Burley.

P. Delorme notes that the chief authorities, beside Aristotle, followed by Bacon in this course are Avicenna, Averroes, and Boethius: that his language is not (as too often elsewhere) aggressive and violent, and that on Averroes alone does he animadvert with severity; and that (in the editor's opinion) he does not direct his criticisms against contemporaries, so that these *quaestiones* lend no support to P. Mandonnet's theory of a bitter personal antagonism between him and St. Albert the Great. On the celebrated question of the eternity of the world it is observed that Bacon believes Averroes to have been wrong in ascribing to Aristotle the affirmative view; but in a discussion intended to show, against Mandonnet, that he was by no means singular in this view, but in agreement with Albert and others, I am not sure that P. Delorme has sufficiently distinguished between the assertion that Aristotle did not himself hold the world to be eternal and the assertion that the Philosopher's arguments in support of its eternity prove only, as a matter of fact, that it is not the product of natural generation or subject to natural corruption.

To be properly qualified as a reviewer of this book one should be more familiar with the text and subject matter of Aristotle's *Physics* and with the medieval commentaries thereon than the present writer can pretend to be. But I should like to associate myself generally with the remarks of Professor A. E. Taylor in his notice of Fasciculus XII in *Mind* (July 1935) on the method adopted in this edition; and to add to them the observation that the omission of references to the pages of Bekker's edition of Aristotle's Greek text—the presence whereof would greatly conduce to the convenience of students—is symptomatic of a failure, characteristic of the editors, to apply their minds to questions which involve going behind the Latin versions of the Philosopher; a failure which falls to be reckoned among the features of the Oxford Roger Bacon suggestive of an unfavourable contrast with the masterly edition of Eckhart's Latin works now appearing under the editorship of P. Théry and Dr. Klibansky, a *fasciculus* of which is reviewed elsewhere in this number of *Philosophy*.

This same feature may be illustrated in an instance which is perhaps worth

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noticing here. On p. xxxviii of his Introduction, P. Delorme quotes the following words from p. 300 of the following text: *mathematica non habent positionem nec locum nisi secundum intellectum et opinionem secundum aliam translationem, et dicit in fine quarti Physicorum*. He then tells us that "after long reflection" he has come to the surprising conclusion that *secundum aliam translationem* here means, not (as one would expect) "according to another translation" from the Greek, but *secundum motum imaginarium*. It is perhaps because P. Delorme has not observed that Bacon has made a slip in saying *in fine quarti Physicorum*, and that the reference is to the first chapter of *Phys.* iv (208 b. 23-25), that he has resorted to this strange hypothesis. For in the Junta edition of Averroes' Commentary the words are rendered, according to William of Moerbeke's version, *ut solum intelligatur ipsorum positio*, but according to the Latin translation from the Arabic, *sed situs eorum est opinabilis tantum*. P. Delorme himself remarks that Bacon must have known this latter translation, and surely this difference of rendering sufficiently explains *secundum aliam translationem* without resort to so desperate an expedient as he has thought it necessary to suggest. But the interest of this passage does not end here. For, as may be learned from the Provost of Oriel's note in his recent edition of the *Physics* (p. 564.), the Greek text in this place exhibits a remarkable variation. Most MSS. read ὥστε μόνον αὐτῶν νοεῖσθαι τὴν θέσιν, while Simplicius, who mentions this reading as an emendation of Alexander's, has τὰ μόνον λεγόμενα διὰ θεσιν, to which modern editors have returned. It certainly looks as if the former of these two readings lay behind the Latin of William of Moerbeke, the latter behind that of the Arabic on which the other Latin version was based.

I add some suggested emendations which have occurred to me in the course of my reading. P. 29. 35 *quod*. *Ad* l. *Quod ad*. 30. 29 dele [*particularis*]: 34. 29, 30 b. *distancia illa [que] est prima*: 35. 35 *natura substantialis precedens* l. *nature (naturae) substantialis precedentis*: 47. 8 *signetur* l. *signet*: 61. 11 *privatio potest esse forme*: *hujus* l. *privatio forme potest esse hujus*: 62 l. 1. *utra* l. *utraque*: 64. 32 *immo moriundo* l. *immorando*: 65. 28 l. *sicut et [a] prima*: 67. 13 *minores* l. *motores*: 77. 19 post *forme* om. *et*: 77. 32 post *materia* add. [*et*] 82. 3 om. *non*: 82. 26 *quia* l. *que (quae)*: 89. 14 < > l. [3^o de Anima] (see *Ar. de Anima* iii. 9, 432 b. 15 seqq.): 93. 2 *ubi* l. *nec* (MS. *nisi*): 93. 16 *fit* l. *sit*: 99. 26 *corporum* l. *corporeorum*: 105. 33 om. *est principium*: 108. 1. 1 *constringit* l. *constringit*: 118. 33 post *quod* add. [*non*]: 120. 36 om. *cause* 125. 11 *deaci* perhaps l. *decani* (in the astrological sense): 128. 9 (the editors' unfamiliarity with Aristotle is peculiarly illustrated by their punctuation and emendation of this sentence) *sicut [formam] vel efficientem solum, sicut aliquando*: here the name of some philosopher or philosophers should be supplied after the first *sicut*, and that of another or others is concealed under *aliquando*: 133. 33 *divinum* cannot be right here; the persons of the Trinity are not at all in question (if they were, Bacon would be committing himself to a gravely heretical position); perhaps *individuum* may be the right reading: 133. 33 *accidunt* l. *accidunt*: 138. 28 *utrius* l. *utriusque*: 143. 24, 25 *et in partes essentielles et integrales esset tunc divisibile*; l. *et in partes essentielles et integrales; esset tunc divisibile [omne compositum in partes hujusmodi]*: 157. 37 *in quantum citate* l. *in quantitate* (v. *infra*, p. 158. 22): 159. 11 *infinium* l. *finitum* (cf. *infra* 159. 18): 161. 11 *licet* l. *scilicet*: 162. 25, 29 *magis* l. *majus*: 179. 9 *aque forte*: *unde quod* l. *aque*; *unde forte quod*: 228. 23 ante *materia* add. *aque*: 229. 33 *inordinatione* l. *ordinatione*: 234. 21 *objectionum* l. (as in MS.) *objectorum*: 288. 15 *Athenis* l. *a Thebis* (v. *Phys.* iii. 3, 202 b. 13): 309 8 *est variata secundum numerum corrupta* l. *variata secundum numerum est corrupta*: 371. 35 *aliud* l. *aliquid*: 411. 10 *citius* l. *sit ejus*.

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There is appended to this *fasciculus* a list of notes and emendations which contains a certain number of references to the authors used by Bacon; but many to Aristotle might have been added with advantage, especially as Bacon's own references (at any rate as given in the Amiens MS.) are not infrequently incorrect; the quotation from *de Ortu Scientiarum* (presumably Kilwardby's) on 72. 8 has not been traced; Boethius *de Musica* i. 2 should have been noted as the source of 99. 9: and where the *Articuli* quoted on 124. 28 (the inserted *de* here is superfluous) is assigned to Nicholas of Amiens, it should have been added for the convenience of students that in Migne's *Patrologia*, the volume and column of which are given, this treatise is printed not as Nicholas's but as the work of Alan of Lille.

C. C. J. WEBB.

Language, Truth and Logic. By A. J. Ayer. (London: V. Gollancz, Ltd, 1936. Pp. 254. Price 9s.)

This essay is of special interest as the only systematic presentation by an English writer of a type of philosophy which has a great and a growing influence. The principle of this "logical positivism" is that no statement is significant unless it is conclusively verifiable by sense-experience. Mr. Ayer recognizes that if we accept this principle we shall be driven to find all statements meaningless except those which describe our own present sense-experiences. For no statement of science or of everyday life, nor any assertion about our own past experiences can be conclusively verified. He therefore adopts a modified form of the principle, namely, that no statement is significant unless some sense-experience or other would make it probable or improbable (or more accurately "would be relevant to the determination of its truth, or falsehood").

The logical positivist has a second task. He attempts not only to maintain that significant statements must be verifiable by sense-experience but also to reduce them to statements about sense-experience. This is the function of analysis. It seems doubtful whether Mr. Ayer (with his weakened version of 'verification') should commit himself to the second task. The rigorous logical positivist must maintain that the proposition "Jones feels frightened" is meaningless because it cannot be conclusively verified, but Mr. Ayer, observing the movements of Jones's limbs, can regard these observations as contributing to the probability that Jones is frightened. Yet this very distinction between the evidence (sense-experience) and the probable conclusion should make it illegitimate to reduce the latter to the former as analysis must, and as Mr. Ayer does when he says (p. 206) that we *define* the experiences of others in terms of their behaviour. The other piece of analysis referred to is that of propositions about physical objects into propositions about sense-contents, an analysis which is familiar to us in phenomenalistic theories of perception. We may note in passing, however, that like other phenomenologists he has to call to his aid in making his analysis "possible sense-contents" (and even in one place a "possible series" of sense-contents). It is doubtful whether possible sense-contents, or even hypothetical facts which elsewhere appear as alternative constituents for the analysis, are legitimate inhabitants of a positivist system.

The real interest of the system for the ordinary reader will probably lie in its negative side. There are many statements which cannot be verified by sense experience. They fall into three classes, those expressing religious, moral, or aesthetic experience; those expressing theological or metaphysical doctrine, and those expressing *a priori* truth. Mr. Ayer maintains that the

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first class is made up of expletives, the second of nonsense, and the third of tautologies. The expletive theory holds that when I say "that is right" or "this is beautiful," I am certainly not describing objects or situations; I am merely giving vent to my own feelings. I am not even describing them, so that what I say cannot be true or false any more than an oath or other loud cry. This position, though it is more accurate and thorough than ordinary subjective theories, has nothing more to be said for or against it than has been said often enough by the subjectivists and their opponents.

It is therefore in his critique of metaphysics and *a priori* knowledge that special interest in Mr. Ayer's method will lie. Statements about God and the soul, statements expressive of monism, pluralism, realism, or idealism, all these are nonsense since no sense-experience can contribute to their verification. Now it is true that there is at present a general distrust of these sweeping dogmas and a growing suspicion of metaphysics as a special study independent of logic and science and yielding its own valid results. There is also a recognition that Idealism and Realism are terms covering a number of rather heterogeneous doctrines many of which are not metaphysical doctrines at all. To the elucidation of this complexity Mr. Ayer's book makes many welcome contributions, and in the main his attack on metaphysics as an independent type of thinking with its own methods and its own results is successful. Yet this solution of all the debates of theology and metaphysics by the discovery that both sides have been talking nonsense seems to require more support than it receives from the mere statement of the positivist dogma. It may indeed be difficult to analyse the statement that God exists or impossible to prove that the soul is immortal, yet if a principle requires us to maintain that proof and analysis are not needed because both statements are nonsense, we shall say, "So much the worse for the principle."

In considering *a priori* truth, Mr. Ayer holds as other positivists do that the necessity of such truths is due to their being tautologies. Now "a tautology" should mean a statement in which two equivalent sets of words are found, and therefore one which gives new truth concerning only the words themselves. Yet in other positivists (in Wittgenstein, for instance) it usually appears that tautology is not being used in its ordinary sense and that when they say that mathematical propositions are tautologies, they are only saying that mathematics is analytic or denying that it gives new knowledge of fact or rests on any sort of intuition. But Mr. Ayer is here, as elsewhere, clear and consistent; he means what he says. For we are told more than once that "*a priori* propositions tell us nothing except about our use of language." They "record our determination to use symbols in a certain fashion." They "call attention to linguistic usages." And it is true that the inference "If A equals B then B equals A" is not established by sense-observation; yet it is surely clear that it does not record a determination to use the word "equal" in a certain way. It asserts that equality is a reciprocal relation, by whatever symbol you represent it. "If A is to the right of B and B is to the right of C, then A is to the right of C." Here again the truth concerns the relation and not the symbol. For suppose I were devising a new language such as Basic or Esperanto, I might then observe the ambiguity in English between the spatial and the ethical senses of "right" and coin the word "dextral" for the former. But this determination concerning language could have nothing to do with the recognition that this relation which I now call "dextral" is a transitive relation. In the very pages where Mr. Ayer expounds his view he accepts Russell's reduction of all *a priori* inference to apprehension of the formal relationships of classes. Yet surely these relationships are independent of and unaffected by the symbols we may choose to use for "all" and "or"

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and "not" and "class." It is true that Mr. Ayer sometimes says that *a priori* propositions reveal not merely linguistic usage but also "the implications of this usage." But I hope the examples given above make it clear that the implications have nothing to do with the language and its usage. They are implications of the formal relationships represented. The positivist theory seems like the verbal magic of savages or as if one should maintain that what happens to a man who lies down in front of a train is due to the fact that he calls it a "train."

These three negative sections of Mr. Ayer's book would no doubt be claimed to stand on their own evidence. The expletive theory of morals or the nonsense theory of theology would be defended by recognition of the failure of their rivals and their own success. Yet the feeling is strong upon the reader and indeed frequently expressed by the author that he *must* say what he does about ethics and metaphysics and mathematics because of his initial dogma that "significant" means verifiable. It is this thoroughgoing consistency which gives its main attractiveness to the essay and for which even the most violent dissentient may welcome it. But this welcome would not satisfy Mr. Ayer, for it would reduce his work, on his own theory, to a collection of tautologies whose repeated refrain is itself the tautology that "significant" means verifiable, and the book would be then no more than a record of its author's determination to use the English word "significant" in a certain way, along with the implications of that determination. The dissentient, however, could stick to his more polite view that it is the effective and vigorous working out of a philosophical theory which has much incidental success in clarifying the issues and which was well worth undertaking with such spirit and acuteness.

J. D. MABBOTT.

Aristotle's Physics. A revised text, with introduction and commentary, by W. D. Ross, Provost of Oriel College. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, London: Humphrey Milford, 1936. Pp. xii + 750. Price 36s. net.)

As Hegel remarks in the introduction to his *Naturphilosophie*, there is more of the philosophy of nature than physics in the *Physics* of Aristotle, and at a time when distinguished physicists are reviving interest in the concept of nature and in the philosophical study of the field of science, it is not surprising that philosophic attention should be focused once more on the *De Physico Auditu*. Last year saw the conclusion of the useful Loeb Library edition by Professor Cornford and the late Dr. Wicksteed, and the reissue in Germany of Prantl's translation, first published in 1854; and this year has now given us what the Oxford Press Bulletin does not hesitate to call "the standard edition" by the Provost of Oriel. 'Standard' it must undoubtedly be in the sense that upon it any future study of the *Physics* must be based. A work of this kind a reviewer studies for his instruction, and any criticisms that he advances must be hesitating and diffident: for Mr. Ross has no equal in the field of Aristotelian philology, and this volume exhibits once more to the full his encyclopaedic knowledge of the Aristotelian corpus and his acute insight, the fruit of solid learning, into the meaning of even the most obscure of Aristotle's sentences; and it goes almost without saying that the commentary in this volume, as in the edition of the *Metaphysics*, is the work of a master of lucid and concise exposition.

The text has been established after the recollection of some MSS. and the collation of Vindobonensis 100, which had not previously been collated for the *Physics*; and there will be few who will not rest content to take Mr. Ross

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for their guide both in the text itself and in the two sections of his introduction on the "structure" and the "text of the *Physics*." His *apparatus criticus* is comprehensive and in the notes his reasons in support of the reading that he adopts are clearly stated and generally carry conviction. Some of Professor Cornford's *prima facie* plausible emendations in his second volume (e.g. at 230^b 18) are rejected without mention, but Mr. Ross's edition had probably reached the proof stage before that volume was published.

To the understanding of Aristotle's argument in detail, Mr. Ross contributes in addition to his comprehensive commentary a careful and illuminating analysis of the whole argument, occupying 120 pages, printed continuously, and not, as in the edition of the *Metaphysics*, interspersed through the commentary, prefixed to the several chapters. The elucidation of the *Physics* sentence by sentence, however, can be but the necessary prelude to the exposition of the meaning of the work as a whole; and it is here that Mr. Ross's edition perhaps begins to be a little disappointing. To quote from his introduction (p. 42): "Most inquirers about nature, Aristotle remarks . . . merely try to trace the sequence of events"; in this edition of the *Physics*, "the sequence of events" is traced for us with a masterly hand, but here, as in the edition of the *Metaphysics*, Mr. Ross says that he has refrained from writing at greater length in his introduction on the philosophical significance of the sequence of Aristotle's doctrines on the ground that his book was long enough already, and that he could not impose further on the patience of his readers. His readers, however, are likely to regret his decision, for the interest of most of them seems likely to lie above all precisely in what he has refrained from giving them.

He devotes eighty pages in his introduction to "Aristotle's Natural Philosophy"; most of these pages report "the sequence of events"; when they do more, they become perplexing. For instance, readers will turn eagerly to the section on the Paradoxes of Zeno; but whether what they find there will satisfy them perhaps admits of doubt. Zeno has not been answered, Mr. Ross holds, by either Aristotle or modern mathematicians; but he does not explicitly deal, although he mentions the various statements of Aristotle on which it is based, with Hegel's interpretation of Aristotle's argument, which does seem to provide an answer difficult for Zeno to meet. His bibliography of the paradoxes extends for two printed pages, but it does not include Hegel's name, nor is there any hint that it was from his study of Hegel's logic that Noël, who is mentioned, drew his inspiration on the subject.

Mr. Ross points out that two of the paradoxes are based on the assumption of infinite divisibility (motion as continuous), and two on the assumption of divisibility into a finite number of indivisibles (motion as discrete) (p. 84). Aristotle, Mr. Ross says, "argues convincingly that every continuum must be infinitely divisible" (p. 70), and yet "equally firmly asserts and argues for the existence of indivisible nows" (p. 71). If these statements are put together, is Aristotle's answer to Zeno's paradoxes not in effect similar to Hegel's answer to Kant's antinomies, namely, that the continuous and the discrete are the opposite inseparable moments of which motion is the concrete unity and that if one is severed from the other by the analysis of motion into its constituents, paradoxes and antinomies must result? (A similar argument surely lies at the back of *Physics*, I, 5.) Mr. Ross may find the doctrine of the real as a synthesis of opposites unpalatable, but not to expound it as the reply to Zeno in *Physics*, VI, 9 is to do less than justice to Aristotle.

Mention may perhaps be made of one or two other places where philosophical, as distinct from philological annotation, might have been supplemented: (i) Mr. Ross seems to be clear (pp. 41, 524-5) that in Aristotle's view

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there is no real contingency in nature. Does this take sufficient account of his sometimes holding that the possibility of purpose necessarily implies a real indeterminateness in things (e.g. *De Int.* 19^a 30 ff.)? (ii) Is 185^a 2-3 (*ἀνελάττα τὰς ἀρχὰς*) not a reference to *Rep.* 533^c (*τὰς ἀποθέσεις ἀναρροῦσα*), and when the Greek commentators refer to 'dialectic' in notes on the passage (Ross, p. 461), may it not be Plato's dialectic that they have in mind? (iii) 237^b 13-22 might have been used by Professor Collingwood as Aristotelian support for his doctrine that "the lower end of the scale of forms lies at unity" (*Method*, pp. 81 ff.); but in affiliations between Aristotle's doctrines and contemporary thought Mr. Ross does not seem to be much interested, or he might have suggested that it is not Aristotle alone who fails to "see the difficulty of supposing a finite material universe with nothing whatever, not even space, beyond it" (p. 53).

T. M. KNOX.

Descartes: An Examination of Some Features of his Metaphysics and Method.
By W. A. MERRYLEES, M.A., B.Litt. (Melbourne University Press,
in association with the Oxford University Press. 1934. Pp. xxviii + 330.
Price 12s. 6d.)

Mr. Merrylees' work does not pretend to be a general exposition of Cartesianism. Its Preface tells us that the author limited himself to dealing with those questions to which he believed he could make a useful contribution and that his main object was to return their true answers. The consequences of this self-imposed restriction are in no respect unfortunate. Mr. Merrylees has dealt with what most attracts him. By restricting his field he could explore the subjects he selected more fully and had sufficient space at his disposal to examine systematically positions which, as formulated in the text, seemed to him ambiguous or obscure. He has produced a most stimulating and useful book. For perhaps what is most required of present philosophical scholarship is expertly judicious and thorough interpretation of certain complicated and often less obvious themes which have predetermined characteristic features in a great thinker's ultimate position. Mr. Merrylees has helped towards this end, though in his book unity of theme is less apparent than diversity of subjects. Yet the questions selected are undoubtedly major ones, and the author guides us, though sometimes by very labyrinthine paths, through at least the central plateau of Cartesian metaphysics and methodology. His discussions are uniformly thorough and often acute, yet I must confess inability to see eye to eye with him on a number of his interpretations of Descartes' meaning and on a number of the answers he regards as the true ones.

The matters of which Mr. Merrylees attempts to determine the sense and the soundness are: Doubt and Certainty, the interpretation of the Cogito, the epistemological significance and metaphysical value of the proofs of God's existence, Ideas, Judgment, and the Method. And of the ten chapters on these subjects, the five treating of the third, fourth, and fifth seem the most valuable. The last two chapters on the Method have somewhat the air of an appendix, for the topics there examined are brought into little close or clear connection with the doctrines about ideas and judgment or with the more metaphysical part. In this, no doubt, Mr. Merrylees but continues a tradition. But it is surely one that calls for correction, and the reader might reasonably have expected him to have established the connection in some detail since Mr. Merrylees is not one who thinks Descartes' method to be a method of science only and not one of metaphysics. Perhaps the reason for

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the omission is partly to be found in Mr. Merrylees' decision that the doctrine of simple natures (a central one in the *Regulae*) is "valueless." The only ground I can find for this is that various simple natures are 'simple' in very different senses and the only sense of simplicity which covers them all is a superficial one. Mr. Merrylees' treatment of these unduly neglected entities, though full and interesting, is not very satisfying, and one wonders whether he has clearly seen to what his admission of the universal applicability of the method commits him. Ample and interesting, too, are the discussions of intuition and deduction (Ch. IX), though they are somewhat clouded in consequence of a troublesome and dubious distinction drawn between *four* kinds of doubt in Ch. I. There he first distinguishes "psychological doubt" (which we feel or experience) from "logical doubt" which is differentiated from the former by the fact that "we perceive a ground is required," or that "there are certain reasons for regarding the matter as doubtful." Both are next distinguished from "subjective" and "objective" doubt and certitude. The course and fortunes of Descartes' methodical doubt are explored by the aid of these four distinctions, but I find the issue confusingly involved, and their baneful effects are to be described later in the book, particularly in Ch. II on the Cogito. Of the former antithesis I suggest that though there is a valid and important distinction to be made, Mr. Merrylees' "logical doubt" (as formulated above) misrepresents Descartes and misses his point. Descartes does not regard arithmetical truths as "doubtful" in the sense suggested. Though not doubtful they are nevertheless such that a doubter could doubt them without thereby contradicting himself. That the author has misrepresented Descartes is clear from the fact that a proposition which we have no reason to doubt (exempt from "logical doubt"), and which is not dubious (exempt from "psychological doubt"), Descartes, none the less, requires to be submitted to his *methodical* doubt. That is, such proposition is to be *supposed* false, though not asserted or believed false, in order to show, if possible, that it is necessarily true. And Mr. Merrylees' second distinction tends to confuse and seems to serve little purpose. His "objective" certainly consists in "subjective" certainty being justified or valid, from which I infer that "subjective" certainty is the same as unjustified "psychological" certainty. So far as I can see, the second distinction is designed to facilitate the discussion of a problem which might be put: How can we be certain that the certainty by which we think we are justified (and therefore possessed of "objective" certainty) is itself a "logical" and not merely a "psychological" certainty? (I suspect there may be no real problem indicated here, or, if there is, that we never could come by a certainty of the kind sought.) In Ch. II Mr. Merrylees treats at length the consequences of a dilemma which he believes to confront Descartes. But the "dilemma" arises from Mr. Merrylees erroneously supposing that Descartes can be certain of the Cogito only because he has the prior certainty that whatever is clear and distinct must be true (pp. 13, 16). But surely Descartes would maintain that until we are assured of the Cogito (independently of the criterion) we *have* no criterion—the most we could have would be the surmise or hypothesis that *perhaps* clearness and distinctness is a mark of truth. Descartes is further interpreted as *inferring* (though non-syllogistically) his existence from a state of thinking. Two illicit suppositions seem to be responsible for this, viz. (i) that what can be *defended* by inference or argument cannot have been *discovered* except by inference; and (ii) that we cannot *intuit* or perceive the implication of one character by another (both characters being present to intuition), but can only *infer* one character (not intuited) from another character (intuited) which implies it. These errors lead Mr. Merrylees in Ch. III

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to ask the very strange question: "Does the Cogito *prove* that I actually do think?" and to deny that the Cogito "first takes us to existence." Surely the Cogito neither proves nor is intended to prove anything, and his attempt to settle whether the Cogito "establishes" this and that is presumably due to his supposing (as title of Ch. III suggests) that the Cogito is a premise or a principle of inference.

The chapters on God's existence (IV-VI) and on Ideas (VII) are the best in the book. In Ch. VII he extracts and generalizes from various passages eight possible meanings of Idea in Descartes. These are then shown to be variants of four ultimately distinct conceptions, of which two are rejected, and the one retained as being the least inconsistent with all Descartes' utterances is that of "an intermediary mental object which represents a real object by somehow repeating its character." Point is given to the last clause by an *déclaireissement* on representation, and there follows a very good discussion on the causality of ideas and helpful analyses of Descartes' use of 'know' and 'think.' The refutation of Descartes' theory of judgment on the ground that all perceiving is judging, whether convincing or no, is certainly stimulating. I cannot, however, even hope to do justice within my very limited space to a book in which each topic is so thoroughly hammered out and the discussions are so close and detailed. That I have dwelt more on my disagreements with the author than on the excellences of his book is not incompatible with my sincere admiration of it. Every student of Descartes should consider it attentively.

S. V. KEELING.

Possibility. Lectures delivered before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, 1933. (Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 1934. London: Cambridge University Press. 1935. Vol. 17. Pp. 224. Price 10s.)

The Philosophical Union of the University of California are adepts at choosing important problems of contemporary interest as the topic for their annual philosophical lectures. The members of the Union must have a pleasant time, interchanging their views and developing them by mutual discussion. The results nearly always make interesting reading for those less pleasantly situated. The lectures published in the volume now being reviewed were delivered in 1933 and published in 1934; it seems to have taken some time for the volume to reach this side of the Atlantic. The topic—*Possibility*—is an extremely difficult one. Very different answers have been given to the question, "What is Possibility?" The sort of answer one is likely to find acceptable will be determined by one's philosophical outlook. Some would consider the question to be improperly formulated. The present reviewer belongs to the latter class, and can hardly hope to avoid undue bias in reviewing the various theories propounded in these lectures.

The word "possible" occurs in many different usages; it seems often to be assumed that there must be some central notion present in each occasion of its diverse use. It is doubtful whether there is. At the outset it is important to determine whether "possible" is being used in opposition to "impossible" or to "actual" or to "improbable," or in some other way. Many of the contributors to this volume have seen the importance of distinguishing these different usages, but some of them seem to suppose that, when this has been done, questions of the same form can be asked with regard to what is being said in the case of each of these different oppositions.

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This is surely a mistake. It inevitably leads to the supposition that *possibility* is a species of something, or to hypostatization in some form or other. The question of the relation of *the actual* to *the possible* gives some of the contributors a good deal of trouble. Prof. Pepper (in "A Contextualistic Theory of Possibility") asserts that "the actual is in greater opposition to the possible than is the impossible. Or, to state the matter the other way round, there is a set of connotations such that the impossible is more possible than the actual. For, according to that set of connotations, the actual is not even possible; it is. The actual is neither possible nor impossible. It is not in any way hypothetical; it is categorical. It is" (p. 179). If by this is meant that it is equally senseless to say "the actual is possible" as to say "the actual is impossible," then it would seem that it is as senseless to say "the impossible is more possible than the actual." Prof. Pepper, however, does not find it nonsensical; he finds only a "tangle of paradoxes." He proposes to straighten out the paradoxes by substituting "specifiabiles" for "possibilities." There is a hierarchy of specifiabiles, of which the lowest level is the actual; all other levels are possibilities. In every level except the highest and the lowest is a field of possibilities, specified by definite conditions, and a "complementary field of impossibilities inconsistent with the conditions." The highest level, the apeiron, has no conditions; hence, in it there are no impossibilities. In the lowest level there are no possibilities since "the actual has nothing but conditions." It is difficult to see the force of this antithesis and to understand what is meant by "the apeiron." Prof. Pepper's recipe for understanding it is as follows: "We first imagine some set of conditions and then imagine these conditions and any other conditions negated. We imagine the apeiron, in other words, only by conceiving an opposite and then hypothecating the negation of that opposite. It differs from nothing simply by being absolutely anything" (p. 180). It is not easy to see wherein this difference consists. Prof. Pepper does not afford any help in this difficulty, but passes at once to an account of actuality in terms of time, and to a discussion of past and future. In this discussion he seems to me to confuse *possibility* with *uncertainty*.

Prof. Lowenberg is perhaps also a contextualist, though not of the same type as Prof. Pepper. In his lecture ("Possibility and Context") the influence of Leibniz is apparent, especially in those respects in which Prof. Lowenberg would most strongly dissent from Leibniz's statements. He rejects the view that the possible is prior to the actual only to replace it by the equally unintelligible view that the possible is the coactual. "Because sugar is capable of being dissolved," he says, "I regard its solubility as coactual with its solidity. But the capacity of sugar to be dissolved foreshadows an eventual state competing with its actual solid state. The coactual, being the rival of the actual, may become the actual, and when it does, an alternative has triumphed and taken possession of the field" (p. 94). However complicated the situation, "the status of the possible remains the same." Finally, "the possible is but the actual in embryo lying in the womb of a context" (p. 104). This metaphor (if it be meant as a metaphor) does not make the view taken at all clear. It is odd to think of the possible as a *rival* of the actual, or as an *embryo* lying in a womb, though no doubt such language is suggested by Leibniz's treatment. But Prof. Lowenberg himself cautions us not to hypothesize possibility. "Possibility," he says, "is a substantive in form but an adjective in intention" (p. 83). Difficulties arise once we allow ourselves to frame the question—"What is the ontological status of Possibility?" Prof. G. P. Adams seems to be aware of these difficulties. He distinguishes between "the actual," "the trans-actual," and "the hyper-actual." The trans-actual is the realm of possible experience. The distinction between actual and possible

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(in this sense) is said to be dependent "upon us, upon the position we chance to occupy, the direction of our attention, our powers of observation, and the like." Somewhat surprisingly Prof. Adams calls this an "epistemic" distinction. The hyper-actual is altogether different, and differs constitutively from the distinction between the actual and the trans-actual. The latter are called "continuous possibilities," the former are "transcendent possibilities." But we must not take these transcendent possibilities to be subsistents "transcending all that exists." Prof. Adams wishes "to avoid the Scylla of such a realm . . . and the Charybdis of a view which finds nowhere a legitimate place for objective possibilities" (p. 9). But the title of his lecture, namely, "What makes Possibility Possible?", tends to throw him into the arms of Scylla. If he were to avoid this kind of question, he might be able to secure what he calls "objective and constitutive possibilities," by discovering that there are no *species* of possibilities.

Prof. V. F. Lenzen (in "A Positivistic Theory of Possibility") says that "in a positivistic interpretation [of science] we must not raise the question of the ontological status of possibilities while they are merely possibilities" (p. 75). But he also suggests that there is "a more ultimate question of the ontological status or ground of possibility" (p. 67), which is not the topic of his lecture. This suggestion is unfortunate, and accords ill with his positivistic treatment of possibility as relative to "a realm of discourse." His definition, "A possible entity is one the nature of which is in conformity with the conditions of laws governing that type of entity," indicates what I should call a "legal" view of possibility. But the "ontological vocabulary" dominates his discussion. I believe that his theory could be so reformulated as to be freed from this defect.

Prof. P. Marhenke (in "Possibility and Significance") accepts a "legal" view of possibility, based upon the doctrine of types. His lecture is, in my opinion, the most interesting and the most important of these contributions to the topic under discussion. It does not admit of detailed discussion in the space at my disposal, and it cannot be summarized to advantage. It must suffice to say that Prof. Marhenke considers that "A is possible" and "A is impossible" must be interpreted in terms of significance, that there are different levels of significance, and that "the relation of the possible and impossible to the significant is the same at each level of significance." To determine what is possible is to determine the conditions of significance. This is by no means always easy, but it is at least a problem capable of being precisely stated. One of the difficulties of determining the conditions of significance is amusingly illustrated in the requirement that we should be enabled "to relegate to the class of the nonsensical the sentences of James Joyce and Gertrude Stein (some of them, at any rate), while leaving significant the sentences of less advanced authors (p. 159).

Prof. D. S. Mackay (in "The Limits of Possibility") provides an interesting discussion of the distinction between the conceivable and the possible, and he stresses the importance of considering "the several senses in which a possibility may be affirmed or denied" (p. 147). Mr. E. W. Strong (in "The Possible and the Actual") ranges over a variety of topics. His lectures show how difficult it is to avoid elaborating platitudes instead of clearing up difficulties. Prof. W. Savery (in "Possibility and Pluralism") takes up the problem from the point of view of Concatenism. This is the view that "the universe is a chain of beings or individuals. There is overlapping of the links but there is no inclusive being" (p. 219). His discussion is somewhat too disconnected to be clear to a reader unfamiliar with his views. Prof. R. W. Church (in "Possibility and Identity") makes an attempt to settle "the status of the

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possible" by regarding the predicate "possible" as meaning what is meant by "qualities and relations being intrinsically individuated and self-identical and therefore repeatable" (p. 28).

Anyone who attempts to read these lectures steadily through, one after the other, is likely to suffer from mental indigestion. Nevertheless, the volume is well worth reading, especially in small doses. It raises many interesting questions in a way which should stimulate the reader to ask himself further questions. Much that is said suggests that it would be desirable to attempt to analyse the syntax of sentences in which the word "possible" (and its variants) occur. It is to be hoped that Prof. Marhenke may some time or other devote a whole volume to this problem of analysis.

L. SUSAN STEBBING.

God and Creation. Three Interpretations of the Universe. By JOHN OLAF BOODIN, Professor of Philosophy, University of California at Los Angeles. (New York and London: The Macmillan Company. 1934. Pp. 519. Price 12s. 6d.)

Professor Boodin "came out," so to speak, as a philosopher with a Dissertation on Time in 1889, and he has, to use his own words, "fought for real time" ever since.

In the present book he gathers up the fruits of his long and patient studies into the philosophies of the past and present, from this point of view.

Different philosophies represent different interpretations of the universe, and from the point of view of their attitudes to the time process these interpretations fall into three well-defined groups, which Professor Boodin brings under the heads of preformation, emergence, and creation.

The basis of the doctrine of preformation can be expressed in the fragment of Anaxagoras that "nothing comes into being or passes away, but there is mingling and separation of things that are," or more picturesquely in a statement of Heraclitus, that "time is a child playing draughts." Time, that is, makes nothing new, it only shifts the pieces.

In Part I this preformation doctrine is followed out in its main representatives from ancient to modern times.

As against this view, the doctrine of emergence insists that in the process of time something new arises which was in no sense present before, so that there is not merely a shifting of pieces whose natures are uninfluenced by the shifting, but a process of genuine growth.

The word emergence is, as the author insists, not the happiest one to describe this process. A duck emerges from the water into which it has dived in pursuit of food. Emergence in this sense would involve preformation. The word Professor Boodin prefers is epigenesis. The notion emphasized in this word is that of time's passage, and of the entrance of novelty upon the scene. Professor Boodin regards it as fundamental to the notion of epigenesis that it should not include the notion of guidance or control, either within the process itself or from without. If to the notion of the entrance of novelty we add the notion that there is some "actuality" controlling and animating the course of history, we get a third notion, that of creation.

The division then of world views into three can be expressed by the two dichotomies: What comes in time is either not new (1) or it is new. If it is new, its arising is either not controlled by something existing (2) or it is controlled by

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something existing (3). On (1) we have preformation, on (2) epigenesis, on (3) creation.

It will be obvious on reflection that the notion of creation so defined is a very wide one including a number of alternatives ranging from the supposition that the creative control is carried out under the guidance of a plan completely formed from the start by a being completely actual from the start, to the supposition that the control comes from within beings themselves in process of epigenesis, this control being slight and unconscious at first, gradually becoming more influential and in some beings at least gradually arising into consciousness. Historically it is only the former type that counts; and Professor Boodin shows, in his journey from Plato through Aristotle and Plotinus to the great thinkers of the Christian Church, what variations are possible within this type of view.

The hypothesis of emergence or epigenesis as limited by Professor Boodin, leaves its advocate practically nothing beyond the task of considering the evidence of fact which can be adduced in its favour, and of chronicling the various successive stages which arise in the history of the time process; it is thus more akin to science than to philosophy. Accordingly the author devotes the bulk of this section of the book to an account of the evidence for emergence in physics, in biology, and in psychology. These three chapters have all the writer's customary clarity, width of knowledge and discernment, and show how fully he is at home with the recent trends of thought in the sciences.

The reader of these chapters who turns next to the third section, on theories of creation, will discover, perhaps to his amazement, that Professor Boodin is equally at home in the field of ancient and mediaeval philosophy. The chapters on Plato and on Aristotle are full of interest, and deserve careful study not only by the reader who wishes to get a general view of the progress of human thought, but also by the specialist in Greek philosophy.

The writer apologizes for one section of his treatment of Aristotle (pp. 362 ff), where he doubtless feels that entering on the difficult field of textual criticism he may find himself warned off as a rash trespasser. For my own part I think that this section ought to be welcomed. Professor Boodin is clearly no outsider in textual matters, and his skill in interpretation of philosophical ideas justifies the closest attention being given to his suggestions. (Something has gone wrong with the printing of the Greek text on the top of page 363; it is correctly printed lower down on the same page.)

Professor Boodin is to be congratulated on what we might call his History of the Philosophies of Time, so wide in its range, so admirably planned, and so well written.

L. J. RUSSELL.

Riddell Memorial Lectures. Eighth Series. General Subject: Evolution and the Christian Conception of God. Delivered before the University of Durham at Armstrong College, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, November 1935, by CHARLES E. RAVEN, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge. (London: Oxford University Press: Humphrey Milford, 1936. Pp. 56. Price 2s. 6d. net.)

In these Riddell Lectures the Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge is concerned to insist upon the importance to Christian theology of recognizing in the Incarnation of God in the person of Jesus Christ, the affirmation whereof is the central doctrine of the Christian religion, not an intrusion from without into an alien world, but rather the crown of a creative process which we

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have in these last days learned to regard as in its method evolutionary. Such insistence is of course a characteristic note of Christian thought since the early days when the Church rejected Marcionism with its denial that the author of nature and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ were one and the same God. But in view of the present prevalence in some quarters (for example, in the movement associated with the name of Karl Barth) of a tendency in a direction which recalls that of Marcionism, it is not untimely to have the confession of the ultimate unity of the source of nature with that of grace, of the Creator with the Redeemer, emphasized as the presupposition of a reconciliation of science and religion, now too often supposed to be necessarily in mutual conflict.

Dr. Raven writes as a theologian with a training in natural science rather than as a philosopher by profession; and although he points out the ambiguity involved in the use of the term "evolution" both for the dissipation of energy by entropy and for the development of living organisms which culminates in mankind, he does not enter upon such a thorough investigation of the meaning of that "blessed word" as is to be found, for example, in Mr. Joseph's Herbert Spencer Lecture on "The Concept of Evolution," now reprinted in his *Essays in Ancient and Modern Philosophy*.

Of Dr. Raven's three Riddell Lectures, one is devoted to the Unity of Creation, a second to the Emergence of Deity (by which is not meant what it means in Professor Alexander's philosophy, for Dr. Raven certainly does not intend to deny the priority of God as Creator to the universe, but only the emergence of a nature in which God can become incarnate), and the third to the Energy of the Spirit. In this last the writer pleads for a more intensive study by Christian theologians of the doctrine of the Third Person of the Trinity, which he considers to have received less than its due share of attention, to the loss of what might have been a powerful aid in the religious interpretation of natural phenomena.

When Dr. Raven remarks (p. 44) that "if anyone had suggested at any period between the reign of Constantine and the Reformation that the work of poets, musicians, scientists, or craftsmen was a ministry of the Spirit his outlook would have seemed absurd, and even blasphemous," the exaggerated language indicates, as indeed do other parts of his book, his unfamiliarity with the thought of the Middle Ages. No doubt the identification of the Platonic *Anima Mundi* and the Holy Spirit by the school of Chartres, and at one time by Abelard, came eventually, under St. Bernard's influence, to be regarded as inconsistent with orthodoxy—but, although obviously presenting a difficulty in view of the *holiness* which from the beginning was recognized as characteristic of the divine power manifested in the life of Christ and of the Church as participating in that life, this identification seemed to many in the Middle Ages a natural one. Indeed, the Reformation, in reaction from the authority attributed by the Schoolmen to the Greek philosophers, and especially to Aristotle, tended probably on the whole to an increased emphasis on that "dualism of nature and grace" to a care for which Dr. Raven is disposed to trace the lack of sympathy with the progress of natural science which has too often been exhibited by theologians. One would have welcomed a clearer recognition on Dr. Raven's part than we find of the truth, as I take it to be, that the health of Christian theology depends upon the maintenance of a due tension between faith in One God as the author alike of creation and of redemption, and realization of that difference between nature and grace which is implied in "the sense of contrast characteristic of the twice born," in which he himself tells us (p. 37) that his "own experience of Christ" began.

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The statement (on p. 51) that the Holy Spirit is not "the sole divine Being" is, coming from a Regius Professor of Divinity, surprisingly loose; but we may be sure that Dr. Raven is not really a polytheist. On p. 6 we should read "Lyell" for "Lyall," and on p. 51 "J. S. Haldane" for "J. B. Haldane."

C. C. J. WEBB.

Creative Society, a Study of the Relation of Christianity to Communism. By JOHN MACMURRAY. (London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1935. Pp. 196. Price 5s. net.)

It is impossible to do justice to the importance and the interest of this volume by a detailed examination of its contents within the limits which must necessarily be assigned to this review. It is a lucid, forcible, and challenging expression of intense personal conviction as well as of learned historical survey. The author writes from the Christian standpoint, as he understands it, but with thorough appreciation of the aim of Communism, although he fully recognizes its defects. "I have no doubt in my own mind that the Christian conception of God and the substance of the Christian Gospel expresses much better than any Communist theory the truth about human life. I am sure that the rejection of God and of religion in Communist theory makes its understanding of human reality dim and limited, and in practice hampers and diverts its efforts, and may, in the long run, frustrate them. I am equally convinced that a Christianity which remained true to the revelation of God contained in its own Gospel could achieve the purpose which Communism seeks to achieve through its rejection of religion, more easily, more certainly, and with a fuller understanding of the real issues which are involved. But this would depend upon the Christian belief in God being real and practical" (p. 28). As for the author, a belief in God is the expression in action of an attitude of faith or trust, "which necessarily delivers a man from fear and self-centredness" (p. 20), he disregards and dismisses much which has had a prominent place in Christian theology, and much of the religion of the Christian Church he condemns as pseudo-religion. To discuss this subject here would carry us beyond the realm of philosophy. I am content to record my own opinion that the judgment is too severe and needs to be more moderately stated. For the author, Christianity is the religion of Jesus, and of this he gives a discerning and appreciative account. On most points I am here in agreement with him, but must regard his statement as inadequate, as dominated too exclusively by his interest in life in community in this world. The horizon is, however, widened in the sixth chapter in the *Eternal and the Temporal*, in which theism is asserted over against the insufficiency of humanism. "Only the idea of God is wide enough to represent the synthesis of all things, the restoration of the unity which is broken by the emergence of rational consciousness. Only real religion can achieve the synthesis of the eternal aspect of personal life with the temporal" (p. 95). In dealing with the *Dialectic of Christianity* in Chapter VII, he does not confine that process to organized religion, but includes "the full social process of Europe" which has been Christian (p. 128). He holds that "in broad outline the Communist principle of explanation is satisfactory, resting as it does upon an analysis of the economic factors which determine the general form of social changes" (p. 132); but the Communist overlooks two points, first the revolt of the common folk against some aspect of the existing social order as a factor in Christian organization, and second the necessity of religion for any

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human community. In its exclusive stress on the hunger-motive (economic) Communism ignores the love-motive (social or religious). This love-motive (tribal or national) Christianity has universalized. The opposition of Communism to Christianity is due to the neglect of the hunger-motive by Christianity and of the love-motive by Communism. It is on this assumption of the complementary character of Christianity and Communism that their present relations are discussed. When Christians restore to organized Christianity the element it now lacks, it will supplant Communism as meeting the need that it stands for. The last chapter brings us into "the Contemporary Field of Action," and the volume ends on a note of hope. "It is in England, if anywhere, that Christianity provides the answer to the situation" (p. 192). May I warmly commend this book for serious consideration?

A. E. GARVIE.

Magistri Eckardi Opera Latina auspiciis Instituti Sanctae Sabinæ in Urbe ad codicum fidem edita. Fasciculus XIII. Quaestiones Parisienses edidit ANTONIUS DONDAINE, O.P. Commentariolum de Eckardi Magisterio adicinxit Raymundus Klibansky. Lipsiae: 1936. Pp. xxvii, 58. RM. 650.

What is to be reckoned as the thirteenth *fasciculus* of this admirable edition of Eckhart's Latin works contains *Quaestiones Parisienses*, edited by Père Dondaine, with a *commentariolum* by Dr. Klibansky prefixed, dealing with the activity of the great mystic as a teacher in the University of Paris. These *Quaestiones* are derived from two manuscripts, one at Avignon, the other in the Vatican Library. Those taken from the Avignon MS. seem to belong to the years 1302-3; they deal with the relation of *intelligere* to *esse* in God and in the angels; and are accompanied by a discussion of the respective claims to primacy of the understanding and the will, of knowledge and love, in which Gonsalvo, the master of Duns Scotus, a Franciscan master expelled from France by Philip the Fair in 1303, defends those of the will against the arguments of "Equardus" on the other side of the controversy. Those from the Vatican MS. are concerned, one with the nature of motion, another with the body of Christ; the former is assigned by the editor to the years 1311-12, the latter to some period before 1314. These are ascribed in the manuscript itself, the first to "Ayerdus," the second to "Aycardus"; and there is no reason to doubt that they are Eckhart's. Some others, interposed in the manuscript between the two, do not bear his name, and are by the present editors considered as probably not his; they are, however, printed by them as an appendix to those which are assigned to him. The Avignon *quaestiones* have been previously published by the learned Franciscan P. Longpré, and both these and the Vatican *quaestiones* by Grabmann and by Geyer. On these labours of his predecessors the present editor, P. Dondaine, passes (p. viii) the following judgment: *Suo quaeque editio merito commendatur; prima aetate, secunda plenitudine materiae, tertia acumine critico excellit.*

Dr. Klibansky in his "little commentary" shows the agreement of the doctrine maintained by Eckhart in these *Quaestiones Parisienses*, that *ipse Deus est ipsum intelligere et non est esse* with that to be found in his German writings, where we read that "vernünftekeit ist der tempel gotes," and "wesen ist sin vorburg" (p. xvii). Twenty years later, however, in the prologues to the *Opus Tripartitum* (which have already appeared in this edition, with Dom Bascour as editor), his cardinal position is *esse est Deus*. But, despite this difference in respect of *esse*, he did not cease to follow St.

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Thomas (and, as Dr. Klibansky notes, to agree with Dante) in ranking understanding before will, knowledge before love.

The editing of the text is such as to inspire confidence, even where one finds difficulty in translating: but must we not, to get the right sense, read *assumitur* for *assumit* in 32, 10?

C. C. J. WEBB.

Storia della filosofia. Parte prima. La filosofia greca. By GUIDO DE RUGGIERO. Terza edizione. (Bari: Laterza & Figli. 1934-5. Two volumes. Pp. 396; 346. Price lire 45.)

In this third edition the author presents a text so fully re-written that he submits it as a new work. The two volumes extend from the Pre-Socratics to the Neo-Platonists. The demand for such a comprehensive survey, proved by the exhaustion of two editions, is both a tribute to the excellence of this work and a symptom of the fewness of native surveys of similar scope (and the histories of Zeller and Gomperz are only now in course of translation into Italian).

A short review can draw attention to only relatively random points. The introduction discusses with common sense as well learning the disputatious problems of the relations of the first philosophers to Oriental thought and to the theogonies and mystery-cults of Greece, the conclusion being, in effect, that however much we may demonstrate that the thought of Thales and his successors had specific historical conditions, that thought was more than a selection of oddments from or a natural residue of these. But he recognizes that any interest in the school of Miletus can be only antiquarian and passes on quickly to their successors. Under Socrates the Burnet-Taylor theory is discussed in a note and sharply dismissed: an attempt might have been made at least to show its value as compelling us to admit the hazard in *any* account of what Socrates and Plato thought severally. The treatment of Aristotle, less conventional, is refreshing. While admitting what the Germans would call the philological value of Jaeger's work, Professor de Ruggiero contends that the genetic approach can never do for Aristotle what it has done for Plato, because the inquiries of the former were attended at every stage by the ideal of system, whereas the inquiries of the latter arose and shaped themselves with reference to current discussions; besides, Aristotle moved away from Platonism only to return in the end to a position that, when compared with anything outside Plato, has all the appearance and savour of Platonism. This interpretation is summarized and driven home in the paradox that it was in Aristotle, not in Plato, that the philosophy brought down by Socrates to the market-place returned to the empyrean, since it was Aristotle, not Plato, who in metaphysics preferred the apodeictic to the dialectic method. Of the post-Aristotelian systems there is a well-ordered account, unsympathetic to Stoicism, and, like all other accounts, failing in what seems to be the impossible task of bringing Neo-Platonism to logical clarity and articulating its deep and perennial philosophical appeal. The death of Plotinus, by the way, is put at 289 instead of 270: I know of no grounds for changing the date given by Porphyry. A full and excellent bibliography is appended, in which English works are adequately represented.

The work has the merit that one takes for granted in anything that comes from this author's pen and which it would be impertinent to praise. I sincerely hope that Professor de Ruggiero's health, which not long ago was not good, will be fully restored to him, both for his own enjoyment and to enable him to continue the large History of which the above are the first two volumes.

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Eight volumes have so far appeared (the above two in a third edition, other three in a second), and as the next volume would take up the British line of thinkers its publication should be awaited here, all the more so as it is likely, I imagine, to be strongly critical of our traditional empiricism.

T. E. JESSOP.

American Philosophy To-day and To-morrow. (New York: Lee Furman Inc. 1935. Pp. viii + 518. Price \$3.75.)

In a certain sense this volume may be regarded as a "post-depression" supplement to *Contemporary American Philosophy: Personal Statements* (which appeared in 1930). The contributors, however, are different and most of them are rather younger. Again, it is more of a private venture than the earlier book, the present team of twenty-five contributors having been selected by the editors, H. M. Kallen and Sidney Hook, and not by any philosophical association. I do not suppose the writers were privately instructed to make it snappy, but the editors have obviously intended to make a special appeal to the reading public, for a large proportion of the contributors consists of journalists (at least half-time) and many have had very varied careers. Several sociologists, a literary free-lance, a State Senator, educational administrators, a negro (Oxford trained), a Cambridge man, a former engineer, a Catholic editor, a former engineer largely self-educated here join hands, or pens, with the more cloistered sort of philosophers. Each was instructed to "expound his attitude and outlook in terms of his personal development and take occasion to indicate what he regards as the most pressing problems of the future." Each was to be accounted "young," but for the purposes of this youthful round robin the "younger generation was regarded as a state of mind, not a chronological age." (The average age of those who have mentioned the date of their birth is forty-five, and the figure would not be lower if all the contributors had supplied this particular.)

These unchronologically youthful contributors have refreshingly different views. There is hardly a single important statement made by any one contributor that is not flatly contradicted by some other. So to-morrow may well be lively. The result, however, seems to me to be very successful, although I should advise readers to make successive dips into the book, as their inclination may direct, and not, as I did, to read it straight through. Twenty-five separate jewels seem to be more effective when scattered.

Among the topics treated are the advance from pragmatism to naturalism, the conquest of egoism and its invincibility, the superficiality of Karl Marx and the need for him in the twentieth century. There is not very much logistics (for Mr. Weiss is about to become a metaphysician) and hardly any New-world Hegelianism, although Mr. Sheldon clings to a fissured form of the Great Tradition. In one form or another, value-theory seems to be the topic most frequently recurring, and Mr. Koffka writes an interesting dialogue on the theme of "values-sub-n," that is to say on the general doctrine that the subjective values in this or the other subject reflect (or, even, *are*) the *nisus* towards pattern in his experience and that, metaphysically speaking, we have every right to interpret objective reality in terms of our own experiences—or, at any rate, no other hope. One of the most original essays is Mr. Schneider's, for he draws an important distinction between the ethics of contractualism and the ideal of communism, supplementing the distinction with the provocative thesis that "the basic power of the state is derived from the physical necessities of administering

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certain types of goods, not from the pooled wills or energies of the citizens,"
Not very much is said in detail about to-morrow.

JOHN LAIRD.

Where is Science Going? By MAX PLANCK. With a preface by ALBERT EINSTEIN. Translated and edited by JAMES MURPHY. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1933. 1p. 224. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature. By NIELS BOHR. (Cambridge University Press. 1934. 1p. 119. Price 6s. net.)

Science and the Human Temperament. By ERWIN SCHRÖDINGER. Translated and with a biographical introduction by JAMES MURPHY. Foreword by LORD RUTHERFORD OF NELSON. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1935. Pp. 154. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

In these three books we have an interesting and stimulating account of the present state of the philosophy of the new physics, ill-defined and somewhat obscure as it is. And a point of significance is that Max Planck and Einstein, who were the originators of the whole quantum problem, are unwilling to accept the philosophy of indeterminism. Einstein calls it "objectionable nonsense" and Planck, discussing heat conduction, allows himself to say: "If it were possible for us to follow the movement of each individual molecule in this very intricate labyrinth of processes, then we should find in each case an exact fulfilment of dynamical laws" (p. 145); a declaration of faith for which he is taken to task by Sir Arthur Eddington, who asks: How does he know? But further on, on p. 190, Planck says: "It is now generally agreed that heat movement of molecules and conduction of heat, like all other irreversible phenomena, do not obey dynamical laws but statistical laws": so he seems to have it both ways, and the reader is left in complete bewilderment. Is this not a naïve use of the word *law*, long ago discarded, as something compelling physical objects to change their motions?

Planck, like Einstein, sees clearly that free-will is an illusion and puts forward a convincing argument to support this view: in this he differs from Bohr, who holds free-will to be an "experiential category of our psychic life." Planck, therefore, does not think that the philosophy of indeterminism is needed in order to account for human activity, whereas Bohr thinks that it may have some bearing on "the more profound biological problems, . . . in which we are concerned with the freedom and power of adaptation of the organism in its reaction to external stimuli. . . ."

Philosophers will be intrigued to find that the present state of physics has forced both Planck and Schrödinger to attempt to say what they mean by "really existing." In the past physicists have usually contrived to avoid any of the really difficult problems that arise when scientific method is applied to the external world, but now they are being forced, rather against their better judgment, to address themselves to epistemology. And philosophers must be indulgent if many of the views advanced appear to them naïve, and if, on examination, some of the ideas presented as new and startling, turn out to be much camouflaged versions of old and well-worn gambits, long known and long discarded.

Professor Schrödinger deals in a fascinating and entertaining manner with the connection between science, art, and play; the relation between theories in physical science and the general cultural views of the epoch; and the question: Is science a fashion of the times? It is interesting to notice how closely he approaches the Spenglerian view of the morphology of science.

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All three books are a valuable contribution to the flux of ideas brought about by doubt and mistrust of earlier intuitive notions which form the unconscious background of all Gothic culture.

G. BURNISTON BROWN.

Modern Thomistic Philosophy, Vol. I, *The Philosophy of Nature*. By R. P. PHILLIPS, D.D., M.A. (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne. 1934. Pp. xiv + 346. Price 9s.)

The aim and scope of this text-book, intended for students, is briefly set forth by Dr. Phillips in his Preface. "The purpose of this book is to present a simple explanation of the philosophy usually taught to Catholic students. . . . Since such teaching at the present day is predominantly on the lines of the system originated by S. Thomas Aquinas, it is this system, as developed by modern Thomists, which it is the object of this book to explain." According to this plan, the author does not attempt to give an account of the other Scholastic systems, such as those of Scotus and Suarez, except in so far as their divergencies of doctrine may throw light on the Thomist contentions. In the same way Dr. Phillips only pays attention to the principal divergencies of modern philosophies from Thomism, as "bringing into higher relief its positive teaching." He does, however, attempt to meet the more urgent of the reasons which have been advanced against its truth.

This first volume is entitled *The Philosophy of Nature*, and comprises what is called in Latin text-books of Scholastic philosophy "Cosmology and Rational Psychology," that is, the study of the material world in general according to the two great classes of material things, the inanimate and living ones. The next volume will be devoted to the study of Metaphysics.

The amount of philosophical ground covered in the present volume is immense and the number and importance of the topics treated debar any useful discussion within the limits of a review. The mere titles of some of the first chapters, Mechanism, Quantity, The Continuum, Place and Space, etc., indicate the difficult problems which are raised. I will therefore confine myself to a few general remarks.

Dr. Phillips is to be congratulated on the clear and lucid way he has set forth Thomist doctrines and especially for the manner in which he has rendered the Latin terminology of the Schoolmen in English, an achievement which makes his book very readable and interesting even for those unacquainted with the great treatises of the Schoolmen. It is easy to agree with the Jesuit Professor who recommends it as the best thing of its kind in English. This does not mean that one admits all the arguments put forward by Dr. Phillips. The average student who reflects, for instance, would hardly be convinced by the discussion which tends to prove that matter is the principle of individuation. Moreover, despite the fact that the author makes a laudable attempt to conciliate or incorporate modern theories into the Thomist system and is quite willing to admit that a modern presentation of Thomism must be different from that of a John of S. Thomas or of Goudin; nevertheless, his "Thomism" seems to me to be much too narrow. Thus, in the chapters on Cognition and on the Intellectual Life no mention is made of the work of men like Rousselot, Maréchal, and Romeyer, nor is any account taken of the fact that on their showing the terms "modern" and "Thomistic" would seem to be irreconcilable adjectives.

L. J. WALKER.

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Spinoza. By Sir FREDERICK POLLOCK. (London: Duckworth, 1936. Pp. 143. Price 2s.)

Anything that Sir Frederick Pollock writes about Spinoza is bound to be interesting, and this little book, in the "Great Lives" Series, though almost purely biographical, is full of pertinent detail about the philosopher, his spiritual environment, and his friends and correspondents. The author has utilized the results of the minute researches that have been made by scholars into these matters since his complete study of Spinoza (now out of print) was published some half a century ago. While he has deliberately ruled out any discussion of Spinoza's philosophy, place is given to the intellectual influences that helped to shape it. Among these influences, that of the Neo-Platonic tradition seems to us to have been unduly minimized. The treatment meted out by de Blyenbergh strikes us as over-harsh: the man was, of course, no philosopher, only a well-meaning amateur; but, as Guzzo has shown clearly in his able work on Spinoza, he raised an issue that Spinoza failed to meet. He saw that no solution of the problems of evil and of the moral life was possible on Spinoza's system. In the last chapter the author reviews the history of the Spinozistic legacy during the last 250 years, and closes with the address he gave as the representative of Oxford and Cambridge at the Tercentenary Celebrations at The Hague in 1932.

W. G. DE BURGH.

An Introduction to Contemporary German Philosophy. By WERNER BROCK, Dr.Phil. (Cambridge, at the University Press. 1935. Pp. xx + 144. Price 6s. net.)

A book of this sort was needed. Since the War, philosophy, except in those parts of it that are closely allied to the more internationally minded sciences, has tended to be far too monoglot. More particularly, however, this book should make a special appeal to many readers of *Philosophy*, for it supplies a certain type of answer to the question that has been so much discussed recently in this journal, viz. whether the time has not come when academic philosophy should change its ways and attempt in some fashion to become a guide to life, the supporter and interpreter as well as the critic of the stuff of aspiration. Dr. Brock indicates the answer of certain contemporary German philosophers to this question—not an easy answer but, very likely, none the worse for that.

He does not try to tell us all about modern German philosophy. For that he refers his readers to Oesterreich's edition of Ueberweg. Instead, he tells us, compactly but not sketchily, the story of that part of contemporary German Philosophy in which he himself finds the greatest promise and the greatest interest. As he sees it, this movement of German thought was brought about by the breakdown of Hegelian idealism and the rise of positivism in the nineteenth century. The problem was to reach a new conception of philosophy which should define a genuine field of inquiry and yet be readily distinguishable from the natural sciences and from any encyclopaedia of them. Dr. Brock believes that Jaspers and Heidegger have come very near to success in this important enterprise.

Seen from this point of view, the work of Husserl, Dilthey, and even of Weber is regarded as preparatory. It was not enough with Husserl's followers, or with Dilthey and Weber, to attempt to penetrate into the ethos of the humanistic sciences and exhibit the non-normative character of the positive sciences. Nietzsche and Kierkegaard (in translation), according to Dr. Brock,

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were of much greater importance because they prepared the way for the attempt of Jaspers and of Heidegger to "abandon the epistemological approach and start from a fundamental phenomenon—either 'Life' or 'Existenz'—which is perhaps deeper, certainly more realistic, although more impervious to analysis."

This story could hardly be told in shorter space than Dr. Brock has allowed himself. Consequently it seems sufficient here to remark that Dr. Brock's enthusiasm carries him through much difficult country, and stimulates much reflection among his readers, that he provides a very useful bibliography, and that Dr. Muirhead supplies a very good preface.

JOHN LAIRD.

Psycho-analysis and Social Psychology. By WILLIAM McDougall. (London: Methuen & Co. 1936. Pp. ix + 207. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

When the lectures embodied in this book were delivered at the University of London last year, they aroused some controversy. Some of McDougall's hearers were struck by the apparent inconsistency between McDougall's statement early in the lectures that "Freud has done more for the advancement of our understanding of human nature than any man since Aristotle," and the subsequent ruthless criticism of him. There is, of course, no inconsistency. McDougall's position in this book cannot be understood unless we bear in mind both that he thinks Freud a very great man and that he considers that Freud has made many mistakes.

Some of these mistakes McDougall considers that Freud is now correcting, and is thus drawing nearer to McDougall's own position, for example, in recognizing that there may be many human inborn propensities which are not merely forms of the sex instinct. That Freud, when he advanced into the field of social psychology, did not relate his work with that of McDougall is, of course, true. It is part of the truth that his work shows almost no sign of having been influenced in any way at all by more than two or three contemporary investigations in social psychology or anthropology. Such intellectual isolation may have some advantages for an original thinker, but it has the serious disadvantage of preventing his work from taking its place in the integrated and ordered advance of scientific knowledge.

McDougall has little difficulty in supporting the charge of inconsistency and lack of logical coherence in much of Freud's theorizing. The truth is, I think, that Freud has no gift for the logical side of scientific speculation. He is an intuitive genius who is often right in conclusions supported by reasoning which could be demolished by a student in his first term in a logic class. If this is admitted, there is little interest in analysing his inconsistencies. Such analysis does not affect the real importance of his work; this is based on his observations and not on his reasonings.

One of the objects of McDougall's attack is the 'Oedipus complex.' This a misleading and prejudice-creating term, not always very clearly used. But the question of whether or not there is a strong emotional attachment of the child to the parent of opposite sex before the fifth year which has lasting effects on later character development is a different and much more important question than the use of a particular term to describe it. Also it is a question which must be settled by controlled observation and not by discussion. The fact itself may be true and important even though the term used to describe it is a bad one, and though some of the conclusions drawn from speculations about the Oedipus complex may be indefensible.

We may liken Freud to an explorer who, having discovered a new country,

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and knowing nothing about map making, comes back with a sketch map which uses none of the usual conventional signs and lacks self-consistency. The cartographers criticize the deficiency of his map, as they should, since that is their business. But there is danger that they may lead us into thinking that the deficiencies of the map are, in themselves, evidence that the country does not exist or that it is not better represented by the imperfect map than by no map at all. The imperfections of the map may make it difficult to be sure of how much of the country has been correctly surveyed and how it is related to previously known country. Let us then make better maps with better surveying methods.

At the present time, there has been more speculation on the subject of social psychology than exact research. So long as this is the case, there will be difference of opinion. In the course of the next hundred years (if civilization lasts so long) we may hope that the position will be changed. Many of the questions now in dispute will have been settled by scientific inquiry, many will have been relegated to the lumber-room as meaningless problems. Freud has posed many problems which the experimental investigator should set himself the task of solving, although Freud himself seems little interested in the problem of how his statements could be scientifically verified or disproved.

Freud says, for example, that the feeling of affection results from 'aim-inhibited' sexual needs; McDougall denies this and says that it is the impulse of an independent instinct. It is unlikely that argument will settle this question. The scientific social psychologist will ask what (if any) experiment or controlled observation will give a different result if Freud's and if McDougall's theory is true. If none, it must go to the speculative lumber-room. It is not unlikely that many of Freud's ingenious suggestions will find their way there, but I believe that enough will be left to make sure that Freud will be remembered as one of the very important explorers of the human mind.

R. H. THOULESS.

The World of Colour. By DAVID KATZ, Dr.Phil. Translated by R. B. MacLeod and C. W. Fox. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1935. Pp. xvi + 300. Price 15s.)

While based primarily upon the author's own researches, his appeal to the results obtained by other workers in this field is so full that he has provided a valuable handbook to modern theories of colour vision. The translation, which slightly abbreviates the German original, appears to be excellent. The book is too closely packed with information to be easy reading, and for the same reason it is impossible to give an adequate summary. It is a book to be closely studied by the specialist, and an indispensable work of reference for all psychologists. The artist, too, will find in it more to interest him than he has been offered in the traditional treatment of the subject.

The salient feature of the modern theories represented in Dr. Katz's statement is that a strictly psychological standpoint is adopted, and the older dependence upon physics and physiology abandoned. No doubt science must ultimately reconcile the three points of view, and we do not understand the author to contend that the phenomena which he discusses are without physical basis. But it is clear that a theory of atomic sensations invariably related to physical stimuli will not account for the common facts of visual perception. To explain away as illusions all the facts which disturb the simple sensationist scheme is too facile, and this method has stultified theories of

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perception for too long. Illusions remain facts to be studied in their context. Even to term them illusions is to beg an important question. This book has the merit of treating such phenomena seriously. The "world of colour" treated by Katz is that of common experience, a world in which colours are sometimes attached to surfaces, subordinate to them and localized, sometimes spread through the third dimension, as in a translucent coloured liquid, and at other times seen as "film-colours," as is the colour of my lamp-shade. It is a world in which we observe coloured surfaces retaining their colours while the physical conditions alter, white remaining white when physically reflecting less light than a better illuminated black. We are aware of the illuminant as well as of the illuminated. These are some of the phenomena which are submitted to experimental investigation.

The conclusions reached are in agreement with those of the Gestalt school. The qualities of any part of an experiential field are dependent upon the whole field. The general principle is stated with great precision in detailed instances. The quantitative results are in some cases precarious, since based upon very few observations. It may be, however, that the author intends the data offered only as illustrative of that which he obtained, and those who feel misgivings can repeat the simple experiments which are so adequately described. Similarly those readers who are disappointed to find that the "colours" discussed are for the most part those in the black-white series may be encouraged to extend the author's work. The whole book is too valuable for small criticisms.

A. W. WOLTERS.

The Rise of European Liberalism. By H. J. LASKI. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 287. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

"For, as I have here sought to show, the liberals of the epochs before the French Revolution had only a negative theory of the state; to them, for quite intelligible reasons, it was a tyranny from which they sought an escape. After their victory, they saw it either as a means of protecting themselves from invasion from below, or as, somewhat later, a technique for distributing such concessions to those who challenged their supremacy as might enable them to maintain it unchanged in its larger outlines. To the demand for justice they replied by the offer of charity. This, no doubt, is an unfair description of the more generous minds amongst them. . . . But it is not unfair as an account of the evolution of the doctrine as a whole, and, particularly, of its expression as a social environment, on the one hand, and a body of legislation on the other" (p. 259).

Such, in Professor Laski's own words, is a fair summary of the thesis he expounds in this book. He describes it as "an essay in interpretation," and an essay in Marxist interpretation of history it undoubtedly is. As the quotation shows, it suffers from the defect of all Marxist interpretation—excessive and unreal simplification. It assumes the existence of a class of "liberals"—by which Professor Laski means merely bourgeois capitalists—sufficiently class-conscious and sufficiently continuous over a period of four centuries to use the mechanism of the state for such definite purposes. He insists that "the fundamental aim" of the liberal state has been "to serve the owners of property"; though if this is true of the liberal state, surely it would be even more true of the Greek city-state and the political structure of feudalism, and would not be peculiar to liberalism. Surely, in its effort to escape from

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the "tyranny" of the state—of that feudal state which *had* been constructed to "serve the owners of property"—liberal thought evolved concepts which made it logically impossible to limit politics to such an end. Professor Laski writes as if he were pronouncing a funeral oration over the grave of liberalism. I do not believe that the full implications of its ideas have yet been worked out in theory or in practice; and I am not sure but that Professor Laski, with his passion for individual justice, is the strongest evidence for that belief. He seems to deny that any disinterested desire for individual justice belongs to liberal thought and quotes its attitude to the poor, to the rise of trade unionism and to decent standards of education, health, and housing as proofs of this denial; but surely much of the opposition in each case was simply the slowness of human nature to readjust itself to new ideas, the sheer inertia of habit and tradition; and in so far as there was an urge to reform, and these reforms were actually achieved, it is the principles of liberalism which were responsible. To show that individual liberals resisted such change *at the time* is only to show that the leaven of liberalism took time to produce its results. That such change was effected and accepted marks the evolution and the triumph of true liberalism.

Professor Laski is concerned to show that all "liberal" thinkers in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries in France and England kept intact the principle of private property; though I would not have thought that elaborate research were needed to prove that; what is much more necessary is proof that *because of* this retention of private property all the political motives of men were conditioned primarily by profit-making and self-interest. Surely it is this second link in the argument of materialist interpretation which needs most adequate proof; yet this is, on the whole, assumed. Refer to clearly disinterested thinkers—the author himself mentions T. H. Green, Tocqueville, and Hobhouse—and the materialist seeks refuge in "evolution of the doctrine as a whole," and "its expression as a social environment." But economic determinism means one of two things: if it only means that the intellectual life of an age is "conditioned" by its social and economic structure, in the sense that this structure postulates the general environment and the outside framework of contemporary ideas, then I have little fundamental quarrel with it. One might differ as to how far economic considerations were the chief conditioning factor, how far only one amongst several others. But if economic determinism means that the economic structure of society determines its thought in detail, so that the institution of private property involves the inevitable and complete exclusion of any terms of reference other than the self-interest—however enlightened—of the ruling class, then I have a very great quarrel with it. For I believe it to be quite untrue.

Professor Laski seems to swing between these two poles. Thus he begins by arguing that liberalism was not a conscious and persistent pursuit of the ends of freedom from government control, free association, and so on, but rather that "these were the ends its more ultimate purposes caused it to serve." He maintains that toleration comes "because, at bottom, persecution is a threat to property." The idea of toleration may be urged by some for genuinely religious reasons; but the idea is only materialized into political institutions when a congenial social environment has been created by economic and material considerations. It is a subtle and often elusive argument. Of course, every historical change is caused by a conjunction of congenial circumstances. But that does not prove that the material circumstances are all-important; it shows that every circumstance is vital, in the sense that the result would have been different for the absence of any single one of them. And materialist

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interpretation is simply a foreshortening of the complex truth of the historical process.

The author swings to the other pole when he writes, cryptically, "Tolerance came because intolerance interfered with the access to wealth." I believe that there was an inherent logic in liberalism which drove it to toleration, as an intellectual necessity, in the course of the historical process. I would be glad to make some estimate of the part played in this process by both selfish motives and by economic environment; but I would not start by assuming the supremacy of material factors. Again, the new outlook of Newton's *Principia* is said to have "emerged from a nexus of problems presented to science by business men." I believe that there is an inherent logic of development in science, which would have developed—perhaps slower or faster—regardless of the problems of business men at any given period. Nineteenth-century science is more the product of the liberalism of free inquiry than of the liberalism of capitalist business.

In other respects, it may be that the book is in danger of falling between two stools. Having warned the reader that it is but an essay, and that much more detailed analysis would be required for adequacy, Professor Laski proceeds to pour over him such a flood of erudition as may well submerge the general reader; notes for the specialist student are collected at the end, but so many specialized references are made in the body of the text that mere freedom from footnotes can be but cold comfort to the general reader. Amidst this wealth of detail, one is disappointed to find not a single reference to so important and relevant a name as Bolingbroke. Surely, that appeal from the 'new whigs' of his own day to the 'old whigs' of 1688, that insistence that the general liberal maxims of the Bill of Rights are ineffective until supplemented by legal securities, that programme of radical reforms which foreshadowed Fox (in fact, the whole "Dissertation on Parties"), have much more potential relevance to the theme of the book than even Dr. John Brown, Ogilvie, and Wallace, who are quoted with such zest.

Of minor matters, a misprint of "state" for "statute" on page 150 makes nonsense of a quotation from Thomas Mun. (Incidentally, need we be given the page-reference to the 1664 edition of Mun, when the 1928 edition is readily obtainable?) Verbally, if not physically, "impact" loses force by repetition; and "the impact of the equilibrium which emerged" on page 140 hurls us into the arms of Mr. A. P. Herbert.

DAVID THOMSON.

Race, Sex and Environment: A Study of Mineral Deficiency in Human Evolution. By J. R. DE LA H. MARETT. (London: Hutchinson & Co. 1930. Pp. 342. Price 21s.)

The infinite diversity of human types and cultural development has always been a fascinating subject for speculation. In our search for the why and the how of the so-called "racial" differences we have looked to the biologist, the sociologist, and the student of geography in turn, but each new development of scientific knowledge seems only to show more clearly the complexity of the problem. Those three variables, culture, environment, and innate endowment, still remain, and we are as far as ever from solving the set of equations that link the three. The discovery of the Mendelian principles of inheritance seemed to point to one answer, the psychology of the Behaviourist school to another, while researches on the influence of diet on human develop-

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ment, and the action of the endocrine organs on physique and temperament brought other possible solutions in view. In *Race, Sex and Environment* Mr. Marett makes another, and it must be stated at once a very courageous, attempt, to account for the variations in human races and types.

According to his theory, put very crudely, we are, we think, and we act according to the mineral constituents of the soil on which we live. The effect of certain mineral deficiencies, notably a shortage of iodine, calcium, and phosphorus, on the physique or endocrine balance of the human individual has long been known to physiologists, and it is on this fact that Mr. Marett builds his theory of race, mapping in an interesting fashion the distribution of the various mineral constituents of the soil over the habitable globe, and then applying the knowledge of genetics he gained through breeding experiments on Jersey cattle to the study of the evolution of human types in different environments and climatic conditions.

In stressing the importance of mineral deficiency in human evolution, Mr. Marett has outlined an exceedingly interesting problem. He shows boldness, originality, and very wide reading. Unfortunately, however, in this particular work he covers so large a field that he is compelled almost immediately to leave the realm of established scientific facts. He ranges in time from the pre-glacial epochs through various imagined evolutionary stages to the present day. In space he covers the whole surface of the earth, and deals with every type of people, from the primitive Bushman to the modern city-dweller. And of the human variations which he believes to be dependent on mineral deficiency he treats, not only those physical characteristics such as stature, skin colouring, skull form, etc., usually made the basis of ethnic classification, but as distinctive features evolving similarly under the influence of natural selection peculiarities of the human psyche and the typical mental conflicts described by Freud. These latter he believes to be reflected in the social institutions of different ethnic groups, their political organization, economic institutions, and religious ceremonial. With such an ambitious programme it is not surprising that the author has to draw largely on imaginary reconstructions of the past, and the reader must confess to feeling slightly breathless as hypothesis is piled on hypothesis, and Mr. Marett ejaculates continually, "It is probable," "It is not impossible," or "It can be readily imagined that." Moreover, though adventurers in the No Man's land between biology, anthropology, and psychology are welcome, we feel not unreasonably bewildered at the simultaneous use of the jargon of all three sciences. When the author describes the evolution in arid surroundings of dolichocephalic pastoralists with exteriorized super-egos and a ritual of Sky-God worship, we seem to be moving in a many-dimensional world, although it must be admitted that the appended glossary defines for us realities as diverse as acromegaly, *rites de passage*, and auto-erotism.

To comment in detail on every theoretical issue raised in these three hundred closely printed pages would be impossible. The biologist must examine Mr. Marett's application of the laws of heredity to the historical reconstruction of racial evolution, and his conception of the effects of mineral deficiency on selection for relative degrees of sex-linked predominance, a point on which he lays great stress. The geologist, the archaeologist, and the psychologist will also have their say. The present review must confine itself to the sociological issue alone. Here Mr. Marett's main contention seems to be that the human psyche is the product of certain environmental conditions, and that the terms used to describe individual types can be applied with little modification to racial groups. Even such Freudian concepts as the "id" and the "super-ego," degrees of inversion, or conflicts such as the Oedipus complex, are described as charac-

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teristic of different ethnic groupings and treated as though evolving through natural selection according to biological laws. It is the psyche of different races, divided by Marett into masculine and feminine types, which account for their characteristic social institutions, and hence the author attempts to account for polyandry ultimately in terms of iodine deficiency; shamanistic religions as the product of an over-burdening of the heat-producing powers of the anterior lobe of the thyroid; and the domestication of animals in human history as due to mineral deficiencies encouraging an inhibition of the aggressive instinct in man and beast, thus facilitating co-operative symbiosis! Such hypotheses are too startling to be tested by the laws of human society as we know them. Mr. Marett's book must in fact be regarded as a stimulating excursion through imaginary epochs and spaces and what he calls "psychological imponderables." "Truth," as he himself explains, "to a man of a masculine race absorbing a sufficiency of minerals and expressing his utosomal instincts of self-assertion, consists in no doctrine but rather an adventure."

A. I. RICHARDS.

Faithful Rebels. A Study in Jewish Speculative Thought. By ISRAEL LEVINE, M.A., D.Litt. (London: Soncino Press. 1936. Pp. viii + 146. Price 6s.)

The fourth-century author of the Book of Job, probably under foreign influence, rebels against the Prophets and ruthlessly faces the problem of suffering and the scepticism to which it gives rise, but in the end returns to acceptance of the Hebrew faith in God omnipotent and inscrutable. The same is the fate of the second-century writer of Ecclesiastes after an uncompromising adoption of the Stoic and Epicurean standpoints. Philo, a contemporary of Jesus, uses Greek philosophy, and especially Platonism, only to establish Jewish monotheism and monism, just as in the twelfth century A.D. Maimonides uses Aristotle to uphold as correlatives the unity of Nature and the unity of God. In the seventeenth century Spinoza sets forth a monism making for materialism with an unprecedented thoroughness, disallows the freedom of the will, and exempts nothing from the geometric method, and yet his motive is ethical, and he is God-intoxicated. In the nineteenth century Marx is a Spinoza in economics; in our own days, in spite of his opposition to religion, he has become in Russia the founder of a veritable faith and the prophet of a new social order. Bergson, our contemporary, philosophizes only to depose reason and enthrone intuition and thus mysticism; he reproduces many features of Philo and Spinoza. All of these rebel against, or at least adventure away from the Jewish culture (for philosophy itself is alien to it); yet in so doing they manifest the Jewish characteristics of thoroughness, realism or materialism, and ethical or prophetic provocativeness, and in their very atheism testify to religious faith, which is the sole bond of union between Jews.

Such is Mr. Levine's thesis. His little book is by its simplicity and conciseness admirably qualified for the general reader. But it suffers from oversimplification. Thus, the antithesis between Hebrew faith and Greek "science" is made absolute through neglecting the mystical element of Plato's *Republic*, and the really philosophical problem of the monism of some of the above writers which leans now to atheism, now to acosmism, is never raised. Again, only the derivative nature of Mr. Levine's essay would seem to explain his failure to use Bergson's *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion*, as yet unassimilated by the commentators. His general contention, however, I should like not merely to support, but to express even more strongly than he. The peculiarity of Israel is not simply faith, but the development of a discipline for practising *en masse* the constant presence of God ("and thou shalt talk of

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them when thou sittest in thine house, and when thou walkest by the way, and when thou liest down, and when thou risest up"), and for forming a people of priests. From centuries of this practice come its singleness, its realism (for God is real, living, drastic), and its intense energy and activism. But take away God, the correlate of that energy, and you have materialism, a force *détraqué* and disproportionate to its task, and in all cases, as in some of the above writers, witness (sometimes monstrous) to the *absence* of God. Herein lies the explanation both of the achievements and of the pathology of Israel. Its experiment is unique except for the nascent parallel of the Oxford Group, which should be studied by all interested in the history and destiny of the Jewish people.

PHILIP LEON.

The Hallucinations of Logocratia. By TELEMACHUS KOURMOULIS. (Athens: "Kyklos." 1936. Pp. 243.)

We have here a gallant Don Quixote, officer in the Hellenic Navy, tilting at many isms, in all of which he sees logocracy, that is, "all the philosophical systems hitherto known," which take sense-experience as the origin of cognition. With two exceptions: the philosophy of Herakleitos and of the Buddha. He holds that these two placed beside the empirical origin of their world-view "that true and unique support which Creation has instinctively (*sic*) laid within our psychical energy." "This instinctive support within us is represented by three meanings . . . not given by sense-experience, but appearing in our conscience (*sic*), and are imposed upon us . . . through the so-called direct way of Psychical Facts." These meanings, which he also calls "instinct data," are not easy to run to earth. But on pp. 166-171 they appear as "non-freedom of will," "existence of the external world," and "finiteness of the Whole."

Don Quixotes have my lively sympathy—nay, I should rather call them Irredentists, for they may oftener foreshadow the "futures" in thought than a wasted championship of the outgrown. And I should willingly have tried further exposition had space been here possible; yet am I not sorry that it may not be. For the author is his own worst enemy. Not because he has had the courage to cope with an alien tongue, in which he is, if fluent—so much too fluent!—not thoroughly at home (e.g. he persistently uses *à la française*, "conscience" for "consciousness"), but because (a) he has marred his work by wordiness; (b) has presented, as the "philosophy" of the Founder of Buddhism, his own misconstructions of a few contexts selected at random from Pali Suttas—such misconstructions as great Gotama would have been the first to repudiate as representing what he saw as real and true.

I am much implicated herein, for the author pleads that he has "carefully gathered" such sayings, but betrays he owes them to the perusal of Greek translations of Mr. F. Koehler's *Hinduismus und Christentum* and Mrs. Rhys Davids's *Buddhism*. I do not know what the former writer may have committed himself to about Buddhism, but as to the apparently pirated edition of my own book I can say thus much: (i) I have not misquoted sayings ascribed to "the Buddha," as is, e.g., the case on pp. 41 and 197; (ii) I have in no instance read into any such sayings the interpretations offered by the author; (iii) I regret that he has been incurious to inquire whether the immature first edition of 1912, which has apparently been illegitimately translated may not have been replaced by later maturer editions.

C. A. F. RHYs DAVIDS.

NEW BOOKS

The Doctrine of the Sūfis (Kitāb al-Ta'arruf). Translated from the Arabic of ABŪ BAKR AL-KALĀBĀDHĪ by A. J. ARBERRY, M.A. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1935. Pp. xviii + 173. Price 10s. 6d.)

This excellent translation—a worthy companion to Mr. Arberry's edition of the text (Cairo, 1934)—will be welcomed by all interested in Sūfism, especially as it provides the only complete version at present available of any early Arabic manual of the same kind; for the well-known works of Sarrāj, Makkī, and Kushairi are more or less "sealed" to those who cannot read them in the original language. Here we find no far-reaching speculations concerning the real nature of man as the microcosm in which God is reflected. The subject-matter of all these treatises (*circa* A.D. 1000–1050) is closely akin to the doctrine and experience of medieval Catholic mysticism, and includes little that might not be regarded as a legitimate, though one-sided, development of Qur'ānic ideas. Kalābādhī, perhaps suspected on account of his connections with the arch-heretic, Hallāj, is careful to demonstrate his own orthodoxy; and, like Kushairi fifty years later, he cites the great Sūfis of the past on almost every page in order to justify his contention that the uncorrupted Sūfi doctrine is in perfect harmony with Islam: the unquestionable influences of Christianity and Hellenism he naturally ignores. His *résumé* of mystical theology, psychology, and ethics serves to bring out the salient points which a more detailed exposition would have obscured, and the illustrative material, together with the author's explanations and critical remarks, is of first-class importance. This book, it may be hoped, will do something towards dispelling the view, endorsed by at least one famous English theologian, that few Sūfis are devout Moslems, or even respectable members of society. The whole work, and in particular the poems scattered through it and admirably rendered into verse by the translator, bear witness to a sincere piety and deep religious feeling which is neither pantheistic nor antinomian.

R. A. NICHOLSON.

Human Ecology. By J. W. BEWS, M.A., D.Sc., Principal of the Natal University College, Pietermaritzburg. With an Introduction by General The Rt. Hon. J. C. SMUTS, P.C., C.H., F.R.S. (Oxford: University Press. London: Humphrey Milford, 1935. 1p. xii + 312. Price 15s. net.)

According to the author of this book, ecology is the most important and fundamental of the human sciences, since it unifies them all and "enables each one to find its proper place in a generalized study of man" (p. 14). In human affairs as elsewhere its subject-matter is the triad of environment, function and organism; and its aim is to study these three things in relation to one another. But this is much more difficult in human affairs than elsewhere, for the double reason that there are numerous separate sciences dealing with the different members of the triad and that the first and most important member is not fixed by nature but extensively modified by human activity. Professor Bews is well aware of these (and other) difficulties; and accordingly his book, with the exception of the final chapter, is devoted to summarizing the relevant results of the sciences in question, the greater bulk of it being (as might be expected) concerned with anthropology. It is doubtful, however, if there is much value in an inevitably compressed summary of so many sciences, conducted without any unifying idea other than that it is desirable that they should be unified; and it is perhaps regrettable that the philosophy of history should find no place amongst them, especially in view of the fact

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that ecology is regarded as a philosophy as well as a science and an art (p. 300). Nor does the synthesis which is offered in the last chapter do much more than point to examples of ecological inquiry (such as regional surveys), refer to the work of Marston as an example of an ecological psychology, and show some ways in which ecological considerations affect our enjoyment of works of art. There are also some unfortunate misprints.

O. DE SELINCOURT.

Books received also:—

- H. H. PRICE. *Truth and Corrigibility*. (Inaugural Lecture, 1936.) Oxford at the Clarendon Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. 31. 2s.
- VARIOUS. *The Problem of Time*. (University of California Publications in Philosophy. Vol. 18.) Berkeley: University of California Press; London: Cambridge University Press. 1936. Pp. 225. 2 dollars 25; 10s.
- H. R. PATCH, Ph.D., Litt.D. *The Tradition of Boethius. A Study of His Importance in Medieval Culture*. New York and London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. viii + 200. 2 dollars 75. 10s. 6d.
- E. E. SYKES. *Lucretius. Poet and Philosopher*. Cambridge at the University Press. 1936. Pp. ix + 187. 7s. 6d.
- J. W. FRIEND and J. FRIBLEMAN. *The Unlimited Community. A Study of the Possibility of Social Science*. London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1936. Pp. 383. 15s.
- R. DE BARY. *My Experiments with Death. A Study of the World Soul in its Relations with the Private Self*. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1936. Pp. xvi + 192. 6s.
- VARIOUS. *Philosophy and History*. Essays presented to E. Cassirer. (Ed. by R. Klibansky and H. J. Paton.) Oxford: Clarendon Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. xii + 355. 25s.
- J. H. L. WETMORE. *Seneca's Conception of the Stoic Sage as shown in his Prose Works*. Alberta: University of Alberta. 1936. Pp. 65.
- D. M. EASTWOOD. *The Revival of Pascal. A Study of his Relation to Modern French Thought*. Oxford: Clarendon Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. xii + 212. 12s. 6d.
- J. W. MACKAIL. *Andrew Cecil Bradley. 1851-1935*. (From the Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. XXI.) London: Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. 10. 1s.
- J. NEEDHAM. *Order and Life*. (Terry Lectures, 1935.) London: Cambridge University Press. 1936. Pp. x + 175. 8s. 6d.
- L. FOSTER. *The New Culture in China*. (Introduction by Sir M. W. Sadler.) London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1936. Pp. 240. 7s. 6d.
- D. W. PRALL. *Aesthetic Analysis*. New York: T. Y. Crowell Co. 1936. Pp. 211. 2 dollars.
- E. G. SPAULDING. *A World of Chance. Or Whence, With, and Why?* New York: The Macmillan Co. 1936. Pp. 293. 12s. 6d.
- P. M. BUCK JR. *The World's Great Age. The Story of a Century's Search for a Philosophy of Life*. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1936. Pp. xv + 382. 15s.
- VARIOUS. *Proceedings of the American Catholic Association, Eleventh Annual Meeting, 1935*. Washington, D.C. Catholic University of America. Pp. 219. 1 dollar 50.
- J. W. WOODWARD. *Intellectual Realism and Culture Change. A Preliminary Study of Reification*. Hanover, U.S.A.: The Sociological Press. 1935. Pp. 198. 2 dollars 10.

NEW BOOKS

- R. MATTHEWS. *English Messiahs. Studies of Six English Religious Pretenders. 1656-1927.* London: Methuen & Co. 1936. Pp. xvi + 230. 10s. 6d.
- T. V. SMITH. *The Promise of American Politics.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press; London: Cambridge University Press. 1936. Pp. xiii + 290. 11s. 6d.
- VARIOUS. *Individual Psychology: Theory and Practice* (Individual Psychology Medical Pamphlets No. 15.) London: C. W. Daniel Co. 1936. Pp. 79. 2s. 6d.
- C. E. M. JOAD. *The Dictator Resigns.* London: Methuen & Co. 1936. Pp. vii + 120. 3s. 6d..
- G. H. MEAD. *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century.* (Ed. by M. M. Moore.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press. London: Cambridge University Press. 1936. Pp. xxxix + 519. 22s. 6d.
- B. PFANNENSTILL. *Bernard Bosanquet's Philosophy of the State. A Historical and Systematic Study.* Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup. 1936. Pp. iv + 324. Kr. 10.
- J. HUIZINGA. (Tr. J. Huizinga.) *In the Shadow of To-morrow. A Diagnosis of the Spiritual Distemper of our Time.* London: W. Heinemann Ltd. 1936. Pp. ix + 218. 7s. 6d.
- J. GUTMANN, Ph. D. *Schelling: of Human Freedom.* Open Court Publishing Co. 1936. Pp. lii + 128. 1 dollar 50.
- D. B. MACDONALD, M.A., D.D. *The Hebrew Philosophical Genius. A Vindication.* Princeton: Princeton University Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. xi + 155. 11s. 6d.
- P. MESNARD. *L'Essor de la Philosophie politique au XVI^e siècle.* Paris: Boivin & Cie. 1936. Pp. 176. 75 fr.
- J. de TONGUEDEC. *Deux Etudes sur 'La Pensée' de M. Maurice Blondel.* Paris: Beauchesne. 12 fr.
- G. MOTTIER. *Le Phénomène de l'Art.* Paris: Boivin & Cie. 20 fr.
- A. MITTERER. *Wandel des Weltbildes von Thomas auf heute. Band 1. Das Ringen der alten Stoff-form-metaphysik mit der heutigen Stoff-physik.* Innsbruck: Tyrolia-Verlag. 1935. Pp. 160. RM. 4.20.
- A. MARGOLIUS. *Mutter und Kind im Alttestamentlichen Schriftum.* Berlin: Berthold Levy. 1936. Pp. 46.
- H. MARGOLIUS. *Grundlegung zur Ethik.* Berlin: B. Levy. 1936. Pp. 17.
- E. FILTHAUT, O.P. *Roland von Cremona O.P. und die Anfänge der Scholastik im Predigerorden. Ein Beitrag zur Geistergeschichte der älteren Dominikaner.* Vechta i.O.: Albertus-Magnus-Verlag der Dominikaner. 1936. Pp. xv + 224.
- G. GALLI. *Lineamenti di Filosofia.* Bologna: Coop. Tipografica Azzoguidi. 1935. Pp. 80. Lire 6.
- G. GALLI. *Studi Storico-Critici sulla Filosofia di Ch. Renouvier. 11 La legge del numero.* Milano: Società Anonima Editrice Dante Alighieri. 1935. Pp. 112. Lire 12.
- F. LOMBARDI. *L'Esperienza e L'Uomo. Fondamenti di una Filosofia Umanistica.* (Studi Filosofici XII.) Firenze: Felice le Monnier. 1935. Pp. xii + 333. L. 20.
- F. LOMBARDI. *Il Mondo degli Uomini.* (Studi Filosofici XIII.) Firenze: Felice le Monnier. 1935. Pp. 311. L. 20.
- A. ALIOTTA. *L'esperimento nella scienza, nella filosofia, nella religione.* Napoli: F. Perella, S.A. 1936. Pp. 102. Lire 10.
- F. MIRABENT. *De La Belleza. Iniciacio als Problemes de l'Estètica, Disciplina Filosòfica.* Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Catalans. 1936. Pp. xvi + 307. *Universitat de Barcelona. Anuari. 1934-1935.* Barcelona: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. 1936. Pp. xix + 464.

SPINOZA MEMORIALS IN HOLLAND

SOMETIMES a prophet is not without honour in his own country, although he may have to wait a century or two before he receives it. Spinoza, driven out of the Jewish community into which he had been born, his opinions condemned by the general voice of Holland, obliged to withhold during his lifetime the publication of his greatest book, his memory reviled for generations after his death—Spinoza is now venerated as one of the spiritual heroes both of the race from which he sprang and of the country of which he was a citizen.

Having occasion recently to be in Holland, I paid visits of piety to the two houses in which Spinoza lived and which are now maintained as memorials. Some of the readers of *Philosophy* may perhaps be interested to hear about them.

In the village of Rijnsburg, a few miles from Leyden, Spinoza found a refuge when, as a young man of twenty-eight or twenty-nine, he felt compelled to leave Amsterdam. The village was a centre of the sect of Remonstrants, to which the friend who had harboured him belonged; it offered a safe and congenial home for a man of Spinoza's unconventional opinions. Off the main road stands the red-brick, red-tiled single-storey house, in which Spinoza lived from 1660 or 1661 to 1664. It has been acquired, and is now well maintained, by a Dutch society of Spinozists. In the principal room is a small but noteworthy collection of books by Spinoza and his contemporaries; on the walls are a number of portraits. Of even greater interest, in the room adjoining are to be seen the large wooden lathe and other tools which Spinoza used in his handicraft of maker of lenses. On the outside wall of the house a tablet has been inserted with a quotation from an old Dutch poet, of which this is a rough translation:

Ah! were all men wise
And striving to do well,
This earth would be a Paradise
That's mostly now a Hell.

The house in which Spinoza had spent his youth in Amsterdam, and that in which he first lived when he moved from Rijnsburg to The Hague, have not been preserved; but the one at The Hague which he afterwards occupied, from 1670 to his death in 1677, was bought by the *Dorus Spinozana* Foundation in 1926. It is kept up by them as a memorial museum and meeting place.

The house is a large three-storied building, situated in a broad street. Across the way are some beautiful seventeenth-century almshouses, which Spinoza used often to visit. Between the two is a fine bronze statue, erected in 1880, of the seated figure of Spinoza. Not far away is a great church surrounded by a burial-ground long disused. There Spinoza was buried. The only stone now in the churchyard is one placed there in recent years to his memory.

The two lower floors of the house were occupied in his day by a painter and decorator. The ground floor now accommodates a large conference room, where the *Societas Spinozana* of The Hague and other philosophical societies hold their meetings; there is also a considerable library for the use

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of their members and of students. The first floor is the museum, with a large collection of objects of interest, including some autograph letters in Latin and in Dutch, and a number of portraits. The top floor, where Spinoza lived, is now a single, large, empty loft, with a small room boarded off. This little attic was the one room of his own. Nothing of the contents now remains.

But it is a great thing that the house itself should have been preserved, and should now be admirably maintained as a place both of study and of pilgrimage. All those, in every country, who love Spinoza as a man and set high value upon his work, will be deeply grateful to the friends of philosophy in Holland, who have recognized the duty, and have fulfilled it, of rescuing from destruction or oblivion this home at The Hague, and the other at Rijnsburg, of one of the greatest of thinkers.

HERBERT SAMUEL.

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

SIR,

I do not think that discussions about reviews of books are often very edifying, but Professor H. A. Wolfson's remarks in the April number about my review of his *The Philosophy of Spinoza* appear to call for brief reply.

It is, perhaps, characteristic of the scholastic mode of approach favoured by Mr. Wolfson to rest content with lists of rival authorities rather than to attack problems directly. He may take it as additional evidence of my "supreme faith in (my) own convictions" if I say that I might have reached my conclusion about geometrical proofs being non-syllogistic even if Mr. Joseph had not written his invaluable book from which Mr. Wolfson seems to suppose I must have derived it. Mother-wit and simple examination of the facts will often carry one much further than reliance upon authority. After all, someone must discover truths, and thus do without an authority; and some truths are so obvious as to be constantly re-discovered by new inquirers. "Aristotle was certainly a knowing man, but nobody ever thought him so because he blindly embraced and confidently vented the opinions of another."

If I might, without offence, be brief and brutal, I should argue thus: Geometrical proofs are conclusive, and their conclusions are A-propositions predicting *specific* propria. Now A-propositions can only be conclusively established syllogistically by the mood Barbara. But Barbara proves only *generic* propria (as the *dictum de omni* emphasizes). Hence geometrical propositions are not established by means of syllogisms.

Yours, etc.,

H. F. HALLETT.

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON KING'S COLLEGE,
STRAND, W.C.2.
April 2, 1936.

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The Syllabus of Lectures and Evening Meetings for the Session 1936-37 is now in course of preparation, and will be sent to members in the early autumn.

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THE ROMANTIC FACTOR IN MODERN POLITICS

PROFESSOR ERNEST BARKER

I

ONE of the marks of our times is a new eruption of the personal. Systems and institutions of politics are clouded over. The impersonal principles on which these systems and institutions depend are still more deeply obscured. Men turn for their inspiration to the living flow of personality. Some leader who has burst from hidden and elemental depths commands a passion of personal loyalty. Leadership has always been a great factor in the history of human communities. The deification of the ruler was the cement of the Hellenistic monarchies and of the Roman Empire which inherited their tradition. It may seem a strange atavism that we should now be apparently recurring, in the twentieth century, to a similar practice. But there are exigencies of contemporary life which explain the new vogue of leadership, and there is a tide of contemporary thought which leads on to the current doctrine of the emergent leader.

Among the exigencies of contemporary life there are two which demand some brief notice. On the one hand, the growth of great populations—particularly in urban centres, where they are divorced from the old outlets of personal emotion—has pushed men in the mass towards new and stirring loyalties, which appear to promise the emancipation of a dormant faculty. A party leader is the immediate beneficiary of this trend; but if the growing volume of his party, and the rising surge of its emotion, lead him to victory, he becomes the leader not only of a party, but also of a whole people. On the other hand, the recent growth of enthroned legis-

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latures, sovereign over the executive and its head, and seeking to attenuate personal leadership into a shadow, has provoked a reaction of the executive, and a return of personal leadership, which have carried a number of European countries to the opposite extreme. The leaders of to-day are not only new outlets for old popular passions of personal attachment and loyalty. They are also new incarnations of an old political tradition on the Continent—a tradition of executive power and executive responsibility—which had been overlaid and almost stifled by an extreme form of parliamentarianism.

But the leader is something more than a satisfaction of the personal emotions of a great electorate and a restoration (exaggerated, as all restorations immediately are) of executive power and responsibility. If he were only that, he would be a phenomenon in the world of democratic ideas and practice, produced by causes inherent in that world. He would not represent the incursion of another world. We shall not do justice to his claims, or his significance, unless we realize that he represents such an incursion. He has sprung from roots, and he is grounded in causes, which go beyond the immediate occasions of his emergence. If we are to understand those causes, we must turn to the tides of contemporary thought which run against democracy and in favour of a new idea and practice of the art of political life.

II

There is one tide of contemporary thought which begins with Nietzsche. Nietzsche was not a logical thinker. He was a master of trenchant aphorisms which could cut both ways and might often contradict one another. But he had a general hatred of the slave-morality which was based on the calculus of general advantage, and he had a genuine passion for the master-morality which was founded on the rock of power. Under the head of slave-morality he sets the principle of democracy, as he also sets socialism and Christianity: they all stand for the advantage of the weak, and they all contravene the great hierarchy of nature by which the strong rule the weak. Under the head of master-morality he sets the will to power, which makes a man deploy all the force and resources of his nature and impose himself on the universe. This may seem mere subscription to the doctrine of tyranny; and it is easy to interpret Nietzsche's conception of the superman in that sense. But if it is easy, it is also erroneous. The superman of whom Nietzsche dreamed was really a new super-species, to be achieved in some future age by the intervening travail and self-discipline of strong and chosen spirits, who mastered themselves in order that

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their descendants might enter into their labours and master the universe. The "will to power" of which he wrote was not a will to power over other men; it was a will to power over the self, which would ultimately lead to power over the universe in which the self is set. Nietzsche was not an apostle of the national totalitarian State, inspired and controlled by the genius of a dominant personality. He denounced the State as the "coldest of monsters and most frigid of liars": he looked to the emergence of a free *élite* which, transcending the idea of "bovine nationalism," would guide a united Europe first to the dignity of "higher men" and then to the majesty of "super-men." But the effect of a philosophy is often different from the intentions of its creator; and in any case the philosophy of Nietzsche, even if it was not a proclamation of the dictator, was a denunciation of democracy. He saw democracy as a static system, which was content, and indeed designed, to keep men as they were, with uniform rights and liberties which, just because they were uniform, were merely pitched on the level of average humanity. He wanted to see, in place of the democratic form of State, and indeed of all forms of the State, a dynamic surge, beginning immediately with the strong, but ultimately drawing all men in its wake from the level of the average to the height of the maximum. His desire, in its full consequences, ran contrary to all political organization; but it was particularly contrary to democracy because democracy was the current form. And the interpretation of his theory was even more contrary to democracy than was his theory itself. His superman, who belonged to the future, and was a species rather than an individual, was translated into the present, and turned into an individual. Foreign to the State and the nation, and transcending them both, he was fitted into them, and made their mainspring. The interpretation of Nietzsche, if not Nietzsche himself, is a parent of the dictator.

The theory of Nietzsche may be termed a spiritualized form of Darwinism. It is a theory of evolution translated from the sphere of biology to a higher and more spiritual sphere. There is a second current of contemporary thought which shows a similar character. It is a current which begins with Bergson, and may be seen flowing, in different and altered forms, in the writings of Sorel and Pareto. "All morality," Bergson has said, "is in essence biological."¹ In other words it is ultimately a product of the life-force which moves the whole world of creation. In man, and in his moral world, the life-force works in two different ways. On the one hand it arms man with instinct, and creates a primary morality of social pressure which is "a system of orders dictated by impersonal social requirements." On the other hand it arms man with intelligence, and

¹ *Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (English translation), p. 82.

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creates a secondary morality of individual aspiration, vested with personal emotion, which is "a series of appeals made to the conscience of each of us by persons who represent the best there is in humanity."¹ This secondary morality of aspiration is the result of a "sudden leap." Individuals emerge "who each represent, as the appearance of a new species would have represented, an effect of creative evolution";² or, to express the same point in other words, "life . . . imparts a new impetus to exceptional individuals who have immersed themselves anew in it, so that they can help society further along its way."³ The emergent individual—strong in the new impetus imparted to him by life—who creates a new morality (or rather adds new truths to the existing morality of aspiration), has something of a Nietzschean flavour. He is, however, in Bergson's view, compatible with democracy. It is he and his associates who discover the ideas of democracy: who vest them with emotion: who make them magnets for the minds of millions. When they forecast and seek to realize the ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity, they add a new democratic content to morality; and that content becomes a part of its permanent substance, because it involves a higher and finer form of the social cohesion at which life is always aiming. On this view, therefore, the emergent individual is not the master of society. He is rather the servant, who "can help society further along its way." He is not the enemy of democracy. He is its agent.

But if the *principles* of democracy, or the ideas associated with democracy, are thus connected with the emergence of "exceptional individuals," and indeed proceed from that emergence, it is not equally clear that the *process* of democracy is compatible with the role which such individuals are appointed to play. Democracy involves a reliance on time and tentative effort: the philosophy of Bergson is a philosophy of the "sudden leap." Democracy, again, is a matter of discussion and the collaboration of many minds. The philosophy of Bergson assumes that "masses of men have been carried along by one or several individuals": it even allows that "nature . . . must have intended the ruthless leader if she provided for leaders at all."⁴ The process of the life-force, as it works in our human field and produces our human morality, is not a democratic process, even if it issues in the creation of democratic principles. It proceeds by sudden leaps or emergences, and the motive force of these leaps is the exceptional individual, who incarnates the appetite of life for some new and original form of individuation, some new variation of species.

The theory of Bergson thus seems to be coloured by an aristo-

¹ *Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (English translation), p. 68.

² *Ibid.*, p. 79.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 241 and 266.

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cratic tinge. Sometimes, it is true, the emergent leaders are prophets who freely arise from the depths; but it is also true that they are sometimes members of the upper class, or of the intellectual *élite*, who from a sentiment of justice (or, it may be, personal ambition) espouse the cause and express the views of the rest of society. Georges Sorel, while he was animated by the fundamental ideas of Bergson, preferred to find the leaders who would "help society further along its way" among the working classes. The middle and upper classes lived on the fruits of the past, and for the defence of those fruits: it was only the workers who could produce a new *élite*, and only that new *élite* which could carry men with it in a new leap into the unseen future. The new leaders emerging from their immersion in the life of the working class would incarnate its ideas and its demands; they would vest them with the glow of their own deep personal emotion, and they would communicate that emotion to their followers by preaching the "myth" of the general strike; nor would they shrink from the actual use of a clean and surgical violence, realizing that just as force was naturally used to defend the custom of the past, so it might also, and no less naturally, be used to secure the conquests of the future. There are additions to Bergson's theory, or transmutations of Bergson's theory, in this philosophy. The life of which Bergson speaks in general terms is transmuted into the particular form of the life of the working classes. The general idea of the emergence of exceptional individuals is turned into the particular conception of the appearance of a workers' *élite*. The notion of the sudden leap is charged with the added notion of violence. In a word, Georges Sorel has added elements drawn from Marx to a system of thought which belongs to Bergson. But the additions and transmutations have not abolished the fundamental core. There is still the personalism of the emergent leader, or group of leaders, creating a new morality of aspiration. There is still the emotionalism which, in Bergson's theory, attaches to this morality of aspiration. There is still the leap, under the *élan* of emotion, and under the guidance of the person, into the unseen future.

The doctrine of Pareto, a friend of Sorel, and one of the teachers of Mussolini, is a continuation and a development of the same strain of thought. It is a doctrine of the *élite*, and of the part which is played by force in that circulation of *élites* which characterizes the life of a society. In the course of history some governing *élite* establishes a social leadership by personal qualities and personal prestige. It seeks to retain its position even when it has lost its title. But the presence of a new *élite*, rising from the depths of society, and carrying a new and energetic belief, supported by a myth, impinges upon its position. The social law of the circulation of

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Elites demands the establishment of the new *elite*: the conservative instincts of social pressure resist. The demand and the resistance create a state of tension; and the ending of this state may involve the use of force, by the leader or leaders of the new *elite*, on behalf of the new belief. The personal coming and going of *elites*, and the role of force in determining the sequence of their succession—these are the themes of a doctrine which has played its part in the making of the doctrine of Fascism.

There is thus, in the writings of Bergson, Sorel, and Pareto, a tide of thought which runs in the direction of personalism. This personalism, if it may be so called, is associated with three other factors—the factor of emotion, which is its natural concomitant; the factor of the sudden leap, which for Bergson is the leap of life itself, through the individual in whom its new impetus is incarnate, towards a fresh variety, but which may be interpreted, or extended, into the simple explosion of pure and immediate personal force; and, finally, the factor of the “myth”—a factor which recurs, in various forms, in all these writers, but which is always connected with the other factors of emotion and the sudden leap.¹ Led by the man; stirred by the contagion of his emotion; prepared for the leap and its contingencies of violence; nerved by the myth—with these auspices, and under this aegis, men can shed the past and move into the future. This may be called a Latin tide of thought, which beginning in France has flowed into Italy and there attained its height and its consummation. Italy has again and again, in the course of its long history, produced great and arresting personalities which have deeply affected its life, and even affected the destinies of Europe. Caius Gracchus, Sulla, and Julius Caesar; Visconti and

¹ In Bergson the myth belongs to the field of religion. The intellect of man, representing to itself the facts of death and chance, and being dismayed by these intellectual representations, evolves intellectual counter-representations, by means of “a myth-making function” with which it is furnished, in order to arm itself against its own discoveries and to nerve itself for continued activity. This is the origin of the various form of religious myth. But the myth-making function, though it works with exceptional force in the realm of religion, continues its myth-making work in other realms and in different forms (*op. cit.*, p. 168). Sorel can thus assume the operation of this function in the form of the myth of the general strike, by which the leaders of the working class insure and nerve themselves and their followers for the difficulties of the future. Pareto similarly invents a theory of myths, or “enthusiastic derivations” (drawn from social facts, but transcending those facts, and based on sentiment rather than reason, so that they assume the form of religions), by which men insure themselves against the mere calculations of inductive reason and nerve themselves for the leap in the dark. The connection of the idea of the myth with that of the leap is subtly explained² by Bergson (*op. cit.*, pp. 167–8): it is more obvious in the theories of Sorel and Pareto.

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Sforzas; Eccelin da Romano and Cesare Borgia; Hildebrand and Savonarola; Mazzini and Garibaldi—there is a long list, and the name of Bonaparte may be added to the list. English history is largely a history of the impersonal—of the expansion of precedents: the development of institutions: the slow solidification of a body of law proceeding from the steady activity of the general legal profession, and free from the personal impetus of a would-be maker of codes. Italian history has always shown a more personal character; and this old and historic character still marks the life of contemporary Italy. In a country which has suffered from a long past of disunion, personal figures become the necessary symbols of national unity: in a country largely peopled by an agricultural population, hitherto depressed and uneducated, the leader can find a following which is ready to be led; in a country responsive to personal magnetism, both in the life of art and the life of politics, personality will carry prestige. It is no wonder that the Latin tide of thought which moves towards personalism has found a ready entry into Italian affairs. It is the less wonderful when we reflect that currents of German thought—not only the thought of Nietzsche, but also the general ideas and philosophy of German Romanticism, with all its zest for the factor of personality—have also found their way through the Alps. There is a German as well as a Latin ingredient in the general creed of personalism.

Before we examine that ingredient, we may turn to one of the documents of Italian Fascism which summarizes, in succinct phrases, the core of the Latin version of personalism. This is the preamble to the *Statuto* (or, in other words, the constitution) of the Fascist party, as it was drafted by the Grand Council of the party in October 1926, and approved by royal decree in December 1929. The crucial words of the preamble are those which turn on the position of the leader. "The people recognized the Leader by the marks of his will, his force, and his achievement.¹ The people must receive light and leading from above, where there is the full vision of the attributes to be given and the tasks to be assigned, of function and of desert, and where the only standard is that of the general interest." But the essential factor of leadership carries corollaries and adjuncts. There is first the corollary of emotion or faith. "Fascism is above all a faith, which has had its confessors, and under the impulse of which new Italians to-day are vigorous as combatants." There is next the corollary of struggle, of *élan*, of the sudden leap. "Fascism has always considered itself as being in a state of war. . . . Removed from dogmatic formulas and rigid

¹ The Tibetans recognize their Grand Lama only by external marks. The Western leader is known by the inward marks of his will and force, and the fruits of his achievement

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plans, it feels that life consists in the possibility of continuous renewal." The pragmatism of a "will to believe" in the faith—a will which proves the truth of the faith by simply acting upon it—is also another corollary and adjunct of the creed. The leader; the emotion or faith he inspires; the struggle he leads; the will to believe generated in the struggle, and the action which follows upon it—all these are thus in the foreground. Beyond, in the distant background, stand the law to be ultimately made and the ends to be finally realized. "In the ardour of struggle action always preceded law. Fascism is living to-day in terms of the future; it regards the generations to come as the forces destined to realize all the ends designed by our wills." This is the opposite of the temper of Wordsworth's Happy Warrior,

Who, in the heat of conflict, keeps the law
In calmness made, and sees what he foresaw.

It is not mere opportunism; but it is at any rate a homage to contingency and chance. But that homage is always involved in the creed of personalism. The personality of the leader is in the domain of contingency.

The creed of personalism, in this stage of its evolution, not only affects the idea of democracy; it also affects the idea of law. It challenges democracy as a mere impersonal system of many voices—supposed to be blended and attuned, by the method of discussion, in a common harmony of public thought, but really discordant and jangled—and it seeks to substitute for it the personal note of the dominant voice, followed and echoed by the rest. Challenging the impersonality of democracy, it is led to challenge equally the impersonality of law. It forces the impersonal to put on personality: it makes personal action precede and determine law; it turns the general rule into an act of personal will.

The challenge which is thus offered both to the general process of discussion and to the system of general rules of law (two things which are closely connected, and are therefore challenged together) has a long ancestry. It goes beyond contemporary philosophy. It is as old as German Romanticism. Perhaps we may even say that it is as old as the German woods: *ce beau système a été trouvé dans les bois*. We are thus brought back to that German ingredient in the creed of personalism which has already been mentioned, and which must now enter the stage as protagonist of the drama.

III

Romanticism is a word so general and so comprehensive that we may include under it, according to our predilections, everything

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which we like—or everything which we dislike. It is primarily a term in the language of art and literature; but it is also a term in the language of morals and politics. If we confine it to the latter of these applications, we shall still find it a Protean term. Originally and etymologically, it seems to signify a return to the Middle Ages and the tradition of their vernacular literature, or "romances." It thus acquires a note of what may be called "antiquarian idealism." The restoration of the past becomes the goal of the future: *antiquam exquirite matrem* is made the motto of life. But a return to the past will not stop at a proximate and particular epoch: it will run back beyond the Middle or intervening Ages to the first and immediate beginnings. From the days of Herder and Schelling, in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the German Romantics who turned their faces to the moral and political sphere began to speak of the Folk. They went back, like the school of natural rights, to original and primary nature. But unlike the school of natural rights, they did not posit a state of nature with free individuals who had to make social contracts before they could form a society: they discovered the given and existing society of the Folk, or tribe, or stem, already united by the personal bond of a common loyalty. In the early, and also, indeed, in the later Romanticism of Germany, down to the twentieth century, this spiritual bond of a common loyalty was still held to be the ultimate bond. The biological idea of the unity of a common blood (or "race") could only emerge into the foreground with the further development of natural science; and though the Folk was already regarded by the Romantic thinkers as a tribe or stem, possessing a physical quality of consanguinity, and thus sharing the nature of the family, it was envisaged primarily as a spiritual being, which owed its unity to the *spirit* of a common loyalty.

In the Romantic view the Folk is thus a spiritual being (*Volksgeist*), which acknowledges, as such, a common loyalty. To whom, or to what, is the loyalty due? The philosopher gives one answer: the ordinary man, in his simplicity and his personalism, gives another; and it is the answer of the ordinary man which eventually wins the day—even in the theory of the philosopher. The answer of the Romantic philosopher, in its first intention, ascribes the loyalty owed by the Folk to the spirit of the Universe (*Weltgeist*). God is a pervading spirit, who manifests Himself in many ways: each Folk is a manifestation of Him, or, as Ranke said, a "thought of God": the members of each Folk acknowledge Him, in the manifestation of His nature given to them in their area of space and their epoch of time, as the common centre and magnet of their common loyalty. This is a creed of personalism which ends in the superpersonal. It makes the Folk—and the State in which the Folk

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issues—into a personal group, united by personal bonds of common loyalty; but it carries this Folk “back into the life of the universal substance,” and attaches it to the immanent spirit of a pantheistic universe. There was a simpler form of personalism which appealed to the ordinary man, and which could be discovered by the historian in the cultural records of the early German Folk. This was the figure of the human leader—the *princeps* with his particular body of retainers or followers, gathered around his person in an elementary loyalty; or the *dux* or *fürher* of a whole people, chosen and followed by it for his personal quality. Tacitus had written of such figures; they could still be discovered in old popular legends and tales. Nor did they belong only to the past. The leader, with his dynamic personality, was a perennial factor of human life. He was the core and centre of the community: he was the magnet which drew its members together in a common attraction towards his dynamism. The world and its Folks, dissolved by the philosophers into a fluid play of the spirit, were thus solidified again in terms of concrete personality. The Romantic philosophers themselves were ready to make their peace with this process of solidification. The super-personal spiritual force could be depicted as caught in, and reflected by, the leader; and it has thus been said of German Romanticism that “it placed leadership in the hands of great men, from whom the spirit of the whole essentially radiated and by whom it was organized.”¹

This solidification of Romanticism into a doctrine of personal (and, in the last resort, autocratic) leadership may be traced both in the political philosophy and the legal theory of nineteenth-century Germany. In political philosophy the spiritual Folk becomes the living fountain of an organized and canalized State; and the leader who incarnates the spirit of the Folk (and thereby the spirit of the Universe, in the particular manifestation which it has assumed in his particular Folk) becomes the directing and organizing force of such a State. Hegel can thus regard the universal spirit (the *Weltgeist*) as necessarily concrete and solidified in individual personality—concrete generally in all the persons who form a Folk, but particularly concrete in the highest and most representative personality. A modern German writer, whose work appeared in the beginning of 1933, has expressed the significance of Hegel's theory in the following terms: “The highest universality is also the highest

¹ Ernst Troeltsch, in a lecture of the year 1922, translated in an appendix to the author's translation of Gierke's *Natural Law and the Theory of Society*, vol. i, p. 213.

² K. Larenz, “Die rechts- und staatsphilosophie des deutschen Idealismus und ihre gegenwarts Bedeutung” (in *Staatsphilosophie*, a part of Abt. IV des *Handbuchs der Philosophie*), p. 168.

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individuality. It is in the most perfect union of the universal and the individual that the essence of an historically important personality consists. It follows that the statesman who wills the universal—that is to say, the State—is not only the organ or instrument of the State: *he is the State*; he is, in the instant of his activity, so thoroughly identified with it, that it is active and conscious of itself in him and in his being. On the other hand, since the State is also, at the same time, indubitably something more than any of its temporary representatives, it is true that even the active statesman is never, in himself alone, the State: he needs the complement, the other factor, that is to say the community of the Folk which acknowledges him and recognizes itself in him." These are words which cover and illuminate much of the development of Germany in the nineteenth century—and afterwards. They cover and illuminate the legal theory which found in the person of the monarch *der Träger der Staatsgewalt*—the bearer of the authority of the State. They cover the career of Bismarck—the minister provided by the *Zeitgeist* for the monarch. They cover the coming and the triumph of Herr Hitler—the leader whom, when the monarch was gone, the *Volksgeist* found for itself, and in whom it "recognized itself."

There is a sense in which Romanticism is the negation of personality. It is the negation of moral personality, as such personality was conceived by Kant—the personality which belongs to all men equally, in virtue of the simple fact of their being men: the personality which, true to the nature of its own being, respects its fellow everywhere, and therefore respects the claims of others and its own responsibility for meeting those claims. The rock of moral personality—which is the foundation of the moral law, as that in turn is the foundation of the law of the State and the whole system of the State¹—is submerged by the waters of Romantic theory. Super-personal forces or spirits emerge in its place: with them, and energized by them, there appear the giant forms of groups, communities, or Folks, driven towards constant development by the working of their immanent spirit; and though we are told that the group exists for the individual, whom it lifts into a larger liberty, we are also told that the individual exists for the group, to which he owes the gift of his life and the debt of his loyalty.

In another sense, however, it may be said that Romanticism is the assertion, and indeed the exaggeration, of personality. It creates new dimensions of personality. It seeks to enrich the world with higher (or larger) group-persons: it insists on the unique and personal individuality of each Folk. Again, it adds a new extension to

¹ "A true theory of politics must begin by doing homage to moral obligations" (Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, Appendix 1).

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personality. It emphasizes the idea of *development*: it projects each particular Folk on its own personal voyage of constant becoming and perennial discovery. Law is thus personalized into a matter of fluid personal growth; and we may see the result in the doctrines of that historical school of law which was one of the expressions of Romanticism. "For the historical school of law, the *Volksgeist* is not only the origin and the . . . creator of law . . . it is also the canon of judgment: only that law is 'true' and 'living,' which keeps its connection intact with its particular *Volksgeist*, and has 'grown' historically in the 'organic' development and expansion of this *Volksgeist*."¹ But the personal note in Romanticism not only leads to new dimensions and a new extension of personality; nor is it content with the personalization of law in terms of these new dimensions and this new extension. In the last resort it returns to plain human personality—but it returns on the basis of a fundamental inequality of persons. The leader who is at one with the super-personal force or spirit, and who can thus "will the universal," becomes the residuary legatee of the whole philosophy. He may be the greater and finer leader if he has the sense upon him of his oneness with the Spirit, and of the Universal behind his will; but he is *primus inter impares*, and any sense of responsibility which he feels is not so much to his fellows or equals, as to the higher being and the transcendent cause which he represents in his person. He may cover his position with the form of popular election, and clothe his acts with the form of popular approbation; but this formal homage is not a duty, and he is really an incarnation of the super-personal rather than a representative of true and actual human persons.

IV

The principle of personal leadership which dominates contemporary Germany is not a new and sudden eruption. It has assumed, indeed, a new form by entering into an alliance with the democratic factor of party, and by creating a personal party-following to serve the leader as the immediate source of acknowledgment and recognition. But there is an old substance behind the new form; and even the new form itself, if we see it under the guise of the old institution of the retinue or *Gefolgschaft*, has an antiquity of its own, and is an ancient corollary of leadership. The substance of the *Führer-prinzip* is as old as German Romanticism; and in so far as Romanticism goes back to primitive Germany, it is as old as primitive Germany. In Western Europe men have slowly built an impersonal State, acting through impersonal institutions, and by impersonal rules of law, but acting always to protect the claims

¹ K. Larenz, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

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and to guarantee the rights of each human personality. The democratic form of State is the last stage of this building. Across the Rhine the personal has endured, and it has sublimated itself in a philosophy of personal leadership which makes the leader, himself inspired, the inspiration of his people's life.

There is something here which is deeper than the antithesis of democracy and dictatorship. That antithesis does not cover the facts, or express their significance. The leader is something more—and also something less—than the dictator. He is the vehicle of something more than his own individual force and his own individual will. Just for that reason, he puts less trust in himself and his own resources. The leader is not, like the dictator, an absolute antithesis of democracy: he may be said to be rather an alternative form, at once like it and different from it—like it, in seeking to serve as the channel of a people's thought and aspirations; unlike it, in seeking to resume that thought and those aspirations in the single channel of his own personality. From this point of view it may be urged that a truer form of antithesis would be that between democracy of discussion, with a whole people painfully seeking the truth through the organs and institutions of discussion, and democracy of intuition, with a people content to see the truth through the eyes of a "chosen leader" who possesses the higher vision. But to state the antithesis in these terms is to be guilty of giving the name of democracy to something which is not democracy at all. The antithesis between democracy and dictatorship may not cover the facts; but the antithesis between "democracy of discussion" and "democracy of intuition" only serves to conceal them. There is a fundamental division between the doctrine of democracy, as we know it in Western Europe, and the German doctrine of leadership. The one is an impersonal system which, just because it is impersonal, gives the opportunity to every person of expressing his thought and will, and results in the guidance of national life by the combined thoughts and wills of all persons. The other is the personal explosion of a single individuality which, though it may allege its "representative" character, and though it may actually receive a general allegiance in the moment of its explosion, is fatal to the general expression of persons, and inimical to democracy. The impersonal liberates *persons*. The personal liberates *a person*. That is why it may be said, in a paradox, that the impersonal is based on the fundamental rock of personality. That is why it may also be said, in another paradox, that the personal, not being founded on this rock, has to base itself on the misty and impersonal clouds of an assumed Folk-person and its *Folkgeist*.

The general theory of German Romanticism, as we have already had reason to note, has not been active in Germany only. It is one

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of the forces at work in contemporary Italy. The stream of Fascist ideas has not only been fed by currents of thought which flow from Bergson and Sorel and Pareto. It has also been augmented by a Romantic current flowing from Germany. Italian thinkers have accepted, and added to the common stock, the doctrine of the higher personality of the People, expressed and realized in the person of its leader. The Italian Charter of Liberty, one of the great documents of Fascism, starts from the assertion that "the Italian nation, by its power and its duration, is an organism with a being, and ends and means of action, superior to those of the individuals, whether separate or grouped, of which it is composed." Assume the "superior organism," and you naturally assume, as its inevitable corollary, the superior person who represents its being and gives "light and leading from above." In the varied and kaleidoscopic theory of Fascism, drawn together and welded into a *dottrina* during the last fifteen years, we may thus trace a German as well as a Latin strain—a German strain independent of the peculiar doctrine of Nietzsche, and derived from the permanent trend, and the general character, of the Romantic theories of Germany.

But the principle of personal leadership has a longer historical pedigree, and a larger and more mature philosophical ancestry, in Germany than elsewhere. The leader and his following belong to the primitive records of the early German tribes; and the doctrine of heroic personality is steadily and deeply imbedded in the history of German thought from the end of the eighteenth century to the present day—all the more because that thought has again and again recurred to the inspiration of pure Teutonic antiquity. Nor is the principle of personal leadership merely a fact of the primitive past, or a factor in the modern thought which finds inspiration in that past. It is a principle which is also illustrated in the general course of German history. If the mediaeval history of England is largely a history of the making of the common law and the evolution of parliament, the mediaeval history of Germany is mainly a history of the achievements and the failures of kings and emperors. The German Reformation is something more than the personality of Luther, but the explosion of his fiery spirit is a great part of its history. Prussia was made by its electors and kings; and when Prussia began to pass into Germany, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, it passed through the spirit and personality of Bismarck. The leader and the following—*Führer und Gefolgschaft*—have played a part in German development for which there is no parallel in our insular history. The great men we have produced seem cut on a smaller scale. . . . Perhaps that is only an illusion; and perhaps the real fact is that they have had to work in co-

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operation, or in conflict, with other men who felt themselves to be of an equal temper. . . . At any rate the only votary of Heroes and Hero-worship in the history of English thought was a romantic Scotsman who had steeped himself in German philosophy.

For all its antiquity, the principle of leadership has suffered a change in our times. It has come under the influence of levelling tendencies to which it seems by its nature opposed, but with which it has made its peace. In the past it was only the religious leader who emerged from the depths: the political leader was generally drawn from the heights. To-day the political leaders of the countries which have accepted the principle of leadership are drawn from the depths. They have emerged without advantage of birth or wealth, and espousing or founding a party they have used the popular arts of journalism and propaganda to prove their magnetism and to establish their title. The origin from which they start and the methods by which they arrive can both be acclaimed as in some sense democratic. If they then act, or profess to act, in the days of their power, as representatives of the depths and spokesmen of the people, the acclamation may be redoubled, and their followers may claim that a new and higher form of democracy has been achieved. That claim, for the reasons already stated, is a claim which cannot be sustained. The principle of leadership is not the same thing as the principle of democracy. On the contrary, if the principle of democracy consists in the free expression and the free reconciliation of different views, it is the opposite of that principle. But the matter does not end there. Leadership may be different from democracy, and the opposite of democracy; but it may still have qualities and merits which make it an alternative to democracy. It may satisfy human emotions of loyalty which democracy leaves starved. It may provide springs of continuous and concentrated action in which democracy is deficient.

There was never a democracy which was destitute of leaders. The defect which may be charged against it is not the absence of leadership, but the multiplicity of leaders and the refusal of the led to give to any one leader a continuous enough allegiance. The new principle of leadership may claim the merit of providing a single leader, and of providing that leader with the continuous allegiance which enables him to pursue a continuous and long-range policy. But if it may claim that merit, it also suffers from serious disabilities—disabilities which affect the choice of the leader: disabilities which affect his action: disabilities which affect the eventual succession to his office. Under the system of democracy a reserve of potential leaders is steadily accumulated: their powers are tried and tested in the open and public process of debate; and the eventual choice of the final leader is determined by the known

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and regular methods of a constitutional system. The new system of leadership abrogates any system of choice; it depends on the spontaneous emergence of a dominant personality; it works in the dark. The continuity of the leader in his office, which is another of the essential features of the new leadership, may affect his action for evil as well as for good, and prove a disability as well as a merit. He has indeed the opportunity of long-range policies; but he also incurs the danger of petrification. True leadership demands a fresh and vital impulse; and the period for which any one man can give such an impulse must necessarily be measured by a brief span of years. Democracy is wise in changing its leaders, because it secures a continuity of fresh impulse; it may even be said, from that point of view, to do the truest homage to the nature of true leadership. It is thus ready—sometimes only too ready—to solve the problem of succession. The personal leader who has won his office by a right of emergence can offer no certain solution to that problem. By the very nature of his solitary position, he cannot accumulate a reserve of genuine political leaders from whom his successor may eventually emerge. They would be too dangerous to his power. He tends, voluntarily or involuntarily, to starve the supply of the future, and to leave the succession at the best to mediocrity and at the worst to chance. In its end, as in its beginning and its intervening course, the Romantic principle of leadership defeats itself, and fails to secure its own ultimate aim.

GREAT THINKERS

(IX) LEIBNIZ

PROFESSOR LEONARD J. RUSSELL

I

IT was in 1686, in what has since been given the title of the *Discourse on Metaphysics*, that Leibniz wrote the first systematic exposition of his philosophy. The central conception of the *Discourse* is the conception of individual created substance. Each complete individual in the world is active, but entirely self-contained. In it are to be found traces of all its past activities, and the ground of its present and future activities. Though all created substances are completely independent of one another, yet their activities are in thoroughgoing correspondence, and between them they make up a universe which is a perfect harmony.

The essential nature of an individual substance is mind, or something analogous to mind, which Leibniz calls a substantial form. Its variety consists of perceptions, which in their totality represent the whole universe from the point of view of the individual substance. Its total state at any moment is a harmony of all its perceptions, together with a striving or tendency or appetite towards a new harmony of new perceptions.

Further, each individual substance has an organic body which, as a part of the physical world, changes in accordance with purely mechanical laws, without being interfered with in the least by the mind, or the substantial form, of which it is the body. But the changes in the body correspond with the changes in the mind.

The situation is, however, complicated by the fact that, if it were not animated by a mind or a substantial form, body would not be substantial at all, and the mechanical laws according to which changes in body take place would not be intelligible.

The doctrine seems a strange one and full of difficulty; and I shall confine myself to indicating some of the considerations which led Leibniz to this conception of individual substance, and to bringing out some of the problems in which it involved him. On account of limitations of space I am compelled to leave almost entirely aside the important theological frame in which the thought of Leibniz is set.

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II

Leibniz was while still a youth attracted by the views of the atomists of his day; and the general spirit of his philosophy can perhaps best be approached by noting what he approved of in atomism, and what he came to criticize in it.

The first motive underlying atomism was the desire to seek underneath the changes in the world for something permanent and substantial. Ordinary bodies the atomists regarded as built up out of these substantial indivisible unit substances. With this view Leibniz thoroughly agreed.

The second motive, which the atomists of the seventeenth century had in common with the Cartesians, was the desire to give an intelligible account of the causes of events in the world. Everything in the physical world happens through efficient causes, that is, through the motion of pieces of matter in space. Nothing can move but matter, and no piece of matter can change its motion, unless some other piece of matter collides with it. The machinery of all changes in the physical world is impact. This view also Leibniz accepted, and he held it throughout his life.

Leibniz, however, did not think that the atomists went far enough with their own principles. Most of them thought that atoms have some size, and they were therefore compelled to assume that the indivisibility of an atom arose from the cohesiveness of its parts. Leibniz thought that this cohesiveness ought to be explained by mechanical causes; and his earliest essay in physics was an attempt to show that cohesion could be explained without supposing in matter any other qualities than those of occupying space, and being capable of being swept out of its space by any other matter that impinged on it, without offering the least resistance either to motion, or to the separation of its parts. Any other qualities he tried to show were based on varieties of motion.

This early essay was important for Leibniz's development in many ways. Firstly, because it failed in its purpose. It was an attempt to get what might be called a purely geometrical physics, based on laws of motion deduced by a purely logical process from the notion of body as what occupies space, and is capable of being moved in space. The resulting laws, he soon came to see, were not in harmony with the observed facts; and as he could see no flaw in his reasoning, once the premisses were granted, he took the failure as a conclusive proof that the laws of motion must be derived from a conception of bodily substance which involves more than can be discovered in the notions of extension, or occupation of space, and motion.

Secondly, in this essay Leibniz tried to do for motions what the atomists had tried to do for extended body. He tried to show that

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every motion is built up out of indivisible units of motion. The indivisible unit of motion he called a "conatus," following Hobbes; a tendency to motion, which gives rise to actual motion in a body if the body is not hindered by having impressed on it a tendency in the opposite direction from another body impinging on it, and which when it does not give rise to actual motion shows itself by exerting pressure on the mobile stuff in contact with it. He took space as (for all practical purposes) full of mobile stuff either actually moving or at rest under pressure as the result of such tendencies. Every tendency in a given direction is communicated to all the bodies in the universe along the line of that direction without being lost by the body which possesses it, and in the end what happens anywhere affects directly or indirectly what happens everywhere else: so that nothing is actually at rest during the shortest interval of time imaginable.

Thus Leibniz replaced the atomic picture of changeless atoms moving through empty space—in which nothing happens inside an atom, and nothing happens in space where there is no atom—by a picture of space filled with motions and pressures, of variety everywhere, with a delicate responsiveness to what happens everywhere else.

Thirdly, in this doctrine of the indivisible element of motion Leibniz found his first conception of the nature of mind. The mind is an indivisible system of such tendencies, held together in a unity. Being indivisible, it is indestructible, and in it are preserved all the tendencies that have ever been impressed on the point of its body that it occupies, so that it reflects in its multiplicity all the variety of changes in the world. It is unnecessary to go into the details of this view—which can be taken as in some sort a prophecy in miniature of Professor Alexander's mental space-time—but it is important as showing how anxious Leibniz was to get a picture of the universe in which there was nothing dead, nothing without variety, no happening anywhere which did not have a corresponding effect everywhere. It shows too his feeling that the ultimate substances of which bodies are made are essentially the same in nature as minds.

III

This last point is important. The development of Leibniz's views during his stay in Paris (1672-1676) and in the later years up to 1686 is very closely connected with his criticism of the Cartesian view that there are in the world two distinct kinds of substance, having no common nature, the one consisting of extension and the other of thought. Against this view Leibniz always insists that we have not an adequate account either of extension or of thought,

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that bodily substance involves more than extension, and that perhaps there is a closer connexion between thought and body than the Cartesians suppose.

Various lines of investigation pursued by Leibniz confirmed him in these objections to Cartesianism. I can note only a few of them, very briefly.

(i) His logical studies caused him to question the Cartesian principle that whatever I clearly and distinctly conceive to belong or not to belong to a thing, I can truly judge to belong or not to belong to it—the principle which is the basis of the distinction between mind and body, and of the identification of body with extension, mind with thought. My idea of a thing is clear, if I am able to recognize the thing wherever I come across it, even if I am not able to give a detailed account of a sufficient number of characteristics of the thing to enable anyone else to identify it. If I can give such an account, my idea is distinct as well.

Leibniz regards this as insufficient as a basis for truth. Ideas are far more complex than anyone realizes. We have not yet begun to touch the fringe of their complexity. Only the most strenuous and long-continued efforts at analysing them into their ultimate constituents will make us alive to this. As a help for this, we need a suitable symbolism, as suitable for its purpose as the Arabic numerals are in arithmetic, or as the symbols in the infinitesimal calculus which Leibniz himself had discovered. The Ariadne's thread that we need to guide ourselves through the labyrinths of the problems of thought—the *filum meditandi*—involves a double effort (i) to find suitable symbols to express our thoughts as so far analysed and (ii) to carry the analysis still further, improving our symbols in the process. To our present lack of suitable symbols and of adequate analysis is due the unsatisfactory situation in philosophy. Until we can settle disputes by adequately symbolising the data, and drawing conclusions from them by calculating, we can be sure of the inadequacy of our analysis.

It is not enough then for our ideas to be distinct. If we are to discover truth we need adequate ideas; and we can be certain that an idea is not adequate until we have carried its analysis sufficiently far to enable us to judge from the analysis that it contains no self-contradictory elements, and is therefore a possible idea.

(ii) Leibniz was already studying the nature of extension from this point of view in Paris. There is a long dialogue on the "labyrinth of the continuum" that he wrote in the Thames on his way from England to Holland, at the end of 1676, which foreshadows the conclusion that no real substance can be a continuum. A perfect continuum is something ideal; and hence if extension is real, it is not continuous, and *vice versa*. Again he had already discussed with

Huygens in Paris the possibility of determining absolute motion of bodies in space, concluding that there was no means of doing this.

On both these grounds Leibniz soon concluded that there is something imaginary in our account of extension, when we consider it as an existing whole, and that therefore the essence of matter cannot, as the Cartesians thought, consist of extension.

(iii) Again the Cartesian principle of clear and distinct ideas shows its inadequacy when applied to determine the nature of thought. For if there is more in our minds than we are clearly and distinctly aware of—and there must be if, as Leibniz was already convinced, our minds reflect everything that is going on in the entire universe—then the Cartesian principle is of very doubtful value. For what in us is obscure and confused affects our feeling of certainty. Many ideas seem distinct to us because we do not notice elements that are contained in them obscurely. Our only safe line is that of analysis of concepts.

Thus the Cartesian account of the mind seemed to Leibniz to err by over-simplification; and the sharp separation between mind and body seemed to him dubious.

(iv) Of the two, mind and bodily substance, the latter was the more liable to doubt. In his discussions with the Abbé Foucher, Leibniz agreed that I cannot doubt my own existence as a thinking being, nor can I doubt that there is a variety in my thoughts; but that when I consider the reasons which lead me to conclude that there is an external world outside me, these reasons are not such as to give complete certainty. I can distinguish dreams from waking life only by the greater consistency of my waking life; and this distinction is not completely conclusive, even though it would be carrying doubt too far actually to doubt the reality of the external world. The fact that doubt about the external world cannot be set at rest completely is an indication that our conception of body contains something not completely analysed; and the main value of developing these doubts and trying to answer them lies in the encouragement it affords to further analysis. This is the chief purport of Leibniz's correspondence with Foucher.

(v) It is here, I think, that we can find the significance of Leibniz's studies of the laws of motion, and of his measure of force. They are essentially parts of his endeavour to get a clear account of the nature of matter. That Leibniz substitutes mv^2 for the Cartesian mv as a measure of the force of a moving body is of relatively minor significance; what is important is the light that his method of reaching a measure throws on the nature of bodily substance.

Any measure must be based on homogeneous units. Now a body, whether regarded as a volume or estimated by its weight, can be

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taken as built up out of homogeneous units. But a speed of two feet a second cannot be taken as built up of two speeds, each of one foot a second. Hence we can get no direct measure of the force of a moving body, since we cannot get any homogeneous units of force. We are therefore compelled to estimate a force indirectly, by considering some effect it is capable of producing, which can be measured in terms of homogeneous units. Our measure of force then depends on the general principle that a cause is equal to the total effect it can produce. But this principle cannot be derived from the notion of body, or of motion, or from a combination of these notions. Nor is it an identical proposition, to be derived from the notions of cause and effect. It is a principle of perfection, depending on the activity of God in the world.

Again, if mv were the measure of force, we should be encouraged to take motion as a real entity. But on a closer consideration, we see that since motion takes time, it can never exist all at once, and therefore is not a true entity at all. Further, a body's motion is after all only relative; you cannot say of two bodies moving relatively to each other, which is really moving. A body does, however, possess force at any particular moment, exercising pressure even when it is not obviously moving. And it is clear that what mv^2 measures is something much more fundamental than the measure itself. There is no object which even thought can apprehend, of which mv^2 can be directly seen to be the measure. And mv^2 considered as something in a body at a particular moment is clearly something accidental, for the body can lose motion, giving it to another body. Being accidental, it must be a temporary modification of something substantial. It is this more substantial thing, whose temporary modification is measured by us as mv^2 , that we must take as the substance of body. Since it is essentially a cause, producing effects, it must be an active substance. Leibniz calls it a substantial form, and in accordance with the views developed in his earlier studies, regards it as analogous to mind. He still maintains his old view that for the determination of actual changes in bodies, efficient causes alone—i.e. impacts—must be taken into consideration. Substantial forms have to be posited only for the sake of justifying the use of the principle of the equality of cause and effect, on which the laws of motion themselves depend. Thus Leibniz insists that everything in nature happens through mechanical causes, except the laws of mechanical causation itself.

I cannot go into the complicated considerations involved in Leibniz's dynamics, with their many obscurities and faults; the point I want to stress is his conclusion that the essence of body cannot be found in extension and motion, but must be found in something analogous to mind.

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Thus once more the sharp distinction between mind and body which the Cartesians endeavoured to make, breaks down.


IV

So far I have tried to bring out the various lines of inquiry which Leibniz pursued in his search for the notion of created substance. The results are partly positive, partly negative. Negatively, the sharp distinction between mind and matter cannot be upheld. Neither extension nor motion can constitute the essence of bodily substance. Again our minds are more complex than we think, and may involve matter in ways we are not clearly aware of. Clear and distinct ideas are not enough to form a basis for our conception of substance. Positively, the essence of bodily substance is something formal, akin to our own minds. Every simple substance is indivisible, containing an infinite variety, a great deal of it not clearly perceived, which mirrors the world of bodily events, so that to all changes in the world of bodily events correspond changes in simple substance. There is this infinite variety in our own minds; but we are clearly aware of only a very small part of it.

A further point, insisted on by Malebranche, was fully approved by Leibniz, viz. that no created substance can affect, or be affected by, any other created substance. Thus mind cannot act on body nor body on mind. But Malebranche concluded that God is the sole direct agent in the universe, producing all changes both in matter and in minds. Leibniz could not agree to this. Creatures are not the mere repositories of God's daily deeds. While God is the sole ultimate agent, He is not the sole agent, but carries out His purposes by making created substances active, putting into them, in so far as they are not capable of reflection and thought, the law of their activity, and in so far as they are capable of reflection and thought, giving them a responsible nature, capable of acting freely in accordance with what seems to them to be their good.

It is clear that this view, taken along with the conclusions already reached, leads straight to the conception of a simple created substance as completely self-contained so far as all other created substances are concerned, affected directly only by God; the conception we meet for the first time in the *Discourse on Metaphysics*.

The clear expression of this conception he owed to his logical studies, especially those between 1679 and 1686, which were published for the first time by Couturat. In these studies the effort at analysis of propositions and of concepts, and the effort to provide suitable symbols for the expression of concepts and of propositions, go very closely together. The analogy of multiplication of numbers was never far from his mind, and he tried to symbolize propositions by



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the help of this analogy, so as to find a way of expressing propositions, whether universal or particular, and whether affirmative or negative, in such a way that you could see from an examination of their symbols, without any consideration of their subject-matter, whether they were necessarily true, or necessarily false, or whether it was possible that they should be either true or false. A necessary proposition is one in which when explicitly expressed a predicate is attributed to a subject of such a nature that the notion of the predicate is contained in the notion of the subject. The proposition which is the logical negation of a necessary proposition is an impossible one. Again a proposition in which a predicate is attributed to a subject of such a nature that the notion of the predicate, while not contained in the notion of the subject, is yet not incompatible with that notion, can be said to be a possible proposition, though, of course, the proposition which denies this is equally possible. (Leibniz was aware that in strictness what we have called possible propositions are not propositions at all, since they do not conform to what he often stated as the primary truth, viz. that every proposition is either true or false.) But the most important kind of proposition with which Leibniz endeavoured to deal lies between absolutely necessary propositions and bare possibles. He called them contingent propositions, and in them, he thought, the notion of the predicate is contained in the notion of the subject, not in the straightforward way in which the notion B, say, is contained in the more complex notion AB, or in which 7 is a factor of 56, but in a more complex way. He helped himself out by the analogy of incommensurable numbers. Two numbers are commensurable when their ratio can be expressed by a fraction whose numerator and denominator are finite whole numbers; incommensurable numbers are numbers whose ratio cannot be so expressed, although in their case a series of fractions each with whole numbers as numerator and denominator can be found, which come ever closer and closer to expressing the ratio, so that we can get such a series of fractions differing from the ratio by an amount less than any amount we care to mention, however small it may be. E.g. the square root of 2 is a number whose square is exactly 2. Now the square of 1.4 is 1.96; the square of 1.41 is 1.9881; the square of 1.414 is 1.999396. As we take more decimal places in extracting the square root we get a number whose square is closer and closer to 2. By taking enough places we can make the difference between 2 and the square of our number as small as we please; but however many places we take, we shall never get an exact expression of the square root. Something analogous to this Leibniz found in propositions expressing actual fact. It is, e.g., true that I am at the moment of writing this seated in my chair; this is true of me, and thus it is connected with my complete notion,

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indeed contained in it, but it cannot be extracted from my notion by any finite analysis. All that can be done is to give more and more reasons, taken from my personal nature and my past history, and so on, which will make it more and more certain that, being the person I have been and am, I shall do my present writing sitting down rather than standing up. But since the reasons are infinite, even though this fact is contained in my notion, it is not so contained as to make it necessary that I should be sitting down at present, although it is so contained as to make it certain that I shall.

There are then for Leibniz two ways in which a predicate is contained in a subject, one way which involves necessity, and one way which only involves determinateness, or certainty. Although God from the beginning of the world has foreseen with complete certainty that I shall in the present circumstances do my writing sitting down, and although the rest of the universe is so arranged that my position fits in perfectly with it, this does not prevent me from acting freely in choosing to sit down.

Until Leibniz had settled this point satisfactorily in his own mind (however unsatisfactory it was to some of his contemporaries, and however unsatisfactory it may seem to modern readers) he was unwilling to take the next step, and define an individual substance as he does in the *Discourse on Metaphysics*, as entirely self-contained apart from its continual dependence on God, its whole history, whether it is said to act or to suffer, depending on its own nature.

V

As we have seen, Leibniz in his early writings defined thought as the harmony of variety. He retains this view in his conception of an individual substance. Thus at any moment the state of an individual substance contains an infinite number of perceptions held together into a unity. These perceptions represent or express the entire state of the universe at this moment, from the point of view which the individual occupies in the universe. But in addition to this, there is in the substance at any moment an active tendency to the production of new perceptions, held together in a new unity, which express the next state of the universe. This active tendency Leibniz in his later writings calls *appetition*. Thus perception and appetition are the two basic features of all substance.

In his later writings Leibniz distinguishes three main grades of created substances. The lowest are those to which he applies the term *monad* simply, or *entelechy*, or sometimes *life* (*vie*). They are bare principles of life animating the lowest organisms, and have merely perception. The next are those in which some perceptions stand out clearly, and are capable of being attended to and remem-

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bered. He calls them souls (*anima, âme*): they have *sensio*, clear sense impressions, and animate organisms with sense organs capable of producing definite impressions. They include animals. The third range of substances includes those which in addition to perception and sense have also intellection, apprehension of concepts and universal principles. Of these he uses the term mind (*mens, esprit*). Substances of the first two grades express the created universe. Those of the third grade express God as well. Only they are moral creatures. All created substances have spontaneity, but in the highest substances this spontaneity is freedom. For since they are capable of reflection, their activity is not a mere blind tendency to a new harmony of perceptions, but depends on their choice of what appears to them to be the best. In the divine economy the lower creatures serve the higher. The higher are privileged to become, through the bestowal of God's grace, citizens in the city of God.

Each monad represents or expresses the whole world at each moment, and through its own spontaneous striving, without any outer influence, reaches at the next moment a representation of the whole world at the next moment. This correspondence between expression and thing expressed can only be explained by supposing it to have been pre-established by God at the beginning of things. Leibniz holds that in this argument we have an important proof of God's Existence. All the facts of experience show the appearance of interaction between individuals. But individuals cannot interact. The apparent interaction is only correspondence. But the correspondence is so constant and so detailed that it cannot be fortuitous. It requires a being who can foretell all the contingent actions of free creatures: and this is possible only to an infinite intellect. It requires also that the being possessing this infinite intellect shall have been responsible for admitting to existence such creatures, and such creatures alone, as he foresaw would maintain this correspondence. In short, it requires an infinitely intelligent creator. This argument of course does not involve that God should be good: it leaves God's goodness to be settled by other considerations.

VI

There are two obvious points of difficulty in this conception of an individual substance: firstly how an individual can be said to act if it does not interact, that is if what it does has no effects beyond itself, and secondly how it can be said to act freely if everything it does, down to the smallest detail, can be foreseen from the beginning of things. To the second difficulty Leibniz always replies by his distinction between what is necessitated and what is certain but contingent. It is only if this distinction be accepted that the first

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difficulty can be met. Action is possible without any interaction only if the rest of the universe independently of me is so arranged as to adjust itself at each moment to what I shall do. This adjustment requires that what I do shall be certain, but not that what I do shall be necessitated. And it requires that I shall continually do something, i.e. that I shall continually act. What difference does it make to the possibility of my acting, Leibniz asks, whether this adjustment takes place through my action, or whether it takes place independently?

Any fuller reply to both difficulties involves a consideration of the representative nature of perception, since as we have seen the activity of the monad consists in its passing from one harmony of perceptions to a new harmony of new perceptions. Now the accounts Leibniz gives of perception are in language that implies that each monad is situated in a bodily organism, which is a part of the world of bodily substances, and as we shall see the whole notion of bodily substance is in danger of having to be jettisoned if the account of the monad is accepted. In dealing with his account of perception this must be kept in mind: the account will require reinterpretation if there should in the end turn out to be no real bodily substances, i.e. if there should in the end turn out to be nothing in the entire created universe but monads and their perceptions.

Leibniz's account, then, is somewhat as follows. It is essential to an idea that it should represent or express something beyond itself. There is no need for the idea to be like the thing it represents. We may compare ideas in this respect with words. For words to convey meaning it is sufficient that each word should correspond with a single meaning and each meaning with a single word.

So far, then, an idea must have a constant relation with what it expresses or represents.

This, however, is not sufficient, and taken by itself misses out an important element in Leibniz's thought. As we have seen, he regarded the discovery of suitable symbols as one of the most important tasks for man in his efforts to understand. In algebra the symbol x^2 is fitter to represent the square of an unknown quantity than the symbol Q (*quadratus*); and this notion of fitness must be added to the notion of constant relation, in giving an account of the representative nature of ideas.

God did not put in us ideas bearing merely a constant relation to the things they represent. To do this would have displayed His power, but not His wisdom. Ideas have the characteristic we are always trying to secure in our symbols, of being more fitted to represent their objects than any other ideas would be.

Thus Leibniz was asked by Bayle, why God gave us the idea of pain to represent or correspond with a state of imperfection in our

organism. Why did He not give us the idea of the remedy for the imperfection, along with a vivid desire to use the remedy? Leibniz's reply is to the effect (i) that the idea must be fitting to represent its object, (ii) that the relation between the idea and its object must be such that the state of the mind at one moment, fitly representing the state of the world at that moment, must, by laws which are natural, i.e. fitting to monads, give rise to a state of the mind at the next moment which fitly represents the state of the world at that next moment, while the state of the world must follow from its previous state by laws which are natural, i.e. fitting, to bodily events.

This notion of fitness plays a large part in Leibniz's thinking. The word Leibniz mostly uses in his later writings is *convenientia*, *convenance*. Our word convenience, which includes only the notion of utility, is inadequate as a translation. The *convenable* is intermediate between what is necessary and what is arbitrary. The laws of motion of bodies are an illustration. They are "natural" to bodies, not in the sense that they can be deduced from the nature of body (in which case they would be necessary) nor in the sense that they are arbitrarily established by God (which would require a continual miracle on God's part), but in the sense of being suitable to bodies. Leibniz sometimes speaks of what is natural to bodies as what we can conceive as capable of explanation by efficient causes, sometimes as what belongs to the natures of things. But even the simplest laws of efficient causes are laws of "*convenance*," as can be seen in the special case of motion in a straight line. A body continues to move in a straight line with uniform speed unless it is constrained by some other body to change its motion. This is neither "geometrically" necessary, nor purely arbitrary. It is a consequence of the supreme principle of perfection, the principle of sufficient reason. Of all the possible alternative laws of motion (e.g. that it should bend to left or right, in a circle of this or that radius or in a curve of any other shape, or that it should increase or diminish speed in any way), this law is the most reasonable. The specific form of the principle of sufficient reason which applies in this case is the principle of maximum determination, which is one of the principles by which Leibniz's conception of the "natural," the "fitting" is rendered precise.

Now all this applies to the representative nature of ideas. Firstly, there is no created monad without an organism; and each organism is adapted to receive and register the effects produced on it by whatever is happening in the entire universe. If it has definite sense organs, some of these effects are registered clearly, though a large number of them are registered only in a confused way. The perceptions of the monad fit these effects; the clear effects are perceived clearly, the confused ones confusedly. When the organism is advancing

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to a condition of greater perfection in any respect, the monad feels pleasure; in the reverse case, pain. The desires of the monad represent the tendencies in the organism.

God's problem here was to find representations which should, though evolving within the monad through the spontaneous activity of the monad in a "natural" way, continually preserve their character of being fit representatives of the changing state of the organism.

Since some monads are minds, a second condition comes into play. Minds have apperception, self-consciousness, reflection. They are free, responsible, moral agents. Their activities are guided by choice of what appears best. They are inhabitants not only of the realm of nature, but also of the realm of grace. And the laws of nature are such as to be fitting for the attainment of God's purposes in the realm of grace. Morally evil or sinful acts, for example, are connected with changes in the physical world which tend to have physical consequences connected with pain or suffering, while the opposite is true in the main of morally good acts. This is, of course, a general tendency; where there are exceptions to it, we can be sure that they contribute to enhance the total harmony of things.

Thus, in determining what characteristics perceptions must have in order to be representative of the things perceived, God has at least these considerations in view. It is not enough to say that representation involves a "constant" relation between a perception and the thing perceived.

If this view is correct, it becomes easy to see why the monad has no need of any "windows" through which to "look out" upon the world. For it has its perceptions within it; and these perceptions, carefully attended to, explored, thought about, will lead it to knowledge of the world, and of God, and of God's purposes in the world, at least as far as is necessary to enable the monad to play its part in the whole evolution of things. Leibniz sometimes calls the monad a "living mirror" of the universe; but he sometimes uses another word which emphasizes rather more the close connexion between the monad and the universe. He calls it a "concentration" of the universe. It is by virtue of the fully representative character of its perceptions that it is so.

Further, perceptions do not arise in our mind apart from our activity. It is we who produce them. In one passage in a draft of a letter to de Volder (which, however, was not actually sent) he speaks of mind as an ideating substance, the source of its ideas. Mind is not a storehouse of ideas. Its activity is to be regarded as a kind of imitation, in the limited way possible to it, of God's creative activity.

Again, it is true that Leibniz explains the dependence of one creature on another in terms of explicitness of representation, so that if the substance A represents or expresses a state of affairs

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more explicitly than the substance B, A is said to be active, B to be passive, or to be dependent on A, in regard to that state of affairs. But in this he has no intention of explaining *away* the fact of dependence. The dependence is not brought about through direct interaction, but is involved in God's entire design.

When then Leibniz says that the lower monads serve the higher, he means that God, foreseeing what a particular higher monad will do in its free action, arranges things at the beginning of the world so that the lower monads will evolve in a corresponding manner. Every higher monad is partly responsible, through its free acts, for the entire course of the universe.

So much then for the activity and the freedom of the monad.

VII

There is only one further point on which I shall touch, very briefly. Adequate treatment would require a series of articles. If the ultimate complete created substances are monads, what is the status of bodily substances? Are there really any such things? A substance must be a unity, and all body, even the smallest conceivable, is divisible. The problem of bodily substance is then the problem of how something divisible can also be a unity.

This problem Leibniz never solved. But he did not think it a meaningless problem; he thought that an endeavour to solve it was useful, as a means of getting further light on the nature of things.

Certain points he was quite definite about. In the first place, we are not certain that there are any substances beyond monads. What we call the world of bodies in space, outside our minds, may in the end turn out to be only well ordered appearances in our minds. There is a great deal to be said for this view, and Leibniz was often inclined to accept it. He says in a letter to Des Bosses, that it is a very satisfactory view philosophically, although he does not think it is capable of being reconciled with the mysteries of the Christian faith.

In the second place, if there are any bodily substances, they must be organisms. Ordinary inorganic bodies are pure aggregates; their unity depends only on our way of looking at them. But organisms do have a closer unity. An organism can gain and lose bodily parts without ceasing to be an organism; and there is much evidence to show that every organism is indestructible. The parts of an organism are themselves organisms or aggregates of organisms.

In the third place, monads must be present in a bodily substance, because otherwise it would contain nothing substantial at all. But no monad by itself, and no collection of monads, could make an aggregate into a unity: and even an organism is, as regards its body,

an aggregate, even if we should be able to show that it is not a mere aggregate. A monad cannot act on anything outside it so as to unify it.

Hence, fourthly, if we are to solve the problem of showing how there can be bodily substances, we shall need a new conception, beyond that of the monad; a conception of a new type of unity. And unless we can work out this new conception satisfactorily, we shall be forced to conclude that there is nothing substantial, and hence nothing real, outside monads.

This new conception Leibniz calls the conception of a substantial bond, a *vinculum substantiale*; and it is only in the correspondence with Des Bosses that Leibniz explores the possibilities of such a *vinculum*: something that would make organisms real substances, and that would in consequence "realize phenomena outside minds." He never reaches a clear account of it. He suggests that such a *vinculum substantiale* would "require" monads and organized bodies, although monads and organized bodies are not "parts" of it. We can perhaps express this in more recent language by saying that the *vinculum substantiale* would be a unity of higher order, "founded on" monads and organized bodies.

The most explicit discussion of this point is contained in a letter to Des Bosses of May 29, 1716; I can only mention here his statement that such a substantial bond would not involve any modification of the monads it joined (since monads cannot be affected from the outside) nor could it consist in an ordinary relation between the monads (since ordinary relations are not real outside the things they relate). To conceive of it at all requires that we shall be able to conceive of predicates and modifications that do not belong to a single monad, but that arise from a number of monads taken in common or conjointly; if there is a real substantial bond between monads, it will be the subject of such predicates and modifications.

Leibniz did not give himself wholly to this line of exploration. It would have needed, as we see, a new type of unity distinct from monads. It would have given the possibility of explaining a true unity which was extended. But perhaps it was too late for Leibniz to follow it out. He was distracted by other problems and by bodily illness. The new notion would have involved a transformation of the entire logic through which his conception of the monad was formulated.

I do not think, however, that he ever gave himself wholly to the alternative view that phenomena are not "realized outside monads." His main point was that unless we can give some account of the unity of bodily substance far more satisfactory than that given either by the atomists or the Cartesians, we shall have to conclude that so-called bodily substances are only appearances to monads. There are more passages in his writings in which he presents the two

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alternatives than passages in which he definitely states his adherence to one. And the bulk of his writings are in language which taken in its straightforward significance involves the view that organized bodies, when you take them along with the monads necessary to make them real, are true substances. The description of inorganic bodies and of aggregates of organisms in general as, when considered as unities, only *phenomena bene fundata*, belongs to this view that organisms are true substances, and belongs to this view only. If organisms are not true substances, then the whole world of body becomes only a set of well ordered appearances within the monad—a very different conception from the conception of aggregates of bodily substances when taken as unities, as being *phenomena bene fundata*.

A full discussion of the situation would involve a discussion of his view of the monad as containing both matter and form, in the light of his dynamical conceptions.

Whatever the outcome of such a discussion, we must conclude that the attempt of Leibniz to give a satisfactory account of "bodily substance" fails to reach completeness. The "substantial forms" he introduced into bodies some time round 1680 showed themselves inadequate for the purpose. The *vinculum substantiale* he did not succeed in carrying beyond the preliminary stage of a purely tentative conception.

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WILLIAM McDOUGALL, F.R.S.

IN a little book of 155 pages the late John Scot Haldane gave the world his final message.¹ Much as his friends and admirers must regret his recent death, we may rejoice that in these few pages he has succeeded in presenting in clear and unmistakable fashion the philosophy which, throughout his long life of highly successful detailed research in physiology combined with equally effective and untiring application of his findings to practical problems, he slowly developed into the outlines of a comprehensive and rounded system.

In the combination of highly successful and notable achievement along these three lines Haldane stood unique among his contemporaries. And indeed it would be difficult to point to any other figure in the whole history of intellectual endeavour who could rival him in this remarkable combination. History can show several great figures who have achieved greatly along two of these three lines; such as Helmholtz, Kelvin, and Pasteur, distinguished in both pure research and practical applications; such as Fechner, Ostwald, and Driesch, equally eminent as laboratory workers and as philosophers. But whom can we place alongside Haldane as having made contributions of distinguished excellence in all three fields?

Haldane had set forth his philosophical views in earlier publications; in several small books and in a number of articles and addresses.² In none of these did he achieve the clearness and completeness (in outline) of this last effort. There can be no doubt that the somewhat piecemeal fragmentary presentation of his philosophy in this scattered series was one factor which has made against understanding of it and adequate recognition of its importance. I must confess that, although I had carefully read all of these earlier presentations, I had never felt quite sure where Haldane stood philosophically, how to place him as a philosopher in relation to other philosophers; and I venture to think that my failure was in some degree excusable; partly on the ground of the fragmentary

¹ *The Philosophy of a Biologist*, Oxford Press, 1935.

² Haldane first struck the note of the philosophy here presented in brief form in an essay of 1883 (*Essays in Philosophical Criticism*). The other books in which he has developed his views are *Mechanism, Life and Personality* of 1913, his Silliman Lectures of 1915, his Gifford Lectures of 1928, his Donnellan Lectures of 1930 (*The Philosophical Basis of Biology*). References in this article to these earlier presentations are indicated by dates of publication.

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nature of Haldane's presentations of a very difficult and subtle cosmogony, partly on the ground of certain obscurities and ambiguities of expression pervading all of them. If such was the effect upon myself, who approached Haldane's writings with complete sympathy for his radical repudiation of the mechanistic biology (as well as with affectionate admiration for the man) much more must appreciation of his philosophical position have been difficult for all the many biologists who still insist, in one sense or another, on the necessity of mechanistic interpretation of all biological facts.

Some of those obscurities and ambiguities of expression are not completely absent from this last work; but in spite of them, Haldane has succeeded in drawing the outline of his system not only clearly but also persuasively. So much so that I, for one, am at last convinced; not convinced that it is the one and only possible system, and therefore to be accepted as final truth; but convinced that it is a tenable system and, in fact, the only tenable alternative to a thoroughly dualistic theory such as is implied by the terms "vitalism" and "animism."

It may, I think, be helpful to some of the many puzzled readers of fragments of Haldane (I have heard a professional philosopher of the first rank assert that he could not make out what Haldane was driving at) if I try to set forth very concisely and in my own way the essence of Haldane's view as I now seem to grasp it. I begin with negative definition, by asserting what it is not.

Haldane rejects decisively both Mechanism and Dualism (Animism and Vitalism). This, of course, is only a first approximation to a definition; for nowadays almost every self-respecting biologist, psychologist, and philosopher does likewise; and the theories which claim to fall into this third or neutral¹ class, i.e. to be neither mechanistic nor vitalistic, differ widely from one another. There is considerable ambiguity about the status of these theories, arising from the ambiguity of the words "Mechanistic" and "Vitalistic." Nevertheless, four sub-classes of theories claiming the intermediate or neutral status, neither mechanist nor vitalist, may be distinguished. (1) The *Gestalt* psychologists claim to be classed here with an insistence which reflects the somewhat questionable nature of their claim. It is claimed also by (2) many of those biologists (Ritter, Schaxel, Ungerer, Bertalanffy, etc.), who call their view organismal or organicist. Again it is claimed (3) by many of those who, like S. Alexander, Lloyd Morgan, C. J. Herrick, H. S. Jennings, R. S. Lillie, and C. D. Broad, accept the doctrine of emergent evolution. All members of these three groups equally repudiate both Mechanism and Vitalism, including those who, like Herrick, boldly assert that

¹ The adjective neutral is not altogether satisfactory here; but I can find none better; and, in adopting it, I am following the lead of Dr. William Stern.

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conscious activities are radically different from mechanistic processes and that "consciousness makes a difference," and who, therefore, in a sense accept psycho-physical interaction. And a fourth sub-class consists of those who accept mechanism as a methodological necessity for the working biologist, while rejecting the wider implications of such strictly mechanistic biology, leaving to the philosophers the task of reconciling their mechanistic biology with some cosmogony from which mental activity, purpose, value, spirit, and even some degree of human freedom, are not excluded (Needham *et al*).

Haldane cannot be placed in any of these four groups. He stands apart from all of them in one very fundamental respect; namely, all of them assume that the inorganic realm can validly be interpreted in mechanistic terms, because all its events are, as they believe, intrinsically of mechanistic type. Haldane on the other hand insists that mechanistic interpretation of inorganic events, although it has proved very useful and successful up to a point, is radically at fault; because, as he maintains, such events are not in their intrinsic nature mechanistic. He holds that the mechanistic interpretation of the physical world has been achieved by a process of abstraction; which, like all abstraction, leaves out of the picture it draws certain aspects which must be included in any completely true and adequate account. He insists that, if we had before us any such account, we should find that the differences which we all (mechanists and vitalists not excepted) commonly recognize as marking off living organisms from inorganic things would have no place in it; that the gulf between living organism and inorganic matter would be abolished, not by the assimilation of organisms to physical systems of the inorganic type (as commonly accepted by science and by common sense), but by the assimilation of the latter to the former; that, in fact, all things would be shown to be living organisms; that life (or the distinguishing attributes of living things) would be revealed as present throughout every part of reality, in all constituents of the universe.

This is the keynote of Haldane's world-view; and it sets him apart not only from all mechanists and vitalists, but also from most other philosophers. For Haldane's view is not to be identified with the idealism of Berkeley, nor with that of the Hegelians. In fact, as he rightly insists, it does not fall into the class of Idealisms; it is rather a form of Realism. And among realisms its affinity is not with the realism of Plato and its modern derivatives, according to which the most real things are the highest or thinnest abstractions, the "ideas" or "essences." Its affinities among systems or world-views are with those of Leibnitz, Kant, Fechner, Paulsen, Ward, and Whitehead. With Kant, because Haldane holds that our perception reveals only phenomena behind which lies the noumenal world of realities; with

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Leibnitz, because he holds that those realities are entities which differ from ourselves in degree of development rather than in kind; with the psychical monism of G. T. Fechner and of Paulsen, because he holds that all reality is mental, psychical, or spiritual; with Ward and Whitehead, because he insists that our way of thinking of such things as physical systems located in space-time is arrived at by processes of extreme abstraction, processes which inevitably yield very inadequate accounts of the physical world, disguising the fact that it also, truly conceived, is a world of organisms.

Although Haldane makes, I think, only one reference to Whitehead (but that once with approval) the affinity between them is very close. In fact, there would seem to be only one great difference between them; namely, Whitehead goes with the neo-realists in repudiating the distinction between primary and secondary qualities (which Galileo and Locke made one of the foundations of modern science), insisting with them that the acceptance of secondary qualities of perceived things as subjective, as inherent not in the object, but evoked only as experiences of the perceiving subject, that this acceptance inevitably involves materialism and universal mechanism. Haldane, being a physiologist, is too well aware of the difficulty, or, as I would say, the impossible nature, of this cardinal feature of Neo-realism. He takes the opposite line in face of this problem, and, rightly, I think, makes both primary and secondary qualities subjective, products of the active reactions of thinking beings to the impressions reaching them from without (for Haldane—from other members of a world of universally interacting beings like themselves).

What Haldane and Whitehead have in common is the insistence on the organic and vital nature of what is commonly called the inorganic or physical realm. "The apparent physical world thus appears as a biological world of lives, . . . what had appeared as physical reality appears for biology as biological reality." Further: "The world of our experience becomes now a psychological or concrete spiritual world of personalities. In short, this world is a concrete spiritual world. The conception of it as a physical world is an abstraction of great practical use for certain limited practical purposes, but not more than a very partial representation of experience" (p. 150). "For we are free to conclude that when we examine more completely what we at present call the inorganic world we shall find in it phenomena which are the same as those of life" (p. 70). And that Haldane, like Leibnitz (and a few moderns, James Ward, Wildon Carr, Eugen Bleuler, and myself), accepts a monadic theory of human personality is made clear in the following: "A person is the expression of unity embracing what may be regarded as the separate personalities of innumerable cells or groups of cells

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present in the living body, but is no less real on this account" (p. 120).¹

Having made ourselves clear as to the central core of Haldane's world-view, let us see what are its strong and its weak points? What are the arguments by which he seeks to establish it, and which seem to him so final as to justify complete confidence in its truth? What advantages does it bring in the way of harmonizing our experience?

Haldane reaches his position in the main by the process of ruling out all alternative possibilities. In the first place, he insists very strongly on the truth of the functional wholeness or unity of each organism. He points out that even the most mechanistic biologist does in practice recognize and use this truth as a guiding principle in research and interpretation; that every organ and every physiological process is only to be fully understood in terms of the role or function it discharges in contributing to the co-ordinated maintenance of the life of the whole organism. But the organicists and the Gestaltists also insist on this truth.² How, then, does Haldane's argument lead beyond the organismal view (of which the Gestalt view is but a variety)? And does he offer sufficient grounds for the confident rejection of dualism or vitalism? For these, Organicism and Dualism, are the two alternatives which he must show to be untenable in order to establish his own view.

This part of his argument is two-fold. First, he accepts, with the emergentists, the continuity of evolution of living organisms in and from a world in which life (as we commonly recognize it) was lacking. But "the rejection of the mechanistic conception of life carries with it the rejection of the theory that life has originated out of mechanical conditions." And referring to the emergentism of Alexander and of Lloyd Morgan, he writes: "It seems to me that this conception only hides away the gap which exists between mechanical and biological interpretation" (1935, p. 73). Now these

¹ In a lecture before the Congress on the History of Science (1932) Haldane, after referring to the recent developments of micro-physics, said: "Atoms seem now as if they had properties similar to those which the vitalists attributed to living organisms; and even their external activities cannot be described in terms of the Galilean conception. It looks as if, while we shall retain the old physical and mathematical conceptions for practical purposes, more fundamental physical and mathematical conceptions were assuming similar characteristics to those of biology." And in 1931 he wrote: "It might be . . . that if we knew enough we should have to regard the behaviour of plants, or of individual cells in our bodies, or even the behaviour of atoms or molecules, as conscious behaviour."

² Haldane seems to overlook the fact that every machine exhibits wholeness in the same sense. Each part can be understood and interpreted only in terms of its relations to other parts and to the function of the whole machine; and the working of each part is dependent on that of all the other parts in harmonious co-operation.

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two propositions taken together, would, if they were firmly established, suffice to compel the acceptance of some such world-view as Haldane's. But continuity of evolution is denied by all thorough-going dualists (and perhaps 50 per cent of all persons competent to form an opinion in this difficult field are dualists, including many of the greatest intellects of the present and the past); and the emergence of life and mind from a merely physical world is asserted by contemporary thinkers as competent as Alexander and Lloyd Morgan. These propositions cannot, then, be established as truths by mere emphasis of assertion. In the nature of the case no crucial experiment is possible. We seem to be at a deadlock, and must proceed with open minds by the slow methods of science, rather than by the hasty methods of metaphysics on which Haldane too much relies.

Secondly, beside assertion of continuity of evolution Haldane offers one other argument against both Organicism and Dualism (Vitalism), namely: "Vitalism in any form has the same fundamental defect as the mechanistic theory of life. It assumes that a living organism and its environment can be separated in observation and thought, when they cannot be separated" (1931, p. 31). And in the same book he asserts that Vitalism "has failed because we can show by observation and experiment that it is impossible to distinguish within the organism any influence not dependent on that of environment, direct or indirect" (p. 111). This argument, which Haldane uses again and again to refute at one blow¹ both mechanism and Vitalism, is, however, a *non-sequitur*. And not only that: it is not to be intelligibly reconciled with Haldane's frequently reiterated assertion of the unity of the organism, or of its life; as, e.g. "the whole which we call the life of an organism" (1931, p. 29); "structure and activity are regarded . . . as an indivisible manifestation of the unity which is called the life of an organism." "The whole which we call the life of an organism." "We are dealing with an indivisible whole when we are dealing with a life"; and "each life being a unity expressing itself in co-ordinated maintenance of detailed structure and activity."

It is true that many of these assertions of the unity or wholeness of the organism are followed by the assertion that "This unity

¹ For example: "Human life ceases almost at once if the oxygen supply to the central nervous system is cut off, or if the latter is reached by some very poisonous substance. . . . Facts such as these, which may be multiplied indefinitely, make vitalism an altogether inconsistent hypothesis" (p. 36). And: "The mistake of the vitalists and of the essentially similar 'organicist' or 'organismal' biologists, was . . . to separate a living organism from its environment. The maintained co-ordination is present, just as much in the relations between organism and environment as in the relations between the parts of an organism itself. We cannot separate in space the phenomena of life from the life of its environment."

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extends over its relations to environment as well as over the mutual relations of its parts"; or that "the life of an organism must be regarded as an objective active unity which embraces its environment" (p. 149). Now Haldane, no matter how admirable his aims, cannot be allowed the privilege of eating his cake and keeping it intact. The words "extending over" and "embracing" as here used are highly ambiguous. I submit that, if each organism (or its life) is a unity and has wholeness, it cannot at the same time be (in perception, observation, thought, and space) inseparable from and indistinguishable from its environment; its unity or wholeness cannot "embrace" or "extend over" or include its environment. In short, Haldane uses the unity and wholeness of each individual organism (as expressed in the maintenance and restitution and reproduction of itself as a specific co-ordination of its structural and functional details) as the proof that its life processes cannot be explained in terms of physics and chemistry (and such actively maintained unity and wholeness are just the facts which the vitalist insists on as requiring some ground wholly different from anything perceptible or inferrible in the inorganic world). And then he turns round and, in asserting that the organism cannot be distinguished from its environment (and in using this assertion to disprove Vitalism and to prove that the environment is of the same intrinsic nature as the organism), he virtually denies the unity and wholeness of the individual organism.

These are, I think, the principal weaknesses of Haldane's argument. But others of secondary importance may be pointed out.

Haldane weakens his presentation by indulging in language reminiscent of the old-fashioned metaphysician who believed that the nature of the world, of man, and of God, could be sufficiently revealed by a process that was called "the analysis of concepts." Again and again he writes of the axiom of life;¹ and frequently he implies that the conception of life is somehow given us ready-made and adequate (like Descartes's innate idea of God) so that we have only to use it in order to solve aright by a deductive process all biological problems. Whereas, of course, there is no biological axiom; and an adequate way of conceiving life is not the starting-point, not an axiom, nor even a clearly definable postulate, but rather the final aim of all biological endeavours, one not likely to be achieved for many years to come.

Of more importance is the criticism that Haldane, while finding the chief error of all other schools of thought in their acceptance of abstractions as concrete realities, is himself open to the same reproach in his treatment of biological problems. He separates psychology

¹ "The existence of life is the most fundamental axiom of biology" (1931, p. 31).

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from physiology, recognizing that physiology, in neglecting the mental aspect, is treating organisms abstractly. Yet in treating of the greater part of biological problems in this abstract manner, he avoids, or in part neglects or ignores or abstracts from, just that realm of facts which most strongly suggest the necessity of the vitalistic or dualistic assumption, the facts, namely, of goal-seeking or of purposive activity.

We all, mechanists, vitalists, and neutrals alike, are familiar with and make use of two types of explanation; namely, explanation in terms of mechanistic causation, and explanation in terms of goal-seeking activity, of purposive or teleological causation. We differ in that the mechanists profess to know, or to believe, or to have faith, that, in principle and at some remote future date, explanations of the second type will prove to be resolvable into specially complex forms of the former type. Haldane, of course, rejects this assumption. Yet, although presumably accepting the reality of purposive activity (as a form of causation or influence radically other than mechanistic process), he leaves it out of account in his discussions of the co-ordinated unity of the organism.

Further, Haldane insists that we must use the conception of the unity and wholeness of the organism as an indispensable guide in all biological research and in all interpretation of biological processes. But he offers no *explanation* of that unity and wholeness of the functions of a complex organism comprising many parts and organs, a unity which must be a unity of reciprocal influences, of activities of the parts and of the whole constantly working upon one another. And a central problem never touched upon by Haldane is—What is the nature of these activities, these causal influences? Are they mechanistic, or purposive, or of some unknown and never-yet-conjectured third kind?

Haldane, in thus confining himself to interpretation of biological processes, and without specifically repudiating all attempts at explanation of them, simply avoids the problem of explanation in terms of activity, of reciprocal influence, of causation. "Biological explanation or description is essentially different from physical explanation or description, and aims at the discovery by observation and experiment of specific maintained relationships in phenomena" (p. 68). And: "When we find that any detail of structure or activity enters into the co-ordinated life of an organism we have reached the biological interpretation or perception of this detail; and it is this kind of interpretation that biological science seeks" (p. 66). Again, the aim of the physiologist "is to exhibit the phenomena as manifestations of the unity of the life of the organism. . . . Biological explanation is just the finding of this place" . . . "the place of every detail of activity and structure in the maintenance of life."

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Thus Haldane, although he does use the word "explanation," does not mean by it explanation in terms of causation or influence, but means only such explanation as consists in discovering the fact that each part and process contributes to the maintenance of life. The words "cause" and "causation" hardly occur in his books I believe; and equally conspicuous by their absence are the terms "teleology," "purpose," and "purposive activity."

Haldane, then, would have the biologist rest content with ascertaining *that* any particular organ or process plays a part in, or contributes towards, the maintenance of life; and seems by implication to forbid him to inquire *how* that part is played. And just here is the feature of his whole scheme which repels, I venture to think, the great majority of his biologist readers, leaving them with the feeling that Haldane is "all up in the air." The endeavour to explain (in the sense of understanding the sequence of events in terms of causation) has been the very breath of science, of biology no less than of physical science. When, then, Haldane seems to repudiate causal explanation in biology, while necessarily recognizing its immense role in physical science, he is up against a principle of proved value, one essential to all scientific research, and one deeply rooted in the nature and experience of all men.

I suspect that Haldane, though I cannot find explicit evidence of it in his writings, entertained, like so many other men of science, the fallacy that causation is necessarily mechanistic; and that it was this false belief which led him to exclude all discussion of causation from his books.

And the trouble goes further than ignoring the problem of causation in the more specifically biological phenomena, such as the processes of development, restitution, and heredity. For Haldane seems to accept causation as a valid and necessary principle of explanation in physical science, and even to accept it as valid and useful up to a point in biology. He even seems to say that all biological processes may validly be regarded as caused or determined by physical and chemical action as commonly conceived in physics and chemistry. Thus: "The more deeply we probe into the conditions which determine any physiological phenomenon, the more clearly does it appear that it is dependent on what are generally interpreted as physical and chemical conditions. This is so, however strikingly the phenomenon may illustrate the co-ordination which is so characteristic of life, and however obscure may be the actual causal connection between the phenomenon and the material change or 'stimulus' which initiates it." And: "While we can always discover or indicate conditions in the environment which determine both organic structure and co-ordinated physiological activity, we can never demonstrate the existence of any factor other than what may be regarded

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as physico-chemical which determines this action. What still remains mysterious is the specific co-ordination of activity, and corresponding organization of structure. These are characteristic of all life, however lowly an organism may be" (1928, pp. 70, 73).

Now it is just this mysteriousness (this lack of understanding in terms of causation) of vital processes which leads the vitalist and the dualist to postulate some agency of an order radically different from all physical events. How, then, does Haldane deal with this mysteriousness? He merely extends it to the inorganic realm. After insisting again and again that the specific co-ordinated activity by which complex wholes maintain themselves is the essential phenomenon of life, and that this remains *mysterious*, he goes on to assert that a similar mystery pervades the inorganic realm. "Co-ordinated activity is inherent in matter," he writes. "When we examine more completely what we at present call the inorganic world we shall find in it phenomena which are the same as those of life. . . . An atom, or even an electron, or light quantum, is for recent physics something of which the existence, like that of a living organism, is an expression of ceaseless co-ordinated activity, incapable of being interpreted in mechanical terms. . . . The conception of wholeness must therefore be introduced in physics as in biology" (p. 71). Nevertheless: "No degree of physical and chemical complication brings us in any way nearer to the phenomena of life or conscious experience." And: "Life is, however, not something apart from physical reality, but only the same reality seen and interpreted more fundamentally" (p. 77).

Thus life remains a mystery which Haldane seems to forbid us to hope to resolve in any other way than by recognizing (with Smuts) that the same mystery of wholeness pervades equally the inorganic realm. Can, then, any man of science be expected to rest content in face of this mystery, as Haldane seems to demand that he shall? Surely not!

I remark in this connection that Professor Max Planck, who, as Haldane points out, is "the originator of one of the great new directions of discovery in physics" (the quantum physics), and who himself insists that "the conception of wholeness must therefore be introduced in physics as in biology," is nevertheless a stout upholder of the fundamental necessity for science of the endeavour after causal explanation and indeed of "strict determinism." I remark also that Köhler, the leading Gestaltist, claims to explain the wholeness of physical as well as of biological wholes in terms of field-forces, in terms of reciprocal influence, that is to say, causally; and that the possibility of such explanation of wholeness is implicitly assumed, if not asserted, by the organicists.

Further, I suggest that the specific maintenance of co-ordinated

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wholeness (which Haldane insists upon as the leading and most essential phenomenon of living things, and by the extension of which to molecules, atoms, and even electrons, he seeks to abolish all radical difference of nature between living organisms and the wholes of the "non-living" realm) that this is by no means the only or the most distinctive peculiarity of living things. Goal-seeking processes or teleological activities are their most distinctive and fundamental peculiarity; and the co-ordinated activity which maintains and expresses the wholeness of each organism may with good ground be suspected to be only one of many forms of such teleological activity, activity analogous to the purposive striving with which each one of us is familiar in his own person.

That analogy affords the only clue hitherto suggested for the understanding and causal explanation of vital processes; and not until such attempts to apply it as those of August Pauli and Eugen Bleuler shall have been renewed, pushed to the limit, and found unworkable shall we be justified in resigning ourselves to impotence in face of the universal mystery of "co-ordinated activity." And not until we can discover in the inorganic world some indications however faint of that teleological causation (so familiar to each of us in his own person and the evidences of which we observe in a multitude of phenomena of the organic realm) shall we be justified in believing, with Haldane and Whitehead, that there is no radical difference of kind between the processes of the organic and those of the inorganic realm.

Haldane's neglect of teleology is not total. But his recognition of it is implicit rather than explicit, and not altogether logical. "Life," he tells us, "thus appears as a constant struggle against what is not life but only physical chaos. It is, however, only in this struggle that life can manifest itself as life. Life becomes meaningless if we regard it as other than a struggle against unco-ordinated chaos." And, "Personality represents a constant active struggle to realize itself."

Now active struggling implies striving towards a goal, even when the struggle can be described as directed against something. We do not describe a mountain stream as struggling against the rocks which resist its progress towards the sea. Even the poet does not assert that the water is striving to reach the ocean as its goal; he is content to say: "Even the weariest river winds somewhere safe to sea." And has not the modern physicist made plain to the meanest intelligence that the movement of the water towards the sea is caused by the curvature of space-time! But how can Haldane describe life as a struggle against the unco-ordinated chaos of the physical world, consistently with his doctrine that the physical world, equally with the world of life, is pervaded by the mystery of

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co-ordinated activity maintaining wholeness, and is in fact also alive?

One other feature which pervades all Haldane's endeavour to exhibit the inorganic as essentially of the same nature as the realm of living beings calls for critical comment. Namely, his language constantly tends to confuse the distinction between the experiencing and the experienced; between the "ing" and the "ed," as Alexander puts it; between, on the one hand, the activity of experiencing, perceiving, apprehending, conceiving, or thinking of, any object and, on the other hand, the object experienced, perceived, apprehended, conceived, or thought of. He can, of course, find abundant precedent for this in the writings of metaphysicians, some of whom seem to regard such confusion as a meritorious achievement. Yet the clear drawing and constant observance of this distinction is the first requirement of all profitable philosophizing.

This is a serious charge, and, since this confusion occupies a prominent place in Haldane's argument, it must be substantiated by citations, as follows: "The universe which is capable of being perceived is the only universe which has any meaning for us" (p. 21). "The whole world of our physical experience is a world of perceived experience, and non-existent apart from perception" (p. 28). (Here I would draw attention to the regrettable ambiguity of the expressions "physical experience" and "perceived experience.") "Our whole universe is a universe of perceived phenomena in which all that is perceived embodies what is part of ourselves" (p. 98). "The perceived universe is thus only a 'phenomenal' universe, and it is only this 'phenomenal' universe that is represented in the universe of physical science." From these statements about what we perceive, he passes to the equally, or still more, questionable assertion that "the conception of a visible and tangible universe independent of mind is without meaning!"

These and similar assertions might seem to imply that Haldane is a subjective idealist. Yet he stoutly asserts that he is a realist; that what we call the physical world exists as objective reality, that "beyond it (the perceived universe) there must be a 'noumenal' world of real existence, but which cannot be perceived." Now this will not do—no matter how much countenance such assertions receive from similar statements by other philosophers. The noumenal world is the world that we perceive, no matter whether our perceiving and our conceiving are shaped little or much by our constitution, no matter whether the phenomena (or appearances to us of the noumenal world) have but little or much correspondence with the noumena. Surely the chief aim of Haldane as of all scientific thinking of the wider kind (commonly called philosophical) is to correct, step by step in conception, the distorted phenomenal picture of

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noumena which we acquire through perception, to the end that we may constantly approach more nearly to an adequate account of things as they are.

This part of Haldane's argument may, I think, fairly be explicated as follows: Our perceiving activities are determined only partly by the nature of the things perceived and largely and to an unknown degree by the constitution of our organs and powers of perception and conception. These activities, therefore, lead us to represent or think of perceived things in ways which are infected with our own nature. These ways of thinking or representing the world about us are then called phenomena, and are said to constitute a phenomenal universe; and this, further, is called "the perceived universe" and identified by Haldane, quite illegitimately, with "the universe of physical science." In this way Haldane seeks to make it appear that the noumena (including all the things dealt with by physical science) partake of our own nature as living beings. The illegitimate step is achieved, or its illegitimacy obscured, by the use of the ambiguous expression "the perceived universe," and by way of identification of the latter with the equally ambiguous "phenomenal universe" and with the equally ambiguous "universe of physical science."

More concisely the argument runs: Our thinking of the universe (or the universe as we think it) is infected with our own nature; therefore the universe itself and all that is therein partakes of our own nature, and all things are living things and even consciously active things. When stated in this bald and concise fashion the fallacy is obvious; but the argument is not less fallacious (*pace* Kant and Haldane) when wrapped up in the traditional jargon of noumenal and phenomenal universes. It arises largely from an old error of psychology, the error of speaking of perceiving and conceiving as though they were the activities of two distinct faculties; whereas they are but two forms of thinking distinguished merely by the fact that impressions on the sense-organs are not directly concerned in conceiving as they are in perceiving.

Yet another feature of Haldane's exposition must, I think, repel many of his readers; though it may seem to others his chief merit. Namely, Haldane, having to his own satisfaction proved that the so-called physical realm is similar in nature to the realm of life and mind, proceeds at once to identify the whole with God, thus making his scheme a kind of Pantheism. The step may be justifiable; but it is a big one; and Haldane does little or nothing to justify it. And this arbitrary introduction of a designation loaded with obscure traditional meanings cannot but have the effect of making his motives suspect; must lead the reader, or some readers, to suspect that his desire to pursue and reveal truth is at least complicated and

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rendered impure by the desire to bring science to the support of traditional religion.

One last criticism and I have done my worst. A novelty of this volume is the introduction of certain observations in the field of vision, phenomena of visual contrast and others allied with them, which Haldane has studied in the last few years. Many years ago I became very familiar with the phenomena with which Haldane is here concerned, and from which he derives a new and additional argument for his view. I am strongly of the opinion that his descriptions are not quite accurate, and that, even if they were so, they would not support the weight of the argument which he bases upon them.

If I have criticized severely Haldane's argumentation, it is because it seems to me that he is ably presenting a case of the greatest interest and importance, the case for a world-view which, as I said at the outset, is the only tenable alternative to a vitalistic and thoroughly dualistic view, and therefore deserving of the most thorough and impartial scrutiny. I can see no logical impossibility in this view, and no facts which will support any argument that would make it untenable. Such criticism as I have advanced may be summarized by saying that Haldane seems too determined to prove his case at all costs; too ready to put forward weak and ambiguous arguments in its support; too ready, like so many modern philosophers, to reject Dualism merely because he does not like it and has a strong preference for his own rival view, a dislike which leads him to be content with slight and flimsy arguments for the refutation of it.

SPIRITUAL LIFE: SANTAYANA'S APPROACH TO ESSENCE

CORNELIA GEER LE BOUTILLIER

I

THERE is no such opposition between mind and spirit for Santayana as for Descartes existed between matter and mind, provoking him to uncompromising fireside dichotomy. For spirit is born out of an achieved harmony, Santayana says, and this harmony is the psyche. There can be then, it will be seen, no direct opposition. Actually, mind yields spirit. But there is some degree of conflict, precisely the conflict between ethereal flying and material wings, the one achieved through the agency of the other, but checked by their weight.

Spirit is an emanation from that natural life in which body and mind together engage. It is an emergent from nature, not contra-natural, but as it were hyper-natural, the dividends of life, perhaps, life outstripped: "life looking out of the window," Santayana says, with its tasks done. Spirit is thus seen as a departure from nature. But in thus departing she goes not empty-handed, with any wistful after-looks or *arrière-pensées*. Joyously, rather. Empty-handed, in a sense, yes. As having nothing and yet possessing all things

This notion of possession is persistently stressed. "The difference between the life of the spirit and that of the flesh is itself a spiritual difference: . . . the one is anxiety, inquiry, desire, and fear: the other is intuitive possession."¹ I shall take up later the relation between spirit and essence. Here I shall say somewhat prematurely of this point that it is essence which is thus the spirit's ultimate possession: the thing desired and loved "after it has been detached from the world that besets and threatens it," that thing in its eternal essence, out of which the stress and the doubt of existence have wholly passed."

The life of the spirit is the life of freedom, the life that responds to nature's charms, to her colour, her cadences, her music: the poetry that sums these up and calls them evanescent and calls them also beauty. Spirit is not created art. Spirit is the poised brush; it is gazing; it is listening. Spirit is sensitivity that asks not why nor whether, that simply enjoys and through enjoyment may give rise to creativity. Spirit thus described as airily embracing in silent

¹ *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, p. 42.

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rapture insubstantial essences must itself be essence and insubstantial too. Contrasted in general with the world's effort and confusion, its aimlessness and its aims, its meretricious victories and its smarting defeats that are yet so meaningless, as Santayana reminds us, *sub specie aeternitatis*, spirit is light, inconsequence, the mind at play. The world harbours spirit; it is hospitable to that extent; but it harbours it grudgingly. The world, "mortal, tormented, confused, deluded forever," is shot through, says Santayana, with beauty, with love, with glints of courage and laughter. "In these the spirit blooms timidly and struggles to the light among the thorns."

Spirit for Santayana is the ante-room to essence. Spirit, which is ultimately addressed to Pure Being, is not itself this Pure Being, he says; it is not essence, but looks to it. Yet we shall fail to understand Santayana here if we do not see that in his view of spirit he thinks of spirit as involving nature and yet escaping from it, as having both a footing in nature and a winging in the sky. We reach the airy ante-room to essence only by way of the busy household below, its well-worn corridors, its service stairs. Spirit, indeed, like the lowly tasks it escapes from, is not debarred from any life, at any time. Ingenious youth knows no substitute; age cannot wither it. Santayana dangles it irresistibly before us. "One of the great things always possible is spiritual life."

II

In the *Realm of Essence* Santayana distinguishes four, as he calls them, "avenues of approach" to essence, four sectors in which spirit may be operative: scepticism, dialectic, contemplation, and spiritual discipline. These all, as he says, "lead to the discrimination of essence."¹

For scepticism Santayana claims a high degree of spirituality just because it is detached from nature, pure of natural involvement, holding as it does that "this alleged order of appearance and this extended experience are themselves only dreamt of." Scepticism sees nothing but "the thing in its eternal essence out of which the stress and doubt of existence have wholly passed." In *Scepticism and Animal Faith* he says in this vein: "The sceptic, then, as a consequence of carrying his scepticism to the greatest lengths, finds himself in the presence of more luminous and less equivocal objects than does the working and believing mind; only these objects are without meaning, they are only what they are obviously, all surface. Scepticism therefore suspends all knowledge worthy of the name, all that transitive and presumptive knowledge of facts which is a form of belief; and instead it bestows intuition of ideas, contem-

¹ *The Realm of Essence*, p. 14.

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plative, aesthetic, dialectic, arbitrary."¹ And even more explicitly he says: "There are certain motives . . . which render ultimate scepticism precious to a spiritual mind, as a sanctuary from grosser illusions."² Thus scepticism shuffles off the coils of nature and stands free: "all that is sordid or tragic falls away, and everything acquires a lyric purity, as if the die had not yet been cast and the ominous choice of creation had not yet been made."³

Yet in another sense scepticism has its earthbound aspect too, as Santayana might be willing to admit. Scepticism is freedom if taken in one sense, frustration if taken in another. Scepticism indeed turns back upon nature, but only after having searched for nature and pleaded with it and been foiled. For scepticism looks to nature first, then, disappointed, looks away. By questioning nature, it sheepishly admits a bond; by denying nature, in hang-dog fashion it affirms it. So scepticism is, in Santayana's way of speaking, of the mind and of the spirit both. It is a flower-strewn detour around nature: as this it is spiritual. But it is a cul-de-sac as well, with nature at the end of it vanishing into thin air. So there are two facets, two faces, to this scepticism. One looks for essence and, in revelling, is free; the other looks for nature and, not finding it, is blocked. Scepticism taken thus gives evidence of an ebb and flow, a flux; it does not "burn with a hard, gem-like flame" as its proponents would have us think. It takes cognizance of nature by denial; takes leave of her by innuendo. It has a natural aspect and it has a spiritual aspect.


The other three approaches to essence, namely, dialectic, contemplation, and spiritual discipline, embrace a flux too, as scepticism does, or what might be thought of as an ascending scale of concerns, the lower reaches of which are natural and not spiritual, the higher reaches of which are free of nature and belong to the spiritual realm. Santayana discriminates these three again in *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, where he has been discussing "Socratic logic" and ethical values, and where he says that if Plato's "sense for the eternal" had been absolutely direct and pure, he would have seen the eternal in the "figments of sense"⁴ no less than in those of logic or ethics. He would have seen sensual forms, that is, as actualization of eternal essences no less truly than logic is an actualization of the eternal dialectic of Ideas or than ethics at its peak might be an actualization of eternal values. Here Santayana in speaking of Socratic logic means what elsewhere, in its higher, more spiritual reaches, he has called "dialectic," and in speaking of ethics means what, in its higher, more spiritual reaches, he has called "spiritual discipline," and in speaking of the apprehension of the "figments

¹ *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, p. 70.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

² *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁴ *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, pp. 87 and 88.



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of sense" means what, in its higher, more spiritual reaches, he has called the "contemplation of essences." I will quote the passage in full. "Spiritual insight has been frequent among Platonists, and may, indeed, have been at the root of that trance-like vision of essences which enabled Plato to turn the general terms of Socratic logic into individual and immortal beings. But, if his sense for the eternal had been absolutely direct and pure, he would have seen the eternal in the figments of sense no less than in those of logic and ethics: for all forms equally are essences, and all essences equally are eternal." That is, in their spiritual scope, contemplation and dialectic and spiritual discipline are spiritual "approaches" to essence. But all three of them have lower, natural reaches also, and as these they might be called, not "approaches" to nature or the world, because they are completely entrenched in it, but thoroughfares of the world for mind. The "figments of sense," Socratic logic, and ethics, are actually, for our minds, such thoroughfares. Knowledge. Logic. Value. These are our minds' ways of dealing with the world of nature. Through knowledge we perceive the world. Through logic we discern or express its relations. Through value we appraise it. There is another concern of mind with nature, and we call this metaphysics. But Santayana has already disposed of this, in his character of sceptic, by denying it. Scepticism is a repudiation of metaphysics.

III

Of these three approaches, let us take first knowledge. For Santayana knowledge is not an immediate act of the mind by which the mind without intermediary can grasp its object. Santayana sees a preliminary step there in which the mind discerns an essence, in which the object is apprehended not as an existent thing at all, but "detached from the world that besets and threatens it." In this moment of intuition the object rushes into the mind and is possessed by it, not questioned as to its existence at all, but in its freshness, with felt impact of essential clearness. This experience, Santayana says, is spiritual, and it is inevitable. In the Preface to the *Realm of Essence* Santayana expresses this notion as follows: "Intuition, or absolute apprehension without media or doubt, is proper to spirit perusing essences."¹ This means that, related to knowledge besides the "beyond" which Santayana terms contemplation, there is a prior step, as one might say, purely sensuous, leading into the thoroughfare of perception. This is the spirit's intuition of an essence. He describes it quite fully: "An essence, then, is no abstraction, no unrealizable generality, but any actual aspect which anything can

¹ *The Realm of Essence*, Preface, p. xi.

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wear, determining its nature, or revealing it to an attentive mind. The sweetness I may taste is not dependent in the order of knowledge or being upon abstraction from anything else. In my experience it is very likely the *first indication* (italics not in the text) I have of any substance called sugar existing near me, to be appropriated or investigated further."¹ For Santayana this immediate perusal of essence is the same intuitive experience as contemplation; and contemplation is, in a deeper sense, the ultimate apprehension of essence: knowledge, that is, in a spiritual sense eclipsed. Neither of these intuitions, the immediate or the ultimate, represents abstraction: intensification, rather. Santayana gives as an example of this "approach through contemplation," the following instance. "As I was jogging to market in my village cart, beauty has burst upon me and the reins have dropped from my hands. I am transported, in a certain measure, into a state of trance. I see with extraordinary clearness, yet what I see seems strange and wonderful, because I no longer look in order to understand, but only in order to see. I have lost my preoccupation with fact, and am contemplating an essence."² It must be clear that a distinction can be drawn here between the spiritual experience of an essence which was "very likely the first indication" of a substance to be known and this more remote experience of essential beauty which comes not as a "first indication," but as a result of losing all indications, of *losing* one's "preoccupation with fact." Santayana insists that it is not a difference in kind, but in degree.

The contemplation of essence, then, for Santayana, as an experience of pure spirit, is both the purlieu of that world from which spirit alone can be free, and the spirit's own way out of it. Essence introduces us to knowledge, and essence frees us from it. Essence is both immediate and ultimate, and these twain are one. Indeed, Santayana says so: "When spirit is free and collected, it has no life but this spiritual life, in which the ultimate is the immediate."³ This is what Santayana means, too, when he says: "The notion that knowledge is intuition, that it must either penetrate to the inner quality of its object or else have no object but the overt datum, has not been carried out with rigour: if it had, it might have been sooner abandoned."⁴ Knowledge is not intuition: "Intuition lies at the opposite end of the gamut."⁵ Knowledge is concerned with the existent figments of sense; intuition can both contemplate the "datum" and also penetrate to its inner quality. Knowledge lives in the middle ground of fact. Intuition lives in the ultimate and in the immediate. This is the realm of beauty.

¹ *The Realm of Essence*, p. 40.

² *Ibid.*, 6.

³ *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, p. 50.

⁴ *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, p. 85.

⁵ *The Realm of Matter*, p. 40.

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"This experience," says Santayana, "in modern times is called aesthetic"—not the knowing of any existent objects, but the free play of mind in that life of the spirit in which the ultimate is the immediate and existence is not even thought of, in which beauty bursts upon us, to be recorded as art or not, to be proclaimed as art or not according to whether or not the spirit gives us utterance. Nature does not create art; she suggests it. Spirit does not create art; she provokes it. Man, his senses alive to nature's fragrances and dead, in a sense, to her existence, his mind lost in contemplation of eternal essences, is spiritually empowered to bring the two worlds together through art: the clearness of sensual sting and the coolness of spiritual peace.

IV

Logic is the second one of the thoroughfares of mind which Santayana discriminates. This is the science by which, either for ourselves or in discourse, we express the internal relations of our world and posit external relations for it. In *The Realm of Essence* Santayana has made clear that the internal relations of nature are of no interest for spirit. Logic is distinctly a thoroughfare of this world: essences elude implication. "Implication and impossibility," he says in a marginal caption, "hang on an accepted order in nature."¹ "The absence of all material implications leaves every essence equally innocent, inviolate, and profound." Implication, denoting, as it does, physical inclusion, or descriptive equivalence, or logical inclusion of parts in a whole, has no persuasiveness for essence, nor for spirit which is addressed to essence. "Nature gives play to logic in so far as continuity, repetitions, or fulfilments are found in her"; but spirit is not curbed by continuity, nor repetitions, nor fulfilments. Spirit is free. Conversely, spirit has no such power over facts as logic has. Nor does she want it. Spirit looks on while logic springs the trap, and is indifferent to the catch as to the kill. So much for the logic of existence.

Yet, as in the case of scepticism and as in the case of knowledge, we find again in logic a dual emphasis. In one aspect logic hangs thus upon an accepted order in nature; in another it is free. "Existence is accordingly not only doubtful to the sceptic, but odious to the logician. To him it seems a truly monstrous excrescence and superfluity in being, since anything existent is more than the description of it."² But, odious or not, Santayana elsewhere states that the logician carries existence like a bee in his bonnet, even if it cannot be a feather in his cap.

Religion is, for Santayana, a dialectic of the imagination, that

¹ *The Realm of Essence*, p. 82.

² *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, p. 48.

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tries imaginatively to express the degree and character of man's relatedness to the rest of nature, or to the spiritual world "beyond" nature. In its lower reaches religion is concerned with interests entirely non-spiritual. But Santayana distinguishes two functions in religion: this lower, natural concern which in its religious aspect he calls piety, and the higher intuitive interest which he calls again contemplation. "A complete religion needs to look both ways, feeding piously at the breast of nature, yet weaning itself spiritually from that necessary comfort to the contemplation of superhuman and eternal things."¹ "Spirit on its part actualizes, in an intuition which is through and through poetical and visionary, various movements, rhythms, potentialities, and transcendent relations which physical life involves but which are not parts or moments of its moving substance." Thus religion partakes of both these functions, the pious and the contemplative; these may be distinguished; they cannot for religion be divorced. Santayana takes religion, too, then, to exemplify his assertion of these two differently directed, differently "weighted" reaches within that process of mind which discerns or posits relations.

For logic in general, as I have said, as well as for religion, there are also, in the last analysis, these two. The higher, more intuitive concern of logic Santayana calls dialectic. But by this approach (because dialectic can never entirely free itself from the psyche) he says that the realm of essence cannot be reached. Contemplation from knowledge could wrench itself free and win through to essence. But from dialectic there is no such thing as aesthetic detachment even where essence is the goal. "Dialectic evidently involves transition; it is progressive; but any actual transition transcends the realm of essence (where every term traversed must always maintain its intrinsic character) and proves that an existential and moving factor is at work, namely attention and whatever may be the organ of attention and of its movement. In a word, a psyche is involved. . . .² The transitions are discursive, their necessity is merely physical; but they lead to intuitions in which essences appear having intrinsically a logical complexity corresponding more or less perfectly to the stages of discourse which preceded; this correspondence, so far as it goes, makes the validity of dialectic a validity which cannot be intrinsic to the essence reached in the conclusion, since it is the validity of a process, of a series of substitutions and identifications."³ The postulates of dialectic are rooted in animal faith which alone dares to assert consistency and which alone dares to lean on continuity. Dialectic is a means to an end and many and

¹ *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, p. 48.

² *The Realm of Essence*, p. 96.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

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devious are its expedients. "It is instrumental," Santayana asserts; "when successful and finished, it yields to intuition."¹ "Dialectic, then, while ostensibly following ideal implications absolved from any allegiance to facts or to actual instances of reasoning, secretly expresses a material life."² What Santayana states about dialectic is tantamount to saying that dialectic is an "approach" to essence but can never be an arrival. Indeed, as John Dewey pointed out when the *Realm of Essence* was published, it is sense which, according to this philosophy, affords the approach to essence which is complete and adequate, "not the desiccated 'sensations' of analytic psychology," Dewey says, "but direct and pregnant realization, in which emotion also is contained": that sensuous intuition of forms, he means, which Santayana places "at the opposite end of the gamut" from knowledge. Dialectic is the intuitive margin of logic which looks towards essences but can never achieve them. It yields an arrival because it yields intuition: but itself can never arrive. "This total intuition will perform the operation of its organ, raising natural life at that point to its natural entelechy."⁴ Contemplation, the spiritual off-shoot of sense, yields arrival immediately and ultimately: but dialectic only as intuition can become the mediator for it.

In so far as the dialectic is religious, however, there is on the spiritual side immediacy and ultimacy too, if the impregnation is deep enough. "It is the saints most steeped each in his traditional religion who are nearest together in spirit; and if nature caused them to change places, it is they that, after a moment's pause to get their bearings, would be most at ease in one another's skins."⁵ Immersion is both more satisfying and more convivial than sprinkling. When it happens that dialectic does in this way abandon itself to intuition and thus consummate a spiritual union with pure Being, when religion, rising above a docile piety and transcending myth and pageant, sets the spirit free, this ultimate oneness, this final mysticism, means, in Santayana's philosophy, the Spirit's cleavage with the body, and so extinction. For spirit, as he said, is an emanation from the bodily, and no otherwise can it endure. "This absorption, the union or ecstasy of which mystics speak, has always been the goal of religious discipline. . . . The union is sacrificial, like that of an insect in its bridal flight. In it the spirit loses its self-consciousness, the sense of its own or any other separable existence: and it loses this existence actually, because it cannot attain that ecstasy without dropping all con-

¹ *The Realm of Essence*, p. 104. ² *Ibid.*, p. 99.

³ *The New Republic*, February 15, 1928, Vol. LIII.

⁴ *The Realm of Essence*, p. 106.

⁵ *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, p. 36.

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nection with its body—that is, without dying. Yet, if in the act of union with pure Being the spirit drops the separate existence which it had before, it drops only what it wished to drop; its separation consisted in not yet having attained perfect intuition, which must be without a natural centre or personal perspectives. On attaining that intuition the spirit abolishes itself by passing into that which it wished to find. Whether saved or lost, liberated or dissolved, the soul ceases to exist equally; but this fact does not touch the interests of the spirit seeking liberation, whose office, even from the beginning, was worship, not thrift or self-assertion.”¹

V

Value is the third one of the world's mental thoroughfares discussed. This, as I have said, in its higher reaches becomes for Santayana “spiritual discipline.” Particularly in his little book, *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, Santayana successfully tilts against the notion that values in general belong to the spiritual life. Values in general are distinctly and definitely not spiritual, Santayana points out, but are the work of mind. Applied values are the mind's judgments on existent things. They shift and change; they are played upon by all sorts of relative forces. Values themselves are relative, never unconditioned because, unconditioned, they could not be values. “For felt values, taken absolutely and regarded as unconditioned, are all equally genuine in their excellence, and equally momentary in their existence.” At this point Santayana reminds us with his own subtlety that St. Thomas Aquinas goes so far as to say that to the sinner God becomes an evil—“the Christian God, he means, for I suppose the reprobate might still find a friend in Bacchus or Venus.” Thus these earthly values are at the opposite pole from the care-free thing that spirit is, and always have been. “Spiritual life is not a worship of values. . . . It is disintoxication from their influence.” Spirituality waives values; it is concerned only with Being in its purity and not in relativity. The Platonist is very far from worshipping essences, when he sees the workaday world as “sharing” in eternal values, as embodying them, furnishing forth goodness and beauty and truth as goods and beauties and truths. The Platonist may make this genuflection with his mind; but spirit bows the knee to no such linked sweetness. For these are chains, however sweet, and spirit is not held. “It is the essence of spirit to see and love things for their own sake, not for the sake of one another, nor for its own sake.” Every existence as valued is a forged link. How could spirit care for existence, which has to “verify itself from moment to moment

¹ *The Realm of Essence*, p. 61.

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and must always remain temporal, no matter how long it lasts?" Spirit is not concerned with morality at all or with comparing and valuing. "What should the spirit care if moralistic metaphysics ceased to invade the field of natural philosophy, venturing there upon some guesses flattering to human vanity?"¹

Santayana defends the Platonic dualism in so far as it places the Ideas in some realm remote from nature. For thus are the Ideas endowed with creativity. And even as revealed in a felicitous conjunction of matter and form which we call aesthetic, beauty is still a "homeless essence," not imprisoned: if captured for a second, in the next second free and never to be recaptured again in that precise conjunction. Santayana elsewhere says: "When for a moment some value is realized, all potentiality and material efficacy are left far behind: we are in the realm of actuality, of music, of spirit; and the value actualized lives and ends in itself."² The value actualized: the essence which we spiritually yearn for, which we spiritually can possess, actualized in our world if only for a second. As actual this would be transient; as spiritual, timeless. As actual this would be relative; as spiritual, free. This is an experience of pure spirit. Moral values in this sense may be spiritual too. "They lie in the joy of having done *this* (italics in the text): they are a passage into essence." There is a kind of eternity here from which the world is an abstraction and an interlude strange to spirit, strange to the "homeless essence," but in which the mind is entirely at home.

The approach to essence which enables us to understand essential values Santayana has called "spiritual discipline." Spinoza called it blessedness: the intellectual mood of detachment by which we see the world under the aspect of eternity. Santayana's three approaches, through the higher reaches of knowledge, of logic, of ethics, are actually one approach. In contemplation, in dialectic, in spiritual discipline, the immediate is the ultimate: spirit. "It is the gift of intuition, feeling, or apprehension: an overtone of animal life, . . . the fountain of grace."³ By this discipline we may be weaned from the life of the flesh to the life of the spirit.

There is, then, for Santayana, an immediacy to spiritual values and an ultimacy to them, just as we found there was both immediacy and ultimacy to the spiritual reaches of other throughfares of mind. There is the immediate apprehension of beauty or goodness or truth as non-existent or as for an instant actualized; there is the ultimate apprehension of these essences as beyond ordinary experience, achievable by spirit only; and between these two, the immediate and the ultimate, which are really one, there lies the world, with its

¹ *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, p. 55.

² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

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allure, its instability, its hollowness, and with its troubled, shifting, and passionate values. Values have also the double function we noted in the other "approaches"; they are rooted in nature, and as such are earthbound and transient; but they exhibit also an empyrean flowering which is eternal and which is wholly spiritual.

VI

We see this duality of the spiritual again in *The Genteel Tradition at Bay*.¹ Here Santayana, having openly renounced the Black Art of Metaphysics, surreptitiously stirs the cauldron and renders out a half-hearted hypothesis: nature against a shifting background of the infra-natural and the super-natural. "I am far from wishing to deny," he says, "that the infra-natural exists, that below the superficial order which our senses and science find in the world, or impose upon it, there may not be an intractable region . . . of idiocy and accident. . . . All this underlying chaos, however, if it exists, has nothing to do with that supernatural sphere—a sphere and not a medley—to which morality and religion may be tempted to appeal. . . . There is nothing impossible in the existence of the supernatural: its existence seems to me decidedly probable." Here is the sceptic's olive-branch held out not only to nature but to the possibility of a world beyond. But it is only offered in fun, and is not meant to be taken seriously. Like many a flag of truce, the tender would be more embarrassed than gratified to have it honoured.

So sense still stands as the only sure road to essence. The way of dialectic must be mediated. The way of discipline is momentary. The way of the sceptic tempts, it would seem, to the open fields of faith.

Santayana's position, as always, arrests us. What he tells us, he tells us so beautifully and so fortuitously that we all but believe. In so far as we are of the world, we look askance at his singing; in so far as we are of his spirit, we try to find the key. Santayana's spirit, unlike Paul's, sees the world not as dross, but under the aspect of eternity; not as polluted, but as crystalline, to be seen and to be seen through, to be lived in so that we may live beyond it. In living beyond it, in living the spiritual life as Santayana defines it, we may discover it to be a life of these many facets. Here we may know the emancipation of the sceptic as, tongue in cheek, he waves good-bye to nature. Or we may join the artist in his reverie as he cries to essence, "Make me thy lyre," and thrills to all the gleaming surfaces, the harmonies, the poetry of life. We may learn here the "last secret" of the truly religious, standing in the cool of the day

¹ *The Genteel Tradition at Bay*, p. 31: The Appeal to the Supernatural.

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before that not impossible door, for Santayana left open "towards the infinite." We may kneel in unentangled worship of those eternal values which have no earthly counterpart. These all, we shall find to be not different but akin, not at variance but in accord. Or so we are told. For there is communion here, as Plato said there was, and for Santayana community. And if we ask ourselves in any amazement if this can possibly be all there is for spirit, let us withdraw our question before we utter it. For this is not the spirit whose fruit is love, joy, peace, longsuffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, self-control: against which there is no law. This is the spirit of laughter and the spirit of radiance, the spirit of music and the spirit of freedom. This is a kind of aesthetic *fiesta* against which the law has voiced its heavy displeasure. But this spirit is elusive. It is quicksilver; it is waterfalls. It may be pursued. But it cannot be imprisoned.

If this analysis seem heavy, is it not in part because there is something elemental about spirit, like quicksilver? And something that laughs at analysis, like waterfalls? "Spirit bloweth where it listeth and continually undoes its own work."¹ Consistent Santayana's definition of the "spiritual life" is up to a certain point. This is a trick it learned "from the sad flesh itself" which finds it easier to be consistent than not—up to a certain point. Beyond this point perhaps we should not press it.

¹ *The Realm of Essence*, Preface, p. x.

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THE quickening of interest in the great philosophical figure of Aquinas which has taken place during the last few years is a well-attested phenomenon. Of recent years there has been a distinct recognition that this mediaeval period was a most important time in the development of the human race, and that it has many urgent lessons for a modern age which has begun to realize that science and industry and mechanical efficiency have not succeeded in building such a perfect society as the optimistic Victorians had hastily hoped.

The famous Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII in 1879, urging the faithful to restore the "golden wisdom" of St. Thomas, has had an effect not only on the faithful but also on lay writers of the humanist kind. For in spite of its abstract conception and detachment from the theories of modern psychological and physical science, the Thomistic view of things still possesses that kind of immortality and truth which belongs to the unchanging concept Man and to his ineradicable desire for beatitude.

Few people who have any extensive acquaintance with Catholic thinking would challenge the assertion that one of its main characteristics, especially when it deals with human nature, is common sense. To the eccentricities of a particular age, or country, or clique, it presents the experience of humanity—*quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*.

The Christian revelation, in the Thomist system, is the manifestation to the world as a whole of a truth of divine love which is yet more than metaphysic to the philosopher, or mysticism to the saint. In it, in terms the simplicity of which all can apprehend but the wealth of which none can exhaust, God is revealed as a unity of life and love. His knowledge of Himself—His thought of thought—lives, *lumen de lumine*, as an actual man. By being made manifest to men's senses, He wins them to love of His invisible excellence. Identifying Himself with what He has created, He completes both man's destiny and man's knowledge. But more, He captures men's hearts. He is, in the words, not of a theologian, but of Pierre Loti, *le maître des consolations inespérées, et le prince des pardons infinis*. His spirit of informing love dwells for ever, *lux beatissima*, in the society of His chosen. By that light St. Thomas tested and perfected the doctrines of Aristotle. He established between religion and philosophy a harmony which invites the admiration not only of the

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Christian who recognizes the intrinsic merits of reason, but also of the philosopher who realizes that the excellence of reason points beyond itself to the insight of the lover and the mystic.

The name "Scholastic" is derived from the Greek word which means "ease." The scholastic is, therefore, the man of leisure, who, freed from the cares and worries of providing for his material needs, can devote himself in tranquil detachment to the pursuit of wisdom. The word assumed various meanings in later Latin, until in the Middle Ages it meant anyone engaged in a teaching capacity; and as philosophy figured on the curriculum of the mediaeval schools, the name "scholastic philosophy" or "scholasticism" arose.

There are two great principles, says Professor de Wulf, in the light of which we may seek a synthetic interpretation of the philosophic facts which the history of the Middle Ages presents to us. They are, first, that there were in those days systems of philosophy distinct from theology, and second, that Scholasticism is not the whole of mediaeval philosophy, but the best part of it—the collective inheritance of the majority of the thinkers of the West, which survived in spite of the fierce opposition that it encountered throughout the centuries.

Another striking characteristic of Scholasticism is its impersonality. Progress, in philosophy as in everything, was looked upon as the work of humanity at large, not of the individual. St. Thomas says that what a single man can bring to the perfection of knowledge is little, but that from the work of many there comes a wonderful increase. The mediaevals looked upon the succession of human individuals as a growth and development of one great human family. They appreciated the wisdom of Cardinal Newman's dictum that if we can see farther than the ancients, it is because we stand on their shoulders. If they could add a single stone to the edifice of human progress, they were content to do so and step quietly aside.

Probably the most prolific source of philosophic error is the ambiguous word. The ambiguous word is a characteristic of every language in the world. It is an instinct of human nature to indulge in metaphor, personification, and the other figures of speech. This, together with the impossibility of putting a separate label upon every idea is responsible for the multitudinous ambiguities of language. These ambiguities cause little or no trouble in ordinary conversation or in literature; but they constitute a formidable obstacle to philosophic analysis.

A second source of error is the confusion of thought with thing, of formal with material object, attributing to things distinctions which we have in our thoughts about things.

A third of error is the confusion of the fact of a thing with its

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nature, cause, and mode of operation, to say that we do not know *that* a thing is, because we cannot explain *what* it is, or *why* it is, or *how* it acts and behaves.

A fourth source of error is the demanding an explanation of the obvious, the concluding that a thing is questionable because some one has questioned it. Some persons ask the question, "Why?" when they should first have asked themselves, "Why not?" For example, "Why do we assent to self-evident principles?" Common sense tells us that the question "Why?" is out of place unless there is some conceivable positive answer to the question "Why not?"

A fifth chain of error is the inadvertent limiting of the application of universal principles. This is the mistake committed by those who impugn the cogency of the argument from design for the existence of God. If all men, including the opponents of this argument, in the daily routine of life unhesitatingly pronounce certain combinations of phenomena to be evidence of design, it is against reason to doubt that evidence in the case of phenomena which point to the existence of a Supreme Intelligence. The agnostic does not allow the abstract possibility of an accidental coalescence of parts to interfere with his absolute certitude that a complicated printing-press is the work of intelligence. All we ask of him is that in his reasonings about the existence of God he apply the rules and principles upon which he relies for the attainment of certitude in his everyday life.

A sixth source of error is undue eagerness for finality in the solution of problems. This is a very common failing of the human mind. The mind is impatient of delay, and rushes to conclusions without sufficient data or without a sufficient examination of the data at hand.

Scholasticism defends against the idealists the existence of an external world; against the sceptics, the validity of the sense-perceptions by which we apprehend the external world and the validity of the intellectual processes by which we interpret things and reason about them. It teaches the essential difference between living and non-living matter, and from the nature of vital activities it concludes to the existence in living things of a vital principle or soul. It sees in man not merely the power of sense-perception, but from the nature of his intellectual processes concludes that he is animated by a principle which is immaterial and spiritual—a rational soul which, by giving life to the body, constitutes the human personality, and yet does not depend upon the body for its existence. In that soul it recognizes, from an examination of human actions, the faculty of free will. It holds that the intelligence, by reasoning from the facts of experience, can establish the existence of a Supreme and Infinite Spiritual Being, who is the First Cause of

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things, the Creator of the universe, the Founder of the cosmic order, and the end of man. In the domain of human action, Scholasticism holds that there is a natural distinction between good and evil, and that our duty to do good and avoid evil is absolute.

To put it technically, though very inadequately, Scholasticism is a dualist realism, built up by a confident reliance on the value of intellect.

In his *Dichtung und Wahrheit* Goethe tells the story of his first entry to Strassburg Minster: "I seemed suddenly to see a new revelation; the perception of beauty in all its attractiveness was impressed on my soul." M. De Wulf, from whose *Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages* I borrow the quotation, points the story's moral. Goethe had been educated in the traditions of Classicism: "among the detractors of Gothic architecture," as he phrases it himself. That revelation of the Minster's beauty opened a vista which led back, past the Renaissance, to mediaeval art, and M. De Wulf reminds us that art is not the only legacy which we inherit from the Middle Ages. His book is a plea for Scholastic philosophy: that *sententia communis* which dominated European thought during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and which, as he shows with singularly imaginative erudition, was rooted in a civilization that made both architecture and philosophy possible, even natural. Mediaevalism is the fashion nowadays. Shall we learn to be mediaeval in our thought as well as in our canons of art? The question sounds paradoxical enough; but the list of books that deal with mediaeval philosophy grows yearly longer.

It is widely assumed in our day that Catholics are people whose ideas, when they have any, spring from loyalty and love rather than from intelligence and independence, and whose lives are ruled by authority rather than by reason. The very opposite is, of course, the case. And those who try to read St. Thomas, with its presentation of truth, will never fall into that particular delusion again. It is your up-to-date modern who says, "one feels," "one likes to think," "one can't help thinking." St. Thomas says, "this is necessary," or "this is impossible." He proves, he does not declare. Most honest readers of St. Thomas feel tempted to think that if he has a fault it is, perhaps, that he tends to believe too much in reasoning, rather than too little.

Western civilization is at a crisis; most will admit that our central problem is our incapacity to assess the implications and order the material achievements of the colossal progress of the positive sciences. We are confronted by a mass of material for thought and for use, and must confess ourselves overwhelmed by it. Increase of knowledge is not the same as increase of intelligence, and their divorce has been emphasized by the philosophical developments

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of the last century. Positivism led us to believe that the concrete would satisfy us by its own laws and exigencies—a philosophy denying its own right to independent existence. Idealism taught us to leave phenomena to the scientist and consider the thought-processes of the subject. By the end of the nineteenth century the phenomenalism of Kant and the idealism of Hegel had deprived metaphysics of any authority as the objective science of the *passiones communes entis*. But man is a metaphysical animal, and if he cannot integrate objective reality by a metaphysics explicit and true, he will integrate it by a metaphysics implicit and false.

The Great War revealed our anarchy of values. Empiricism has carried on in its old unintelligent way, presenting us with more and more of the food it cannot teach us to digest. Idealism has made two brilliant attempts to bring order into anarchy: through Marx, the left wing of the Hegelian tradition underlies the communism of Lenin; while through Croce and still more through Gentile, the right wing has been a chief formative influence upon Fascism.

Empiricism is self-condemned; idealism is ill at ease when the task is an ordering of objects. Political authority is wielded by classes who have not learnt the humanist traditions. And all over the West symptoms are discernible of what Wust calls "the return of metaphysics"; it is becoming increasingly recognized that realist metaphysics alone can reintegrate our "anarchy of values" and enable us to order the material development.

Neo-Kantianism, in more than one form, has separated religion from reality. It has seemed to many during the last hundred years to provide a possible basis for Christian apologetic. Thomism quite definitely will have nothing to do with the kind of separation between religion and metaphysics which leads to an ultimate discontinuity between faith and reason. God is the Source and End of all reality.

When St. Thomas speaks of "desire," he is not thinking of any mere wish or conscious appetite. To tell a plain, carnal man that the real meaning of his life is the desire of God is obviously not true, in that sense. Desire, in the vocabulary of St. Thomas, is the tendency of all being to its perfection, to its proper good, to the unity of its being. All being tends to return to its source. The finite is not perfect but imperfect, not completely, but only potentially, real and actual. It implies, therefore, a tendency beyond itself; an urge, as it were, towards a final end, a more perfect reality, to the pure actuality from which it came forth, which is God. No existing thing is ultimately intelligible apart from its goal.

There are two divisions, scholastic and anti-scholastic. John Scotus Erigena is the father. Of the former—the chief exponents are Anselm, Alexander of Hales, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventura, and

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Duns Scotus. Much as these differ among themselves on many grave issues, they are united as against John Scotus and his school in absolutely rejecting any theory of the universe which implies a community of being between God and His creatures. The issue, then, is between what is, in effect, if not in intention, a pantheistic view of the universe and the pluralism which in fact ultimately triumphed over it.

Philosophy, in the sense in which the word is used when Scholasticism is contrasted with other philosophies, is a systematic and fundamental explanation of human knowledge. "Knowledge" is here used in the twofold sense of knowing and what is known. Knowledge is called human, when its attainment is within the natural competence of mankind. It is obvious from the definition that there can be only one system which deserves the name of philosophy; or if we wish to put it so, there can be only one *true* philosophy. If two rival theories are advanced which disagree in their explanation, they evidently cannot both *explain* human knowledge. Only one of them can in reality be an explanation. It will, however, be convenient to have a definition which will apply to all the systems that go by the name of philosophy. Philosophy, then, may be defined as an attempt at a systematic and fundamental explanation of human knowledge. If the attempt succeeds, it is true philosophy.

But the question arises, How are we to judge whether the attempt is a success or a failure? What is the test of a true philosophy? There must be some test applicable to all systems of philosophy, or we shall have no reason for adopting one rather than another. It is easy for a philosopher to fall into the error of fancying that his system is true because it is consistent. And when he does so, he will interpret facts in the light of his theory and deny those facts which cannot be reconciled with it. Internal consistency is very far from being an infallible criterion of a true philosophy. It is possible to start with a few false principles and deduce from them a mass of doctrine which will be consistent with itself and with the initial principles. But in spite of its consistency the system will be false. Suppose there were two such systems, each containing a coherent body of teaching, but one contradicting the other: we could not choose between them and we should have to pronounce them both true.

St. Thomas is one of the world's outstanding philosophical masters. He stood at the apex of mediaeval thought, and, surveying the whole range of metaphysics up to his own day with an amazing breadth and calmness of judgment, he produced a coherent synthesis of the whole, in which contributions from every school of thought were ordered in relation to St. Thomas's central belief, derived from

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Aristotle, in the concrete reality of things and the reality of our capacity to know them.

He will never be put off with the contention that we only know our own ideas: our ideas would be valueless unless they truly represented objective external facts or "beings." "His point of departure is not the idea of truth, but the fact that being is perceived by the senses"; "Metaphysics attains to a concept of the ego, of the world, and of God, by starting from experience." He is therefore in full accord with science and with common sense in insisting that our sense impressions provide the raw material for valid comprehension of external fact by intellectual process. "In the order of knowledge, then, our thought is enclosed between two points. At the point of departure we have an initial cognition of being; at the point of arrival we find nothing else than a perfected cognition of this same being." This sanity of attempting to deal with real things and no chimeras runs through all St. Thomas's thought on every subject which he touches. It determines equally his solution of the logical problem of universals and his doctrine of the existence of nature of God and Creation.

Aquinas's extraordinary clearness and balance may also be illustrated by his treatment of the relation between Faith and Reason. Among his predecessors and contemporaries some confused the two, and others either the one or the other. St. Thomas simply accepted both and demarcated their respective natures and functions.

Probably nothing more divides modern thought from the philosophies of St. Bonaventura, St. Thomas, and Scotus than the serene self-confidence with which all mediaeval thinkers take intellect for granted. God is the source of intellect, and intellect governs the world: man sets out to conquer the world by intellect, and in his own mind re-creates the external world.

But what is Scholastic Philosophy? There have been various attempts at a definition, and in the works of many philosophical writers who professed to give an account of it, Scholasticism, instead of being defined, has been caricatured and loaded with abuse. We shall succeed in defining Scholastic Philosophy, if we bear in mind the purpose of definition. This purpose is to mark off from everything else the thing denoted by the term to be defined. This purpose is achieved by fixing upon a group of characteristics which is permanent in it and is not found elsewhere. In searching for such a group of characteristics it is not unusual to start with what is called a nominal definition.

A *nominal* definition of Scholastic Philosophy is the philosophy developed from the teachings of Aristotle by the great theologians of the Middle Ages and elaborated in the Catholic universities and seminaries of the succeeding centuries. The following may be set

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down as a *real* definition: Scholastic Philosophy is the philosophy which teaches the certitude and objective validity of human knowledge acquired by means of sense-experience, testimony, reflection, and reasoning, and distinguishes an objective and a subjective element in universal ideas. By "reflection" is meant both psychological reflection and ontological.

The foregoing definition marks off Scholastic Philosophy from all other systems of philosophy, so far as they are *systems*. It indicates where Scholastic Philosophy differs from them in fundamentals. It picks out those characteristics which, in the comparison of philosophy with philosophy, are of the most far-reaching importance and have the widest application. There is scarcely a system of philosophy which does not somewhere coincide with the teachings of Scholasticism; but often this will be in some tenet which, though of momentous consequence in itself, has not such a universal influence upon philosophic thought as the doctrines indicated in the foregoing definition.

Until comparatively recent times, we are told St. Thomas received little recognition in this country and suffered almost complete neglect outside the Church, so that "no one save a Catholic thought of studying his system from the point of view of pure philosophy and truth." But there is distinct evidence that St. Thomas was studied by non-Catholics in this country and elsewhere, quite independently of the revival movement and at a time when his philosophy was comparatively neglected in many Catholic schools. Thus, in his famous *Biographia Literaria* (published in 1817), we find Coleridge writing as follows:

"In consulting the excellent commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas on the *Parva Naturalia* of Aristotle, I was struck at once by its close resemblance to Hume's essay on association. The main thoughts were the same in both, the order of the thoughts was the same, and even the illustrations differed only by Hume's occasional substitution of more modern examples. I mentioned the circumstances to several of my literary acquaintances, who admitted the closeness of the resemblance and that it seemed too great to be explained by mere coincidence; but they thought it improbable that Hume should have held the pages of the Angelic Doctor worth turning over. But some time after Mr. Payne, of the King's mews, showed Sir James Mackintosh some odd volumes of St. Thomas Aquinas, partly perhaps from having heard that Sir James (then Mr.) Mackintosh had in his lectures passed a high encomium on this canonized philosopher, but chiefly from the fact that the volumes had belonged to Mr. Hume, and had here and there marginal marks and notes of reference in his own handwriting. Among these volumes was that which contains the *Parva Naturalia*, in the old Latin version, swathed and swaddled in the commentary aforementioned!" (p. 105).

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Here we have three eminent non-Catholic philosophers in the eighteenth, or early nineteenth, century independently studying and praising the philosophical writings of St. Thomas.

This fact shows how precarious are such judgments as that of Mark Pattison in another connection: "All the grand development of human reason, from Aristotle down to Hegel, was a sealed book to him"; for of all the English philosophers Hume was the least likely to have concerned himself with the scholastic system.

In his popular *History of Mediaeval Philosophy* (second edition, 1859), Frederick Denison Maurice devotes many pages to St. Thomas.

"Albert's name is surrounded with a traditional haze. Most people have a vague notion that he was half school-man, half magician; they scarcely know whether he passed among his contemporaries for a servant of God or of the evil spirit. On the contrary, Thomas Aquinas has abundantly fulfilled his master's prophecy of him. The bellowings of that bull have been heard through all countries and in all generations; there is more than a feeble echo of them in our own. He has governed the schools, moulded the thoughts of all Roman Catholic students, given a shape to the speculations of numbers who have never read any of his writings and to whom his name is rather a terror than an attraction" (p. 184).

In our own times we have seen a more obvious revival of Thomism. After considering the systems of Gioberti and Rosmini, the Vatican gradually decided to make Thomism its official philosophy. The result has been far-reaching. In Italy, where, as ever, Dante is studied, Scholasticism accompanies the neo-Hegelianism of Croce and Gentile. Cardinal Mercier was the leader of the revival in Northern Europe. He founded the school of Louvain, and he re-wrote his lectures in a considerable volume. Scholasticism regains its hold on Germany, and is beginning to arouse respect also in Great Britain. D'Arcy's work is a valuable addition to this literature. Stressing the distinction of act and potency in all contingent reality, St. Thomas's valuable contribution of the theory of analogy, and his vigorous intellectualism, the author carries these principles through the various branches of philosophy and shows how St. Thomas with unwearying skill erected upon them the cathedral of his thought, giving to posterity a shrine where all, regardless of creed, might worship truth.

The outstanding claim is that Thomism was "not for an age but for all time" and that it has been so "canonized" by successive Popes (without, however, being pronounced infallible) that St. Thomas may rightly be called "the Common Doctor" of the Church. "His light, because it is spiritual, and his philosophy, because it is true, still continue with their essential grandeur and essential efficiency to-day as in the time of St. Louis."

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In the preface to the French translation and the text of the *Summa* edited under the auspices of the *Revue des Jeunes* we find this gentle boast. "The time is past when Victor Cousin could congratulate himself on having unearthed on the quays of the Seine, in a bookseller's stall, the works of a 'certain Aquinas' who, to his great astonishment, showed signs of originality and depth." To-day an awakened Scholasticism and able pens are setting forth the merits of St. Thomas's *Summa* for the world to view.

As a thinker, St. Thomas is first and foremost a classifier and systematizer, and it is this characteristic which helps to explain his rather dubious position of seeker after truth and Christian apologist combined, both of which positions he maintained with complete intellectual honesty. This does not mean that he accepted all that was handed down to him, whether by Aristotle or by Christian tradition; "if it be true" which he appended to his remarks on Ptolemaic cosmology should be enough to exonerate him for this accusation. He simply believed that there were forms of knowledge higher than reason but not irrational, and that this knowledge was furnished, in the last resort, by Christian revelation—a point of view differing in degree but not in kind from the modern semi-religious "faith" in reason which Professor Whitehead has argued to be the foundation of modern science.

The important claims of Thomas Aquinas as a philosopher, apart from whatever position he may occupy as a saintly personality or as the exponent of a particular religious system, is beginning to be heard again with renewed ardour on the lips of the intellectual.

If, as Emerson so well puts it, "we only believe as deep as we live," in no one's career was the golden thread of doctrine more closely woven into the tissue of a perfect life as in that of St. Thomas of Aquinas. For St. Thomas study was not an interruption of his prayer and loving contemplation but, like a telescope, it only brought nearer to his eyes the flaming sun of God's love.

Aquinas, like a modern empiricist, begins with the *tabula rasa*, and the immediate sense impressions, but, unlike him, sees no reason to stop there and to call a halt. For where Aquinas breaks with realism is in his belief that the mind can penetrate to an ultimate end beyond matter and "tend" from the material origin to God, thus fusing together both the Greek teleological tradition and the modern philosophical trend towards origins deriving from Locke and Hume. It is, however, precisely in the difficulty of determining the exact nature of this relation that the external mystery begins, and Dr. O'Mahony expresses it in the following manner:

"The God of St. Thomas is not the *prima materia*, the one being of which multiplicity is the outer phenomenon. Neither is He the form which unites immediately with the finite, nor yet is He the

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one unique substance that upholds all being. God is transcendent. He is being identical with itself in the fullness of all perfection. The finite as a mere participation in being is in a position of total dependence in His regard, and it is in this total dependence that characterizes the finite most immediately. Yet God is not to be absolutely opposed to creation; the total dependence of the finite on Him requires an intimacy which is ineffable."

Now, because God is the supreme Good, and because it is of the essence of goodness to impart itself, the world of multiplicity was created and thus became at once part of God's necessity as "being" and the product of His free act as creation. Yet the created things are in potency only, and they yearn to return to the creator, thereby manifesting the "divine discontent" which is apparent in all things which are only "becoming." So the whole universe tends back to its centre, and in the hierarchy of creatures which form the universe it is man who is the peak and coping stone, for in him alone the *amore* inherent in all things becomes conscious. Man, in fact, on his intellectual side, is the mediator between nature and God, and as such has a twofold end and a twofold potentiality, natural and divine, both of which have their meaning in the human quest of beatitude.

The spirituality, the immateriality of the soul, lay in the notion that the simplicity of the soul of man was only immortal because it was not material, because it was not extendant in space; and this spiritual nature of the soul was rationally inferred by the Catholic philosophers of the Scholastic school from its characteristic activity. A number of experiments had been carried on of recent years in the physical laboratories, the results of which might be considered to form a strong corroboration of the view of the Scholastics that the soul is spiritual and simple and therefore immortal. The phenomena which gave this conformation dated from 1879, since when a mass of demonstrable evidence had been compiled in support of what was known as "imageless" thought in opposition to the view previously held that thought was the direct result of sensations. The latter view, which had been held by what were called the Associationists, had been the stronghold of materialism which the coming of the third mental element known as "imageless thought," was not steadily undermining.

The philosopher, taking up the subject where the physicists left it, could take as the easiest hypothesis to fit the facts that if "imageless thought" could not be conceived in material terms then it must be spiritual, and if the function was spiritual, then that of which it was function must be spiritual also. The human soul, like "imageless thought," could not be touched, seen, or heard, but like "imageless thought," it had to be conceived as nonsensorial and nonmaterial, and because of its certainly manifested peculiar and characteristic

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activity it was, therefore, of a spiritual nature. Thus, they got to the Scholastic reasoning of the mediaeval Catholic philosopher through the modern physical laboratories.

For St. Thomas the road to intelligibility lies through the senses of man, and the pathway to God therefore cannot be jumped, as the mystics thought, by a *saltus mortalis* of immediate intuition, but must be carefully mapped out by the reason. What enables him to go farther than this, however, and what makes him seem abstract to us, is his assumption as an ultimate truth that man is able to know reality, and the doctrine of "being" which he adopts in order to interpret it. With "being" as his definition he sets out to classify all things that are, from God as the limiting concept down to the meanest objects of nature. Yet, although all is "being," there are different grades of "being," and these differ, as in Aristotle, in proportion to their hold on reality. The things which are subject to change are less real than the unchanging, and into the systemized fabric which this reasoning yields, of act and potency, form and matter, substance and accident, the multiplicity of the universe is made to fit. God is supreme act with no potencies, whereas all other beings have potencies to be realized in act. In dealing with the region beyond the world Aquinas uses the instrument of analogy, and by his use of it he is enabled to pass into realms where the subject-matter, although beyond reason, is not, in his opinion, unreasonable. To us the whole fabric appears one of form rather than of content, and it is an important problem of Thomism to-day to define to what extent modern physical knowledge can be dovetailed into the mediaeval scheme.

Is Scholasticism merely a latinization of Aristotle? So Diderot defines it. "It is not so much a special philosophy," he writes, "as a certain dry, still sort of arguing to which Aristotelianism, incrustated by hundreds of puerile questions, has been reduced." And Brucker speaks of Scholastic "Aristotelomania." It is undoubtedly true that Scholasticism is more closely allied to Aristotelianism than to any other system, and that most of the great mediaeval Scholastics commented upon Aristotle. But their commentaries are not those of modern scholarship, which simply expounds a text. They took Aristotle as presenting a good foundation upon which they built their own superstructure, casting out what they thought false or useless and retaining what they approved.

The word "neo-Thomism" may be taken with more than one meaning. It can be applied to the philosophic work of Dominicans and members of other Orders which has gone on at least since the pronouncement of Leo XIII in favour of Aquinas, including the work of such men as Rousselot, Sertillanges, Garrigou Lagrange, and Jacques Maritain. Or it can be applied to the popularization of

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intellectual Catholicism in the life of contemporary Paris. In the latter aspect, if we consider it only as an aspect, neo-Thomism has some of the appearance of a literary and philosophic mode. It represents, beyond its strictly theological import, a reaction against such philosophies as that of Bergson, against Romanticism in literature, and against democracy in government.

Scholasticism perfected an instrument of philosophic exposition that stands unrivalled, and which, compared to the Babel of modern philosophic terminology, where a new writer often thinks it his duty to invent a new vocabulary, is like an Italian sun compared to a London fog.

Another most fruitful idea of Mercier's was to approach with sympathy non-Scholastic thought, to seek in present-day discussion the points on which the old Scholastic teaching could throw most light, and thus insert itself again even outside Catholic circles as a living, up-to-date, and thoroughly critical philosophy. This attitude is now taken for granted; but before Mercier set the good example, it was the fashion in many Catholic circles to despise all modern philosophy as "the pathology of human reason" and to dismiss as absurd puerilities the teachings of Descartes, Kant, Hegel, or Fichte without taking the trouble to gain an exact knowledge of their doctrines. But Mercier followed out the wishes of Leo—*vetera novis augere*, to add new things to the old, to "rethink Thomism" in the light of modern problems. St. Thomas also held that the real exists apart from the mind, and that justice, truth, and goodness exist elsewhere than in the finite beings which share in them.

In spite of his dogmatic reputation St. Thomas has a strong claim to be considered as a rationalist, and, in Fr. D'Arcy's opinion at least, St. Thomas would have desired no other test. Fr. D'Arcy emphasizes the partial antagonism of Aquinas to the more voluntarist Augustinians of his age, and draws attention to the half-way position which he occupies between the mystics on the one hand and the rationalist Aristotelian Arabians on the other hand. This apparent leaning towards the Arabians, and the anti-Christian flavour resulting from it, rendered his philosophy suspect to the mediaeval Church, and the fact that the study of Aristotle had native European as well as Arabian sources did not suffice, for a time at least, to save him from this suspicion. To us, looking back from to-day, it may seem rather that in championing the cause of the intellect against the philosophers who appealed to the heart St. Thomas was not only serving the cause of his Church but also, by returning to an older and perhaps saner tradition, preparing the way for the Renaissance of two centuries later.

Scholasticism, as taught by St. Thomas, is alive to-day because it gives an intellectual answer to the great problem of thought. In

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these days of cloudy scepticism men turn with relief to a philosophy which, in addition to sane ethical teaching and a very penetrating psychology, affirms the power of man's intellect to solve such problems as the existence of God, creation, free will, or the fundamental processes of our intellectual activity: and St. Thomas is nowhere more satisfying than on these central truths.

Scholasticism should not be measured by anything extrinsic such as its relation to schools, which was the error of writers of the Renaissance and Reformation periods; nor by its method of exposition, which was a mistake of Foillee, Willmann and Diderot; nor by its temporal environment, which was done by Cousin, Unenberweg-Baumgartner, Erdmann, Picavet, and others; nor by religion as attempted by Manser. Dr. De Wulf compares the historian which identifies Scholasticism with Catholicism to a "man who thinks he can get to know all about the oak tree by describing the composition of the soil in which it grows along with other trees of the forest." Lastly, Scholastic philosophy is not to be identified with mediaeval philosophy. A mediaeval philosopher is not necessarily a Scholastic. John Scotus Erigena, for example, is called the "first of the Scholastics" in a recent study published by Henry Bett through the Cambridge Press. Dr. De Wulf, on the contrary, terms him anti-scholastic. Scholasticism should be judged not extrinsically but intrinsically and doctrinally.

No philosophy is lived apart from its environment. Thought influences civilization and civilization influences thought. If men do not live as they think, they soon begin to think as they live; if they do not suit their lives to dogmas, they soon begin to suit dogmas to their lives.

Human nature remains identical in all its profound needs in spite of the diversity of historic conditions. . . . So in its nature state, Scholasticism was a synthesis wherein were treated all the questions with which philosophy is concerned, and in which the solutions were harmonized, held together, and controlled by one another.

The modern mind is beginning to realize that the Middle Ages can show an art and a philosophy which can stand comparison with what was best in the ancient world, and which far surpasses the modern, and a social framework that in many points surpasses both. No one sneers at them now, unless it be the popular demagogue or the sciolist magazine.

Twentieth-century "reformers" will probably be surprised to find how many of the social theories we take credit for as being creatures of our own civilization were germinally, if not completely, heirlooms from the Middle Ages. With regard to Law and Education, jurists will find bedrock principles furnishing substantial food for profitable thought, pedagogues will learn that their science has not

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advanced a great deal since the days of Vincent de Beauvais, Humbert de Romans, Tolomeo de Lucca, and especially Mafeo Vegio of Lodi.

A new alternative synthesis arose in the Scholasticism of St. Thomas Aquinas, who built up a complete, rational scheme of knowledge, in which Christian doctrines were blended with Aristotelian philosophy and science. As the survival of Roman Law kept alive the ideal of order through the time of chaos and through the Middle Ages, so Scholasticism upheld the supremacy of reason, teaching that God and the universe can be apprehended, even partially understood, by the mind of man. In this it prepared the way for science, which has to assume that nature is intelligible. The men of the Renaissance, when they founded modern science, owed this assumption to the Scholastics.

Sir Thomas Browne was even a closer exponent of Aquinas than Donne, and the former's continuous inspiration was the *Summa contra Gentiles* of the great Schoolman. Nothing could sound more personal than the melodious confessions of *Religio Medici*; yet when we read such sentences as that "vulgar and tavern musick which makes one man merry, another mad, strikes me in a deep fit of devotion, and a profound contemplation of the first composer," we are reading a transcription from Aquinas. Sir Thomas Browne was avowedly a Schoolman, and it is on Thomism that he builds up his typical paradoxes, such as the famous one:

"I was not only before myself but Adam, that is in the idea of God and a decree of the synod held from all eternity. And in this sense, I say, the world was before the creation, and at an end before it had a beginning."

To a modern reader, then, the interest of St. Thomas lies chiefly in his humanist leanings and the success with which, while holding fast to his intellectual point of view, he harmonizes the Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic ideals with those of Christian asceticism and spirituality. It is no small merit in the thirteenth century to have placed almost equal stress on the body and the mind, and, as man seems not to change very much in the course of years, it is likely that this merit will continue unimpaired in the future.

St. Thomas stands out as a really great scholar, with the greatest respect for all sound learning and a strictly scientific outlook, and as one of the greatest masters of constructive criticism of all times. His extraordinary gift for logical analysis and his no less amazing insight into the facts of common sense cover, but cannot conceal, the profundity of all his thoughts. The fact that he did not spin metaphysical webs out of his own speculation without reference to other thinkers or to the corroboration of experience proves him, *pace* certain modern schools, not only a safer guide, but a greater

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original genius. For only a genius can apply other men's work with such transcendent results. And over the whole is cast the mantle of genuine spiritual humility.

If Milton followed the mediaevals, so did Dryden, and nowhere more than in his Anglican confession of faith. But Pope was more of a Schoolman, and some of the best passages in Pope recall the *Divina Commedia*. For when all is said of what the English poets themselves owe to Scholasticism, we have still to reckon with Dante. Eighty years ago Dean Church in a famous essay wrote of him as the most original of thinkers. But when was a scholar so misleading? when was a supreme genius as close a follower as Dante in the train of a contemporary? The great Ghibelline did depart, it is true, from the political philosophy of St. Thomas, but in all other matters the doctrines he states are Thomistic. And Dante is not so much more easy to escape than Plato. Ever the luminary of Italy, he drew France, Germany, and England into his trail of light. Through the centuries reflections, not only of his imagery but of his thought, flash down the avenues of English literature, as Dante's own Matilda flashed among flowers on the poet while melodies played through the luminous air. Translations of the *Divina Commedia* are themselves an addition to our literature. And whenever we meet Dante we are close to St. Thomas Aquinas.

The mind of St. Thomas was a diamond of many facets; it could cut with dialectical precision as well as sparkle with verse. Into the undying list of mediaeval hymns such as the "Stabat Mater," "Jesu Dulcis Memoria," and especially the "Dies Irae," fragments of which fluttered on the dying lips of Sir Walter Scott, and the tenth stanza of which was never read by Dr. Johnson without shedding tears, St. Thomas now enters with his "Lauda Sion," his "Pange Lingua," his "Adoro Te" as the poet laureate of the Eucharist. Ever since the Church approved of that most popular devotion to the Blessed Sacrament, the service of Benediction, the "Tantum Ergo" gives glory to the Real Presence of the Lord in the rhyme of His greatest theologian. In the silence of prayer before the altar, what words rise so spontaneously to the faithful heart as those of the hymn "Adoro Te," which bids sense stand aside and tramples upon all the cavilling of heretics, past, present, and to come, with that all-subduing act of faith: *Credo quidquid dixit Dei Filius*.

In view of these achievements it is not surprising that St. Thomas rose to fame even within the very thirteenth century in which he lived. Stephen, the Archbishop of Paris, called him "The great luminary of the Catholic Church, the precious stone of priesthood, the flower of doctors, and the bright mirror of the University of Paris." He was sought after and coveted as the most distinguished

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lecturer by the great universities of Europe, then flourishing centres of learning. He became the attractive model for imitation to all late Catholic scholars and theologians, though never to be surpassed or equalled. Popes and Councils vied with one another in expressing their approval of his method and doctrine as most conformable to the divine plan of Christian truth.

During the Council of Trent the *Summa* was laid upon the altar beside the Holy Bible and the Conciliar and Papal decrees for the safe guidance of the bishops. And lastly, Leo XIII, esteeming St. Thomas as "the special bulwark and glory of the Catholic faith" as "one richly endowed with human and divine science—who like the sun, heated the world with the ardor of his virtue and filled it with the splendour of his teaching," so that reason, "borne on the wings of Thomas to its human height can scarcely rise higher," enthroned him as the angel of Catholic institutions of learning, and called upon the bishops of the Catholic world "to restore the golden wisdom of Thomas, and to spread it far and wide for the defence and beauty of the Catholic faith, for the good of society, and for the advantage of all sciences."

St. Thomas was a man endowed with the characteristic notes of the three great Fathers of Greek Philosophy: he possessed the intellectual honesty and precision of Socrates, the analytical keenness of Aristotle, and that yearning after wisdom and light which was the distinguishing mark of Plato. With a comprehensiveness of purpose which, in our modern times, seems nothing short of stupendous, he laid broad and deep the foundations of his vast system, and with a force and directness, less easily to be attained in the rich confusion of modern thought, compelled every source of knowledge to yield him material for his work. His *Summa Theologica* is a mighty synthesis, thrown into technical and scientific form, of the Catholic traditions of East and West, of the infallible words of the Sacred Page, and of the most enlightened conclusions of human reason gathered from the soaring intuitions of the Academy and the rigid severity of the Lyceum.

Like one of those monumental Gothic cathedrals of the same Middle Ages, the *Summa* is vast, complicated, and yet unified in the heaven-pointing plan by which vault and arch, turret and pinnacle, all conspire to the one general effect of lifting our thoughts from the earth beneath us to the supernatural world above us. Nature and grace, reason and faith, natural and revealed truth are there articulated and subordinated and co-ordinated in such a way that Dante had only to put in verse to make it a harmony in expression as it was already intrinsically a harmony of thought. And although St. Thomas accomplished all this not so much by creating as by transforming and assimilating, what will always remain new

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and wholly original in his work is the spirit with which he addressed himself to the task, the sense of completeness which impelled him to leave nothing incomplete.

St. Thomas states the objections to theism with startling vigour and insight and comprehensiveness. It is impossible to prove that God exists, because it is necessary to start by defining what you are going to prove; and it is a contradiction in terms to attempt to define the Infinite. All proof, all argument, implies the existence of a rational order, which itself cannot exist without God. If He exists, all necessity flows from Him; there can be, therefore, nothing on which we could build a demonstration of His existence. The argument cannot start.

Similarly, no relation can be stated, can exist, between the finite and the infinite, so that you cannot argue from the world to God. And if there be a God at all, He must exist of Himself. As philosophers put it, His nature and His existence are identical. It is admitted by all, however, that the Divine nature is inaccessible. We cannot know Him as He is; He is infinitely incomprehensible. That means, also, that we cannot know whether He is. And, lastly, an argument is based upon experience. But God far transcends any possible experience. Therefore we cannot reach Him by argument. Certainly Kant and all the moderns seem children beside St. Thomas when it comes to knowing what are the objections to theism.

"All evidence goes to show that the metaphysics of St. Thomas is independent of any physical theory and that he was quite prepared to jettison the current science if a better could be devised."

Catholics are a puzzling people to whom things are fundamental which to other men seem maddeningly irrelevant; and when the Catholic psyche is disturbed, only a Catholic can hope to treat it aright. For other men will regard religion either as something from which the patient must be set free altogether, or at any rate as something which has too strong a hold upon him, and will treat the patient accordingly. But religion can never have too strong a hold, though it can have a wrong hold; and this is a distinction which only the trained Catholic philosopher can see aright.

Aquinas represents the principles of a "Christian naturalism" which is based on an exact study of phenomena, and accepts the world for what it is genuinely worth. He relegates abnormal spiritual experiences to the background, and, while insisting on the vision of God as being man's last end and full perfection, throws open the opportunity of contemplation to all men, and not merely to the monastic profession. His broad sanity did so much to straighten out the kinks of mediaeval thought and mediaeval assumption.

The *Summa contra Gentiles* was written to show heathens and Jews that the doctrines of the Catholic Church were reasonable in

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the sense that they could not be shown to be opposed to reason. Scripture is cited simply by way of confirmation or to indicate what precisely the Church held. It was authoritative for those only who accepted it. The *Summa Theologica* was written for Catholics, and it, too, presupposed the Church. Had it been necessary to prove the Church's position, St. Thomas would have done it. To argue that because he has never done so he failed to realize that the treatise on the Church's position was a vital point is to argue that he was absolutely wanting in the logical sense. The late Dr. Wicksteed makes the mistake of supposing that the two great treatises, the *Summa contra Gentiles* and the *Summa Theologica*, were meant to be exhaustive of the whole theological problem. Readers of the *Secunda Secundae* know how at almost every turn the authority of the Church is taken for granted, or better, that the student is supposed to have mastered the treatise *De Ecclesia*. Thus he remarks that "Faith adheres to all the Articles of the Faith on one only ground, viz., the First Truth propounded to us in the Scriptures expounded in accordance with the Church's teaching" (Qu. V iii. ad 2dm).

That all men desire beatitude was a theme frequent in antiquity, and is one frequent, indeed, to-day; but what is new in Aquinas, in spite of his own Platonic and Aristotelian borrowings, is the stating of the problem as a synthesis of the natural (which is by no means to be despised) and the supernatural, and corresponding distinction of faith and reason. For while the finite must of necessity tend toward the limit which is God, there is nothing at its disposal to raise its thought to God except the finite, and only man with his double potentiality is the link between. Man on one side of his nature is gifted with the capacity of receiving grace from above, and God, by an astounding act of condescension, stoops down to elevate His creature to His own plane. This is the problem which reveals most clearly the Thomistic antinomy of two ends for man, the perfect man known already in antiquity who has reached his own natural perfection, and the other man who tends, also naturally (Aquinas unfortunately uses the same word), to the Divine perfection. The solution is seen in the words of Aquinas himself.

That a shrub becomes a tree is quite in keeping with the very effort of its own nature, but that a shrub becomes a ladder, something else is required. And yet its limited capacity of becoming merely a tree did not prevent its being worked on by man to be fashioned into a ladder. Such is the case of man in regard to the supernatural.

[The above notes have no pretension of being altogether original. Apologies for one's work are generally unprofitable. Still, I wish to point out that I recognize the extent of my indebtedness to many famous books and writers—some of whom are anonymous.]

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NOTES ON SOME EARLY EDITIONS¹

AQUINAS was evidently a favourite with Cranmer, for the late Prebendary Burbidge traced a number of his books, mostly early sixteenth-century editions, printed in Paris, in the British Museum and the University Library, Cambridge. It is especially interesting to-day, when so many monuments of the early printers are being transferred to the United States, to note that a vellum copy of the *Summa de Articulis Fidei et Ecclesiae Sacramentis*, Mentz, circa 1460, was, in 1851, one of the few specimens of early typography in the United States; it was knocked down for \$20 at the Corwin sale in 1856, and twenty years later reached \$162. The Rev. J. Fuller Russell's copy, lent to the Caxton Exhibition in London in 1877, turned up in a sale in New York in December, 1920, and brought \$330; there are only about ten copies traced, nearly all in public libraries.

From a sale room point of view the earliest editions of *Secunda Secundae* would seem to be the most precious of St. Thomas Aquinas's works; it was frequently printed before 1500, and forms a substantial folio of which Erasmus is reported to have said, "no man can carry it about, much less get it into his head!" At the Wodhull sale in 1886 a fine copy of the *editio princeps*, Strasburg, circa 1466, bound by Roger Payne, brought £37, which is nothing like its value to-day; and on May 1, 1922, a fine copy in the original pigskin, brought \$650 at the American Art Galleries in New York. A copy, bound by Derome, of the Mentz edition of P. Schoeffer, 1467—the first with a date—brought £111 at the White sale in 1902—this was bought at Syston Park sale in 1884 for £35—while one of the few copies printed on vellum brought £131 at the Sunderland sale in 1881. The Mantua edition, Paulo de Puzpach, circa 1475, of the same work, although it has only a small commercial value, is interesting in connexion with the history of early printing in Mantua; a copy sold for £6 at Sotheby's in 1901 belonged in 1501 to the Convent of St. Maria delle grazie d'Imola.

The *Summa Theologiae*, *sine ulla nota*, but printed at Mentz by Schoeffer, folio 1463, is a magnificent book, printed with the same types as those used by Schoeffer for his 1462 Bible and his 1468 edition of *Justinian*. William Morris's copy in the original boards with brass clasps sold for only £34 in 1898. One of the rarer of this author's works is the *Super primo Sententiarum*, Venice, 1486, not recorded by Hain; Mr. Henry White's copy of this, printed on vellum, possibly unique as such, brought £101 in April, 1902, and originally belonged to the Monastery of St. Leonard, at Venice—this may have been the copy which was sold for £300 in 1870. What

¹ Partly due to facts recorded in the *Times Literary Supplement*.

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may be described as the early "library" edition of St. Thomas Aquinas, the *Opera*, Rome, 1570, in seventeen folio volumes, occurs now and then when old libraries are dispersed; Sir Mark Sykes's set, on vellum, brought 155 guineas in 1824, and three years later the Rev. T. Williams's set, also on vellum, sold for 170 guineas. One of the most interesting manuscripts to come under the hammer was the *Thomas d'Acquin, le livre du Regimen des Princes*, translated by Charles de Saint Gelaye, a folio manuscript of the fifteenth century, on seventy-nine leaves of vellum, with four fine miniatures, half-page size, one with the translator presenting his work to his patron, the Count d'Angoulême; this was in the sale of the Hamilton Palace collection in 1889, and then brought £164.

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FORMALISM AND TELEOLOGY

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THE recent discussions on "The Right and the Good" show that the reconciliation between formalism and teleology is still a problem. Some of the contending parties lean more strongly towards formalism, others towards teleology; but neither side has, I believe, done equal justice to formalism *and* teleology. To review the whole discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I propose to suggest in outline a theory which may possibly harmonize the essential tenets of both parties.

We are indebted to Prichard and Ross for a much-needed renaissance of formalism which stresses certain deep-seated moral convictions of many, if not of all, men. These convictions may be firmly held without being easily expressible; they will therefore not necessarily be stated in the same way by every moralist who is alive to them, but they may be presented roughly as follows: We are not to justify our moral obligations on the grounds that our fulfilment of them is more likely to produce a greater amount of good consequences than any other act open to our choice at the time, and that these consequences are in harmony with our truest and most abiding interests. In so far as it is my duty to do good to others, for example, it is not an appreciation of the value of their good as an end in itself which exerts that influence on my will called a sense of obligation, nor is my obligation to be justified on the grounds that their good is also my own good in that it satisfies my benevolent impulses. It is because an act is *right* that I am under an obligation to do it, and justified in doing it. Wherein its rightness lies is a question I need not answer just yet.

For my act to be morally good, I must do what is right from a specifically moral motive. This motive, in the ethical sense, is not some good beyond the act, such as the happiness of others; nor is it, in the psychological sense, the benevolent impulse which is the spring of such altruistic conduct. Such motives indicate very admirable traits of character, but their value is not that of moral worth. Prichard calls such motives virtuous, but not moral. Ross calls them moral, but admits that they are inferior in moral value to the sense of duty, which is for him *the* moral motive. But the distinction is important whatever words we use to denote it.

I propose to retain this formalistic tenet, perhaps in a modified form, and to combine it with the apparently incompatible teleological

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tenets, viz., that the rightness of an act is conditioned by the value of its intended consequences, and that it is only *the good* which can furnish us with a reason and justification for doing anything at all, and which can place us under an obligation—I would add, however, that this good need not be the greatest amount of good consequences. With regard to the relation between right, duty, and the moral good, and also the question of the relevance of motives in judging whether an act has been a dutiful one or not, my views will be given as I proceed with the development of my theory.

Instead of the distinction between the right and the good, I prefer to distinguish between the good-will and the good-willed, between the morally good and the beneficial results which are the objects of the good-will. Later on I shall correlate this distinction with that of the right and the good. I prefer to distinguish between the good-will and the good-willed rather than between the right and the good, because the former distinction draws attention to *character* as a fundamental concept in moral philosophy. It is because the Neo-Intuitionists tend to view acts apart from the character which expresses itself in the acts, that they come to hold the theory that an act of duty, unless done from a moral motive, may have neither intrinsic goodness, nor be productive of any good, and yet be obligatory. It seems to me that if the right act is not obligatory on the grounds that it is likely to produce the best consequences, it can be obligatory only in virtue of the goodness of character it involves. Moral goodness is a goodness of disposition, a direction of the will, and may be applied to the act expressive of that disposition, or to the character whose will is so disposed. The good-willed, or the consequences aimed at by the good-will, involves values other than the good-will, such as the development of knowledge, the creation and appreciation of beauty, the satisfaction of our need for social intercourse, for food and shelter, and so on. The good-willed by the good man is the all-round development of human capacities, and the all-round satisfaction of human needs, which require to be adjusted and organized in relation to each other in accordance with their importance. The good-willed is therefore a complex *end*, involving a harmonious adjustment of the different goods of life and the adjusting and organizing of the various interests and pursuits of the different members of the human race. This good-willed must of course include the good-will on the part of all members to promote and maintain this complex end. The good-will is itself complex, involving such traits of character as unselfishness, justice, disinterestedness, self-control, constancy of purpose, etc.

So far, I have considered the moral life from the point of view of the end towards which moral effort must be directed. Before passing to the good-will itself I will guard against a possible criticism. I do

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not mean that, before any man can do his duty, he must work out for himself, and *ab initio*, what effect his conduct will have on mankind as a whole. Years of civilization have marked out the limited areas in which we can act most effectively, and by working in our plot we can best promote the good of humanity as a whole, without having to make impossible calculations. But the conception of some ideally good life for mankind as a whole should be at the back of our minds, and if we see clearly that an act, previously accepted as right, will hinder this good for mankind as a whole, we should refrain from such an act.

To return to the good-will. The good-will is the will to promote a comprehensive system of values, in the enjoyment and promotion of which all are to share according to their needs and capacities. The good-will is therefore teleologically directed, and would not be good if it were not thus directed. This does not mean that it is good as a mere means, or that its goodness is proportionate to the real value of the end or ends it tries to effect, or actually achieves. To direct the will to its appropriate end as far as we know it, is in itself an intrinsic good over and above the good consequences at which it aims; for even if these purposed consequences be not good enough, or be not produced even if good enough, the goodness of the will is unaffected, so long as the will makes every effort to attain its end and to find out whether these ends are really as good as they appear to be. The good-will is therefore formal: its content may vary in kind and in value without its form, and therefore its intrinsic worth, being changed. Let me develop this point.

The good-will is the rational will or practical reason. The good man rises above the standpoint of his own preferences and the standpoint of those for whom he happens to feel affection, sympathy, or pity, and he tries to judge his proposed act from a universal, impartial, or rational standpoint, instead of from the standpoint of his own likes and dislikes. From this standpoint, his judgment is concerned with the universal or rational good. This rational good which is the appropriate object of the good-will is, as I have pointed out, a comprehensive system of values in the enjoyment and promotion of which all are to share according to their needs and capacities. It must include the good-will, which is a kind of holistic urge, a spirit of wholeness and integrity, directed towards synthesizing particular ends into one complex universal good. The good-will is, therefore, the dynamic *structural principle*, or *form*, of the good-willed. Consideration of the consequences of our acts is, therefore, relevant in moral issues. In what sense are they relevant?

To do our duty we must aim at the furtherance of the complete good, or of such aspects of it, and for such persons as are dictated to us by circumstances. But the complete good, or such aspects of

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it as are commanded by duty, i.e. the good consequences which duty commands us to promote, need not be the main motive of our dutiful act, or even a motive at all. Often we have no direct desire for these ends, but we must will to promote them if we are to do our duty, and we *can* will to promote them, for we can have some motive for doing so other than a direct desire for these ends themselves. If we rule out interest in these ends themselves and also self-interest, our motive must be the good of acting reasonably for its own sake. To act reasonably means not only to recognize that others besides myself and my friends have a right to the good things of life and a claim upon me to help them towards these, but also a determined will to fulfil these claims even at the sacrifice of my own pleasure and the expectations of my friends. We should help others to an appreciation of knowledge and art, for example, not because, or not only because, it is good that they should enjoy these things, and because their enjoyment of these things appeals to us and is capable of rousing a desire in us, but also because it is good to act thus disinterestedly on behalf of others, whose claim to our consideration does not depend upon the presence of a fellow-feeling for them. The willingness to restrain our selfish desires, and even our kindly impulses towards others, so as to act impartially and reasonably—it is *this* that constitutes our moral goodness. It is this good which, as an ideal, makes itself felt in our consciousness as a categorical imperative.

I shall now consider the relation between "right," "duty," and "morally good." A right act is, strictly speaking, one which *will* bring about the best consequences. The plain man often uses the word in this sense. If he has genuinely tried to do his best, but finds out subsequently that he really did more harm than good, will he not say, "I did the wrong thing"? Or, say, a self-seeking prime minister decides, in opposition to public opinion, to abandon the gold-standard, because he sees that, if he does not, his country's trade will be ruined, and he will not be re-elected. Suppose he forces his policy through and prosperity results, will not people say, "He did the right thing after all," and will they not pass this judgment without bothering about his motives? This seems to show that we judge acts to be right or wrong by their consequences, and also without reference to motives. But it is seldom that we can be certain what *is* right in this sense, and then generally only after the event. So "right" usually means what will possibly, as far as we can see, produce the maximum amount of good. Right in this sense begins to have moral implications, and cannot be defined with exclusive reference to consequences. It brings in intentions, the direction a good-will must take. A right act thus comes to mean more an act directed in accordance with Practical Reason, though not necessarily

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because Practical Reason so directs, than an act definable in terms of possible good consequences. Without the conception of an obligation to act reasonably, that is, without the conception of a moral good which is other than, but not opposed to, the benefits to be conferred on humanity, we should not arrive at the notion of a good which includes these benefits, and without this notion there would be no conception of a right act as one which will, as far as the agent knows, promote the best consequences. Even a selfish man who may do right from selfish motives, owes his conception of right to his rationality, or at any rate to the rationality of those from whom he has learned what is accepted as right. So that a right act means not *merely* one which is directed towards the promotion of what is possibly the best consequence; it also implies that this act is *one which is required of a reasonable, and therefore moral, being*.

But a right act is not a moral one unless done from a moral motive. This motive, or end for the sake of which a moral man does the right act, is not primarily the benefits he intends to confer. His motive is the prevalence of reasonable conduct for its own sake. It is when he acts from this motive that his right act has moral worth, because it expresses a good-will. He may have an additional motive in the good consequences intended by the right act, and it is preferable that this motive should also be present. But this latter motive is one which he cannot command at will, whereas, I believe, he can always act from a moral motive, and ought so to act. A right act done from a moral motive I should call a dutiful act, and I therefore disagree with Ross in so far as he holds that, when we are commanded to do our duty, we are not commanded to act from any particular motive, for it is not in our power to command our motives, not even a moral motive. I think even Ross would agree that it is our duty to do the right act, even if we feel impelled to do it neither by self-interest, nor by desire for the good consequences it may promote. But we cannot act without a motive, we must therefore be able to do the right act from the only motive left, namely, the right for its own sake, a moral motive which apparently *is* at our command; only I would say that the moral motive consists in doing the right act because it is through this act we express our will to do good. It may be our duty to do an act towards which we are inclined neither by self-interest nor humanitarian feelings, nor any interest in the results of the act for their own sakes. As we are still expected to do our duty, and as we cannot act without a motive, our motive must be the reasonableness of so acting for its own sake; or, alternatively, our motive must be the exercise of the good-will for its own sake. This motive is always in the background for us to fall back on when self-interest, humanitarian feelings, or interest in the consequences of our act for their

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own sakes, alike fail us. A good deal of our moral spinelessness is due to our predominantly teleological practice. Unless the ends which duty requires us to promote involve our feelings (other than the thirst for righteousness) we are unable to act. Spiritual paralysis and not spiritual diabetes is our malady.

Although I hold the view that we have not done our duty unless we have acted from a moral motive, I hope I have escaped Ross's criticisms, which have force against this view when defectively expressed in the statement, "It is our duty to act from a sense of duty," or, what comes to the same thing, "we have not done our duty unless we have done so from the right motive." Ross maintains that this statement is absurd. If duty = acting from a sense of duty, we can substitute the latter for the former. "It is your duty to act from a sense of duty" would then become "It is your duty to act from a sense of acting from a sense of duty." We can substitute again and we get "It is your duty to act from a sense of acting from a sense of acting from a sense of duty," and so on *ad infinitum*. To put this point more simply. If we are to do our duty from the right motive before we can be said to have done our duty, we must first of all have the conception of an act of duty. If now we add the conception of motive to it before we call it an act of duty, we have as the subject of our proposition, duty bare, and as the predicate, duty plus motive, and we have illegitimately identified the two. And we were able to do this only because we have first of all distinguished between an act of duty, and an act of duty done from the right motive. The same criticism applies to the statement, "You have not acted rightly unless you have also acted from the right motive." We must therefore distinguish between acts which, in Kant's words, are done *as* the moral law requires, and those done *because* the moral law requires. We cannot use the words right and duty indiscriminately for both without confusion. Now, if we agree with Ross that moral motives cannot be commanded at will, we must use the word "duty" for those acts which are done *as* the moral law requires, for "it is my duty," means "I ought"; and if "I ought," I "can." For those acts which are done *because* the moral law requires we must have another word. Ross suggests "morally good."

If on the other hand we hold, as I do, that a moral motive is the one motive that we always have at our command, we may use "an act of duty," and "a morally good act" as equivalent, and apply these words to acts done because the moral law commands them. We should then have to use the word right for those acts done *as* the moral law requires. On this view, an act may be right even if done from a non-moral motive. I prefer this way out of the difficulty to adopting Ross's theory, because the phrase, "it is your duty to

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act from a sense of duty," contains, I believe, a valuable truth, namely, we have not done our duty unless we have obeyed the moral law for its own sake, and not from some selfish motive, or even from kindly impulses. To obey the moral law for its own sake means, according to my theory, to act reasonably, as an end in itself. If we do this, we shall aim at the complete good, as far as we can know what this good is, that is, our reasonableness will express itself in and through a right act, i.e. an act directed towards what, to the best of our knowledge, we judge to be in harmony with the complete good. But it is this reasonableness or willingness to do good which is the motive of a moral act and the source of our sense of obligation.

The statement "It is your duty to act from a sense of duty" contains another important truth, which it expresses confusedly. It implies that the notion of obligation is involved in moral action and bound up with motive. But the concept of obligation stands in great need of clarification, for, as the statement stands, it seems to mean "you ought, i.e. you are under an obligation, to act from a sense of duty." But does a sense of duty mean a sense of obligation? If so, we have "you are under an obligation to act from a sense of obligation," and that means that the ground of our sense of obligation lies in the sense of obligation itself, which is absurd. For moral obligation to arise there must first of all be the conception of a moral ideal, the realization of which is an end in itself. This ideal is not a lifeless idol, it is dynamic, and exerts some influence on us. The experience of this influence constitutes our sense of moral obligation. We have done our duty if the recognition of the moral ideal as an end in itself, with an urgent claim to be fulfilled, determines our acts, irrespective of whatever other urges we have influencing us to act either in conformity with, or contrary to, the requirements of the moral ideal. The statement "It is our duty to act from a sense of duty" is really a confused analysis of the notion of duty, namely, "duty consists in acting from a consciousness of the moral ideal as an end-in-itself with an urgent claim upon us to realize it, the consciousness of this claim constituting our sense of obligation."

The problem of moral obligation may be raised in the form: how can we comply with the requirements of duty, when it does not promise us any satisfaction, and how can such a demand be justified? Is it possible, and is it fair, to ask a man to act contrary to every inclination and feeling? We cannot get out of the difficulty by arguing that duty always requires us to do some good, usually to somebody else, and that the promotion of their good will satisfy our social impulses. The others to whom duty requires us to do good may be just those towards whom we have no social impulses at all, and we may have to do good to them even at the expense

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of those whose welfare we most strongly desire. True enough, we may hold that there is such a thing as a desire to do our duty to those who have a claim upon us, as well as a desire to help those for whom we feel some affection. But that does not help us much. Suppose that I, as an examiner, award the scholarship to Jack Jones instead of to my son, because it is my duty to do so. The situation is not accurately described by saying that my desire to do my duty was stronger than all the impulses and feelings bound up with my own son's successes and failures. Nor can the sense of obligation to do my duty be described as the experience of my desire to do my duty pulling me one way, and my desire to secure my son's success and happiness pulling me the other way. This conflict between the desire to do one's duty and competing interests, gives rise to our feelings of constraint and unwillingness, which make it so hard to do our duty. But this feeling of constraint is merely a consequence of our sense of obligation and not the sense of obligation itself, which is a recognition that the desire for duty has a *right* to supremacy, and should prevail. If our desire to do our duty can be called the strongest desire in every case in which we have done our duty in opposition to competing interests, then it has become the strongest desire through a recognition of the *right* of duty to prevail. Duty is bound up with the sense of obligation, whether we have conflicting desires or not. Butler expressed the same point when he said, "Conscience, had it power as it has authority, would rule the world." But the ideal of duty, which claims this authority, does not necessarily affect us by presenting us with an end which appeals to our sympathies.

The difficulty as seen by Prichard seems to be this: Even if every act of duty requires us to promote some particular good for somebody, it is not this good which is the ground of our sense of obligation. We either in a coldly intellectual way recognize this good as a state of affairs which is called good because it will satisfy someone's needs, and then it can provide no motive, nor give rise in us to any sense of obligation, but is merely a knowing of the specific content of a particular duty; or we recognize the good which duty requires us to promote, in an appreciative way, but then we shall desire it, and from desire no sense of obligation can arise.

Prichard draws the conclusion that we recognize certain acts as right and as obligatory, irrespective of whether or not the state of affairs these acts require us to produce *appeals* to us as good. When there is no such appeal, we still ought to do what is right, and if we ought, we can. Therefore, the recognition of an act as right, and not the appreciation of some good bound up with the right act—for, in this case, there is no such appeal—must be the moving influence in our conduct, when we have done what is right in spite

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of our desire to do something else. In fact, the ends which duty requires us to promote are not presented to us *sub specie boni* at all, but simply as certain results to be effected. It is just because duty does not deign to appeal to us that its demands are felt as obligations.

Prichard's difficulty is due partly to his failure to distinguish between the psychological aspect of our sense of obligation and its ethical aspect. The feeling of unwillingness, and of being pulled contrary to our spontaneous desires, is due to our recognition of a good which has a right to prevail, impinging upon competing interests in some lesser goods. But to feel the appeal of the higher good does not destroy the sense of obligation, for we can desire the highest good without ceasing to recognize its right to prevail, and to feel the securing of this *right* as an *obligation*. I cannot see how anything can place us under an obligation, except a good recognized as such. Nor can I see eye to eye with Prichard in his argument that there is no passing from the conception of a good for humanity which "ought to be," to the conviction that I "ought to do" what I can do to promote this good. To be conscious of the good of humanity as something which ought to be, is to be conscious of its claim upon us to uphold its right to prevail. There is just as *little* and just as *much* difficulty in holding that the recognition of a highest good is bound up with a sense of obligation, as there is in holding that the consciousness of the rightness of an act is at the same time a consciousness of our obligation to do it.

I should, of course, agree that it is not the good of humanity which is the ground of our obligation, but the ground of our obligation must still be a good, for only a good can oblige us. I have already pointed out that we have an *a priori* recognition of a rational principle which claims authority over our lives. That this principle prevails in our conduct, is the good which is the ground of our sense of obligation, and the moving influence of any moral act, even if there is also a desire for the ends which this principle commands us to promote. If we are responsive to this principle, we can, and shall, aim at values that need not involve our sympathies, but which will do so in proportion to our responsiveness. It will lead us to a discovery and an appreciation of a wider good, which will exert on us a no less dynamic influence or claim, being but the full flowering of this rational principle or urge towards wholeness. Though the sense of constraint will disappear from our moral life if we become perfect, a sense of obligation, in its ethical connotation of a recognition of the *right* of the complete good to prevail, will remain.

THE MISSING LINK IN PEACE PLANS

(Address delivered by PROFESSOR J. H. MUIRHEAD at the Eleventh Annual General Meeting of the Institute.)

THE older of us are agreed that never before within our memory has there been a time in which men's souls have been so filled with anxiety as to the condition of the world. The Afghanistan and the Boer Wars as we look back come into our minds. But these were on the outskirts of civilization, and no one really believed that they threatened that of our own country, not to speak of Europe. The period before the Great War was one of violent conflicts, but, as contrasted with those wider and more subterranean conflicts out of which the war rose, they may be said to have been household matters, and only required a little more resolute goodwill on the part of the nation itself for their solution.

Now everything is different; the anxiety is world-wide. It comes, moreover, with the added bitterness of the sense of failure to have secured ourselves against the danger of the "downfall of the civilization of the West" which the War had suddenly revealed to us. It is now seventeen years since a great hope rose within many that by the foundation of the League of Nations Kant's vision, as set out in his Essay on Perpetual Peace, might be on the eve of being realized. The world was terror-stricken with the rising horrors of modern warfare. Here was the Ark that would save us from this appalling flood for all future time, and afford the chance of beginning anew on the basis of a new international order. Whence the shipwreck of these hopes? We have had endless letters and articles in *The Times* and elsewhere on the subject. But how few of them have touched the real root of the failure! G. K. Chesterton speaks somewhere of much of our current literature as mere "splashing about in a vocabulary." How much of our political thinking is mere splashing about in secondary causes! We shall not get the real root of the breakdown of all our peace plans and of all the mechanical means that science, physical and social, has put into our hands for bringing us closer to one another till we recognize that it has its ultimate source in the wilderness of spiritual estrangement from one another in which the nations of the earth are still wandering.

Could the issue have been any other than it was, seeing that our League was founded on no new-born love of mankind or enthusiasm for humanity, no real attempt to understand one another, but on what is a very different thing, the fear of our neighbours. Few of us were thinking of mankind, but where it wasn't of revenge it was of security for ourselves as against one another. But fear of one's neighbour, like fear of the Lord, is only the beginning of wisdom, if it is even that. Peace from war and safety within our own borders can never be ends in themselves. If peace leaves behind it the rankle of injustice, it may be itself an evil, acting merely as a plaster on a suppurating wound. Even justice and the law that supports it are incomplete and precarious, so long as they stand alone and have to rely on a continual application of force, with all the misunderstandings which that must inevitably engender when we are dealing with the complicated structure of international life. Justice is only secure when it stands on a basis of real friendship and mutual understanding. Where we have these, we may even say that law and justice may be left to take care of themselves. "Where friendship is

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there is no need of justice" is one of the greatest of Aristotle's sayings. While fear may be said to be the beginning of Law, love is the chief end of it. Law, with the power that enforces it, is only there that something better may have time to grow out of it. Until international society is united by the same bond that unites families, neighbourhoods, co-operative groups of every kind and constitutes the soul of them, until we come to think of our own and other nations as we think of our private friends and acquaintances, there can be no real advance towards a fellowship among them.

What is the meaning of friendship in ordinary life? What is it that you desire for your friends? Is it not that they should live truly up to the best of their capacities, material, mental, above all spiritual? We don't say all this when we wish them all happiness. Most of us, I suppose, are thinking mainly of material things. But this is what at bottom we mean. We intend to include all mental and spiritual blessings, and the last as including all the others. Unless this kind of friendship underlies our efforts to form political leagues and peace plans for the world we labour at them in vain. Love is Lord (so far all the great religions of the world are at one) and "Except the Lord build the house they labour in vain that build it. Except the Lord keep the city the Watchman waketh but in vain." Is this an impossible ideal as between nations and races? If it is, then we are back in heathendom. The cry must be, "Each to your tents," which, translated into modern language, means "Each to your fortifications, your lines of trenches, your cruisers, your aeroplanes, and your bombs." How long shall we be before we awaken to this? How long shall we be in discovering the falsehood that underlies Hobbes's saying that "man is a wolf to man," and the essential deep-lying truth of the opposite saying of Spinoza's, "There is nothing more serviceable to man than man"?

There are immense difficulties in our way. We have recently been realizing how difficult, even impossible, it is to apply the analogy between the relations of individuals and groups within a nation to nations in their relations with one another. But this difficulty is increased tenfold in face of the reversion of so many of our neighbours to the inflamed nationalism and racialism that was the root cause of the Great War, with that terrible instrument at their disposal ("an instrument with teeth")—the concentration of power and influence over the nation's mind in the hands of a national hero. There was nothing in which the philosopher Kant showed more prophetic insight than in the emphasis which he laid upon the condition that the nations which were to form his League should be republics in the full sense of the word. It was not to him a question of President, King, or Leader, but of devotion to a *res publica* or common good; nor again merely the devotion in each to its own good as a separate nation, but to the common good of mankind. It meant to him the acceptance of his great ethical maxim that "each should treat humanity in his own person and in the person of others always as an end, and never as a means only," as applicable to nations as well as individuals. Without this he saw that we should be building our League upon sand. It might even be, as Hegel foresaw with equal insight, merely a provocation to form other perhaps more powerful leagues outside of it; and the last state of mankind might be worse than the first.

Yet against the acceptance of the maxim in this wider sense the new continental politics has raised a formidable barrier. I do not in the least underestimate it. But I wish to conclude by calling attention to some considerations that, in the general sense of failure, may be the ground of renewed hope. The first is that our own generation has seen the growth of humanitarian feeling to an astonishing degree in the treatment of individuals and classes

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within civilized nations. No matter how this change has been brought about, the fact is there in the growing recognition of the rights of women and children, of workers, of the workless and the slum dweller, even of the so-called criminal class, and constitutes the best of omens for the possibility of extending it beyond the nation to the community of nations, the backward and the forward alike. At any rate, that is the task of the coming century, which it has to attempt at the peril of losing this and everything else that the past has won.

A second thing (by this time almost a commonplace) is that the imposed treaty of 1919 has been largely (if not wholly) responsible for these sinister reactions. You can't sow to the wind and not reap the whirlwind. You can't give way to passion and revenge in making peace any more than in making war and hope to escape the nemesis of your crime. Seldom has this lesson been driven home with such terrible convincingness as in the present case. Whether it be still possible to repair the blunder remains to be seen. It all depends on the amount of the humane feeling I have been speaking of that we are prepared to bring to the task. Where there is a will there is a way; and where there is a good will there is a good way.

The third thing and the most important of all is the discovery of the power which modern systems of education and propaganda, consistently directed to one supreme object, have of influencing the mind of a nation. We know how this weapon was used in pre-war Germany. We see with what fatal power it is being used in the Italy and post-war Germany of to-day. "*FAS EST ET AB HOSTE DOCERI.*" If this tremendous instrument can be used for one purpose it can be used for another. If it may be made an instrument of evil, it may also be made an instrument of good. The "intellectual co-operation" that has been acknowledged at Geneva as a part of the League's work from the beginning is a good thing, but it is not enough. What is wanted is a *moral* co-operation directed not to the extinction of national feeling, but to the recognition of what it is that unites nations to one another, their common and precarious tenure of life upon one small planet, their common inheritance, equally precarious, if a civilization that has been won for them in some degree by the heroic efforts of all the chief races and nations of the world in their art, their literature, and the various types of excellence, intellectual and moral, that they have developed in the past, and the unlimited possibilities they hold within themselves of developing them in future in new creative ways. We are in revolt, and rightly, against the intellectualism of the older education, and are seeking to direct it far more to the cultivation of feeling than it has hitherto anywhere been. But it all depends on the kind of feeling we seek to cultivate. This must include feeling for our homes and country, our nation and race. But it must be feeling for these only as part of the greater whole from which none can be separated without irreparable loss to itself, and only as offering the opportunity of contributing to the common work of making this tiny globe a fitting home, not for heroes, but for "Every Man." "All fine things are difficult." We are aiming at the finest of all—an *ENTENTE*, not between two or more single nations, but between all the nations of the earth. No *ENTENTE*, whether of few or many, can be the real thing unless it be an *ENTENTE* in the full dictionary sense of the word—that of an *understanding*. And to be such an understanding it must be *CORDIALE*, again in the full dictionary meaning of the word—something in which, not only mind speaks to mind, but heart speaks to heart. Machinery to embody and give effect to this there must be. Mr. H. G. Wells so far has been a true prophet to his generation. But no machinery will create it, and so long as our prophets are under the delusion that it will, they prophesy a vain thing. Out of the heart are the issues of life, and no machinery can put the new heart in us.

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PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY

OF late years Benedetto Croce's interpretation of the philosophy of G. B. Vico has been exposed to continual criticism from Catholic writers anxious to claim for themselves the figure of the great eighteenth-century thinker, wrested from them by Croce for inclusion in a setting of secular and immanentistic philosophy. The Catholic polemic was founded partly on a false supposition: it derived from the idea that Croce meant to deny entirely Vico's Catholicism. Instead, Croce made a distinction between Vico the man and Vico the philosopher. While he recognized that the man cherished Catholic sentiments and beliefs, he denied that the philosopher could re-enter the circle of dogmatic and confessional philosophy. To confirm the accuracy of his interpretation, Croce has now republished an interesting monograph by an eighteenth-century Catholic writer, a little later than Vico, G. F. Finetti,¹ who subjects the doctrine of Vico to a lively criticism. The motive of this exhumation is plain: "The protest of eighteenth-century Catholic criticism against the doctrines of Vico, or rather, against the doctrines of an author well known to be a blameless observant throughout his life, is of considerable importance because it is the first real acknowledgment of the revolutionary spirit, the anti-Catholic and generally anti-religious spirit, which informed his doctrines." "Finetti with fine intuition perceived that to allow the feral state as the starting-point for the development of humanity was sufficient to shake the Catholic conception to its foundation. With that historical and philosophical conception the origin of the human race could be explained by internal dialectics, without the intervention of a religious transcendent power, and outside the framework of the Bible and sacred history. He did not let himself be deluded by the distinction Vico made between profane history, or the history of the Gentiles, and sacred history, or the history of the Jews, because he saw the former and not the latter deploy in the author's mind as the sole object of his attention, and in the whole of the *Scienza Nuova* he found no trace of the action of Christianity or of the Church. Still less was he deceived by Vico's continual reference to Providence, because the Providence of Vico seemed to him very different from the Providence of the theologians. The genesis that the philosopher assigned to religion revealed itself to Finetti as Lucretian, not Christian. He was deeply preoccupied by Vico's disintegration of the personality of Homer and of other heroic characters, because this method inevitably pointed the way to the ultimate disintegration of Moses, the patriarchs and the prophets, and the stories in the Scriptures, which someone or other would not fail to carry out, indeed it was already taking place at that time—a step which was all the more natural and logical if, as it seems to me, the treatment to which Vico submitted Homer was suggested to him or facilitated by the knowledge of the treatment Spinoza had used for Moses and the prophets."

From this a further problem arises: how comes it that the Catholic Finetti, at his first reading of Vico's works, clearly perceived their anti-Catholic

¹ G. F. FINETTI: *Difesa dell'autorità della Sacra Scrittura contro G. B. Vico*, con introduzione di B. Croce, Bari, Laterza. 1936. Pp. xvi, 108.

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character, while contemporary Catholics who surely ought to be instructed in secular historical criticism persist in seeing in Vico a partisan of their principles? For Croce the reply is obvious: Finetti was a sincere believer who therefore was not satisfied with Vico's outward conformity to the letter of the Scriptures; the same cannot perhaps be said of the Catholic apologists of the present day.

The centenary of the death of the Italian philosopher, G. D. Romagnosi, was celebrated in Italy in 1935, occasioning many publications which, as usually happens at such anniversaries, exaggerated his historical importance not a little. An appreciation that I would like to mention is the restrictive judgment, but clear and well balanced, of Professor Giorgio del Vecchio, set out in a commemorative lecture read to the University of Parma.¹ Romagnosi was born at Salsomaggiore in 1761. He studied the physical and mathematical sciences, later philosophy, and was guided by his tutors towards the doctrines of Leibniz. Kantian critique had but a slight influence on him; rather he sympathized with the French sensist and materialistic doctrines, yet without identifying himself definitely with them. As Vecchio says: "In a word, naturalism is the sum total of the Romagnosi system, a system which certainly goes beyond the sensism of the eighteenth century, but definitely stops short of the arguments of criticism and idealism founded therein. Rather, by anticipating their fundamental traits, it links up with the positivism and the evolutionism which were to have such a great part in European thought after the first third of the nineteenth century, that is, immediately after Romagnosi had completed his days of labour."

Furthermore, del Vecchio acknowledges that theoretical philosophy is not the most original or the most elaborate part of Romagnosi's extensive activity as a writer. This activity was displayed chiefly and much more profitably in the field of public and private law, of economics and statistics. His best work, in del Vecchio's opinion, is the *Genesi del diritto penale* (Genesis of Penal Law), published in 1791. "It is not an exaggeration to say that with this work Romagnosi has given to the science of penal law a surer basis than it had ever had before. Nor does he thereby lessen the worth of those who preceded him in the study of this difficult theme, and particularly of those glorious sons of Italy, Beccaria, Filangieri, Pagano. The first of these, the second too, though indirectly, certainly contributed in preparing the thought of Romagnosi. But if these authors shared the illuministic and humanitarian intention of introducing an equal measure where before the blindest and most irrational cruelty had ruled, yet to the strongly systematic spirit of Romagnosi belonged the office of building the edifice of penal law from its foundations, resolutely abandoning the old formulas of this most unfortunate part of philosophy, without, on the other hand, trusting in the often deceptive impulses of sentiment. The principles laid down by Romagnosi about a century and a half ago have not only withstood the many agitations of doctrinal disputes in this matter, but represent therein even to-day the surest orientations."

A. Aliotta has published a thought-provoking monograph² into which he has compressed the more salient points of the conception of philosophy, which has been maturing in his mind for more than twenty years of study. He calls this conception radical experimentalism. "A radical experimentalism," he says, "is the one method, it seems to me, which is adapted at the present

¹ G. DEL VECCHIO: *Giandomenico Romagnosi nel primo centenario della sua morte*. Roma, *Rivista internazionale di filosofia del diritto*, fasc. I, 1936.

² A. ALIOTTA: *L'esperimento nella scienza, nella filosofia, nella religione*. Napoli, Perrella, 1936. Pp. 102.

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time to Italian thought to make us leave the judgments of empty dialectics, without returning through the fog of a no less arbitrary mysticism or being numbed in the musty little formulas of the scholastic tradition." The word experimentalism suggests at first sight an analogy with traditional empiricism. Against this collocation Aliotta affirms that "experimentalism recognizes no truth or reality that may be right outside the work of man; for that reason it must not be confused with empiricism in its classical form. The old style empiricist always supposed an external nature from which sensations derived, and he made consciousness consist in the reproduction of a web of things and relations given from without. In this way all value was taken from our subjective activity, which was even considered a disturbing element." On the other hand, Aliotta's experimentalism can be differentiated from any form of rationalism, dogmatic or critical, in that it radically excludes any logical preconceived design which the intellect ought almost to read in itself according to the theory of innate ideas, or perceive intuitively outside itself according to the claims of Malebranche and Gioberti. It excludes it even in the disguised form which it assumes in Kant's philosophy, because it admits no immutable structure of categories according to which the subject is bound to think. All the categories of the mind are produced by its free activity, which never stops definitely in a given rational form, but can always generate other more complete logical structures. In this affirmation that logical structures are built by the mind, above all in placing the criterion of their truth in a concrete action which they exercise in the world of our human experience, Aliotta's experimentalism marches with pragmatism. But it differs from that too, in that it strives to free itself from the prejudice of a pure experience, that is, of an amorphous fact on which thought would act, changing its shape for practical needs: "Experimentalism thus takes from thought all character of arbitrary superposition and gives an objective value to human logic, however susceptible of infinite gradations. If he affirms that experimentalism alone is the proof of the degree of all truths, if in this he is even more radical than James, who continues to speak of truths absolute, unconditional, and eternal, yet he gives to the concept of experiment a precise meaning that frees it from a kind of vagueness which was still in the pragmatistic manner of understanding verification; above all, it frees it from that dangerous subjectivism by which truth appeared as an adaptation of fluid experience to our human needs."

In order properly to understand this philosophy (which among all the differentiations remarked upon has been only negatively characterized), we must consider that it derives from scientific experience, in which the experiment is not a reproduction or imitation of an existing order but an active modification by means of the intelligence, the creation of a higher order. Aliotta holds that the value of this intervention of the subject in the world is not limited to the physical sciences, but can be extended to any field of human activity, and he gives short examples drawn from religious experience, metaphysical experience, from logical experience itself. Thus he is drawn to recognize a foundation of truth in idealistic conceptions which seek to give a pre-eminent creative function to human subjectivity, without, however, accepting the idea of a rationality enclosed in a predetermined system of categories, which would annul all possibility of progress. If I were to indicate among the most generally known philosophies one that came nearest to Aliotta's philosophy, I think Dewey's would be the nearest approach to his inspiring mind.

A short informative note is not the place for discussing Aliotta's ideas, which provoke in the reader a double current of agreement and objection.

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But the very fact that they can provoke it is a sign that they are live and suggestive ideas even in a very summarized form; all the more so that Aliotta, by his preceding works as well, is well known to English readers, who will find united and condensed in this latest monograph the mental "experiences" of the Italian thinker.

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO.

(Translated from the Italian by Constance M. Allen.)

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Bernard Bosanquet's Philosophy of the State. A Historical and Systematical Study. by BERTIL PFANNENSTILL. (Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup. 1936. Pp. iv + 324. Price 10 kr.)

This is a sympathetic exposition and defence of Bosanquet's philosophy of the State. It is a useful piece of work, competently and thoroughly carried out. Its usefulness lies, I think, in the fact that this co-called Idealist theory of the State is the only theory which has paid thoroughgoing attention to all the problems which must be considered by a theory of the State, and at the same time is a theory which has yet to receive a satisfactory statement. And any attempt to understand the *Philosophical Theory of the State*, which still remains (with all its defects) the most comprehensive account of this theory, is a useful preliminary to restatement. Preachers, journalists, politicians, and moralists have all had their whack at this theory, and they are satisfied that they have discredited it. But it still retains some vitality, and when, if ever, a philosopher turns his attention to it again, he will find what this book has to say both relevant and valuable.

It consists of 300 pages, and is divided into four chapters; and it is only in the last chapter, the last hundred pages, that the author comes to grips with Bosanquet's philosophy of the State itself. The earlier chapters are devoted to discussions of the object and method of political philosophy, the historical basis of Bosanquet's theory, and Bosanquet's general philosophical position. And this proportion seems to me, on the whole, to be right. It is impossible to understand this theory of the State apart from the general philosophy to which it belongs, and when that is understood the obscurities of the political philosophy are few and relatively unimportant.

Mr. Pfannenstill takes Bosanquet's theory to be an example of what he calls a "universalistic" theory, and contrasts it with what he calls an "individualistic" theory. These theories are alike in being "ethico-normative" theories; but the main difference between them lies in their different concepts of freedom. There is, however, a point of importance which he does not consider. What he speaks of as the "individualistic" theory, in all the examples of it that we have, has always been distinguished by a hedonistic ethical foundation; and the "universalistic" theories differ from it in their rejection of hedonism. And again, while Bosanquet's philosophy of the will is thoroughly and intelligently discussed, not much is said expressly about his philosophy of the self. Yet it is its thorough consideration of the self which distinguishes this theory from the so-called "individualistic" theories, which are inclined to treat the self as something too important to be examined.

Throughout the book, Bosanquet's theory of the State is taken together with that of Hegel, Green, and Bradley, and the criticisms of Hobhouse and others are considered with care. The author never attempts to go beyond Bosanquet, or to point out how the defects of Bosanquet's exposition might be remedied; indeed, he recognizes few defects. He is concerned almost entirely with removing the more obvious misunderstandings of that theory, which (though some of them are obvious enough) are sufficiently widespread to be worth while considering, and with giving a systematic exposition of

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Bosanquet's thought. And, within these limits, and in spite of its rather uncritical attitude, it is as complete a guide to Bosanquet's theory of the State as one could wish.

M. OAKESHOTT.

In the Shadow of To-morrow: A Diagnosis of the Spiritual Distempers of Our Time. By J. HUIZINGA, translated from the Dutch by J. H. Huizinga. (London: William Heinemann, Ltd. 1936. Pp. ix + 218. Price 7s. 6d.)

Diagnoses of our present troubles are so many and, too frequently, so partial and hasty—if not hysterical—that it is a sign of courage in a scholar of European fame to publish yet another. It is to invite the disregard of a crisis-sated public. Yet the idlest glance at Professor Huizinga's book reveals its importance and distinction. The crisp chapter-heads alone excite an interest which carries the reader eagerly to the text and through it to the conclusion with unabated attention. The author brings to his task of diagnosis the equipment of a great philosophical historian and political philosopher; while the translator gives to his father's thought a form worthy alike of its matter and of our English tongue.

The tap-root of our spiritual distempers Professor Huizinga believes to be the "anti-noetic creed" or the disavowal of intellect and morals. "Systematic philosophical and practical anti-intellectualism such as we are witnessing," he maintains, "appears to be something truly novel in the history of human culture." In all previous reactions against intellectualism truth and knowledge in their widest sense have never been forsaken, whereas this goes the whole way to fetch up in a stinking morass of sentiment and slogan, of "blood and soil" and "nordic heroism." This "stale romanticism" with its sentimental slogans is intrinsically dangerous, but when taken as a major premiss in what purports to be science and as a principle determining forms of life and art, its influence is yet more deeply perverting and perilous to sanity and culture. It reaches those ultimate springs whence, however imperceptibly, a civilization draws its spirit, its life. Our present incipient dementia may (Professor Huizinga, in his opening sentence, fears) give way "to a frenzy which would leave our poor Europe in a state of distracted stupor, with the engines still turning and flags streaming in the breeze, but with the spirit gone."

To those who suppose him to be a pessimist the author answers shortly, "I am an optimist." Yet he is an optimist only as the greatest Christian theologians have been optimists in that they (and he) have been able to encompass in their creed a proximate pessimism darker dyed than that of even Spengler, whose factitious despair is warmed by the romantic hope of "Faustian greatness" and "healthy warlike joy." Professor Huizinga is not unfair to the "political revivalisms" of to-day. These "have caught something of the spiritual attitude necessary for the restoration of culture, but it is impure, wrapped up in excessive puerilism, overborne by the cries of the caged animal, sullied by falsehood and deception."

The healing of our distempers, he holds, awaits a new *askesis*. This, he continues, "will not be one of renunciation of the world for heavenly bliss; it will be one of self-domination and tempered appraisal of power and pleasure. The exaltation of life will have to be toned down a little. One will have to remember how Plato already described the occupation of the wise man as a preparation for death. A steady orientation of the life consciousness on death heightens the proper use of life itself." And, "The new *askesis* will

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have to be a surrender, a surrender to all that can be conceived as the highest. That can no more be a nation or class than the individual existence of the self." Where, whence, and how the "indispensable purification" will set in he very wisely does not attempt to say; yet he is willing to state his conviction that it will—that in the future lies *katharsis* not destruction.

Perhaps one of the most wholesome symptoms in our disordered time is that this book is already something of a best-seller in Holland, and bids fair to become one in Great Britain. Thought (and still less reading) is not action, but, unless the noetic creed—or faith in intelligence and conscience—is utterly baseless, this remarkable essay, widely read, cannot but move men, or dispose them to be moved, in the right direction.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

The Chinese Renaissance (The Haskell Lectures, 1933). By HU SHIH. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; London: Cambridge University Press, 1934. Pp. viii + 110. Price 7s.)

No one is better qualified than Professor Hu Shih to interpret China, both to the West and to his own countrymen. Not only does he know America and Europe, but he has been, as far as one man can be, the parent of more than one of the intellectual movements which have contributed to make the China of to-day. In the Lectures published under the title *The Chinese Renaissance*, he compresses, with masterly skill, into a book of just over 100 pages, the experience and reflections of a life-time. The result is the best introduction to the study of China which exists in English. The belief that China is an enigma, in a sense in which other countries are not, is a cherished Western illusion. Its victims, who are numerous, will find in this unpretentious volume an effective antidote.

Professor Hu Shih begins by treating the situation of China to-day as a particular case of a general problem. Dislocation arising from a conflict of cultures is not an uncommon phenomenon. Struck by the impact of Western civilization, Japan effected a political and economic reconstruction which, whatever its remoter consequences, appears as yet to be stable. Confronted with the same alien force, China dissolved in a disorder which has lasted a quarter of a century, and which—though it is commonly exaggerated by Western writers, who are apt to forget that China is as large as Europe without Russia—is sufficiently serious. Professor Hu Shih's first chapter is devoted to a discussion of the causes of this impressive contrast. His answer to that question is given by pointing to the salient differences, when the Western impact occurred, of social organization in China and Japan. The existence in the latter of a powerful ruling class, of a strong military tradition with a caste to represent and perpetuate it, and of an imperial house which, when the moment came, could be turned into a symbol of unity and regeneration, favoured a controlled and authoritarian readjustment. In China, where authority was weak, what occurred was, not an organized reconstruction, but a "diffused assimilation" of Western influences, without the power required in order to canalize them. The words of a Chinese scholar put the situation in a nutshell: "It is easy for China to acquire the civilization of the West, but it is very difficult to master its barbarism. Yet, I suppose, we must first master this barbarism, before we can feel at home in this new civilization."

"Western civilization" includes a variety of influences, from Shakespeare and Newton to bombs and poison gas. A European can hardly read Professor Hu Shih's second chapter, in which he discusses the revision undergone by

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Chinese estimates of the West since the time when China discovered that the admired Jesuit missionaries of the seventeenth century were not its most typical representatives, without a sense of humiliation. The war of 1914-18 destroyed, perhaps, as many amiable illusions in China as in Europe. By the end of it a Chinese intellectual Renaissance was under weigh, of which the author writes with the authority of its pioneer. In essence it was a return to the popular tradition represented by the *pei-hua*, the vulgar tongue of the great majority of the population. The movement was aided, no doubt, by the indignant nationalist feeling which woke when China learned that the Peace Conference proposed to hand over to Japan the former German possessions in Shantung. But its roots lay deeper. China had discovered herself by discovering, at first with extreme reluctance, the character of a culture alien to her own. That the Intellectual Renaissance was overdue was shown by the rapidity with which, once launched, it triumphed.

The cultural tradition on which it worked was profoundly different from that of the West, and Professor Hu Shih devotes some illuminating pages to the causes of the contrast. The predominantly literary and philosophical culture of China has not, however, prevented the emergence of natural scientists, who, like the late Dr. V. K. Ting, the founder of the geological survey, Dr. W. H. Wong, and Dr. J. S. Lee, have done admirable work in their own field. The contrast between the attitudes of China and the West to religion, is, perhaps, more fundamental. The subject is one on which verdicts based on the temper of a single generation, or even century, are notoriously misleading. Religious fanaticism, though it seems to-day peculiarly alien to the Chinese outlook on life, is by no means an unknown phenomenon in Chinese history. On the whole, however, a rationalist mentality has been, Dr. Hu Shin thinks, more characteristic of China than of Europe, and the slowly advancing Westernization of Chinese economic life is on its side. To that immense movement and its social repercussions Dr. Shih devotes a concluding chapter of the highest interest. Altogether this book is a *tour de force* of lucidity and compression. It may be added that it is written in an English which many Englishmen might envy.

R. H. TAWNEY.

The Revival of Pascal: A Study of his Relation to Modern French Thought.

By DOROTHY MARGARET EASTWOOD. (Oxford Studies in Modern Languages and Literature. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. xii + 212. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

The revival of Pascal, or perhaps it might rather be said the first attempt to find a positive value in his writings, belongs to the last decades of the nineteenth century. It is not the Pascal of Jansenist controversy, though that subject is not absent, but the author of the *Pensées*, the thoughts that have compelled a number of French thinkers to ask what are the fundamental truths implied in their attitude towards reality. The present work is in the first place a brilliant exposition and analysis of several strands of recent French thought, but it is also a valuable contribution to the understanding of Pascal.

However diverse these writers may be, we find them all adopting Pascal's attitude and breaking away from the complacent rationalism of the nineteenth century. Bergson and the mathematician Henri Poincaré appear to have dealt the first blow. But how much have they in common with Pascal? Poincaré's scepticism towards scientific concepts remained scepticism, but Pascal, in spite of his sceptical method, cleared the ground for "une idée

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de la vérité, invincible à tout le pyrrhonisme"; while Bergson's doctrine, which, we are told, leaves the whole domain of morality untouched, does not lead to any truth of value to Pascal. Nevertheless, the author gives a long and important chapter on the conflict between scientific dogmatism and the new intuitionism. It is needless to discuss it, for every reader will have his own point of view, but no one can doubt that it is an illuminating account of this revolution in French thought.

But there is another type of thought, that of Catholic France, which takes us into another world. Here we find not only the pragmatists but Brunetière discussing the famous Wager, Blondel with a new philosophy of action, and Father Laberthonnière writing an apology, and finding that the Thomist position and his own are fundamentally irreconcilable. Finally, the question of Pascal's Jansenism intrudes. Did he die in a state of complete submission to the Church? This question is discussed, but surely the only thing that matters is whether he held a Jansenist position when he wrote the *Pensées*. This chapter is somewhat inconclusive, as the author disclaims any attempt to define the teaching of Port-Royal, and thinks that two directly opposite views may be maintained with equal emphasis. But at least we have the unbiased attempt of one writing "without any confessional bias" to arrive at the truth; and the final conclusion appears to be sound, that the basis of the *Pensées* is not any Jansenist dogma but the mind of Pascal. The chapter on the new interest in Pascal as a mystic at first appears to land us in the deepest problems of religion, but really "the conceptions of mystical theology" are assumed, and what we have is a discussion of the new attitude of twentieth-century thought to the mystical aspect of Pascal. Naturally there will be some who will shrink from seeing him discussed in the light of William James and the new psychology, but granted the point of view the chapter is an essential part of Pascal's relations to modern French thought. Throughout the book there are odd turns of expression, which arouse not criticism but the deepest sympathy for one who through ill health had largely to depend on her own energies, and who yet succeeded in portraying a complex and important chapter of French thought and throwing new light on the character of a great man. The care and devotion of her friends who have revised and edited the work has been well spent.

E. J. THOMAS.

Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century. By GEORGE H. MEAD.

Edited by MERRITT H. MOORE. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. London: Cambridge University Press. 1936. 1 p. xxxix + 518. Price 22s. 6d. net.)

The most striking thing about the thought of the nineteenth century is perhaps its lack of originality. The doctrine of evolution which fills so much of the literature of the time results from the adaptation to empirical science of the historical method discovered in the century preceding. Pre-Raphaelitism in art and the Catholic revival in religion are regressions to medieval ideas strong enough in this country to cast a spell even over a man like Carlyle. The aridity of nineteenth-century philosophy is a commonplace amongst those who have to teach the history of philosophy from Descartes to the present day; just as the technologists of the period confined themselves to the unoriginal task of building bigger and bigger steam engines, so the philosophers failed to improve on the ideas of their eighteenth-century predecessors, Hume, or Kant, or Hegel (whose system was more or less complete in his mind by 1810 at the latest). The century was perhaps too intent upon

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and successful in material progress to have time or inclination for original thought.

Into that question, however, this book does not enter. It consists of a verbatim report, taken down by a stenographer, of lectures delivered by Professor Mead, who died in 1931, and it is concerned not with the history of nineteenth-century thought as a whole, nor with its origins or development, but with showing the interconnection of historical events, or economic conditions with scientific discovery, and of both of these with philosophy. The French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, and the development of the technique of empirical science have as important a place in the book as the exposition of philosophic ideas. Idealism failed, in Professor Mead's view, because it could not take account of the novelty of scientific discovery and the method of "research science"; his lectures began, therefore, with an account of the "revolutionary" or "romantic" philosophers from Kant to Hegel, went on to give an account of the scientific advance which made them obsolete, and concluded by giving some account of those philosophers who had learned the lessons of science, namely, Bergson, the pragmatists, Russell and Whitehead.

The strength of the book is its concreteness, its insistence on relating philosophical ideas to contemporary life as a whole, and this makes it useful for reference to, for instance, candidates for the Honour School of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at Oxford. But it lacks the brilliance and the incisiveness of Ruggiero (whose work was surely more worthy of mention than those referred to by Professor Moore in his Introduction), and the omission of any comment on the use in the nineteenth century of historical as distinct from scientific modes of thought is extremely curious. It must also be added that, owing to the retention of the lecture form and the consequent repetitions, the book is very tedious to read. It is surely no kindness to the memory of a scholar to publish *in extenso* a verbatim report of lectures delivered extempore from notes, and this volume would have gained greatly in attractiveness had half its bulk been pruned away by a sympathetic pupil of its author.

T. M. KNOX.

The Hebrew Philosophical Genius. A Vindication. By DUNCAN BLACK MACDONALD, M.A., D.D. (Princeton: Princeton University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. xi + 155. Price 11s. 6d. net.)

Philosophy and Faith. By DOROTHY M. EMMET. (London: S.C.M. Press. 1936. Pp. 164. Price 4s. 6d. net.)

Dr. Macdonald seeks to show that the Hebrews had a fundamental philosophy of their own, not simply one adapted from Greece. Whether or no it be regarded as a strong case, it cannot be regarded as a long one, since apart from much said in these 150 pages about the Greeks, there is much space given to translations. For example, the whole of Ecclesiastes is translated—one may add very well translated. But had the material for proving Dr. Macdonald's case been ampler, he could not have spared so much space for extracts. What Dr. Macdonald does succeed in showing is that there is a philosophical background to the Old Testament, but that does not prove that the Hebrew race had philosophical genius. All races have a racial philosophy, just as they have a racial psychology. But it is *phronesis*, not *sophia*. The Hebrew was not a philosopher in the sense that the Greek was. Dr. Macdonald makes much of the concept of Reason as found in the Book

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of Proverbs. Yet even there Reason is much more manifestly extolled as an attribute of God than as the glory of man. The Hebrew race has produced its great philosophers, though, as with the greatest of them, Spinoza, the espousal of philosophy has often meant divorce from the synagogue. Dr. Macdonald has written a most interesting book, and demonstrated the existence of philosophical conceptions in the Old Testament, but it is still open to doubt that it is correct, at least in the technical sense of the term philosophy, to speak of the Hebrews as a philosophical race.

The religious man and the philosopher have often met on some field of quest. "What are you doing here?" inquires the philosopher. "Seeking God," is the reply, "and look, here is a token of Him." "That," says the philosopher, "is merely an aspect of the Absolute." Miss Emmet wants to introduce these fellow seekers to each other. She admits, "The philosopher may even make his contribution to the Church by keeping a certain detachment from it." But she adds, "It must be no attitude of mere indifferent detachment." In those sentences lie the gist of the book. Miss Emmet writes in detachment as a philosopher, not a theologian, but hers is a very understanding and sympathetic detachment. She sees that philosophy and religion cannot conduct separate quests, yet each is suspicious of the other. It is to remove some of that suspicion by showing what is common to the work of each that she sets herself. If we could be delivered from materialist philosophies and dogmatic theologies, from agnostics who make a philosophy of what they don't know and mystics who make a theology of what nobody knows, we might find that religion and philosophy were much closer kin than we think. Miss Emmet's book is admirable in contention, tone, and temper, and should do something, especially among the student class, for which it is particularly suited, to remove the foolish separation between two seekers, each of whom will come back unsatisfied without the knowledge gained by the other. *Philosophy and Faith* is a book that was well worth writing and is well worth reading.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

The Unlimited Community: A Study of the possibility of Social Science. By JULIUS W. FRIEND and JAMES FEIBLEMAN. (London: Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1936. 1st p. 383. Price 15s. net.)

As its sub-title suggests, this book is not so much a contribution to social theory as a consideration of the conditions under which there could be such a thing. Indeed, it is primarily a contribution to metaphysics. According to the authors, the chief defect of modern thought is what they call nominalism, using the word in its medieval sense of the denial of reality to universals; in fact, though they see some signs of grace in Spinoza and Whitehead, the only modern philosopher whom they seem willing to exempt from their strictures is C. S. Peirce, from a remark by whom the main title of the book is taken. And their main aim is to advocate instead a Platonic-Aristotelian realism, in which the objective existence of universals is explicitly upheld. To describe in detail the way in which they develop this thesis would occupy too much space; and it is sufficient to say that they conceive that their task should be carried out in the spirit of modern physical science, of which they regard the procedure, though not of course the explicit metaphysics, as thoroughly realistic in their sense of the word. When this is satisfactorily done, they maintain, it will be seen that values are an essential part of the objective structure of the universe; and it will be the proper duty of the social theorist to consider them mathematically.

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A thesis of this ambitious nature is hardly likely to escape criticism. The social theorist, unless he should chance to be also a metaphysician, is likely to regard it as very remote from his actual studies, and as likely to remain so in any conceivable future. The metaphysician, too, in addition to deploring the indifference to concrete detail of all kinds, is likely to regret the absence, and indeed the impossibility, of any satisfactory conception of individuality; how, on such a theory, could there be individual things, and especially individual minds, at all, and how can we account for our stubborn tendency to associate values with such minds and their experiences? Our authors are not, however, altogether unaware of such criticism, or at least of its possibility. They make no claim that the mathematical treatment of value is now possible, or soon likely to be; and they have much that is valuable, though of a negative kind, to say in the "Criticism of Present-Day Social Theory" which they offer in the second chapter: in particular their attempt to exhibit the corruption of social theory by nominalism is an interesting and effective application of their main thesis. They also attempt to deal with the more metaphysical difficulties by devoting a whole chapter to what they call the "Historical Order," as distinguished from the "Logical Order" of which they suppose objective reality to consist; and in their chapter on the "Epistemological Hypothesis" and elsewhere they have much to say about the place and function of minds in the scheme of things. But they do not explicitly consider either of these objections, or indeed any objections of the kind, preferring to develop their argument dogmatically rather than dialectically; and the remarks which they do make on such topics are not likely to convince or enlighten the critics who do not share their general assumptions and outlook. At the same time, their thesis is well worth maintaining; and they have argued it with considerable skill and force.

O. DE SELINCOURT.

Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel. By M. B. FOSTER. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Humphrey Milford. 1935. 1p. xii + 207. Price 7s. 6d.)

This is an important book. Mr. Foster summons Plato from off his pedestal and argues with him as one philosopher should argue with another, with the result that I have learnt more from his three short chapters on Plato than from many volumes of Platonic exegesis.

But there are dangers in Mr. Foster's method. In the first place, he has not been able to resist the temptation of fitting Plato and Hegel into a neat pattern, in which the one-sidedness and ambiguities of the former are corrected by the latter, and the historical relation of the two is given a purely logical form. Perhaps this fault is inevitable in a Hegelian looking back at the history of philosophy, but it undoubtedly results in an over-simplification of Plato's argument. Partly because he was not so rigidly consistent, Plato was not as pellucidly wrong as Mr. Foster suggests. He did not¹ deny all Reason to his lowest class, and for this reason it seems possible to connect the tripartite divisions of soul and State without violation of the *τεχνη* principle. Each class has a function and a *dominant* interest which is realized in the State by the sacrifice of the *full* realization of its other two interests. But each soul has the three parts, and it is only because Reason is weak in those of the lowest class that it must be aided and guided by the Reason of the ruler.

In effect, Mr. Foster interprets the *Republic* as though it ended at Book IV, and leaves it to Hegel to take the problem a stage further and consider how

¹ See *Republic*, 590 ff.

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the *τεχνη* of ruling can become the free functioning of Reason. But this is precisely the question discussed by Plato himself in Books V to VII, where it is clearly seen that the Guardians are not only *δημιουργοὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῆς πόλεως*, but rational souls aware of the principles of unity which permeate the universe; and where *διανοητικὴ ἀρετὴ* takes up into itself and transforms the *ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ* of Books II to IV.

Thus we reach the strange conclusion that in fact Hegel did not carry the thought of Plato much further than Plato himself. For in Mr. Foster's excellent account of Hegel's political philosophy it is clearly admitted that Hegel too found himself unable to grant to the mass of the people genuine freedom. Hegel and Plato are parallel philosophers of different ages, not stages in the evolution of Philosophy.

But no criticism should leave the impression that this is not a noteworthy book. It is clearly and simply written, and is obviously the work of a philosopher: as such it cannot but stimulate others to a better understanding and a careful re-reading of the texts which it analyses.

R. H. S. CROSSMAN.

An Introduction to Theory and Practice of Psychology. By LL. WYNN JONES, M.A., Ph.D. (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1934. Pp. x + 308. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

This is a valuable addition to the available textbooks of Experimental Psychology. The title is too wide, since the book makes hardly any reference to affection, instinct, or the higher conative processes, omissions not justified by the writer's strict adherence to experimental treatment. But in compensation he has made available to students such topics as Factorial Analysis and Perseveration, which would otherwise have to be studied in the original papers. Within its chosen limits the book is up to date and good, though those who are not fervent believers in the doctrines of Noogenesis may find it inconvenient in use. But this would be true of a textbook written from any definite and consistently maintained point of view, and it is to the author's credit that he has sought to present one consistent theory.

Most of the twenty-four chapters start with instructions for experiments, followed by discussion of typical results and a wider discussion of the general topic. Questions are appended to stimulate the curiosity of the reader. Dr. Wynn Jones has earned the gratitude of teachers of the subject by presenting such an unusual wealth of useful, and often novel, exercises. The instructions are nearly always perfectly adequate, and the discussions good, though necessarily brief. The statistical chapters also deserve praise, and an important feature of the book is the adequacy of the running references and the chapter bibliographies. Throughout the book psychology is presented as a very living field of experimental study, and though it will require supplementation in the important departments omitted, it is well designed to lead students to an appreciation of scientific method and to more extensive study. It is clearly the work of an experienced teacher addressing himself to students.

A. W. WOLTERS.

Early Buddhist Scriptures. A Selection translated and edited by EDWARD J. THOMAS, M.A., D.Litt. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1935. Pp. xxv + 232. Price 10s. 6d.)

This is a practical little book containing a good selection of carefully translated ancient Buddhist texts. Most of these have been long available in com-

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plete translations, but the reader will thank Dr. Thomas for his pleasant introduction to the vast subject. The standpoint taken by the translator is that of the compilers of the Pali Scripture, which means that he declines Mrs. Rhys Davids's view of a falsified and mutilated scripture. This opposition to such a great authority whose numerous works have a larger circle of readers than those of any writer on Buddhism should, in our opinion, even in a work for beginners like the one before us not have been merely hinted at in a solitary footnote (p. xii).

F. O. SCHRADER.

Kamala Lectures: *Evolution of Hindu Moral Ideals.* By Sir P. S. SIVASWAMY AYER, K.C.S.I., C.I.E., LL.D. (Calcutta University. 1935. Pp. xix + 242. Price 4s. 6d. Rs. 2.8.)

The task the author has set to himself in these lectures is to examine the ethical principles of Hinduism with special regard to that defensive movement of Hindu orthodoxy which is represented in the legislature by the so-called Sanātanist group, and in journalism by such papers as the *Indian Mirror* of Bombay. He shows that the assumption underlying this position, viz. that the ethical rules and principles laid down in the ancient "Law Books" (Dharma Śāstras) are *sanātana*, i.e. eternal and immutable, is contradicted by the history of that very literature. But he is not, for that, prepared to assent to all attacks made on Hinduism. There is a good deal in its principles which is sound in his opinion. Thus he thinks that, while the social institution of caste is bound to disappear, the doctrine of Karma deserves to remain the backbone of Hindu ethics.

There is too much detail in some parts of the book, while others are too sketchy. E.g. we need not know all the absurdities Manu has got to say on sins and corresponding penances, while a sentence of three lines telling us nothing but that sea-voyages cause loss of caste is surely too meagre an information on a most extraordinary prohibition which is still in force with the majority of the orthodox. But the book is based on accurate information, and well worth reading. It should be specially welcome to those who, having read Prof. Washburn Hopkins's *Ethics of India* (New Haven, 1924), wish to know how an enlightened and patriotic Indian deals with the same subject.

F. O. SCHRADER.

Pareto's *General Sociology: a Physiologist's Interpretation.* By LAWRENCE J. HENDERSON. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1935. Pp. vii + 119. Price \$1.25, or 5s. 6d. net.)

This book consists of eight short chapters and of thirteen long notes covering an approximately equal number of pages; it has a Preface but no index. The author entertains a great admiration for Pareto's *Treatise on General Sociology*, which he feels is not likely to be appreciated as it deserves, partly owing to its inordinate length and partly owing to the natural difficulty presented by much of it to those who have had little acquaintance with natural science; and he offers his book as a modest contribution to the overcoming of these difficulties. Since it is probably the most elaborate attempt in existence at a purely objective treatment of sociological questions, the importance of the *Treatise* is not likely to be questioned; and a discussion of it is especially welcome just now in view of the recent publication of the English translation.

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Nor can it be questioned that Dr. Henderson has had some success in making clear some of its fundamental ideas. Considerable portions of his book, however, are devoted to chemical formulae, and to other topics which will hardly be intelligible to anybody unacquainted with scientific procedure. Moreover, even the portions of it that are of general interest are mainly discussions of scientific method in general; and he has not really attempted to determine how far the methods appropriate in other sciences can be profitably followed in sociology. It is indeed arguable that his aims could be more effectively achieved by somebody who, while sharing his admiration for Pareto, was more interested in society and less interested in science.

O. DE SELINCOURT.

A History of Embryology. By JOSEPH NEEDHAM, Sc.D. (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1934. Pp. xviii + 274. Price 15s. net.)

In his very comprehensive three-volume work on *Chemical Embryology*, which Dr. Needham published in 1931, a section was devoted to the history of the subject. This historical section is here reprinted as a separate work, the period covered extending from Indian and Egyptian Antiquity to the beginning of the nineteenth century. It is a very readable book, very thorough and scholarly, with enough detail and explanation by the author to make a connected story, but not too much to obscure what is of interest to modern embryology. These qualities make this book the best history of embryology in the English language.

Dr. Needham freely distributes praise and blame among the authors whose works are commemorated in his history. But it is difficult to see what such judgments express beyond the personal predilections of the author, because in different histories one finds the praise and blame differently distributed. Dr. Needham is also fond of seeking for anticipations of modern theories in the works of early embryologists who wrote at a time when the whole outlook was so different from our own that such comparisons must be very hazardous. To the reviewer at least some of the alleged connections between ancient and modern theories seem rather far-fetched.

Dr. Needham concludes his book with ten pages of very pertinent reflections on the lessons of history for modern biology. Among other points he shows how the earlier workers were hampered by the poverty of their language and how this was in part responsible for diverting them from the work of observation to endless discussions of pseudo-problems. Perhaps the most interesting topic in the history of embryology from the philosophical point of view is the lengthy controversy about "preformation" and "epigenesis." Any reader who is interested in this subject (which illustrates so well the evil influence of rationalism in natural science) should compare Dr. Needham's account of it with that of Professor Cole in his *Early Theories of Sexual Generation* which appeared in 1930.

J. H. WOODGER.

Neoplatonism of the Italian Renaissance. By NESCA A. ROBB, D.Phil. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1935. Pp. 315. Price 12s. 6d.)

There is room for a book on the philosophy of the Italian Renaissance in relation to the sources, mainly Plato and the Neoplatonic School, in which it found its inspiration. This, however, is not the subject of Miss Robb's book, though the title might lead us to expect it. In the fifteen closely printed pages

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of bibliography one subject is conspicuous by its absence—Neoplatonism. We look in vain for the names of Plato and Plotinus, and for references to the modern philosophers and historians of philosophy who have written about them. There is nothing in the body of the work to suggest that this omission is accidental. Miss Robb is a learned medievalist and an accomplished Italian scholar. Her book will be full of interest to students of one of the most fascinating periods of European history. But since it does not profess to be a contribution to philosophy, a very brief notice in this journal may suffice.

W. R. INGE.

Outline of Clinical Psycho-analysis. By OTTO FENICHEL, M.D. Translated by BERTRAM D. LEWIN, M.D., and GREGORY TILBOORG, M.D. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1934. Pp. 492. Price 18s.)

We learn from the translators' preface that the volume under review was published serially in the *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, before appearing in book form. It is easy to understand the choice. Dr. Fenichel's book is a monument of laborious systematization. The very index gives proof of this, running as it does to fourteen closely printed pages. But this same index provides a forecast of the almost slavish orthodoxy which one recognizes on perusing the text. Indeed, one could read through this volume and be left with the impression that psycho-analysis marches forward with a united front rolling up the forces of blind ignorance opposed to it and untroubled by dissensions, mutinies, or revolts. The whole tone of the book assumes that the spirit of man can be interpreted completely and exclusively by Freudian theory. To those who accept this assumption the book can be recommended unreservedly. On the other hand, those who have a wider outlook on psychology, philosophy, and indeed physiology, are likely to find it cramped in treatment and narrow in outlook. As examples of the author's loyal objection to physiological aetiology we may take his whole section on addictions (pp. 294 to 312), and his introduction to the chapter on manic-depression (p. 362). Here we see the typical Freudian determined to read Freudian psychopathology into a syndrome that is being recognized, more and more generally, as of endocrine origin. And, as far as philosophy is concerned, the writer has written 478 pages without reference to the subject of values. This might be permissible in a textbook of pure psychology, but not in one that professes to deal with characterology. It is noteworthy that the book contains two references apiece to Kretschmer and Jung, one to Groddeck, and none to McDougall, Adler, or Prinzhorn.

In short, the book is first rate of its kind, but makes no contribution to that synthesis of Freudian theory and the general structure of philosophy.

H. CRICHTON-MILLER.

General Experimental Psychology. By A. G. BILLS. (London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1934. 17p. x + 620. Price 16s.)

This book must be regarded as a textbook in general psychology, but written from the experimental standpoint. It is arranged in six parts. Part 1 deals with the nature of the sensory process, Part 2 with the perceptual process—space perception principally, Part 3 with learning and memory, Part 4 with association and thought, Part 5 with work and fatigue, and

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Part 6 with emotional and affective processes. There are, in addition, two appendices, in one of which is given a brief account of the essential statistical methods in experimental psychology, and in the other the psycho-physical methods are discussed. At the end of each chapter throughout the book appears a very full list of references.

The book is very comprehensive and covers the ground well. Much attention is paid to Parts 3 and 5, and very adequate discussions on learning and memory and work and fatigue are contained therein. The other sections are shorter, and the tendency in some chapters is to give merely a summary of results obtained or of theories expounded. This is apt to make certain parts of the book a little scrappy. The book, however, may be recommended as a useful reference book for students, though not quite for beginners, as well as being of use to those in charge of experimental courses. It could also be used as a general textbook in psychology. It is a pity that no references are given to any articles or books published in this country, for these surely are not so inaccessible as the author indicates in his preface.

MARY COLLINS.

Manu: A Study in Hindu Social Theory. By KEWAL MOTWANI, A.M., Ph.D. (Madras: Ganesh & Co., 1934. Pp. xxvii + 261. Price Rs. 3.)

This is an effort, written in lucid and agreeable style, to present to American instructors in Sociology the bulky contents of the work known as the Laws of Manu as a "social theory in the scientific terminology of to-day. The spirit is ancient . . . and oriental; the garb is modern and occidental." Well, I have tried to some extent to do that in psychology—"myself when young"—I don't do it now. Art warns us; she once tried pictures of people of A.D. 30 or thereabouts, in clothing of the Renaissance. They make to us now no appeal. "Manu's" theory, "Manu's" language belong to the ancient Orient: let the writer seek to quicken our reconstructive imagination and take us back to it. Do not let him ask us to understand, by *brahmacharya*, education, by *artha*, power, by *môksha*, wisdom, or by *dharma*, intellect. Everyone of these is a misfit. Nevertheless, when Mr. Motwani is not trying adjustments, and discusses the history of the many Manus and expounds the aggregate of codes, his book is both informative and interesting.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

Human Personality and the Environment. By Professor C. MACFIE CAMPBELL (London and New York: The Macmillan Co. 1934. 1'p. x + 252. Price 12s. 6d.)

The theme of this book is no new one, but Professor Macfie Campbell's treatment of his subject is delightfully fresh. He has the necessary qualifications for the task—an extensive knowledge of human personality both adjusted and maladjusted, a practised and discerning eye for human behaviour and its motivation, a breadth of erudition possessed by few in his profession, and, above all, a sense of proportion that never fails him.

In this most readable volume we are first given a simple exposition of anatomy and physiology in so far as they constitute significant factors in the environment of the personality. In this connection the author sketches in an intriguing way the modern views of cortical and thalamic influences on behaviour. In the third chapter we have a description of personal development, which necessarily introduces most of the broader concepts of psycho-analysis.

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The second half of the book is devoted to the integration of the personality in relation to society and the universe. In these chapters the author draws upon his wide literary and historical knowledge, and provides examples from all ages and countries, from Loyola to Captain Scott, from Robespierre to Roosevelt, from Shelley to Santa Teresa. This material is handled in a way that can justly be described as fascinating. With an insight that is always tolerant and generally humorous, the unconscious motivation of conduct is laid bare, and we see our saints and heroes, our geniuses and reformers dissected, explained, and demonstrated with no more iconoclasm than is demanded in the interests of accuracy.

No one who reads this book will lay it down without wanting to know more about human personality and wanting to read more of Professor Macfie Campbell's writings.

H. CRICHTON-MILLER.

Eros and Psyche: an Essay on the Constitution and Destiny of Man. By BENCHARA BRANFORD. (London: University of London Press. 1934. Pp. ix + 378. Price 12s. 6d.)

This book has proved difficult to read, and seems almost impossible to review, not because of its profundity or originality, but because of the arrangement and the style. Were it not for the intense enthusiasm and transparent sincerity of the author, one would be tempted to pronounce it a pretentious production with a parade of learning, which disappointed the promise that it held out. I have allowed patience to have "its perfect work," and have been rewarded, not with entire satisfaction but with a qualification of the unfavourable impression which at first the book made upon me. It is good enough to deserve a review, but not good enough to secure an uncritical appreciation.

The argument lacks continuity; there are many irrelevancies; the author is too easily tempted to turn aside into bypaths, and so mislead the unwary reader as to the direction of his journey. While there is an index of names only, the Table of Contents is altogether inadequate, as no chapter headings are given but only the titles, some of them misleading, of the seven books, each of which is divided into a number of short chapters. The use of Greek words where plain English would serve the purpose just as well seems to me an affectation. The definition of love in the last book would lead one to expect *Agape* and not *Eros* as its title. The first chapter of Book V, *The Mission of Genius*, raises six questions about man, and one would expect that the succeeding chapters would answer these questions; but not so. A good deal of historical and autobiographical material is introduced which is really not necessary for the exposition of the subject. It is no advantage to the author that he has, as it were, gone to school to Sir Patrick Geddes, whose methods of exposition always seemed to me too artificial, however great his merits as a pioneer thinker may have been. The diagrams which, following his example the author uses freely, I find no help whatever. There are also arbitrary analogies and artificial correspondences, which show ingenuity rather than insight. For brevity let me tabulate a series:

LAWS	MYTHS	RELIGIONS
Mechanical	Fetishism	Islamism
Biological	Totemism	Confucianism
Sociological	Tabuism	Judaism

I find this simplification of complex problems quite unconvincing. The

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psychology is also arbitrary and its terminology confusing. Again let me illustrate:

MAN AS NATURAL CREATURE

FORM

Mechanism	Sense
Organism	Intellect
Humanism	Feeling

MAN AS CREATOR

SPIRIT

Super-mechanism	Imagination	Artist
Super-organism	Ideation	Thinker
Super-humanism	Idealization	Ethicist

How does this system relate itself to recognized science and current speech? The author is apologetic about his neologisms; but he is far too fond of them and indulges in them needlessly. Would not the word *lover*, parallel to Artist and Hunter, convey more meaning than Ethicist does? Sometimes the writing is eloquent but sometimes only rhetorical. I have offered these criticisms as a protest against a tendency to make philosophy an esoteric doctrine, intelligible only to initiates, instead of making it accessible to all persons of general culture. The sciences need their own precise terminology, and to that no objection can be taken; but in a work like this under review all this "jargon" and artifice is without any justification, and my appreciation of what is good in the book makes me regret that the author seems to have gone out of his way not "to get it over."

As I have indicated, the argument is not consistently sustained, and only a general indication can be given. Book I is an *Overture* of undue length, autobiographical and historical, and one wishes before reaching page 78 that the play would begin. Book II elaborates a distinction between *Fact* and *Myth*, which in varying forms runs through the whole book, reappearing as Form and Spirit, Science and Philosophy, or Religion, Man as Creature and as Creator. Book III, under the fanciful name *Pan*, discusses nature generally; and Book III, also with a fanciful name, *Psyche*, deals with man as natural creature. Book V, entitled the *Mission of Genius*, seems an intrusion; but one discovers that the discussion of eminent thinkers is intended to justify the transition from Fact to Myth, from man as natural to man as spiritual. This is the completion of the argument in Book VI, named *Eros*.

Some of the conclusions advanced may be briefly mentioned. Although the subject is the Constitution and Destiny of Man, the writer is no humanist, but a theist. He closes a sentence dealing with the progressive order in nature and man with this statement: "an order created and sustained by Deity, All-holy Spirit; as Personal, immanent in man spiritual and in nature spiritual, with divine spontaneity suffering with all selves and joyful with all selves: as Absolute, Super-personal, transcending man and nature, beyond good and evil" (p. 269). If the last words mean that for God as Absolute moral distinctions cease, I must register my emphatic dissent. This belief is not "a sentiency of Duty," which accompanies "a sentiency of all nature within man" (p. 171). Religion has significance and value for him (p. 283). His main concern is with man. Man is both natural creature and spiritual creator; he is ever creating himself; it is his imagination which brings his body into being in the mother's womb; for the author whole-heartedly accepts the Eastern doctrine of reincarnation. As eternal spirit man creates not himself alone but his environment, including his fellow-man; for there is an inter-involvedness of God, man, and nature in the continuous creative process. Man is the microcosm and nature the macrocosm: for the latter is fully reproduced in the former, even as regards the chemical elements. A sentence is worth quoting to show the confidence the author has in his own speculations. "Though scarcely one-third of the chemical

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elements have so far been discovered in the body of man, the history of this branch of bio-chemistry supports the conjecture, latent in our fundamental postulates, that ultimately all the elements will be found therein" (p. 240). His outlook is optimistic: "A vital consequence," he writes, "of this transcendental order, this ingenerate bias from irregularity to regularity, is the inherent stability of goodness, truth, and beauty, the cardinal elements of order, with the bliss that is their emotional value and function; and conversely the inherent instability of evil, error, and ugliness, the cardinal elements of disorder, with the bale that is their emotional value and function" (p. 272). While disagreeing profoundly from much of this speculation, which, like the curate's egg, is good only in parts, and distrusting this eclecticism, which draws all fish, good and bad, into its hospitable net, I gladly recognize that the author is on the side of the angels in his estimate of man's constitution and destiny. In his *Envoy* (p. 372) he expresses the hope that his readers will share his happiness in his explorations. Will he make their happiness easier and surer in giving some heed to the criticisms which I have offered in all good will?

A. E. GARVIE.

Inquiry into the Unknown. Edited by THEODORE BESTERMAN. (London: Methuen & Co. 1934. Pp. 142. Price 3s. 6d. net.)

This symposium issues in book form ten B.B.C. broadcast talks on the subject of psychical research, which were given by practical investigators of the subject between January and March 1934. It is a subject which the general public approaches with a considerable amount of bias, and the task of presenting it fairly in so brief a space cannot have been an easy one. Nevertheless, some interesting points of view are raised and discussed, including the charge brought against psychical research of lying outside the realm of science because the phenomena with which it deals are mainly spontaneous. History, it is pointed out in reply, and a large part of astronomy, are also spontaneous or non-experimental, yet not therefore unscientific.

But psychical research has also its experimental side, as is shown by Osty's (and other's) use of the infra-red beam, in conjunction with automatic recording apparatus, to detect the alleged forces of physical mediumship; and the experimental methods now in use for the testing of telepathy and clairvoyance.

The anthropological side of the subject, which includes a discussion of the practices of savage tribes and Eastern cults, with special reference to the "fire-walk," seems to have been accorded an undue importance in the series.

Sir Oliver Lodge refers to the "cross-correspondences" as affording strong evidence for survival. These interesting examples of multiple automatism in which two or more automatic writers have simultaneously produced matter which fits together like the pieces of a mosaic to form a single, intelligible whole are too little known to the public.

Dame Edith Lyttelton gives some clear-cut examples of precognition from her own experience, as when, on February 10, 1914, she wrote automatically the words: "*Lusitania* fire and foam"—and thereafter watched for disaster to the ship, which occurred in May 1915.

The philosophical aspect of the subject is dealt with by Professor C. D. Broad in his lucid summing-up. Although the facts which psychical research alleges "are directly relevant to the very problems which it is their main business to discuss," yet the whole subject, he says, has been ignored by

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nearly all professional philosophers. "You might, perhaps, think," he goes on to say, "that philosophers ignore the whole subject of psychical research in their writings because they have carefully looked into the alleged facts for themselves and have one and all found that there is nothing there but fraud and delusion. If this were so, it would, of course, be highly significant and important. But I can assure you that it is not so. Most philosophers have never taken the trouble even to read the best of the relevant literature, much less to do any investigation for themselves." And point is given to this dictum by a report to which Professor Broad refers, which was published by Mr. H. F. Saltmarsh in the *Proceedings* of the Society for Psychical Research for February 1934. This report contains 281 cases of apparent precognition, the evidence for each of which has been sifted. No attempt has been made by any philosopher to deal with the tremendously important issue here raised or to rebut the evidence. Yet it is the business of the philosopher "to make a resolute attempt to see the world steadily and to see it whole." And it is, moreover, "the odd, exceptional, inexplicable facts, however trivial in themselves (which) are always the points from which the next great and fundamental advance in human knowledge may be made."

G. N. M. TYRRELL.

The Nature of History. By Sir HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., F.S.A., F.R.Hist.S. (London: Oxford University Press: Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. viii + 94. Price 5s. net.)

The aim of this little book is to demonstrate the independence of history from the scientific method and ideal, and to assert its practical and philosophical value as an independent study. In a modest preface Sir Henry Lambert states that his book makes no claim to originality, that it is not a book of metaphysics, but "merely an attempt to give a clear account and definite answers to questions in a matter in which there is a good deal of confusion." I think Sir Henry hardly realizes how profound that confusion is, and that an essay with no pretension to philosophical originality is not likely to achieve a solution of it. But still, within the limits indicated, he has written a quite admirable little book, lucid, judicious, and humane: the trip he takes one is none the less agreeable for not venturing too far to sea. There is just one protest I must make, against his assumption (for which a precedent is to be found, curiously enough, in the opinion of the poet Southey) that the play of *Hamlet* has less interest for us because it is not historically "true."

ADRIAN COATES.

The Idea of Salvation in the World's Religions. By J. W. PARKER, M.A., B.D. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1935. Pp. viii + 259. Price 6s. net.)

This "Essay in the Comparative Study of Religions" deals with salvation in the widest sense—all that man desires to escape or to secure by his relation to spirits, gods, or God. He seeks "relief from present material wants"; he tries to overcome "the dread of evil powers"; he strives for "release" from life as evil; and for "freedom from sin." He craves guidance in "the Way of Life." What other religions only partially supply is perfectly provided for man in "the incarnate God." The words in inverted commas give the titles of the chapters and indicate the nature and the arrangement of the contents. The author admits that what he gives is at second hand from books dealing

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with the religions. On critical, dogmatic, and ecclesiastical questions he is a conservative Anglo-Catholic; and shows no marked originality of thought. As regards the significance of the Cross of Christ, he does not sound the depths of its significance as presented in Evangelical Protestant theology.

His arrangement seems in some respects defective. The first chapter deals not only with material goods, but also with the social order. The dread of evil powers scarcely can claim a chapter to itself. The trust in good powers and the dread of evil powers should have been combined in the first chapter as dealing with natural weal or woe. The teaching on social order might claim a chapter to itself. The description of religions is peculiar, and in my judgment mistaken. I should not describe Hinduism or Zoroastrianism as *universal* religions, but as *national*; and confine the term *universal* to Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity, and Buddhism should not be described as a heresy of Hinduism along with Jainism.

The attitude to other religions is appreciative, although in each chapter the superiority of Christianity is insisted on. The book will serve a useful purpose, not only in showing the solidarity of mankind in regard to the needs religion meets, but in displaying the variety in which the satisfaction is offered. The depreciation of religion as a necessary element of human personality and the substitution for it of an emotional reaction to the Universe without any reference to any divine reality, or of a philosophy which answers the intellectual inquiry, but does not meet the practical needs of mankind, find here a welcome challenge of their adequacy. Could a delusion have spread so wide throughout all mankind, or have endured so long in man's history?

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

Religious Thought in the Eighteenth Century. Illustrated from Writers of the Period. By J. M. CREED, D.D., and J. S. BOYS SMITH, M.A. (Cambridge: at the University Press. 1934. Pp. xl + 301. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

There was a common tendency in the nineteenth century to depreciate the eighteenth; yet, despite its defects and limitations, it made a valuable contribution to life and thought, in philosophy and theology as in science. What we owe to it in religious thought is clearly and briefly presented to us in this useful volume. The quotations from a number of representative thinkers are prefixed by a short biographical note, and besides the well-known names, names now forgotten occur because of some distinctive merit in the eyes of the editors. The main interest in religious thought during this century was the controversy between the Deists advocating natural religion and the Orthodox divines defending a supernatural revelation. What was common to both sides was belief in reason, the adequacy of reason without revelation on the one hand, the argument from reason for the reality of revelation on the other. Accordingly, the first three sections deal with Natural Religion and Revelation, the Credentials of Revelation, the Grounds and Sufficiency of Natural Religion Considered. A fresh phase of thought and life is described in the fourth section, the Passing of the Age of Reason. It begins with the Evangelical Revival under John Wesley and ends in Kant's *Critiques*. The controversy between the Deists and the Orthodox led to the study of the Bible, with which the fifth section deals: not a few of the conclusions of nineteenth-century biblical scholarship were here anticipated. These varied movements, in which there was much activity of mind as well as experience of religion, brought to the forefront the question of the Church in its relation to the State, and this is the subject illustrated

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in the sixth section. The Reformation did not secure religious liberty; it was in this eighteenth century that the principle of toleration was advocated and accepted. It is quite impossible to discuss the contents in detail; this general indication must suffice, with a cordial commendation of the editors' plan and performance, for which all students of theology and philosophy should be grateful.

A. E. GARVIE.

The Theory of Education in Plato's Republic. By R. L. NETTLESHIP. (London and Oxford: Clarendon Press; Humphrey Milford, 1935. Pp. viii + 155. Price 2s. 6d.)

It was an excellent idea to reprint this essay of Nettleship's, since the volume in which it appeared, Abbott's *Hellenica* (1880), has long been out of print, and is in any case less convenient to read than this slim book. Although much progress has been made in Platonic studies since it was written (and in particular Dr. James Adam's exposition, in his edition of the *Republic*, and in *The Religious Teachers of Greece*, should be consulted), yet it remains the best introduction to Plato's theory of education. The Essay is, moreover, as Mr. Spencer Leeson remarks in his brief introduction, "not simply an analysis, but in itself a living whole."

The Trustees of the Jowett Copyright Fund have contributed to the expense of this reprint. Section headings and marginal notes have been added; but the value of the book is very greatly diminished by the omission of references to the text. The Essay should be read in close connexion with the *Republic*, and without references a student will have difficulty in finding the place.

F. A. CAVENAGH.

Manual Skill: Its Organization and Development. By J. W. COX, D.Sc. (London: Cambridge University Press. 1934. Pp. xx + 247. Price 16s.)

The scientific interest in human skill, though a recent development, has already travelled far from the issues raised by the pioneers, F. W. Taylor and F. B. Gilbreth. Their simple "motion study" has been supplemented by specifically psychological approaches, and Dr. Cox's book is welcome, as exemplifying this tendency. He lays stress on the fact that the present volume is concerned with the organization and development of manual skills *after* normal control of the hand has been developed. Yet the treatment in the book, excellent in many ways, does not fulfil the expectations aroused by its title.

The author investigated the conditions in which certain manual operations, which involved the manipulation and adjustment of objects to one another, could be employed as tests, and how reliable measures of individual ability could be secured from them. These initial abilities, for reasons unconvincing to the present reviewer, he calls "static" functions. The investigation of their interrelation raises one's first doubt. Dr. Cox states his aim of resolving the psychological activity in muscular skill into "ultimate unitary mental processes." To read this may raise the eyebrows of psychologists who are not necessarily wedded to the extremest forms of the *Gestalt* school, and when Dr. Cox says "such usage conforms appropriately with that of mathematics" (p. 18), is it not possible that he is putting the cart before the horse,

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or even kissing the rod? Mathematics apart, one would have thought that the word "static" had fallen out of the psychologist's vocabulary long ago. To assume that a person's capacities for doing a particular performance, capacities which depend upon the fluctuations of bodily conditions, are actually static seems unwise.

A very interesting part of the book examines the nature of the changes in abilities which are brought about, first by more or less mechanical practice, and secondly by a special course of training. Such changes are called, with reason, dynamic functions. Dr. Cox then attempts to describe the mental processes involved in improvement in manual operations, and valuably indicates that in the acquisition of manual skill mental processes play a larger part than is commonly supposed.

This allows him to state the problem of the transfer of skill in a relatively new form, for this problem has usually been investigated only under conditions of routine practice and with simple tests, whereas Dr. Cox valuably extends his inquiry to more complex manual operations of the assembling-room.

It seems a pity that the writer uses phrases like "previous researches have already disclosed" where others would say "have shown some evidence," and that such a long book gives so few references. The advanced student, for whom the book is intended, expects them. If there is a second edition—and I sincerely hope there will be—workers in several countries outside England would gladly help to supply a bibliography.

T. H. PEAR.

Morality and Reality: An Essay on the Law of Life. By E. GRAHAM HOWE, M.B., B.S., D.P.M. (London: Gerald Howe, Ltd. 1934. Pp. 136. Price 6s.)

This book deserves special consideration on two separate counts. In the first place the five lectures of which it is composed were apparently delivered to an audience of nursery governesses, and anyone who attempts to distil philosophic truth to nursery governesses commands admiration and sympathetic criticism. In the second place, the author is himself innocent of philosophic training and erudition, and thus approaches his task with an independence of thought and outlook that has both advantages and disadvantages. It is certainly true that he has chosen a title which is intriguing, and which might well adorn a volume more bulky, more profound, and less original. Indeed, if this book is not original it is nothing. But Dr. Graham Howe has brought his fresh and versatile mind to extract from his psychotherapeutic experience certain views of character development which are sure to be helpful to some if not to many. The general theme is a reinterpretation of the familiar Freudian presentation of the Id, the Ego, and the Super-ego. There are those who will think that he has improved on that presentation; others who will consider that he has elaborated it without advantage. Certainly the orthodox philosopher will be apt to cavil at the definition of Reality on p. 18: "That which is now, which is not, as a whole, what I want." Clearly this is a definition which implies an assumption. Again, "A good morality is one which accepts what is true" (p. 21) seems rather an inadequate platitude. One wonders sometimes whether the author does indeed mean morality and reality when he uses these terms, or whether he has not been hypnotized by his own caption and adjusted the connotation of the words to suit his thesis. There are other indications that the author is apt to be carried away by his remarkable facility for contriving arresting headlines, for example, "wholeness and holiness" (p. 123), "Heaven and

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Haven," "Fake Facts or Face Facts," "Convenience and Convention," "Responsibility—Responsiveness—Irrresponsibility." This last example is taken out of the arresting list of "whole words" and "part words" on p. 29. In that list we find that True is the "whole word" which corresponds to the two "part words" Good and Bad. It is difficult to see how any sort of juggling can make sense out of this juxtaposition of different categories.

On the other hand, the book contains many pithy and admirable aphorisms: "I am, then, to predigest reality so that the child may grow by assimilating it in its own way," "We all want the best seats and someone else has them," "This child is not what I want. What am I going to do about it? Do I 'let,' or do I 'try'?" On child psychology the author is always stimulating and generally illuminating. The passage about David and Goliath (pp. 59-64) and that on weaning (p. 30) are particularly good. But when relativity is introduced the present reviewer must admit himself somewhat bewildered. Take, for example, Fig. 3 on p. 44. It is difficult to believe that nursery governesses will be more efficient by reason of the diagram of a spiral with a line through the middle of it to represent a fourth dimension in character growth. The book as a whole is readable, suggestive, and often inspiring, and for these reasons will live down such blemishes as catch the critic's eye.

H. CRICHTON-MILLER.

Conscious and Unconscious Sin: A Study in Practical Christianity. By ROBERT E. D. CLARK, M.A., Ph.D. (London: Williams & Norgate. 1934. Pp. ix + 186. Price 4s. 6d.)

This is an unpretentious but useful work, and while it deals explicitly with Christian character and experience, it implicitly raises psychological and ethical questions of more general interest for the readers of *Philosophy*. While it does not call for a long review, it deserves a brief mention. The style is simple, the argument sound, and the arrangement orderly; and it has what every book should have—a good index. The purpose of the author is to raise the whole moral life to full self-consciousness; and thus to secure a consistent moral character in a fully developed personality. Not only should "provoked" sins, that is, sins of which there is full consciousness, be combated; but "unprovoked" sins, faults, and failings which are subconscious should by reflection be brought out of their obscurity to be dealt with; for his judgment defeats on a wider field of battle may in the long run be better than victories on a narrower. Self-satisfaction with such victories may often go with ignorance or neglect of even more serious defects of character. An educated sensitive conscience and a disciplined intelligence are the conditions of the worthiest type of personality. Even his paradoxes, e.g. that it is better to confess inability to conquer a bad habit with repentance for such failure than to get rid of the struggle with it by rationalization, prove on reflection sound. This book proves that there is a necessary and legitimate casuistry in the education of conscience and the formation of character. I can commend the book confidently.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

Principles of Gestalt Psychology. By K. KOFFKA. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1935. Pp. xi + 720. Price 25s.)

This book will influence the progress of psychology for many years. Pro-

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fessor Koffka has set himself the task of writing a treatise on psychology at large from the standpoint of the gestalt¹ school. The adequacy with which the several sections are treated varies (and the author is very candid regarding his limitations), but most of the subjects are discussed with very great fulness of detail and close argumentation. The appeal to the experimental work of the school is so extensive as to make the book valuable as a work of reference, the extensive bibliography and index adding to its general usefulness. In view of the range covered and the meticulous care in the treatment we must not complain that the book is a very long one, though we may hope that at some future time the writer may feel himself able to take more for granted and provide a more compact statement of his principles. The book is necessarily intricate in its array of facts and arguments, but at the same time is remarkably clear in arrangement and expression. In his preface Koffka ascribes much of the merit of the book's style to Miss Harrower. The reader can only express gratitude impartially to both for the lucidity of statement which distinguishes this work. Unfortunately, the printer has in several cases frustrated their efforts by a disastrous transposition of lines.

It is implicitly claimed that gestalt principles "can lay the foundations of a system of knowledge that will contain the behaviour of a single atom as well as that of an amoeba, a white rat, a chimpanzee, and a human being, with all the latter's curious activities which we call social conduct, music and art, literature and drama" (p. 23). Further, it will retain for science the values of truth and beauty. In attempting to carry out this programme, it is inevitable that the author should at times appear to be achieving a *tour de force*, and in particular the section on Social Psychology appears to be premature. But even this is stimulating, and leads us to hope for a fuller special treatment of the subject.

The foundations of the presentation are the field concept and the principle of isomorphism. The former is taken to mean "a system of stresses and strains" which "determine real behaviour" (p. 42), and this is definitely claimed to be more than an analogical statement. The result is that the boundaries of psychology and of physical science are largely obliterated, and explanations of mental phenomena pushed into the physical sphere. There is one universe of fact with common principles of structure throughout it, so that behaviour can be deduced from the constitution of the field in which the organism is present at a given moment, the organism itself being part of the field. By isomorphism is meant that the structural principles of consciousness are the same as those of the physiological process which accompany it, so that there is no gap between material, physiological, and conscious events and processes. This is worked out most fully in connection with visual perception, along lines which are now familiar. But in spite of the careful treatment the question may still be raised whether we are entitled to use the *physical* conception of a field as more than an analogy, and whether psychological fields must not be treated independently. Further, the writer's claim that we can validly argue from the "behavioural" phenomena to the physiological is too reminiscent of earlier and unfortunate attempts to determine the nature of facts by deduction. To say that if the principle of isomorphism is valid the neural facts must correspond in quality with the conscious facts is only tautology, and the principle can only be established by appeal to the physiological data. Until that line of investigation becomes possible isomorphism can only rank as an attractive and plausible hypothesis, and all that is built upon it will be infected with the same characters. Perhaps, too, its plausibility is largely due to Koffka's persuasiveness, for on reflection it

¹ I follow Koffka's example in abandoning the initial capital.

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must surely appear that the identities of structure which he claims are so very general as to be insufficient to serve as explanatory principles. Nor is the case greatly helped by the play made with terms like force, stress, and tension. In spite of the arguments adduced they seem to be only picturesque descriptions insusceptible of close definition. Even in physical science these terms seem at times to be makeshifts, or unnecessary relics of an earlier stage of scientific thinking, and in the reviewer's opinion gestalt theory would be stronger if it were stated only in terms of descriptive laws based upon the field concept. For this last, when confined to psychology, is indubitably of the first importance, and though it may be claimed that writers in other schools of thought have also realized this, yet none have clarified and emphasized it so thoroughly. For the most part the existence of "field properties" has been accepted in a very general, almost light-hearted fashion; henceforth they provide an endless field for detailed research. No praise can be too high for this achievement. Our complaint is that the talk of forces and tensions adds nothing to knowledge, but only restates the facts in a manner so pretentious as to obscure the real advances made. Is the statement that action results from tension within the Ego better than Locke's, that the mind in willing is moved by a present uneasiness?

While the book is firmly scientific in content and outlook, such broad and bold hypotheses are bound to stir up other interests, and philosophers will find plentiful material for reflection in it, and wonder how the author will steer his way between two perils. For in the earlier sections it appears possible that by his insistence upon the reality of the field he will end by dissolving the psychological data into the homogeneous field of physics; or, if he can stop short of that, that he will reduce psychology to the status of an appendix to physiology. He may claim to have avoided the former risk by his very careful treatment of the Ego, but many will think that he has done so by succumbing to the latter. His theory of the Ego is the most difficult part of the book to understand, but it is quite clear that it rests upon a definitely physiological theory of traces. His hypothesis of traces is the most ingenious and satisfying that we have met, but it is pure deduction from first principles. At all times Professor Koffka is alive to the risk of circular argument, but throughout the relation of physiology to psychology (if he can be said to distinguish them) is dangerously near the circular.

Professor Koffka leaves to the future the decision whether his principles are valid or not. In any case psychologists of all opinions must be grateful to him for this book, which enriches our literature by showing how a systematic empirical science must be built. Those who still feel that biology affords a more promising hunting ground than physics when we need guiding principles, can nevertheless learn much from gestalt.

A. W. W.

Books received also:—

- B. H. STREETER. *The God Who Speaks* (Warburton Lectures, 1933-35). London: Macmillan & Co. 1936. Pp. 224. 5s.
- O. C. J. G. L. OVERBECK, F.C.S. *The New Light*. London: Methuen & Son. 1936. Pp. x + 229. 5s.
- J. WILD. *George Berkeley: A Study of his Life and Philosophy*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. xi + 552. \$6. 25s.
- W. L. GEORGE, M.Sc., Ph.D. *The Scientist in Action. A Scientific Study of his Methods*. London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 355. 10s. 6d.

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- J. H. WICKSTEED, M.A. *The Challenge of Childhood. An Essay on Nature and Education*. London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 336. 10s. 6d.
- A. EAGLE. *The Philosophy of Religion versus the Philosophy of Science*. London and Manchester: Simpkin Marshall, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 352. 5s.
- J. LINDWORSKY, S.J. *The Psychology of Asceticism* (Tr. by E. A. Heiring). London: H. W. Edwards. 1936. Pp. 95. 5s.
- J. H. MUIRHEAD. *John Stuart Mackenzie, 1860-1935*. (From the Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. XXI.) London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. 18. 1s. 6d.
- VARIOUS. *What Can Philosophy Determine?* (Aristotelian Society Supplementary, Vol. XV). London: Harrison & Sons, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 235. 15s.
- D. CARNEADES. *Matter, Spirit and Living Intellect* (English edition). London: Simpkin Marshall, Ltd. 1936. Pp. xvii + 424. 15s.
- VARIOUS. *The Social Sciences: Their Relations in Theory and in Teaching*. London: Le Play House Press. 1936. Pp. 222. 5s.
- F. P. KEPPEL. *Philanthropy and Learning. With other Papers*. New York: Columbia University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. 175. 9s.
- G. HORT, Ph.D. *Sense and Thought. A Study in Mysticism*. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 262. 8s. 6d.
- A. K. COOMARASWAMY and A. G. CAREY. *Patron and Artist: Pre-Renaissance and Modern*. Norton, Mass: Wheaton College Press. 1936. Pp. 69. \$1.
- I. HEDENIUS. *Sensationalism and Theology in Berkeley's Philosophy* (Inaugural Dissertation). Uppsala, Sweden: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri A.B.; Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 238. 10s.
- A. O. LOVEJOY. *The Great Chain of Being. A Study of the History of an Idea* (William James Lectures, 1933). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1936. 1p. xi + 382. \$4. 17s.
- J. J. COHEN. *Psychotherapy*. London: J. Bale, Sons & Danielsson, Ltd. 1936. Pp. v + 149. 5s.
- B. FARRINGTON. *Science in Antiquity*. London: T. Butterworth, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 257. 2s. 6d.
- II. J. PATON, D.Litt. *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience; a commentary on the first half of the "Kritik der Reinen Vernunft."* London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1936. 1p. Vol. I, 585; Vol. II, 510. 30s. the two volumes.
- LORD RAGLAN. *The Hero. A Study in Tradition, Myth and Drama*. London: Methuen & Co. 1936. Pp. xi + 311. 10s. 6d.
- The Testament of Man. An Anthology of the Spirit*. Ed. by A. Stanley. London: V. Gollancz. 1936. 1p. ix + 662. 7s. 6d.
- G. SANTAYANA. *Obiter Scripta. Lectures, Essays and Reviews*. Ed. by J. Buchler and B. Schwartz. London: Constable & Co. 1936. Pp. ix + 238. 10s.
- R. GRAY-SMITH. *God in the Philosophy of Schelling* (A Dissertation), Philadelphia, U.S.A.: University of Pennsylvania. 1933. 1p. 120.
- G. DAWES HICKS, Ph.D., Litt.D. *Thought and Real Existence* (Hobhouse Memorial Trust Lecture, 1930). London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. 30. 2s.
- M. TAUBE, Ph.D. *Causation, Freedom and Determinism. An Attempt to Solve the Causal Problem through a Study of its Origins in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy*. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 262. 10s.
- E. MEYERSON. *Essais* (Préface de L. de Broglie. Avertissement de L. Lévy-Bruhl). Paris: J. Vrin. 1936. Pp. xvi + 273. Fr. 32.

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- H. GOUBIER. *La Jeunesse d'Auguste Comte et la Formation du Positivisme. II. Saint-Simon jusqu'à la Restauration*. Paris: J. Vrin. 1936. Pp. 388. Fr. 36.
- P. ROUSSELOT. *L'Intellectualisme de Saint Thomas*. Précédée d'une notice sur l'auteur et d'une bibliographie par le Père L. de Grandmaison, S.J. Troisième édition. Bibliothèque des Archives de Philosophie. Paris: Beauchesne. 1936. Pp. lxiv + 264. Fr. 30.
- J. SOUILHÉ, R. HÖNIGSWALD, C. VON BROCKDORF, S. HOLM, J. LAIREL, F. TÖNNIES, F. THOMPSON. *La Pensée et l'Influence de Th. Hobbes*. Archives de Philosophie. Paris: Beauchesne. 1936. Vol. XII, cahier ii. Pp. 106. Fr. 24.
- M. WAHL. *Le Mouvement dans la Peinture*. Paris: F. Alcan. 1936. Pp. viii + 117. Fr. 15.
- É. FISZER. *Unité et Intelligibilité*. Paris: J. Vrin. 1936. Pp. 245.
- A. JAKUBISIAK. *La Pensée et le Libre Arbitre*. Paris: J. Vrin. 1936. Pp. 344. Fr. 35.
- A.-H. FOROUGH. *Civilisation et Synthèse*. Paris: F. Alcan. 1936. Pp. vii + 89. Fr. 10.
- J.-J. VALLORY. *Poussières de Physique. Glanes dans le Champ du Sauvage Subtil*. Tome I. Paris: Rieder. 1936. Pp. xvi + 389. Fr. 50.
- É. GILSON. *Christianisme et Philosophie*. Paris: J. Vrin. 1936. Pp. 168. Fr. 15.
- G. BÉNÉZÉ D'ÈS-L. *Valeur (Essai d'une Théorie Générale)*. Paris: J. Vrin. 1936. Pp. 64. Fr. 10.
- G. BÉNÉZÉ D'ÈS-L. *Allure du Transcendental*. Paris: J. Vrin. 1936. Pp. xxvii + 274. Fr. 40.
- VARIÉS. *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* (Dirigées par Ét. Gilson et G. Théry, O.P.). Paris: J. Vrin. 1936. Pp. 417. Fr. 40.
- J.-P. SARTRE. *L'Imagination*. Paris: F. Alcan. 1936. Pp. 162. Fr. 10.
- P. QUERCY. *Les Hallucinations*. Paris: F. Alcan. 1936. Pp. 178. Fr. 10.
- E. MINKOWSKI. *Vers une Cosmologie, Fragments Philosophiques*. Paris: F. Aubier. 1936. Pp. 263. Fr. 15.
- A. HESCHEL. *Die Prophetie*. Krakow: Nakladem Polskiej Akademji Umiejetnosci. Berlin: E. Reiss. 1936. Pp. vi + 192.
- S. VON DUNIN BORKOWSKI, S.J. *Spinoza*. Band III (Aus den Tagen Spinozas; Geschehnisse, Gestalten, Gedankenwelt. II. Teil: Das neue Lei. Münster i.W.; Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1935. Pp. 444. RM. 18.70 geheftet; 20.40 gebunden).
- K. S. LAURILA. *Aesthetische Streiffragen*. Helsingfors: Akademische Buchhandlung. 1934. Pp. 424.
- C. G. HEMPEL und P. OPPENHEIM. *Der Typusbegriff im Lichte der neuen Logik*. Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff's Uitgeversmij. N.V. 1936. Pp. vii + 130. Geheftet holl. fl. 2.25; gebunden holl. fl. 3.25.
- C. OTTAVIANO. *Critica dell'Idealismo*. Napoli: Rondinella Alfredo. 1936. Pp. 194. L. 12.

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

SPINOZANA

SIR,

I am loth to trespass once again on your valuable space, but certain statements connected with Spinoza in your July issue seem to me to call for comment:

(1) In his short popular exposition of the philosophy of Spinoza, and again in his notice of Sir Frederick Pollock's recent biography of the philosopher, Mr W. G. de Burgh makes emphatic reference to the commonly alleged contradiction between Spinoza's deterministic metaphysics and his doctrine of salvation. I confess that I do not understand how it is rationally possible to believe both that a man is capable of falling into so naive a blunder, and also that he is the great philosopher that Mr de Burgh evidently admits him to be. It is like catching Euclid in the act of assuming a simple converse without geometrical proof, or Newton substituting a plus for a minus sign in a fundamental equation. Contradictions there may be, and probably are, in the philosophy of Spinoza, but they are not of the childish kind supposed by Mr de Burgh and the scores of psittacine commentators that were before him. And now in fullness of time Signor Guzzo has even discovered the very "*poiesi*!" at which the contradiction was "unwittingly" introduced. This is criticism indeed! I hope that it will not be supposed that I am unduly impressed by mere authority, even that of Spinoza, when I say that the discovery of a blatant antinomy in the system of a thinker of his integrity and calibre should lead any acute critic to look for a profounder basis of exposition through which the seeming contradiction is resolved. Such a basis is discoverable by a more precise examination of Spinoza's determinism, which is not the mechanism that Mr de Burgh seems to suppose. This is not the place for a detailed analysis: perhaps the simplest way of indicating the source of the misunderstanding is by recalling that the determinism that conflicts with freedom is that which holds that every event is precisely determined in character and occurrence by temporally prior events, so that with sufficient knowledge of these its nature and epoch are calculable. If every event is wholly determined by events occurring before it, and so to infinity, if determination is essentially *aeterno*, there is, of course, no sense in talking of human freedom. Mr de Burgh knows well enough that such a doctrine of causation collapses before the slightest inspection: if it remains stubbornly temporal it stands self-refuted in the philosophy of Hume; if it seeks mitigation it is caught in a process that eliminates time and identifies the cause with its own effect. What he does not appear even to suspect is that *Spinoza neither advanced nor accepted any such view of causation*: this was no more than the "common order of nature" that in philosophy is subordinated to the "order of the intellect" for which real causation is not transeunt but immanent, not sematic but genetic, not serial but creative, not temporal but eternal. This is, perhaps, what critics mean when they falsely assert that for Spinoza "cause" means "reason" or "logical ground". Doubtless, real causation finds its amplest and purest expression in the eternal creative process that unites *Natura naturans* with *Natura naturata*, but although man by reason of his essential finitude is necessarily to some extent involved in time and the common order of nature, yet even for him the essential form of causation remains unchanged, and in *his own* actions he is free as an eternal self-determinant.

Man's self-determination is thus not merely the inclusion of a set of serial causes within the contours of a relative individuality (for so a self-fuelling engine would be free), but the self-legislating individual operating in accordance with its own inherent principles as a draught of *Natura*. Every intelligent action is free, and every action is intelligible: but not every action that falls within the contours of the finite

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individual is intelligent, i.e. to *him* intelligible. Doubtless it is intelligent in relation to some higher individual within which the finite being is an element: in any case it is at furthest the free action of *Natura* or some part of its free action; it becomes *the man's* free action when he understands it, that is when its genetic causes lie within his finite eternal individuality. And there is nothing in Spinozistic determinism to make this variation of contour and integration impossible; the "emendation of the intellect" is no miracle thrust upon a resisting natural order: it is the natural order, though not the "common order of nature". Nor is there in fact anything in Spinozistic determinism to make even temporal choice impossible, for no action is completely determined *a praeclito*, though it is futile to argue endlessly whether the rejected alternative was really possible or not. It was a sure ethical instinct with Spinoza to identify morals not with acts of choice but with aspiration, and to refer freedom to intellectual love and its eternity rather than to fragmentary actions and their temporality. If this variation of ethical climate is really what Mr de Burgh deplures, it was a superfluous refinement to give his predilections an air of scholarly precision by tacitly ignoring the doctrine of *Ethics*, III. xxx, and omitting the ruling phrase of *Ethics*, III. xl: "Qui . . . imaginatur", thus implying that "Hatred is increased by reciprocated hatred" represents "the mechanism", while "Hatred can be destroyed by love" represents "the miracle". If the one is "mechanism", so also is the other; if the one is "miracle", so also is the other. But in fact, as there is no "mechanism" there is no need to make freedom a miracle. That human freedom is limited, not only by man's essential finiteness as an eternal part of *Natura*, but also by his consequent partial pulverization by time, I have elsewhere not spared pains to emphasize; and if the former limitation is the sphere of religion, the latter is the sphere of moral endeavour. The moral life is no more and no less than the aspiration of the temporal individual after his full eternal finite stature. That aspiration, where it exists, is essentially free, for it is the very *nisus* of reality. It is strange criticism that makes the admission of the limitation of freedom into an assertion of its impossibility.

(2) My second comment, happily, can be much briefer: it refers to Sir Herbert Samuel's notes on *Spinoza Memorials in Holland*, in which he implies that it was wholly "friends of philosophy in Holland" who rescued the house at The Hague from destruction or oblivion. I think, Sir, that no account of the Spinoza House, however brief, can be satisfactory that makes no reference to the inspiration, labour, enthusiasm, and unsparing energy and generosity of that true lover of Spinoza, and learned editor of his works, the late Dr Carl Gebhardt of Frankfurt. It would not, I suppose, be far from the truth to speak of Gebhardt as the "onlie begetter" of the *Domus Spinozana* and the *Societas Spinozana*, and it is an act of piety to recall to the minds of some at least of your readers the personality of that most urbane of Germans, that most human of scholars, unhappily cut off by painful disease in a time of national and personal anxiety, and without the assurance of the completion and permanence of the work he had most closely at heart.

I am, Sir, yours, etc.,

H. F. HALLETT.

KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON,
August 21, 1936.

INSTITUTE NOTES

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INSTITUTE NOTES

LECTURE COURSES for the Michaelmas Term, Session 1936-37:—

'SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS,' a course of six weekly lectures by O. S. FRANKS, M.A. (of the Queen's College, Oxford), on Mondays, at 5.45 p.m., at University Hall, 14, Gordon Square, W.C.1., beginning October 19th. Fee for the course, 12s. 6d. Members free.

"OUTLINES OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY," a class by the Director of Studies, on Wednesdays, at 5.45 p.m., at University Hall, 14, Gordon Square, W.C.1., in the Michaelmas and Lent Terms, beginning Michaelmas Term, October 21st; Lent Term, January 20th. Fee for the Session, £1 1s., Terminal, 12s. 6d. Members free.

THE EVENING MEETINGS for the Michaelmas Term of the Session will be held at University College, Gower Street, W.C.1., at 8 p.m., on the following dates:—

Tuesday, October 13th: "On Being a Philosopher." Professor H. F. HALLETT.

Tuesday, November 17th: Presidential Address. The Rt. Hon. Sir Herbert Samuel, G.C.B., G.B.E., D.C.L.

Tuesday, December 15th: "Culture, Philosophy and Faith." The Rt. Hon. Lord Eustace Percy, P.C.

PHILOSOPHY

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